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`Commonwealth of Massachusetts
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`Superior Court No. 2tsecv-2007%D)
`Khalid Ali Mustafa,
`3
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`Petitioner
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`Vv.
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`Gloriann Moroney,
`As Chaitpetson of Massachusetts Parole Board,
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`Respondent.
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`Petitioner’s Corrected Motion for Judgment on the Pleaditigs' WV
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`mc:
`"lo Do
`Petitioner, Khalid Ali Mustafa, pursuant to Superior Court standing order 1-96, Rule and_ ae
`Mass.R. Civ. P. 12), hereby files this motion for judgment on the pleadings asking this Court to . ~ “ mo
`reverse the decision of Respondent, the Chairperson of Massachusetts Parole Board, and terminate. OB ae
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`his patole.’
`
`Introduction
`
`Khalid Mustafa is a 66-year-old man wholives in Boston. He has been on parole for mote coe
`than 31 years, without incident.
`In December of 2020, with the support of his parole officer, Mr.’
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`Mustafa petitioned the Massachusetts Parole Board for termination of his parole pursuant to G.L. .
`c.127, §130A. Without giving any treason, theParole Board denied his request. AR 1.’ Mr. Mustafa - oe - oe
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`
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`appealed to this Court in September of 2021. On July 6, 2022, this Court denied the respondent's -
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`‘ A ptior version of this motion, sent to the defendant on November 21, 2022, incorrectly stated in
`the body of the motion that the respondent was the Department of Correction.
`? The Administrative Record (“AR”) was filed by the Board on September 28, 2022, and
`supplemented on October 31, 2022.
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`

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`motion to dismiss, finding that Mr. Mustafa he could challenge the Chaitwoman’s decision in Court.7:
`See Doc. 6 (¢‘Memorandum and Order on PlaintifPs Motion to Dismiss’’).
`
`Standard of Review
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`Thecertiorari statute, G.L. ¢.249, §4, gives a Superior Court the power to “correct etrors in.
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`proceedings which are not according to the course of the common law” by “such... judgmentas -
`justice may requite.” G.L. c. 249 § 4. The standard ofjudicial review is context specific: it “may vaty ..
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`:
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`according to the nature of the action for which teviewis sought.” Frawley v. Police Commissioner of ; me
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`Cambridge, 473 Mass. 716, 729 (2016); City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Commission, 476” + 8
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`Mass. 591, 604-05 (2017).
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`As this Court has suggested, and as far as counsel is aware, no appellate Court (nor Superior
`Court) has reviewed an appeal from the denial of a termination petition undet G.L. ¢.127, §130A. See . oe
`Doc. 6 at n. 5. The law is therefore silent on this iissue, for now. Nonetheless, there are analogous :
`contextswhich areinstructive. Forinstance, thene
`atbitraty and capricious standardhas beenusedwhen
`evaluating a decision of the parole board: “... In reviewing the decisions of administrative bodies
`which,like the parole board, are accorded considerable deference, .
`.
`. the arbitrary and capricious ©
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`
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`standard of teview applies.” Doucette v. Parole Board, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 540-41 (2014). “A
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`decision is arbitrary or capricious such that it constitutes an abuse ofdiscretion whereitlacks any .
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`tational explanation that reasonable persons might support.” Frawley, 473 Mass. at 729. Saidanother -
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`way, “[a}rbitrary and capricious action on the part of an executive officer is willful and unreasoning
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`action without consideration and in disregard of facts and circumstances.” Long v. Comm’r of Pub.
`Safety, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 61, 65 (1988); Smith v. Wheatley, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 1128 (2021) . . tt
`(unpublished).
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`Procedural and Factual Background
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`A. Mr. Mustafa’s Record
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`On November13, 1976, when he was just 18 years, 8 months old, Mr. Mustafa took the life 7
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`ofTroy Willis. Mr. Mustafa — then “Wilbert Haywood” — was walking to a store when a group of
`people on a porch threw a bottle towards him and wentinside. He waited outside the store until the
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`person who had thrown thebottle came out with another boy. In the ensuing confrontation, Mr.
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`Mustafa stabbed 15-year-old Troy Willis. Afterward, Mr. Mustafa lowered the knife and did not
`attack Anthony Willis, who had thrownthebottle. Troy Willis died later in the hospital of a single -
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`stab wound. Mr. Mustafa’sfirst trial ended in a mistrial. At his secondtrial, he was found guilty of -
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`stabbing Mr. Willis once in the stomach,leading to his death. Mr. Mustafa was not foundto have
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`acted with deliberate premeditation or extreme cruelty and atrocity. See Commonwealth v.
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`Haywood, 377 Mass. 755, 756 (1979).
`Mr. Mustafa was committed onJanuary 30, 1977. He continuesto take responsibility for the fon
`murder, as he has for many years, including at a patole hearing in front of this Board 30 yeats ago, in .
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`- 1991. Mr. Mustafa wasreleased on parole supervision on Match 13, 1992.
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`Mr. Mustafa was provisionally revoked onApril 29, 1997. But finding no evidence for
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`revocation, the Board allowed Mr. Mustafa to stay on parole. Mr. Mustafa’s record as a juvenile
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`included two othercases: larceny when he was 14 years old and use of a vehicle without authority
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`when he was 16. Both wete dismissed. Thelast violence in his record is a disciplinary report dated
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`December 26, 1979, more than 40 years ago. This is his only incarceration. See AR 11-14 (BOP). __
`B. Request for Termination.
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`|
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`Onot atound October 13, 2020, Mr. Mustafa’s Parole Officer, Salvador Bolanos,
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`recommended approval for termination of Mr. Mustafa’s parole. AR 2-5. Soon thereafter, Mr.
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`Bolanos’s supervisor, Debra Warnum,also recommended approval. Id. Soon after that, the Deputy aa a
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`tet e
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`Chief Parole Supervisor, Angelo Gomez, also recommended approval. Id. Mr. Mustafa then filed a
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`memorandum in support of termination with the respondent on January 14, 2021. AR 123-128.
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`His tequest for tetmination was denied.?> AR 1. As teason therefor, the Chairwoman wrote:
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`“Request denied. No further review by Full Board. Subject meeting requirements of parole
`supervision but does notestablish compelling reason why termination of parole supervision
`is in the public interest Per M.G.L. c. 127 § 130A.”
`C. Mr. Mustafa’s Institutional Adjustment
`Mr. Mustafa’s record in prison was excellent. He was committed to the DOC in 1977. Even
`early onin his incarceration, Mr. Mustafa received few disciplinary tickets, andultimately received only ;
`5 disciplinary reports in 15 years. AR 131. Mr. Mustafa was cleared to work “outside the walls” by
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`
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`1979. In the 1980s Mr. Mustafa learned to be a computer programmer, which hestill is. He went on
`more than 100 furloughs, was placedin the Cadre program, andtutoredfellow inmates. AR 158, 160.
`. His manyyears ofinstitutional accomplishment speak to his success in prison. See AR 170-209. In. .
`1987 he went to pre-telease and got a job at Morgan Memorial Goodwill Industries in Boston. AR
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`212. He saw the Board in 1991 and was released as soon as he waseligible, on March 13, 1992, A: |
`letter from his then-lawyer, Richi Reddy, is included at AR 290. Even in 1992 it was clear that Mr.
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`
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`Mustafa was “a decent and honest man” who would becomea leadet and a modelfor others.
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`D. False Accusations
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`.
`Two incidents must be addressed concerning Mr. Mustafa’s record. He has twice been falsely.
`accused of abuse by the same person — his first ex-wife: first in 1997 and again in 2000. InApril of |
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`1997, his ex-wife falsely accused Mr. Mustafa of violating a restraining order. Aroundthe time, Mr.
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`Mustafa’s parole officer noted that for his first 5 years on parole Mr. Mustafa had incurred no
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`infractions, and that his parole period had been “abnormally incident free” in regard to employment,
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`> Counsel was advised by counsel for the Parole Board on August 3, 2021. The decision was dated
`July 8, 2021. See AR 296.
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`counseling, and any criminal activity.” AR 4. Although Mr. Mustafa was provisionally revoked, the
`Board later found there was not sufficient evidence against him and he wasreleased onJune 18, 1997.
`In May of 2000, the same woman again took out a temporaty restraining onder against Mr.
`Mustafa. Thete were also criminal charges in Dorchester District Court. 0007-CR-3969A-B. But,
`again, she retracted herallegations. The restrainingorder was vacated in June of 2000 when she did
`not come to Court. Criminal charges arising from that incident were dismissed in 2001.*
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`|
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`In February of 1999 and again in 2000, Mr. Mustafa’s then-wife wroteletters to Board stating
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`that Mr. Mustafa was never violent. Many other witnesses submitted letter to this Board and the. -
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`Courts verifying that Mr. Mustafa was not violent towards his then-wife. If anything, this incident. ee “s
`demonstrates that a man who was wrongly accused did not get angry, but allowed the system to work: a
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`as it should, and eventually exonerate him.
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`E. Work
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`At work, Mr. Mustafa has succeeded better than most. As noted above, Mr. Mustafa had a
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`job at Goodwill Industries even while he wasstill in prison. There he thrived, eventually becoming —
`Plant Manager. His professionallife has continued-to grow. He began taking classes at South End
`Technology Centet and Roxbury Community College, a member organization of the Timothy Smith:
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`
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`Network. In 2010, the Timothy Smith Network hired him as a trainer. AR 162, 220. As recently as
`.
`2020, the Executive Director of EOPSS’s School of Reentry at Boston Pre-Release Center, Lisa. . , a oo
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`Millwood called Mr. Mustafa, “an instrumental partner and influence in our program’s design.” AR
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`“Mr. Mustafa’s first wife appears to have suffered from mental health problems. In the associated
`police report, the Officer Jason Smith writes, “[she] went on to state that she has had dreams of Mr.
`Mustafa cutting off her hair and burying the hair in a grave. [She] also stated that the dream actually
`came true and that is the reason that her and [the petitioner] are no longer together. Officers
`dispatched health and hospitals for an evaluation of[her]. Boston EMSunit A-12 responded, and
`[she] agreed to be evaluated without incident. [She] was transported to the Carney Hospital. Mr.
`Mustafa was instructed on the proper procedure of how to obtain a restraining order and of his
`rights and privileges under 209A from Officer Smith.” AR 262-63.
`
`_
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`162-63. She continues, “I can honestly say that Tam not sure the team creating the school would have
`had the success they had without Khalid’s wherewithal and drive to see the school succeed.” Id.
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`|
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`Mr. Mustafa also excelled at Workforce Development for the Urban League of Eastern MA.
`WilliamWatkins, the Director ofWorkforce, wtites that “[Mr. Mustafa] has become oneofthe leaders -
`in computer technology that is well respected by industry leaders alike. His expertise in this field has
`been 2 true benefit to this community before and during the pandemic. He has been a shining example
`ofa petsonthatpays it forward to small business owners, enttepreneuts, nonprofits and youth.” AR
`156. The Former President and CEO ofthe organization, Darnell Williams, writes: “[Khalid] became
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`a trusted and valued member of my executive leadership team by occupying the roles as the Manager
`of Technology, Manager of Facilities and the Manager of Small Business Developmentwithin the
`organization.” AR 158.
`|
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`F. Adjustment to Life Outside of Prison
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`Mr. Mustafa has been subjected to 240 dtug tests. They have all been negative. AR 5. His
`social adjustmenthas been excellent, as demonstrated by his support among the Islamic community.
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`Mr. Mustafa is a parishioner of the Mosque of the Qur'an on Intervale Street in Dorchester. Mr.
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`Mustafa’s friend of10 yeats, Yusufi Vali, works fot the City ofBoston at the Mayor’s Office for
`Immigrant Advancement. He writes, “I have never seen Khalid do anything untowards [to] a
`person,lose his temperor act in any arrogant manner, He has always appeared to me to be a
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`gentleman, wise human being who has reformed and changed himself from his younger days. I
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`could never imagine this man - now in his sixties - to ever be a threat to anyone.” AR 151-52.
`Anotherfriend is Emam Talib Mahdee, who spent43 years at the Department of Corrections.
`Emam Mahdeewrites, “I have known Khalid for close to 40 years and know him to be a thoughtful,
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`unselfish, consistent individual, who simply wants to serve G-D and humanity.” AR 154.
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`Anotherfriend, Abu Hanif Abdal-Khallaq,the retired Superintendent of the Boston
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`Prerelease Center, speaks to his adjustmentin the wider community. Superintendent Abdal-Khallaq
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`writes, similarly, “From former supetvisors, current landlord, his colleaguesin the television media,
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`former inmates/parolees, and others speak{] highly about Khalid in terms of his character and
`integrity, all consistent to my findings over theyears. I believe Khalid has consistently demonstrated / .
`his commitment to growth, service, and accountability in every phase ofhis rehabilitation.” AR 160.°-
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`Ms. Millwood, who works for EOPSS,adds, “I can.stand before you now and say without
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`resetvation that Khalid Mustafa is an individual who has spentthe last 28 years of his life striving to
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`make positive change not only for himself and his family, but for countless families in his
`community.” AR 162-63.
`Mtr. Mustafa also has the support of an important community leader in State Representative,
`Liz Miranda, who has met Mr. Mustafa. She writes, “Mr. Mustafa has been a productive member of
`our communityfor almost 30 years. Duting this time on parole, he has worked, he has taught,he has.
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`contributed. ... As a community leader, I believe thatit is in the public interest — our community’s
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`best interest -that someonelike Mr. Mustafa is allowed tolive his life withoutthe strictures of
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`parole.” AR 144.
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`Argument
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`I. The Respondent’s denial was an unlawful abuse of discretion.
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`The Chairwoman’s denial was unlawful for at least four reasons, all ofwhich, alone provide a .
`basis for reversal: First, the denial “lacks any rational explanation that reasonable petsons might
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`support.” Frawley, 473 Mass. at 729. Second, by her own admission, the Chairwoman did not allow
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`an investigation or review of the case by the Board to even occur. Third, she used a standard that
`does not appear to be taken from the law. And fourth, she abused her discretion by not granting
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`termination in a case whereit is warranted.
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`First, the Chairwomangave no reason for her decision. She wrote only that Mr. Mustafa _
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`“does notestablish compelling reason why termination ofparole supervision is in the public interest .
`per M.G.L. c. 127 § 130A.” This is not what the SJC would call a “rational explanation.” Frawley,
`supra. It is not manifestly made with “consideration ... of facts and circumstance.” Hercules .
`|
`Chem. Co. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 76 Mass. App.Ct. 639, 643 (2010). It is just a conclusory
`statement. Thefailure by an agency to demonstrate a basis for a decision is unlawful.
`|
`Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Inst. at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455(1985) (due process
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`requires that there be “some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal
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`could be deduced in order to revoke good timecredits”); Doe v. Mass. Parole Bd., 82 Mass. App.
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`Ct. 851, 860 (2021); Wheatley, 99 Mass. App. Ct: 1128 (“Here, the DOC's failure to provide Smith
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`with any reasoned explanationfor denying hisgrievance was arbitrary and capricious.”) (emphasis
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`added)(unpublished); Mahdi v. DOC, No. NOCV-2019-1064 (Norfolk Superior Court, Match 31,
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`2020) (Connors, J.) (reversing the DOC Commissioner where “[t]he Commissioner’s conclusion
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`includesas a third factor in her decision, in addition to the severity of the crime and ‘the cutrent
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`—
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`state of health,’ ‘other evidence,’ presumably related to risk posed to public safety. She does not,
`however, setforth specifically what exactly that is.”).'To this day, the Board has given no actual reason for
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`its denial of Mr. Mustafa’s termination.
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`
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`Second, thelaw contemplates a termination petition to be reviewed byshefull board. See
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`GL. 127, § 130A (“Theparale board {not theChait, acting alone] may, by a majority vote ofall of the |".
`membets, issue to a parolee underits supervision a certificate oftermination ofsentence...”). Here,
`there was no such consideration of Mr. Mustafa’scase. The Chairwomanherself admitted that there 7
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`was “/njo further review by Full Board.” AR 1 (emphasis added). She has also argued,
`notwithstanding her own policy, that “there is no investigation by the agency.” Doc. 6 at 2. To the
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`extent the Chairwoman hasa stated or unstated policy of removing certain petitions from
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`consideration, such a policy contradicts the statute.
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`Third, it is not clear where the Chairwoman’s “compelling reason” standard comes from.
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`AR 1. Itis not in the statute. See §130A (referring only to the termination being “in the public
`interest”). There are no applicable regulations, and it is not in the Board’s own policies, AR 293,
`which appear to track the language ofthe statute while providing factors for determining whether
`termination is in the public interest. An agency’s use of the wrong standard upon review is unlawful.
`See Adreyv. Dep’t ofCort., Nos. 144809, 19-3786, 2020 Mass. Super. LEXIS 86, at *14 (June 19,
`2020) (“The Superintendent, and then the Commissioner, ... applied the wrong legal standard.”’)
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`(Krupp.J.).
`
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`Fourth, Mr. Mustafa hasplainly presented a case that heis eligible. See AR 293 at 552.02.
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`As the Deputy Chief of Parole writes:
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`(1) he has completed more than one year of supervision, (2) he is on reduced
`supervision (per LSCMI 9/14/20), (3) his last graduated sanction was in 1/8/15 (for .
`failure to pay supervision fees), (4) there is no indication of substance abuse (Spirit
`has recorded 240 drugtests all negative results. In terms of completeness, the PO
`has completed the required CJIS checks (Including FBI I1/QR, WMS and QWA
`warrants checks), the PO has checked with the local PD on 11/10/20 and a printed
`package has been submitted to DCPS.
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`He has also presented a case that his terminationis in the public interest under the Board’s
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`ownpolicies. 9552.03 (“Standard”). AR 293. Evety piece of evidence in the record suggests that
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`Mr. Mustafais the ideal candidate for parole termination:
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`1. Mr. Mustafa has norecenthistory of violence. His last violent act, for which he has
`repeatedly taken responsibility and apologized, took place nearly 40 years ago. Exh. 1-A at 2.
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`2. Mr. Mustafa hasvirtually no disciplinary record during his 15 years of incatceration.
`Duringhis time in prison, he had only 5 disciplinary reports. Id. He has not had any
`sanction whatsoever from the parole board since 2015 for failure to pay supervision fees.
`Exh. 1-A at 4.
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`3. He has no subsequentcriminal record. See Exh. 1-B.
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`4. He has no substanceuse disorders. Mr. Mustafa has taken 240 drug tests. All have come
`back negative. Exh. 1-A at 4.
`7
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`5. Hehas support. Mr. Mustafa has the support of his own parole officer, his supervisor, and
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`the Deputy Chief of Parole, all of whom recommendedhis parole termination be approved.
`Exh. 1-A. He also has the support of community leaders such as Representative Liz
`Miranda, Exh. 1-D, Abu Hanif Abdal-Khallaq,the retired Superintendent of the Boston
`Prerelease Center, Exh. 1-K, and Emam Talib Mahdee, Exh. 1-H. In the wordsofhis
`parole officer: “He has much support ftom manyin the community, mostly garnered
`through his work. He has a beautifully maintained apartment, and presents quite well. He is
`and has always been extremely well disciplined and focused. He appeats to learn quickly
`ftom his mistakes. ... To take a line from his P.O. during the PVR submitted on 4/17/97,
`his personallife in this case, “has been abnormally incidentfree.”” Exh. 1-A at 3.
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`6. Heis gainfully employed. In 2010, the Timothy Smith Network hired him as a trainer. He
`has maintained a job as a trainer evet since. Exh. L.
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`7. Heis reliable. He has traveled without incident. As noted by the Board, “He has received
`numeroustravel permits [while on parole], and has travelled mostly, and curiously,alone,
`withoutincident.” He has “vevermissed a counseling appointment.” Fixh. 1-A at 4 (emphasis
`added)
`Mr. Mustafa presents no tisk; theteis no value to anyone in having him supervised. At the
`vety least, the public will benefit from no longer paying for his needless supervision.
`Mr. Mustafa’s case presents the question: ifnot him, then who?
`Remedies Available Under G.L. ¢.249, §4
`This Court has the powerto terminate parole. Thecertiotari statute gives thisCourt the
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`powerto “correct errots in proceedings which are not according to the course of the common law”
`by “such ... judgmentas justice may requite.” Id. This includes “possible reversal.” Giragosianv.
`Chief ofPolice ofArlington, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 260 (2010).
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`Massachusetts Superior Courts have provided such relief under G.L.c.249, §4. In the
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`medical parole contextat least five Superior Court judges that have either granted medical parole or
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`ordered the DOC to grant medical parole, expressly ot impliedly finding that the trial Court has such’ ~”
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`a power. See, e.g., Bys v. Mici, 2184-CV-0625 (March 29, 2022)(Wilson, J.); Lazarre v. Mici, No.
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`* Counsel is aware, as is this Court, that the Boardis in the process ofpromulgating new regulations |
`concerning G.L. c.127, §130A. See Doc. 6 p. 1 at n. 2 (Thefact that there are no regulations
`governing termination “should change soon.”). As this Court has already recognized, such
`regulations, should they ever be promulgated,will not be relevantto this case, as they were not in
`effect at the time of this determination.
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`2184-CV-02333 (January 21, 2022) (Judge Connolly vacating DOC’s decision and allowing medical
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` " parole); Stote v. DOC, 2184-CV-1966 (December 13, 2021); Emma v. Mici, 2184-CV-01061
`(Suffolk Superior Court, May 26, 2021)(Squires-Lee, J.); Adrey v.Dep'tofCorr., 1984-CV-03786,
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`2020 Mass. Super. LEXIS 86,at *16 June 19, 2020) (“Plaintiff is granted medical parole.”’)(Krupp,
`J.); Mahdi, supra, (Norfolk Superior Court, Match 31, 2020)(Connors,J.). The Department of
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`Corrections does not appear to have appealed any of these decisions.
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`Additionally, in Blake v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2012-1372, 2014 Mass. Super. LEXIS
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`208, at *15 (Jan. 30, 2014), the court vacated a disciplinary decision and dismissed the charges. In
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`recognizing that the Court was granting more relief than was generally given’ in DOCcases,the
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`Court wrote:
`
`This is the remedy sought by Plaintiff. ... DOC instead suggests that
`the matter be remanded for another hearing, which is what the
`Supreme Judicial Court ordered in Lamoureux v. Superintendent,
`Massachusetts Correctional Institution, 390 Mass. 409, 418 (1983)...
`There, however, the guilty finding at the first hearing was invalidated
`because DOC employed procedures that the Court later found to be
`constitutionally infirm, and so it was only fair to allow DOCto correct
`its procedures and thenretry the offense. Here, by contrast, the defect
`was not procedural but substantive, and DOC has already had its
`opportunity to present substantial evidence of guilt, but failed to do
`SO...
`
`Id at *15 n.6 (Wilson,J.) (emphasis added). And in LeMayv. Dubois, 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 289 (Mass.
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`Super. Ct. 1998), the Court (Garsh,J.), upon reviewinga disciplinary proceeding ordered “that[the]
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`Disciplinary Report ... be vacated, that the fifty days of statutory good conduct credits forfeited as a
`result of [the] Disciplinary Report ... be restored, and that the defendants be enjoined from keeping
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`LeMayfrom his classification to MCIShirley for any reasonrelating to Disciplinaty Report 95-0886
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`and from keeping any recordin anyfile ofsaid disciplinary report or any other related information.” *
`
`11
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`Id. at *49.° See also Wheatley, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 1128 (directing the DOC to give Mr. Smith a
`reasonable explanation as to why they took away his Magic the Gathering Playing Cards and
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`retaining jurisdiction should it not have a good reason).
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`Even if remand were an appropriate remedy in some circumstances, it is not the on/y
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`remedyavailable to this Court. Even beyond the medical parole context, other Courts, including
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`our SupremeJudicial Court, have granted substantive relief in other G.L. c.249 §4 contexts, where it
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`
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`is clear from the record that there is an appropriate substantive decision. See, e.g., Clay v. Mass.
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`Parole Bd., 475 Mass. 133, 142 (2016) (“...[Clay] should therefore be gtanted parole. The parole |
`board’s decision is reversed, and we remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion”);
`Frawley, 473 Mass. at 733 (“We vacate the declaratory judgment and remandthe case to the
`Superior Court for entry of a judgment directing the commissionerto issue a replacement1D card to
`
`—
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`Frawley.”); Firearms Records Bureau v. Simkin, 466 Mass. 168, 183 (2013) (“The case is remanded __-
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`to the Superior Court for entry of a judgmentreinstating Simkin’s license.”); Gloucester v. Civil
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` Serv. Com., 408 Mass. 292, 301 (1990)(Reversing Commission’s decision where “[w]e conclude from
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`out review of the administrative record that the commission's decision requiring thecity to reinstate
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`D’Antonio constituted a substantial error of law affecting material rights of the patties, and that just
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`_
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`cause for D’Antonio’s separation from employment has been established.”); Stevens v. Sherborn Bd,
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`
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`of Health, 25 LCR 506, 511 (Mass. Land Ct. 2017)(remandingwith instructions ordering the Board
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`to issue the permit requestedby the plaintiff). Given these cases, this Court has the power to
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`“reverse” and enter a judgmentthat effectively terminates parole.
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`° The DOCiscorrect that the relief offered in G.L. c.249, §4 disciplinary cases arising from the
`DOCis — generally speaking — a remand for a new hearing consistent with the judgmentofthe
`court. See Lamoreux, supra. But those are cases where procedural errorsare alleged.
`
`12
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`

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`Conclusion
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`For the foregoing reasons,the petitioner requests that this Court enter judgmentin favor of
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`the petitioner and grantthe petitioner terminationofparole.
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`Respectfully submitted,
`
`Khalid Ali Mustafa
`
`Dated: December 7, 2022
`
`13
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`

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