IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

STATE OF LOUISIANA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., in his official capacity as President of the United States of America, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-cv-1213

<u>DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION</u>



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