Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 37 Filed: 07/21/21 Page: 1 of 34 PageID #: 905
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
`EASTERN DIVISION
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`THE STATE OF MISSOURI, et al.,
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` Plaintiffs,
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` v.
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`JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., in his official
`capacity as President of the United States,
`et al.,
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` Defendants.
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`Case No. 4:21-cv-00287-AGF
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`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY MEMORANDUM
`IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
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` BRIAN M. BOYNTON
` Acting Assistant Attorney General
`
` SAYLER A. FLEMING
` United States Attorney
`
` ERIC WOMACK
` Assistant Branch Director
` Federal Programs Branch
`
` STEPHEN M. PEZZI, #84311 (VA)
` CODY T. KNAPP, #5715438 (NY)
` Trial Attorneys
` United States Department of Justice
` Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
` Attorneys for Defendants
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`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 37 Filed: 07/21/21 Page: 2 of 34 PageID #: 906
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................1
`
`ARGUMENT......................................................................................................................... 2
`
`I.
`
`THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION. ................................ 2
`
`A.
`
`Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. ................................................................................................ 2
`
`1.
`
`2.
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`3.
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`4.
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`Plaintiffs have not alleged a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent
`injury-in-fact.......................................................................................................................... 2
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`Any injury would be traceable to future, hypothetical agency actions, not to
`the Executive Order or the Interim Estimates. ......................................................... 5
`
`Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are not redressable by a victory in this lawsuit. ........ 7
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`Plaintiffs’ remaining, miscellaneous bases for standing are meritless. ................ 8
`
`B.
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`Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe. .......................................................................................................13
`
`II.
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`PLAINTIFFS LACK A CAUSE OF ACTION........................................................... 17
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
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`Plaintiffs do not challenge any final agency action. ...............................................................17
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`The Working Group is not an agency subject to the APA. ................................................19
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`Plaintiffs cannot invoke an equitable, non-statutory ultra vires cause of action. ...........20
`
`III.
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`PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE MERITLESS. ............................................................ 21
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
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`The equitable, non-statutory ultra vires claims in Counts I and II lack merit. ................22
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`Plaintiffs have conceded their notice-and-comment claim. ................................................25
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`Plaintiffs have not stated any claim against Defendants other than the President or
`the Working Group. ........................................................................................................................25
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`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................25
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`i
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`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 37 Filed: 07/21/21 Page: 3 of 34 PageID #: 907
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Allen v. Wright,
`468 U.S. 737 (1984) ............................................................................................................................................... 6, 7
`
`Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,
`187 U.S. 94 (1902)..............................................................................................................................................20, 21
`
`Arias v. DynCorp,
`752 F.3d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 2014).............................................................................................................................11
`
`Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
`556 U.S. 662 (2009) ..................................................................................................................................................20
`
`Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc.,
`502 U.S. 32 (1991).....................................................................................................................................................21
`
`Neb. State Legis. Bd., United Transp. Union v. Slater,
`245 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 2001) .............................................................................................................22, 23, 24, 25
`
`Bennett v. Spear,
`520 U.S. 154 (1997) ..................................................................................................................................................18
`
`Bldg. & Const. Trades Dep’t v. Allbaugh,
`295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002) .................................................................................................................................24
`
`Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc.,
`836 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016) ..................................................................................................................................10
`
`California v. Texas,
`141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021).................................................................................................................................... 6, 7, 10
`
`California v. Trump,
`No. 19-cv-960-RDM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2020 WL 1643858 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2020) ....................... 5, 6
`
`City of Kennett v. EPA,
`887 F.3d 424 (8th Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................................................... 8
`
`City of Los Angeles v. Barr,
`929 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2019)................................................................................................................................13
`
`Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
`568 U.S. 398 (2013) ........................................................................................................................................ 2, 4, 12
`
`Collins v. Yellen, No. 19-422,
`141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021)................................................................................................................................................ 6
`
`
`
`ii
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`

`

`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 37 Filed: 07/21/21 Page: 4 of 34 PageID #: 908
`
`Common Cause v. Trump,
`506 F. Supp. 3d 39 (D.D.C. 2020) .......................................................................................................................24
`
`Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko,
`534 U.S. 61 (2001).....................................................................................................................................................21
`
`Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Trump,
`453 F. Supp. 3d 11 (D.D.C. 2020) .......................................................................................................................21
`
`Dalton v. Specter,
`511 U.S. 462 (1994) ..................................................................................................................................................22
`
`Demien Const. Co. v. O’Fallon Fire Prot. Dist.,
`812 F.3d 654 (8th Cir. 2016) ..................................................................................................................................25
`
`Democracy Forward Found. v. White House Off. of Am. Innovation,
`356 F. Supp. 3d 61 (D.D.C. 2019) .......................................................................................................................20
`
`Dep’t of Commerce v. New York,
`139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019)................................................................................................................................................ 7
`
`Duffner v. City of St. Peters,
`930 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2019) ..................................................................................................................................13
`
`Eagle Tr. Fund v. USPS,
`811 F. App’x 669 (D.C. Cir. 2020).......................................................................................................................22
`
`El Paso Cty. v. Trump,
`982 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2020) ..................................................................................................................................11
`
`FEC v. Akins,
`524 U.S. 11 (1998)....................................................................................................................................................... 8
`
`Fed. Forest Res. Coal. v. Vilsack,
`100 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D.D.C. 2015) ......................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
`561 U.S. 477 (2010) ..................................................................................................................................................24
`
`Gallagher v. City of Clayton,
`699 F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2012)................................................................................................................................11
`
`Golden v. Zwickler,
`394 U.S. 103 (1969) .................................................................................................................................................... 8
`
`Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt,
`923 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .......................................................................................................................... 9, 10
`
`
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`iii
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`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 37 Filed: 07/21/21 Page: 5 of 34 PageID #: 909
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`Hias, Inc. v. Trump,
`985 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2021) ..................................................................................................................................24
`
`Huskey v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
`486 F. Supp. 3d 1339 (E.D. Mo. 2020) .......................................................................................................12, 25
`
`Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Block,
`771 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1985) ...................................................................................................................... 9, 10, 11
`
`Johnson v. Missouri,
`142 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998).................................................................................................................................. 2
`
`Key Med. Supply, Inc. v. Burwell,
`764 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2014) ....................................................................................................................21, 23, 24
`
`Lance v. Coffman,
`549 U.S. 437 (2007) ..................................................................................................................................................12
`
`Leedom v. Kyne,
`358 U.S. 184 (1958) ..................................................................................................................................................21
`
`Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
`504 U.S. 555 (1992) ....................................................................................................................................2, 7, 8, 10
`
`Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,
`497 U.S. 871 (1990) ............................................................................................................................................. 1, 13
`
`Massachusetts v. EPA,
`549 U.S. 497 (2007) ............................................................................................................................................. 9, 10
`
`Massachusetts v. Mellon,
`262 U.S. 447 (1923) .................................................................................................................................................... 9
`
`Meyer v. Bush,
`981 F.2d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1993)......................................................................................................................19, 20
`
`Michigan v. EPA,
`581 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................................................................10
`
`Missouri v. Yellen,
`No. 4:21-cv-376-HEA, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2021 WL 1889867 (E.D. Mo. May 11, 2021) .................16
`
`Mo. Roundtable for Life v. Carnahan,
`676 F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 2012) ..................................................................................................................................17
`
`Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
`463 U.S. 29 (1983)..............................................................................................................................................14, 15
`
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`iv
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`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 37 Filed: 07/21/21 Page: 6 of 34 PageID #: 910
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`Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior,
`538 U.S. 803 (2003) ..................................................................................................................................................13
`
`Newdow v. Roberts,
`603 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2010)............................................................................................................................... 8
`
`Nucor Steel-Ark. v. EPA,
`2016 WL 4055695 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 13, 2016) ..................................................................................................22
`
`Nyunt v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors,
`589 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................................................22, 23
`
`Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club,
`523 U.S. 726 (1998) ..................................................................................................................................................15
`
`Pennsylvania v. Kleppe,
`533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ...............................................................................................................................11
`
`Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Trump,
`297 F. Supp. 3d 6 (D.D.C. 2018)..................................................................................................................... 6, 23
`
`Regents of the University of California,
`140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).......................................................................................................................................13, 14
`
`Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Rsrv. v. U.S. Corps of Eng’rs,
`888 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2018) ..................................................................................................................................18
`
`Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC,
`888 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2018).............................................................................................................................18
`
`Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
`136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).................................................................................................................................... 5, 6, 10
`
`Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
`523 U.S. 83 (1998)....................................................................................................................................................... 3
`
`Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
`555 U.S. 488, 490 (2009) ...................................................................................................................................passim
`
`Thermal Sci., Inc. v. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n,
`29 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (E.D. Mo. 1998).................................................................................................................22
`
`Thermal Sci., Inc. v. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n,
`184 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1999) ...........................................................................................................................21, 22
`
`Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc.,
`137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017)..............................................................................................................................................17
`
`
`
`v
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`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 37 Filed: 07/21/21 Page: 7 of 34 PageID #: 911
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`TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
`141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021)................................................................................................................................................ 8
`
`Trudeau v. FTC,
`456 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ...............................................................................................................................23
`
`Trump v. New York,
`141 S. Ct. 530 (2020) ............................................................................................................................................. 1, 2
`
`Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found.,
`454 U.S. 151 (1981) ..................................................................................................................................................11
`
`West v. Bergland,
`611 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1979) ..................................................................................................................................24
`
`Wild Va. v. CEQ,
`--- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2021 WL 2521561 (W.D. Va. June 21, 2021) ......................................................15, 17
`
`Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
`502 U.S. 437 (1992) ..................................................................................................................................................11
`
`Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
`343 U.S. 579 (1952) ..................................................................................................................................................24
`
`Executive Orders
`
`Exec. Order No. 12291 (Feb. 17, 1981)............................................................................................................. 3, 19
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`Exec. Order No. 13771 (Jan. 30, 2017) ..................................................................................................................... 5
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`Exec. Order No. 13783 (Mar. 28, 2017) .................................................................................................................20
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`Exec. Order No. 13990 (Jan. 20, 2021) .............................................................................................................passim
`
`Statutes
`
`5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) .......................................................................................................................................................19
`
`5 U.S.C. § 704 ..................................................................................................................................................................18
`
`5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) ......................................................................................................................................................14
`
`41 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)...................................................................................................................................................12
`
`42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. ..................................................................................................................................................16
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`Regulatory Documents
`
`40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2020) ..........................................................................................................................................16
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`
`
`vi
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`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 37 Filed: 07/21/21 Page: 8 of 34 PageID #: 912
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`EPA, Phasedown of Hydrofluorocarbons, 86 Fed. Reg. 27150 (May 19, 2021) ...................................................... 3
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Dep’t of the Interior, Sec’y of the Interior Order No. 3399 (April 16, 2021),
`available at https://perma.cc/6ADG-ZWAN ..................................................................................................16
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`vii
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`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 37 Filed: 07/21/21 Page: 9 of 34 PageID #: 913
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`INTRODUCTION
`Plaintiffs’ opposition brief confirms that at least “[a]t present, this case is riddled with
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`contingencies and speculation that impede judicial review.” Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530, 535
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`(2020) (per curiam). “The President, to be sure, has made clear his desire” that agencies use the
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`Interim Estimates in rulemaking, id.—though only when doing so is already authorized by law. But
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`the problem for Plaintiffs is that, until some agency actually takes some specific action, relying on the
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`Interim Estimates, which affects regulated parties outside the Executive Branch, “[a]ny prediction
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`how the Executive Branch might eventually implement this general statement of policy is no more
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`than conjecture at this time.” Id. And in the absence of a concrete application of the Executive Order,
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`in a particular, final agency action that harms Plaintiffs, the Court cannot reach the merits.
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`“The case-by-case approach that this requires is understandably frustrating to” Plaintiffs, Lujan
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`v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 894 (1990), who would prefer to invalidate Section 5 of the
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`Executive Order and the Interim Estimates in their entirety and all at once. But that case-by-case
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`approach “is the traditional, and remains the normal, mode of operation of the courts.” Id. Article
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`III courts “intervene in the administration of the laws only when, and to the extent that, a specific
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`final agency action has an actual or immediately threatened effect.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here,
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`because that time has not yet come, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
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`If the Court were to reach the merits, Plaintiffs’ claims—which have narrowed and morphed
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`as briefing has proceeded—would fare no better. Despite opening this case with allegations that the
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`Executive Order “comes as a wolf,” Am. Compl. ¶ 1, and “tears at the fabric of liberty,” id. ¶ 5,
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`Plaintiffs’ latest brief hardly discusses the separation of powers at all. Plaintiffs all but concede their
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`notice-and-comment claim. And they reduce their remaining claims to a conclusory assertion that the
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`Executive Order and the Interim Estimates are ultra vires—citing no applicable statutory prohibition
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`and failing to account for the President’s (and OIRA’s) explicit instructions to agencies to stay within
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`any applicable statutory guardrails.
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`Whether for lack of standing or ripeness, the absence of a cause of action, or because they
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`lack merit, all of Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed.
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`1
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`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 37 Filed: 07/21/21 Page: 10 of 34 PageID #: 914
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`I.
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`ARGUMENT
`THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION.
`The two most obvious problems with Plaintiffs’ claims—standing and ripeness—“each
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`originat[e] in the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. at
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`535. Both require dismissal of the complaint in its entirety.
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`A.
`Plaintiffs lack Article III standing.
`Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to establish “the irreducible constitutional minimum
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`of standing.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Although Plaintiffs challenge Section 5
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`of Executive Order 13990 and the Interim Estimates, their alleged injuries are (1) speculative;
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`(2) caused by future hypothetical agency regulations (rather than the Executive Order or the Interim
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`Estimates); and (3) not likely to be redressed by the court order they seek.
`1.
`Plaintiffs have not alleged a concrete, particularized, and actual or
`imminent injury-in-fact.
`To support standing, “an injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.”
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`Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quotation omitted). Plaintiffs’ theory of injury
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`assumes that they will be harmed by future agency regulations issued in reliance on the Executive
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`Order and the Interim Estimates. It is thus undisputed that “a number of things must occur before
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`[they] will suffer an actual or even an imminent injury.” Johnson v. Missouri, 142 F.3d 1087, 1090 (8th
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`Cir. 1998). To mitigate that problem, Plaintiffs invoke “commonsense,” Pls.’ Opp’n 14, and suggest
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`Defendants have “exhibit[ed] a naiveté,” id. at 15, in arguing that Plaintiffs’ anticipated injuries are not
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`“certainly impending,” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. Article III demands more than such rhetoric.
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`For one, the Supreme Court has been “reluctant to endorse standing theories that require
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`guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers will exercise their judgment.” Id. at 413. That is
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`what Plaintiffs ask of this Court. Which agency might harm Plaintiffs? When? By what means?
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`Under what authority? Relying in what way (if at all) on the Interim Estimates? Plaintiffs never say,
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`because they do not (and cannot) know. Instead, Plaintiffs seem to assume that it is enough to predict
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`2
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`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 37 Filed: 07/21/21 Page: 11 of 34 PageID #: 915
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`that, at some point, some agency will inevitably issue some rule that relies in some way on the Interim
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`Estimates. See Pls.’ Opp’n 20 (asserting “the U.S. Government averages roughly 4,000 rules a year”).
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`That is not enough. “[A]llegations of future injury” must “be particular and concrete.” Steel
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`Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998). If the bar were as low as Plaintiffs suggest,
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`then the plaintiffs in Summers v. Earth Island Institute would have had standing.1 After all, there was
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`presumably little doubt in Summers that, at some point in the future, at least once, the Forest Service
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`would make use of the challenged “regulations that exempt[ed] small . . . timber-salvage projects from
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`the notice, comment, and appeal process used by the [agency] for more significant” actions. 555 U.S.
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`488, 490 (2009). Nonetheless, the Court granted certiorari to “determine whether respondents ha[d]
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`standing to challenge the regulations in the absence of a live dispute over a concrete application of
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`those regulations.” Id. Its answer was no: “the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had failed ‘to
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`allege that any particular timber sale or other project claimed to be unlawfully subject to the regulations
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`will impede a specific and concrete’ interest of the plaintiffs in the national forests.” Fed. Forest Res.
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`Coal. v. Vilsack, 100 F. Supp. 3d 21, 43 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Summers, 555 U.S. at 495) (emphasis
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`altered). The Court rejected as insufficient for standing an affidavit about one individual’s “plans to
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`visit several unnamed national forests in the future,” among other reasons “because it [did] not identify
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`any particular site” or “particular timber sale.” Summers, 555 U.S. at 495 (emphases added). Plaintiffs
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`have (at least) the same problem—“in the absence of a live dispute over a concrete application” of
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`the Interim Estimates in a particular agency action that has caused them (or will cause them) actual or
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`imminent harm, id. at 490, Plaintiffs cannot carry their burden to demonstrate an Article III injury.2
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`1 Plaintiffs’ response to the lengthy discussion of Summers (see Defs.’ Br. 16-17) addresses only
`the separate point that bare procedural harms do not provide standing. See Pls.’ Opp’n 9.
`2 Plaintiffs cite one proposed rule in which EPA “referenc[ed]” the Interim Estimates. Pls.’
`Opp’n 13 (citing 86 Fed. Reg. 27150). But EPA did not actually rely on the Interim Estimates to
`support that proposed rule, nor do Plaintiffs allege that the proposed rule has caused them any harm
`(or even that it will cause them harm, if finalized in the same form), so EPA’s proposal has no bearing
`here. In any event, as Plaintiffs acknowledge, “Congress mandated that EPA reduce hydrofluorocarbon
`emissions by 85% in 15 years,” and this proposed rule is just a first step in implementing that
`congressional command. Pls.’ Opp’n 13 (emphasis added). The proposed rule offers no suggestion
`that E.O. 13990 in any way motivated or justified the agency’s (proposed) action. See 86 Fed. Reg. at
`3
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`Plaintiffs argue that “Clapper does not apply here because instead of merely authorizing the
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`injury, . . . the Executive Order mandates the Interim Values.” Pls.’ Opp’n 14. Plaintiffs
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`misunderstand the analogy to Clapper, in which plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge surveillance laws
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`that “at most authorize[d]—but [did] not mandate or direct—the surveillance that respondents fear[ed],”
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`making their allegations “necessarily conjectural.” 568 U.S. at 412. Even if the Executive Order
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`“mandates” the Interim Estimates, that is not the source of Plaintiffs’ alleged injury. Instead, Plaintiffs
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`fear future agency regulations. But neither the Executive Order nor the Interim Estimates “mandate
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`or direct” issuance of any particular regulation. So Clapper forecloses Plaintiffs’ theory of injury.3
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`Plaintiffs try to tighten the relevant causal chain by suggesting that “an agency promulgates a
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`rule using the Interim Values because the President ordered it.” Pls.’ Opp’n 14. That description is
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`both inaccurate and incomplete: although the President, by Executive Order, mandated publication
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`of the Interim Estimates, he never “ordered” any agency to promulgate any “rule using the Interim
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`Values”—let alone any particular rule that has caused (or imminently will cause) Plaintiffs harm. Nor
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`do Plaintiffs account for the possibility that an agency will “use” the Interim Estimates, for example,
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`solely to comply with the internal Executive Branch requirements of E.O. 12866 (i.e., without relying
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`upon a cost-benefit analysis to justify the rule). See Defs.’ Br. 19-21.
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`In sum, Plaintiffs are surely correct “that federal agencies will follow an executive order from
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`the President of the United States.” Pls.’ Opp’n 3. But that is not enough to show a “certainly
`impending” future injury, Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409, from a “concrete application” of the Executive
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`27201. That is no surprise—often, “the Interim Estimates will have made no substantive difference
`to the outcome” of a rulemaking, and thus will have caused no injury. Defs.’ Br. 19.
`3 In Clapper, the Supreme Court also noted that plaintiffs could “only speculate as to whether
`the Government will seek to use § 1881a-authorized surveillance (rather than other methods),” given
`that “[t]he Government has numerous other methods of conducting surveillance, none of which [was]
`challenged [t]here.” 568 U.S. at 412-13. Much the same could be said here: Plaintiffs do not dispute
`Defendants’ explanation of why it will be rare that the Interim Estimates will be outcome
`determinative in any rulemaking, see Defs.’ Br. 19-21, given “the way that cost-benefit analysis is
`used—or, more often, not used—to justify agency rules” within the Executive Branch, id. at 21.
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`4
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`

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`Case: 4:21-cv-00287-AGF Doc. #: 37 Filed: 07/21/21 Page: 13 of 34 PageID #: 917
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`Order and the Interim Estimates, Summers, 555 U.S. at 494, in a “particular” agency action, id. at 495.
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`Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot show injury in fact.
`2.
`Any injury would be traceable to future, hypothetical agency actions,
`not to the Executive Order or the Interim Estimates.
`Even if Plaintiffs could show a certainly impending future injury, it would not be “fairly
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`traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547
`
`(2016). Instead, all of Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries will be caused, if at all, by future, hypothetical agency
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`actions—not the Executive Order or the Interim Estimates. See Defs.’ Br. 21-23.
`
`Plaintiffs’ latest brief (like the amended complaint, see id. at 23) is full of references to harms
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`that Plaintiffs assume they will suffer from future agency regulations—rather than harms that have actually
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`been caused (or will imminently be caused) by the Executive Order. For example, Plaintiffs assert
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`that “they will imminently suffer future injury to their sovereignty and their pocketbooks from future
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`agency actions using the Interim Values.” Pls.’ Opp’n 5-6 (emphasis added). Even excusing the
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`speculation (and the unjustified use of the word “imminently”), that is a claim about harm “from
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`future agency actions,” id.—not the Executive Order. Likewise, even accepting uncritically “that future
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`regulations will increase the costs on