IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
` FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`__________________________________________
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
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` Plaintiff, )
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`v. )
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`STATE OF MICHIGAN; GRETCHEN ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-496
`WHITMER, in her official capacity as )
`Governor of Michigan; and DANA NESSEL, in her )
`official capacity as Michigan Attorney General, )
` )
`Defendants. )
`__________________________________________)
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`COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
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`Plaintiff United States of America bring this civil action against Defendants and alleges
`as follows:
`INTRODUCTION
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`1. The United States is facing an energy crisis. Overly restrictive policies and
`regulation have caused inadequate development of America’s abundant energy resources. Yet
`“[a]n affordable and reliable domestic energy supply is essential to the national and economic
`security of the United States, as well as our foreign policy.” Executive Order 14260, Protecting
`American Energy From State Overreach § 1.
`2. As a result, on January 20, 2025, President Trump declared an energy emergency,
`concluding that the United States’ “insufficient energy production, transportation, refining, and
`generation constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to our Nation’s economy, national
`security, and foreign policy.” Executive Order 14156 § 1, Declaring a National Energy
`Emergency.
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`3. As a result of state restrictions and burdens on energy production, the American
`people are paying more for energy, and the United States is less able to defend itself from hostile
`foreign actors. Id.
`4. Michigan intends to sue fossil fuel companies to seek damages for alleged climate
`change harms. See Scott McClallen, Michigan To Wage War on Oil and Gas Companies,
`Michigan Capitol Confidential (Oct. 14, 2024),
`https://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/news/michigan-to-wage-war-on-oil-and-gas-
`companies. At a time when States should be contributing to a national effort to secure reliable
`sources of domestic energy, Michigan is choosing to stand in the way. This Nation’s Constitution
`and laws do not tolerate this interference.
`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`5. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345.
`6. This Court has authority to provide the relief requested under the U.S.
`Constitution, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 2201, and 2202, and its inherent legal and equitable powers.
`7. The United States has standing to vindicate its sovereign, proprietary, and parens
`patriae interests. E.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). The United States’
`sovereign interests include ensuring that States do not interfere with federal law, including the
`Clean Air Act, or with the federal government’s exclusive authority over interstate and foreign
`commerce, greenhouse gas regulation, and national energy policy. The United States’ proprietary
`interests include its economic interests in revenue from fossil fuel leasing on federal lands, which
`generated over $13.8 billion in 2024,1 and its costs for purchasing fossil fuels, which will
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`1 The Department of the Interior manages land owned by the United States. The Department
`issues leases to produce fossil fuels from federal lands and for production in areas of the Outer
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`increase if Michigan and other states seek damages from fossil fuel companies. See City of New
`York v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81, 103 (2d Cir. 2021) (observing that holding fossil fuel
`producers “accountable for purely foreign activity (especially the Foreign Producers) would
`require them to internalize the costs of climate change and would presumably affect the price and
`production of fossil fuels abroad.”). Additionally, the United States has parens patriae standing to
`protect the economic well-being of its citizens and the national energy market from Michigan’s
`attempts to impose extraterritorial and excessive burdens on fossil fuel companies, which will
`raise energy costs for consumers nationwide and disrupt the uniform regulation of fossil fuel
`production. These harms affect a substantial segment of the population, and individual litigants,
`such as fossil fuel businesses, cannot fully address the nationwide economic and constitutional
`injuries caused by Michigan’s overreach.
`8. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they reside in, or
`conduct a substantial portion of their official business in, Michigan. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1).
`9. Venue is proper in the Western District of Michigan pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
`§ 1391, because at least one Defendant resides in the District and because a substantial part of
`the acts giving rise to this suit occurred within the District.
`PARTIES
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`10. Plaintiff is the United States of America, suing on its own behalf, on behalf of its
`citizens, and on behalf of its executive departments and other subdivisions.
`11. Defendant State of Michigan is a State of the United States.
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`Continental Shelf. Each year, the Department collects substantial revenue from those onshore
`and offshore leases. In 2024, the Department collected revenue of more than $490 million for
`coal, $950 million for gas, and $12.4 billion for oil. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
`NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE DATA, https://revenuedata.doi.gov/ (last visited Apr. 30,
`2025).
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`12. Defendant Gretchen Whitmer is the Governor of the State of Michigan. She is
`sued in her official capacity.
`13. Defendant Dana Nessel is the Attorney General of the State of Michigan. She is
`sued in her official capacity.
`ALLEGATIONS AND APPLICABLE LAW
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`Michigan’s Climate Change Claims
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`14. Michigan has announced its intent to file litigation seeking to hold fossil fuel
`companies liable for purported contributions to greenhouse gas emissions. See Scott McClallen,
`Michigan To Wage War on Oil and Gas Companies, Michigan Capitol Confidential (Oct. 14,
`2024), https://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/news/michigan-to-wage-war-on-oil-and-
`gas-companies. The specific theories on which Michigan would sue are known only to Michigan,
`but the goal of the lawsuit is clear—to extract large sums of money from fossil fuel companies
`for purportedly causing climate change impacts to Michigan. See id.
`The Clean Air Act Comprehensively Regulates Nationwide Air Pollution
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`15. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., creates a comprehensive program for
`regulating air pollution in the United States and “displaces” the ability of States to regulate
`greenhouse gas emissions beyond their borders. City of New York, 993 F.3d at 96. The Act
`improves the Nation’s air quality by delegating authority to EPA to prescribe national standards
`for air pollutants, which States then implement. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
`16. In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the Supreme Court concluded that
`greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide and methane, are within the Clean Air Act’s
`unambiguous definition of “air pollutant,” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g). Id. at 528-529. Thus, the Clean
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`Air Act delegates to EPA authority to set nationwide standards for greenhouse gases. See Am.
`Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut (AEP), 564 U.S. 410, 424-429 (2011).
`17. For in-state stationary sources, the Clean Air Act generally preserves the ability of
`States to adopt and enforce air pollution control requirements and limitations on in-state sources,
`so long as those are at least as stringent as the corresponding federal requirements. See 42 U.S.C.
`§ 7416. For out-of-state sources, however, the “Act gives states a much more limited role,” even
`if the pollution from those sources causes harm within their borders. City of New York, 993 F.3d
`at 88. Affected States can: (1) comment on proposed EPA rules and certain permits and plans,
`see id. § 7607(d)(5), § 7475(a)(2), § 7410(a)(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 51.102(a); (2) seek judicial
`review if their concerns are not addressed, see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b); and (3) petition EPA in
`certain instances, see id. § 7410(k)(5).
`The United States’ Foreign Policy on
`Greenhouse Gas Regulation and Energy Development
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`18. Greenhouse gas emissions “present[] a uniquely international problem of national
`concern.” City of New York, 993 F.3d at 85. Regulating these emissions “implicates” not only
`“the conflicting rights of states” but also “our relations with foreign nations.” Id. at 92.
`19. Consistent with the Constitution’s allocation of supremacy in the field of foreign
`policy to the federal government, see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941), the federal
`government has demonstrated an active and continuous interest in reconciling protection of the
`environment, promotion of economic growth, and maintenance of national security when
`regulating greenhouse gas emissions and fossil fuels, see City of New York, 993 F.3d at 93
`(recognizing responsibility of federal government in striking the right “balance” in promoting
`these goals). The federal government has been actively exercising its authority here and has been
`continually evaluating national interests as is its responsibility under the Constitution. It has “in
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`fact . . . addressed” these interwoven issues on many occasions. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi,
`539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003).
`20. In 1987, Congress enacted the Global Climate Protection Act. See Pub. L. No.
`100-204, Title XI, §§ 1101–1106, 101 Stat. 1331, 1407–09 (1987), reprinted as note to 15 U.S.C.
`§ 2901. Among its other goals, the Protection Act provided that the United States should “work
`toward multilateral agreements” on the issue of greenhouse gas emissions. Id. § 1103(a)(4), 101
`Stat. at 1408. It assigned to the President and EPA the responsibility for devising a “coordinated
`national policy on global climate change.” Id. § 1103(b), 101 Stat. at 1408. And the Protection
`Act assigned to the President and the Secretary of State the responsibility for coordination of
`climate change policy “in the international arena.” Id. § 1103(c), 101 Stat. at 1409.
`21. In 1992, President George H. W. Bush signed, and the Senate unanimously
`approved, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
`Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994), which has as its
`“ultimate objective . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
`level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Id.,
`Art. 2.
`22. Under the Framework Convention, “[a]ll Parties,” including the United States,
`“shall . . . . (b) [f]ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where
`appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing
`anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled
`by the Montreal Protocol, and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change [and]
`(c) [p]romote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of
`technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of
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`greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in all relevant sectors . . . .” Id., Art.
`4.1(b), (c).
`23. The Framework Convention does not set binding limits on greenhouse gas
`emissions for individual countries. It contains no enforcement mechanism. Instead, it includes
`general obligations addressing climate change and creates a framework for cooperation by its
`parties. Among other things, it contemplates the possibility of its parties negotiating “protocols”
`or other specific international agreements in pursuit of its objective.
`24. Since approving the Framework Convention, the United States has engaged in
`international efforts regarding climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, balancing foreign
`policy considerations and domestic energy needs. In particular, the United States is also a party
`to the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol. See Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on
`Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Oct. 15, 2016, S. Treaty Doc. No. 117-1,
`C.N.730.2017. The Amendment commits the United States and other signatory countries to
`phase down the production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons, a greenhouse gas. The
`Senate ratified the Kigali Amendment in 2022, but only after Congress enacted the American
`Innovation and Manufacturing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7675 in 2020, giving EPA authority under the
`Clean Air Act to reduce production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbons.
`25. By contrast, the United States is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, which
`provided for greenhouse gas emission reduction targets on UNFCCC Annex I parties, including
`the United States. Though the United States signed the protocol, President Clinton never
`submitted it to the Senate for ratification. Instead, the Senate passed a unanimous resolution
`expressing disapproval of any protocol or other agreement that provides for disparate treatment
`of economically developing countries. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
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`26. The United States is similarly not a party to the December 12, 2015 Paris Climate
`Accord (the Paris Agreement). Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention
`on Climate Change, Dec. 13, 2015, in Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on the Twenty-First
`Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, annex (2016). In September 2016, President
`Obama signed the Paris Agreement but did not submit it to the Senate for ratification. On March
`28, 2017, President Trump described how the United States would seek to reconcile the Nation’s
`environmental, economic, and strategic concerns. See Exec. Order 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093
`(Mar. 28, 2017). On November 4, 2019, the United States deposited a notification of withdrawal
`from the Paris Agreement. Although on February 19, 2021, President Biden announced that he
`rejoined this expensive and destructive protocol, on February 13, 2025, President Trump
`withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement. See Executive Order 14162, Putting
`America First in International Agreements § 3(a). The President explained that “[i]t is the policy
`of my Administration to put the interests of the United States and the American people first in
`the development and negotiation of any international agreements with the potential to damage or
`stifle the American economy” and that such agreements “must not unduly or unfairly burden the
`United States.” Id. § 2. In other words, the President would put the interests of the American
`people first in negotiating the terms of any future treaty to implement the Framework Convention
`27. More recently, on April 2, 2025, President Trump invoked his authority under the
`International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 to strengthen our Nation’s international
`economic position by imposing reciprocal tariffs on U.S. trading partners. See Executive Order
`14257, Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute
`to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits. The Executive Order
`specifically exempts “energy and energy products” from the tariffs. Id. § 3(b); see also Annex II.
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`CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
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`COUNT I
`Clean Air Act Preemption
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`28. The United States incorporates by reference all allegations stated above.
`29. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]his
`Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . .
`shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
`the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
`30. A state law is preempted under the Supremacy Clause when it intrudes into a field
`exclusively occupied by federal law (field preemption) or when it conflicts with federal law by
`standing as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s objectives (conflict preemption).
`See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1981) (field preemption); Hillsborough
`County v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (conflict preemption).
`31. Michigan’s state law claims are preempted by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
`§§ 7401 et seq., because they impermissibly regulate out-of-state greenhouse gas emissions and
`obstruct the Clean Air Act’s comprehensive federal-state framework and EPA’s regulatory
`discretion, see, e.g., Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987) (“The [Clean Water]
`Act pre-empts state law to the extent that the state law is applied to an out-of-state point
`source.”); Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399-400 (discussing preemption).
`32. “The Clean Air Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that anoints the EPA as
`the ‘primary regulator of [domestic] greenhouse gas emissions.” City of New York, 993 F.3d at
`99 (quoting AEP, 564 U.S. at 428).
`33. Congress delegated to EPA the authority to determine whether and how to
`regulate greenhouse gas emissions, thereby displacing federal common law claims and
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`occupying the field of interstate air pollution regulation. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528-29
`(holding that greenhouse gases are “air pollutants” under 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)); AEP, 564 U.S. at
`426 (“The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision whether and how to
`regulate carbon-dioxide emissions . . . the delegation displaces federal common law.”); City of
`Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (holding that the Federal Water Pollution
`Control Act’s comprehensive regulatory program displaced federal common law of nuisance, as
`Congress occupied the field of water pollution regulation).
`34. The Clean Air Act’s comprehensive framework, which includes specific
`provisions for regulating emissions from stationary and mobile sources (see, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
`§§ 7410, 7411, 7521), preempts state attempts to regulate out-of-state greenhouse gas emissions.
`See City of New York, 993 F.3d at 90-100. Michigan’s claims seeking to hold fossil fuel
`businesses liable for global greenhouse gas emissions usurp this federal authority. Michigan’s
`attempt to make fossil fuel companies pay for greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, most of
`which occur outside Michigan’s borders, is the type of state regulation of out-of-state interstate
`greenhouse gas emissions preempted by the Clean Air Act. See Scott McClallen, Michigan To
`Wage War on Oil and Gas Companies, Michigan Capitol Confidential (Oct. 14, 2024),
`https://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/news/michigan-to-wage-war-on-oil-and-gas-
`companies.
`35. Michigan’s state law claims conflict with the Clean Air Act’s purposes and
`objectives by undermining its carefully calibrated cooperative federalism scheme and EPA’s
`discretion in regulating greenhouse gas emissions.
`36. The Clean Air Act establishes a structured partnership between the federal
`government and States, allowing States to regulate in-state stationary sources under specific
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`conditions, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401(a)(3), 7410(a)(2)(C), 7411(d), 7416, but limiting their
`role in regulating out-of-state or global emissions, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(C),
`7410(k)(5), 7475(a)(2), 7607(b). And the Clean Air Act contains a citizen-suit savings clause. 42
`U.S.C. § 7604(e). When read together, the Clean Air Act “plainly permit[s] [S]tates to create and
`enforce their own emissions standards applicable to in-state polluters.” City of New York, 993
`F.3d at 99. This role “no doubt holds true for both state legislation and common law claims
`under state law.” Id. at 100 (citing Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685, 690-
`91 (6th Cir. 2015)). “But that authorization is narrowly circumscribed, and has been interpreted
`to permit only state lawsuits brought under ‘the law of the [pollution’s] source [s]tate.’” Id.
`(citations omitted).
`37. Michigan’s anticipated lawsuit “does not seek to take advantage of this slim
`reservoir of state common law.” City of New York, 993 F.3d at 99. Rather, the State’s suit
`interferes with the Clean Air Act’s balance by effectively regulating out-of-state emissions. This
`extraterritorial regulation creates a patchwork of state-level penalties that undermines state
`authority over pollution sources within state borders and frustrates the Clean Air Act’s goal of
`efficiency and predictability in the permit system. See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 496; see also AEP,
`564 U.S. at 426 (holding that the Clean Air Act’s delegation to the EPA to regulate greenhouse
`gas emissions displaces federal common law, reflecting federal primacy). Such state
`encroachment on federal authority is preempted, as it obstructs the Clean Air Act’s integrated
`approach to air pollution control. See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497; see also City of New York, 993
`F.3d at 90-95.
`38. Moreover, Michigan’s anticipated lawsuit obstructs EPA’s discretion to balance
`environmental, economic, and energy considerations in regulating greenhouse gases. The Clean
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`Air Act grants EPA broad authority to promulgate regulations based on its expert judgment,
`including whether to impose emissions standards for stationary sources under 42 U.S.C. § 7411
`and for mobile sources under 42 U.S.C. § 7521. By imposing retroactive liability for lawful
`conduct, Michigan would second-guess EPA’s regulatory choices and imposes penalties that
`Congress did not authorize.
`39. Michigan’s state law claims would further undermine federal objectives by
`increasing energy costs and disrupting the national energy market, contrary to the Clean Air
`Act’s integration with national energy policy. As noted in Executive Order 14156 (¶ 2),
`insufficient energy production due to restrictive state policies threatens national security and
`economic prosperity. By targeting major fossil fuel businesses, many of which operate on federal
`lands or supply federal agencies, Michigan’s anticipated lawsuit would raise costs for federal
`operations and consumers nationwide, obstructing the Clean Air Act’s goal of balancing
`environmental protection with economic growth. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (CAA’s purpose
`includes protecting air quality “to promote the public health and welfare and the productive
`capacity of its population”).
`40. If Michigan is permitted to pursue these sorts of state law claims, other States
`could pursue similar claims, leading to a chaotic “patchwork” of regulations that undermine the
`national interest in readily available and affordable energy and the government’s ability to
`effectively administer coherent national environmental policy and regulation of global pollution.
`City of New York, 993 F.3d at 86. Such fragmentation would frustrate Congress’s intent for a
`unified federal approach to global air pollution. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 (state law preempted
`when it obstructs federal objectives).
`41. Thus, Michigan’s state law claims are preempted by the Clean Air Act.
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`COUNT II
`Unconstitutional Extraterritorial Regulation
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`42. The United States incorporates by reference all allegations stated above.
`43. The Constitution’s structure and provisions, including the Due Process Clause, as
`well as concepts of State sovereignty and federalism, prohibit a State from regulating
`transactions, and imposing liability for conduct, occurring outside its borders. Michigan’s state
`law claims violate the Constitution by imposing extraterritorial liability for primarily out-of-state
`extraction and refining activities and out-of-state greenhouse gas emissions. Michigan’s
`anticipated lawsuit is irreconcilable with the Constitution’s commitment of such matters to the
`federal government and the relative rights and obligations of the federal government and the
`States under the Constitution.
`44. The United States has standing to assert this claim to protect its sovereign,
`proprietary, and parens patriae interests. Michigan’s anticipated lawsuit, which would seek
`extraterritorial liability, interferes with the federal government’s authority to regulate interstate
`and foreign commerce and greenhouse gas emissions, undermining national energy policy. The
`financial burdens of Michigan’s anticipated lawsuit on fossil fuel businesses increase the United
`States’ costs for purchasing fuels and threaten revenue from federal leasing. In its parens patriae
`capacity, the United States seeks to protect citizens nationwide from higher energy costs and
`economic disruption caused by Michigan’s anticipated overreach, which individual litigants
`cannot fully address due to the nationwide impact of Michigan’s state law claims.
`45. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall any
`State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S.
`Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The fossil fuel businesses targeted by Michigan’s state law claims are
`persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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`46. The Constitution’s structure and principles of due process mandate that while
`States are sovereign within their borders, they cannot regulate conduct beyond their borders,
`such as by imposing liability for pollution from out-of-state sources. “The concept of Due
`Process constraints on a state legislature’s ability to regulate subject matters and transactions
`beyond the state’s boundaries, while perhaps infrequently litigated in those terms, is not new.”
`Gerling Glob. Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Gallagher, 267 F.3d 1228, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2001)
`(discussing Due Process limits on legislative jurisdiction). Indeed, “[t]o resolve disputes about
`the reach of one State’s power,” the Supreme Court “has long consulted … the Constitution’s
`structure and the principles of ‘sovereignty and comity’ it embraces,” along with “the Due
`Process Clause.” Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356, 376 (2023) (citation
`omitted).
`47. It is a well-established “due process principle that a state is without power to
`exercise ‘extra territorial jurisdiction,’ that is, to regulate and control activities wholly beyond its
`boundaries.” Watson v. Emps. Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 70 (1954) (citing Home Ins. Co.
`v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930)). “The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implie[s] a limitation on
`the sovereignty of all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both the original
`scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
`Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
`48. Indeed, the Due Process Clause embodies “more than a guarantee of immunity
`from inconvenient or distant litigation” but also imposes “territorial limitations on the power of
`the respective States.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, San Francisco
`Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 263 (2017) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958))
`(discussing how the sovereignty of each state imposes limitations on sovereignty of other states).
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`49. No single State can enact policies for the entire Nation, nor can a State “even
`impose its own policy choice on neighboring States.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
`559, 570-71 (1996). “[I]t follows from these principles of state sovereignty and comity that a
`State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the
`tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States.” Id. at 572. “The states are not nations, either as
`between themselves or towards foreign nations,” and “their sovereignty stops short of
`nationality.” New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90 (1883). And “interstate . . . pollution
`is a matter of federal, not state, law.” Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 488.
`50. Michigan’s state law claims violate the Constitution’s structure and principles of
`due process by seeking to impose economic sanctions on fossil fuel businesses for economic
`activities that occurred primarily in other States and around the world.
`51. Michigan’s anticipated lawsuit would improperly seek to “impose strict liability
`for the damages caused by fossil fuel emissions no matter where in the world those emissions
`were released (or who released them),” City of New York, 993 F.3d at 93, including activities in
`other States and in foreign countries with no connection to Michigan. “Such a sprawling” scope
`“is simply beyond the limits of state law.” Id. at 92.
`52. Even if an entity has some contacts with Michigan, such as in-state sales or
`operations, Michigan’s effort to collect damages for out-of-state greenhouse gas emissions does
`not arise from or relate to those contacts, violating the requirement that a State’s regulatory
`authority be limited to conduct with a substantial nexus to the State.
`53. Moreover, the global scope of Michigan’s state law claims inherently overreaches
`by seeking to regulate conduct far beyond Michigan’s territorial jurisdiction, contravening the
`Due Process Clause’s territorial limitations on state sovereignty.
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`54. Thus, Michigan’s state law claims violate the Constitution’s limits on
`extraterritorial legislation.
`COUNT III
`Violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause
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`55. The United States incorporates by reference all allegations stated above.
`56. The Constitution gives Congress “Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among
`the several States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
`57. State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce are unconstitutional, even
`in the absence of federal legislation regulating the activity in question. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v.
`Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995).
`58. Michigan’s state law claims discriminate against interstate commerce facially, in
`practical effect, and in purpose by targeting commercial activity—fossil fuel extraction and
`refining—that occurs primarily if not exclusively in States other than Michigan, including Texas,
`New Mexico, Louisiana, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and North Dakota.
`59. Because Michigan’s state law claims discriminate against interstate commerce,
`strict scrutiny applies, and its anticipated lawsuit can be pursued only if “it advances a legitimate
`local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”
`New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
`60. Upon information and belief, Michigan has no legitimate local public interest in
`discriminating against interstate commerce.
`61. Moreover, even if Michigan’s state law claims did not facially discriminate
`against interstate commerce and did not have non-discriminatory alternatives, it would still
`violate the Interstate Commerce Clause under the balancing test articulated in Pike v. Bruce
`Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Under Pike, a state law that regulates evenhandedly and
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`has only incidental effects on interstate commerce is unconstitutional if the burden imposed on
`interstate commerce is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Id.
`62. Michig