`
`
`
`In Re T-MOBILE CUSTOMER DATA
`SECURITY BREACH LITIGATION
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
`
`MDL No. 3019
`
`Master Case No.: 4:21-MD-03019-BCW
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4:22-CV-00065-BCW
`
`Northern District of California Case No:
`3:21-CV-08995-JD
`
`
`
`
`
`ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
`
`THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
`
`JAMES ACHERMANN, individually, and on
`behalf of a class of similarly situated persons,
`
` Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`T-MOBILE USA, INC.,
`
` Defendant.
`
`
`
`PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND LAWSUIT TO THE
`SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
`
`Case 4:21-md-03019-BCW Document 98 Filed 02/07/22 Page 1 of 14
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`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... 1
`I.
`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1
`II.
`STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY............................................... 1
`III.
`LEGAL STANDARD .............................................................................................................. 2
`
`A.
`REMOVAL .................................................................................................................. 2
`
`B.
`ARTICLE III STANDING .......................................................................................... 3
`IV. DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................................... 6
`
`A.
`THERE IS NO SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE CLAIMS IN
`THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF LACKS ARTICLE III STANDING
`AS TO HIS CLAIMS................................................................................................... 6
`CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 8
`
`V.
`
`
`
`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. Lomax,
`471 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2006) ........................................................................................................... 3
`ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,
`490 U.S. 605 (1989) ........................................................................................................................... 9
`Bassett v. ABM Parking Services, Inc.,
`2018 WL 987954 (9th Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................................... 6
`Bercut v. Michaels Stores Inc.,
`No. 17-cv-01830-PJH, 2017 WL 2807515 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2017) .............................................. 7
`Burns v. Mammoth Media, Inc.,
`No. CV2004855DDPSKX, 2021 WL 3500964 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021) ........................................ 7
`Burton v. MAPCO Exp., Inc.,
`47 F.Supp.3d 1279 (N.D.Ala.2014) ................................................................................................... 5
`Edelstein v. Westlake Wellbeing Props., LLC,
`No. CV 17-06488-AB (JEMx), 2017 WL 5495153 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2017) ................................ 8
`Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,
`980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1992) ......................................................................................................... 2, 9
`Green v. eBay Inc.,
`No. CIV.A.14-1688, 2015 WL 2066531 (E.D.La. May 4, 2015) ...................................................... 4
`Grosset v. Wenaas,
`42 Cal.4th 110 (Cal. 2008) ................................................................................................................. 5
`Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop.,
`902 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2018) ........................................................................................................... 8
`I.C. v. Zynga, Inc.,
`2021 WL 3271187 (July 30, 2021) .................................................................................................... 7
`In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig.,
`No. 12-cv-8617, 2013 WL 4759588 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) ............................................................ 5
`In re Sci. Applications Int'l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig.,
`45 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014) ....................................................................................................... 5
`Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co.,
`265 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................................................. 2
`Larroque v. First Advantage LNS Screening Sols., Inc.,
`No. 15-cv-04684-JSC, 2016 WL 4577257 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) ............................................... 7
`Lee v. Hertz Corp.,
`No. 15-cv-04562-BLF, 2016 WL 7034060 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2016) ............................................... 7
`Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc.,
`No. 14-cv-4787, 2014 WL 7005097 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 10, 2014)........................................................... 5
`Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
`504 U.S. 555 (1992) ........................................................................................................................... 3
`
`
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`Moore v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
`No. 18-CV-07600-VC, 2019 WL 2172706 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2019) ......................................... 6, 8
`Pac. Mar. Ass’n v. Mead,
`246 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ............................................................................................. 2
`Peters v. St. Joseph Servs. Corp.,
`74 F.Supp.3d 847, 2015 WL 589561 (S.D.Tex.2015) ....................................................................... 5
`Polo v. Innoventions Int’l, LLC,
`833 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2016) ....................................................................................................... 2, 6
`Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,
`664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011)............................................................................................................. 5, 8
`Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC,
`No. 14c1735, 2014 WL 4627893 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 16, 2014) ............................................................... 5
`Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
`136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) ................................................................................................................... 3, 6
`Storm v. Paytime, Inc.,
`90 F.Supp.3d 359, No. 14-cv-1138, 2015 WL 1119724 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 13, 2015) ........................... 4
`Syed v. M-I, LLC,
`853 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................................................. 7
`Terrell v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,
`No. C16-1415JLR, 2017 WL 2169805 (W.D. Wash. May 16, 2017) ............................................... 7
`TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
`141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) ................................................................................................................... 3, 7
`U.S. Hotel & Resort Mgmt., Inc. v. Onity, Inc.,
`No. CIV.13-1499, 2014 WL 3748639 (D.Minn. July 30, 2014) ....................................................... 5
`Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
`372 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2004) ........................................................................................................... 2
`Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC,
`847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2017) ........................................................................................................... 3
`Wallace v. ConAgra Foods Inc.,
`747 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2014) ....................................................................................................... 5, 8
`Williams v. Nichols Demos, Inc.,
`2018 WL 3046507 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2018) ............................................................................... 6, 8
`Statutes
`28 U.S.C.
`§ 1332............................................................................................................................................. 2, 8
`28 U.S.C.
`§ 1447................................................................................................................................................. 2
`California Civil Code
`§ 1747................................................................................................................................................. 6
`California Civil Code
`§ 1798.150.......................................................................................................................................... 1
`
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`MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Plaintiff moves to remand this action to the Superior Court of San Francisco where it was
`originally filed. This Court should remand the action to state court because there is no basis for
`federal subject-matter jurisdiction. This action is brought under the California Consumer Privacy Act
`(“CCPA”) (California Civil Code § 1798.150, et seq.), a statute that allows for statutory damages in
`the absence of actual damages. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated the CCPA in derogation of
`his rights. Plaintiff’s operative complaint alleges a single cause of action under the CCPA seeking
`statutory damages and injunctive relief only. Plaintiff has not alleged a claim for actual damages or
`other “concrete” injury as required for Article III standing. This Court therefore does not have
`subject-matter jurisdiction as the claims brought by the Plaintiff under the CCPA do not satisfy
`Article III’s “case and controversy” requirement. District courts across the country have remanded
`similar cases and ruled that the proper course of action when Article III standing is absent is to
`remand and allow the action to proceed in state court which has concurrent jurisdiction. Because this
`Court does not have Article III subject-matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the
`Court remand this action to the Superior Court of San Francisco.
`STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
`II.
`On August 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Defendant in the Superior
`Court of San Francisco. See generally, Def’s. Notice of Removal of Civil Action; ECF No. 1. On
`September 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging two causes of
`action: 1) violation of the CCPA (Civ. Code § § 1798.150) and 2) violation of California’s Unfair
`Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200).
`On November 18, 2018, the San Francisco Superior Court granted Plaintiff’s request to
`dismiss the Second Cause of Action under the UCL without prejudice. On November 19, 2021,
`Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleging a single cause of action under the
`CCPA. (For the Court’s convenience, a copy of Plaintiff’s recently filed SAC is attached to the
`Declaration of Edward J. Wynne as Exhibit 1.) The SAC is the operative complaint in the Superior
`Court action.
`
`
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`Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was the target of a data breach where Plaintiff’s personally
`identifiable information was subject to unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure.
`SAC at ¶¶ 1-2, 5, 9-20. Plaintiff also alleges that, prior to filing the CCPA claim for statutory
`damages, Plaintiff provided thirty days written notice to Defendant, identifying the specific
`provisions of the CCPA that were violated. Id. at ¶ 49. Defendant did not respond to the notice.
`Specifically, Defendant did not cure the violation within the time provided under the CCPA. Ibid.
`On November 19, 2021, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal. ECF No. 1. The only basis for
`removal articulated in Defendant’s Notice is 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d) (“CAFA”), i.e., more than 100
`1
`class members, diversity of citizenship, and $5 million amount in controversy. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 2.)0F
`III. LEGAL STANDARD
`
`A.
`
`REMOVAL
`Before all else, a federal court must determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. “If
`at any time before final judgement it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,
`the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c) (emphasis added). See also Polo v. Innoventions
`Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, if this Court determines that it is
`without proper jurisdiction, then the only course of action is to remand the case to state court.
`On a motion for remand, the party who invoked the federal court’s removal jurisdiction
`always bears the burden of establishing that removal was proper. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564,
`566 (9th Cir. 1992); Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2001). See also,
`e.g., Pac. Mar. Ass’n v. Mead, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2003). Removal is generally
`disfavored, and, “[w]here doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to
`state court.” Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, courts
`
`1
`Following removal to the Northern District of California, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand.
`The parties fully-briefed the motion but no ruling issued at the time of the MDL’s conditional
`transfer order. Plaintiff then alerted the MDL to the fully briefed remand motion pending in the
`Northern District of California and asked the MDL to allow the Northern District of California the
`opportunity to rule on the remand motion. Instead, the MDL Panel ruled that jurisdiction
`questions “generally do not present an impediment to transfer.” See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co.
`of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 170 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1347–48 (J.P.M.L. 2001) (“[R]emand motions
`can be presented to and decided by the transferee judge.”). Transfer Order dated January 31, 2022,
`MDL No. 3019, Dkt. 17.
`
`
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`“strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction must be
`rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566
`(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
`ARTICLE III STANDING
`B.
`Article III of the United States Constitution “limits the [subject-matter] jurisdiction of federal
`courts to ‘Cases’ and “Controversies.’” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992).
`“Standing is an essential component of the case or controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of the
`United States Constitution.” Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. Lomax, 471 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th
`Cir. 2006). “To satisfy Article III standing, the plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2)
`that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
`redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037,
`1042 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). At the pleading
`stage, then, the plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each Article III element. “The
`injury-in-fact requirement requires a plaintiff to allege an injury that is both ‘concrete and
`particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Van Patten, 847 F.3d at
`1042 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548).
`In Spokeo, the Supreme Court addressed the issue directly:
`Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a
`plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute
`grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to
`vindicate that right. Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context
`of a statutory violation. For that reason, [a plaintiff] could not, for example, allege a
`bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-
`fact requirement of Article III. See Summers [v. Earth Island Inst.], 555 U.S. [488]
`(“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected
`by the deprivation . . . is insufficient to create Article III standing”); see also Lujan,
`supra, at 572, 112 S. Ct. 2130.
`Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
`More recently, the Court addressed Article III standing in the context of a Fair Credit
`Reporting Act case in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021). The Court emphasized
`that a concrete injury is required for standing: “No concrete harm, no standing.” Id. at 2200. The
`Court held that, under Article III, an injury in law is not an injury in fact. Id. at 2205. Significantly,
`
`
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`the majority found that even in the context of an alleged statutory violation of the law, as we have
`here, Article III standing still requires a concrete injury. Id. The majority rejected the notion that the
`risk of a future violation or harm is sufficient to constitute standing as well. Id. at 2211-12.
`Even prior to Transunion, this Circuit has found that a speculative, future injury in data-
`breach cases does not satisfy Article III’s requirement of a concrete injury. The Eighth Circuit in In
`re Supervalu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (2017) dismissed a data-breach case for lack of standing because
`the plaintiffs’ allegations that “illicit websites are selling their Card Information to counterfeiters and
`fraudsters” were “speculative” and “failed to allege any injury ‘to the plaintiffs.” Id. at 768-769.
`References in Plaintiff’s SAC to an increased risk of identity theft similarly falls short of alleging an
`2 (SAC, ¶ 32.) In
`actual injury where hackers have used the information to commit identity theft.1F
`fact, Plaintiff’s allegations even cite to the same GAO order analyzed in Supervalu that was deemed
`to be unavailing for pleading imminent, actual injury. Id. at 770-772. (SAC, ¶¶ 31, fn. 3, 32.) Using
`the same reasoning adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Supervalu – which has remarkably similar
`allegations to the case at bar – this Court should hold that Article III standing is lacking since
`Plaintiff has “not demonstrated a substantial risk of future identity theft….” Supervalu at 771.
`Moreover, courts across the country have not found Article III standing in data-breach cases
`absent concrete allegations of actual identity theft or other fraud. In other words – and particularly
`following the Court’s instructions in Ramirez, allegations of increased risk of harm alone are
`insufficient to satisfy Article III standing. See, e.g., Green v. eBay Inc., No. CIV.A.14-1688, 2015
`WL 2066531, at *5 (E.D.La. May 4, 2015) (finding no standing where plaintiff's data was accessed
`during a security breach because there were no allegations that the information had been used or any
`indication that its use was imminent); Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F.Supp.3d 359, 366, No. 14-cv-
`1138, 2015 WL 1119724, at *6 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 13, 2015) (finding no standing where plaintiffs did
`not allege that they actually suffered any form of identity theft as a result of the defendant's data
`
`2
`To the extent Defendant takes the position that Plaintiff’s use of credit monitoring services
`following the data-breach constitutes a “concrete injury, the Eighth Circuit rejected that argument in
`Supervalu. Id. at 771. In particular, the Court cited to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
`Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S., 398, 416 that “plaintiffs ‘cannot manufacture standing
`merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not
`certainly impending.’” Supervalu at 771.
`
`
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`breach); Peters v. St. Joseph Servs. Corp., 74 F.Supp.3d 847, 853-54, 2015 WL 589561, *4-*5
`(S.D.Tex.2015) (finding no standing where plaintiff did not allege actual identity theft or fraud
`despite the possibility "that fraudulent use of her personal information could go undetected for long
`periods of time"); In re Sci. Applications Int'l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F.
`Supp. 3d 14, 26 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding no standing where plaintiffs allegations of potential identity
`theft, which had not yet occurred, were "entirely dependent on the actions of an unknown third
`party"); Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., No. 14-cv-4787, 2014 WL 7005097, at *3
`(N.D.Ill. Dec. 10, 2014) (finding no standing where plaintiffs did not allege that identity theft had
`occurred but only that it "may happen in coming years"); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, No.
`14c1735, 2014 WL 4627893, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 16, 2014) (finding no standing where plaintiffs'
`alleged injury was not "concrete" because it was based on "potential future fraudulent
`charges"); Burton v. MAPCO Exp., Inc., 47 F.Supp.3d 1279, 1280-81 (N.D.Ala.2014) (finding no
`standing despite plaintiff's allegations of unauthorized charges on his debit card because plaintiff did
`not allege that he actually had to pay for the charges); U.S. Hotel & Resort Mgmt., Inc. v. Onity,
`Inc., No. CIV.13-1499, 2014 WL 3748639, at *5 (D.Minn. July 30, 2014) (recognizing that "[i]n the
``lost data' context ... a majority of the courts ... hold that plaintiffs whose confidential data has been
`exposed, or possibly exposed by theft or a breach of an inadequate computer security system, but
`who have not yet had their identity stolen or their data otherwise actually abused, lack standing to
`sue the party who failed to protect their data"); In re Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12-cv-
`8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 3, 2013) ("Merely alleging an increased risk of
`identity theft or fraud is insufficient to establish standing.").
`CAFA jurisdiction cannot be invoked (or any other type of jurisdiction) in cases in which the
`named plaintiffs lack Article III standing. See, e.g., Wallace v. ConAgra Foods Inc., 747 F.3d 1025
`(8th Cir. 2014) (remanding action to state court after CAFA removal because named plaintiffs
`lacked Article III standing); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming
`dismissal of data breach class action for lack of Article III standing).
`In contrast, California does not have a standing requirement similar to Article III. Grosset v.
`Wenaas, 42 Cal.4th 110, 1117 n.13 (Cal. 2008). “Article III of the federal Constitution imposes a
`
`
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`‘case-or-controversy’ limitation on federal jurisdiction … [t]here is no similar requirement in our
`state Constitution.” The single cause of action alleged by Plaintiff here under the CCPA entitles
`plaintiff to recover statutory damages in state court even in the absence of concrete allegations or
`proof of actual damages.
`For example, under Spokeo a plaintiff could file a putative class action in California state
`court seeking recovery under the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1747, et seq.,
`alleging that a store wrongfully asked for his or her zip code during a credit card transaction.
`Without more, this fact pattern closely parallels Justice Alito’s example in Spokeo of what wouldn’t
`suffice as a concrete injury for Article III purposes: zip code missteps. See, Bassett v. ABM Parking
`Services, Inc., 2018 WL 987954 (9th Cir. 2018) (plaintiff’s allegation of “a statutory violation and a
`potential for exposure to actual injury” does not constitute “a concrete injury sufficient to give
`plaintiff standing.”).
`
`A.
`
`IV. DISCUSSION
`THERE IS NO SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE CLAIMS IN THE
`COMPLAINT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF LACKS ARTICLE III STANDING AS TO HIS
`CLAIMS
`There is no federal jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s CCPA claim because it lacks Article III
`standing. Accordingly, Defendant cannot meet its burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction,
`and the action should be remanded. “The rule that a removed case in which the plaintiff lacks Article
`III standing must be remanded to state court under § 1447(c) applies as well to a case removed
`pursuant to CAFA as to any other type of removed case.” Polo v. Innoventions, Int’l., 833 F.3d 1193
`(9th Cir. 2016).
`Plaintiff has not alleged the “concrete injury” necessary for Article III federal jurisdiction.
`As numerous courts have found, mere allegations of an “invasion of privacy and statutory rights”
`without more is insufficient to state a concrete, particularized harm that satisfies Article III’s
`requirements. See, e.g., Moore v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 18-CV-07600-VC, 2019 WL
`2172706, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2019); Williams v. Nichols Demos, Inc., 2018 WL 3046507, at *5
`(N.D. Cal. June 20, 2018). Moore and other courts have held that a complaint’s “reference to
`invaded ‘privacy and statutory rights’ . . . [is] insufficient to describe a concrete and particularized
`
`
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`harm” and the complaint is “devoid of allegations of confusion, error, or other harm from the alleged
`violations that might give rise to standing” Moore, 2019 WL 2172706, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 13,
`2019) (citing Williams, 2018 WL 3046507 at *5).
`Here, while Plaintiff has made sufficient allegations to establish standing in the Superior
`Court, Plaintiff makes no allegations of “concrete” harm required to establish Article III standing.
`See, e.g., Bercut v. Michaels Stores Inc., No. 17-cv-01830-PJH, 2017 WL 2807515, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
`June 29, 2017) (finding no Article III standing where “no allegations of actual harm [due to
`confusion] are made in this case, and unlike in [Syed], there is no basis to infer actual harm from the
`complaint’s allegations”).
`The Court’s recent decision in Zynga is instructive where the Court found Article III standing
`lacking:
`[A]s currently pled, the complaint fails to establish a sufficiently concrete injury-in-
`fact as required for Article III standing. Specifically, plaintiffs have not sufficiently
`alleged an invasion of privacy or a risk of future harm based on the information
`allegedly stolen in the breach. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204
`(2021)
`I.C. v. Zynga, Inc., 2021 WL 3271187 (July 30, 2021); see also, Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 495
`(9th Cir. 2017) and Burns v. Mammoth Media, Inc., No. CV2004855DDPSKX, 2021 WL 3500964,
`at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021).
`Consequently, Plaintiff’s allegations cannot provide the basis for federal jurisdiction over this
`action.
`Where federal jurisdiction is lacking due to the lack of Article III standing, the proper course,
`as multiple courts have found, is to remand the case to state court. In Lee v. Hertz Corp., No. 15-cv-
`04562-BLF, 2016 WL 7034060 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2016), the district court granted a motion to
`dismiss but remanded the action to state court. Id. at *6. Similarly, in Larroque v. First Advantage
`LNS Screening Sols., Inc., No. 15-cv-04684-JSC, 2016 WL 4577257 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016), the
`district court remanded the action to state court. Id. at *7–8. See also Terrell v. Costco Wholesale
`Corp., No. C16-1415JLR, 2017 WL 2169805, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 16, 2017); Bercut v. Michaels
`Stores, Inc., No. 17-cv-01830-PJH, 2017 WL 2807515, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2017); Edelstein v.
`Westlake Wellbeing Props., LLC, No. CV 17-06488-AB (JEMx), 2017 WL 5495153, at *3 (C.D.
`
`
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`Cal. Nov. 15, 2017) (“Since the California Constitution does not contain a ‘case or controversy’
`requirement like the one in the Federal Constitution, Plaintiffs may fare better in state court.”). The
`Williams court concurred, stating, “[The p]laintiff’s only federal law claim is one over which both
`state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. . . . [¶] Here, remand of [the p]laintiff’s claims
`is not necessarily futile because the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts.” Williams,
`2018 WL 3046507 at *6 (quotation marks omitted).
`Moore v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 18-cv-07600-VC, 2019 WL 2172706 (N.D. Cal.
`May 13, 2019), addressed this issue directly:
`Incidentally, it may initially seem counterintuitive for a federal court, after having
`concluded that the plaintiff lacks standing, to send a federal lawsuit to state court for
`potential adjudication rather than to dismiss it. However, Congress authorized citizens
`to vindicate their rights under the FCRA in either federal or state court. See 15 U.S.C.
`§ 1681p. Even when a plaintiff lacks standing to assert a FCRA right in federal court,
`this does not preclude her from asserting that same right in state court, assuming she
`can satisfy the state court’s potentially more lenient justiciability requirements, and
`assuming the state courts are authorized under their own state’s laws to adjudicate
`such claims. In short, a lack of Article III standing does not necessarily preclude a
`plaintiff from vindicating a federal right in state court.
`Moore, 2019 WL 2172706, at *2.
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`Here, Defendant asserts that removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d) (“CAFA”).
`Defendants, however, cannot invoke CAFA jurisdiction (or any other type of jurisdiction) in cases
`where the named plaintiff lacks Article III standing. See, e.g., Wallace v. ConAgra Foods Inc., 747
`F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2014) (remanding action to state court after CAFA removal because named
`plaintiffs lacked Article III standing); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3rd Cir. 2011)
`(affirming dismissal of data breach class action for lack of Article III standing). Since federal
`jurisdiction is lacking due to the lack of Article III standing, the Court has no discretion to retain
`supplemental jurisdiction over the claim alleged.
`V. CONCLUSION
`Where, as here, Plaintiff does not allege a concrete injury, Defendant has not met its heavy
`burden on removal to show that Plaintiff has Article III standing necessary for federal court
`jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop., 902 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2018) (the
`defendant seeking removal “bears the burden of overcoming the strong presumption against removal
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`jurisdiction”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., supra, 980 F.2d at 566 (courts “strictly construe the removal
`statute against removal jurisdiction” and reject removal “if there is any doubt as to the right of
`removal in the first instance”). Where Article III standing is lacking the Court should remand
`Plaintiff’s case to state court, where “the constraints of Article III do not apply.” ASARCO Inc. v.
`Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989).
`Accordingly, Plaintiff requests that his motion be granted and the case remanded to the San
`Francisco County Superior Court.
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`Respectfully submitted,
`WYNNE LAW FIRM
`RIGHETTI GLUGOSKI, P.C.
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`Dated: February 7, 2022
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`By: /s/ Edward J. Wynne
`Edward J. Wynne
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`Attorneys for Plaintiff James Achermann
`E-mail: ewynne@wynnelawfirm.com
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`CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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`I hereby certify that on February 7, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing document with
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`the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notice of electronic filing to all
`counsel of record.
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`By: /s/ Edward J. Wynne
`Edward J. Wynne
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