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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
`_________________________________________
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`BRANDON J. FRITZ,
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`Petitioner,
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`v.
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`THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
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`STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al.,
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`Respondents.
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`_________________________________________ :
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`FREDA L. WOLFSON, Chief U.S.D.J.
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`Civ. No. 12-7530 (FLW)
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`MEMORANDUM OPINION
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`Petitioner, Brandon J. Fritz (“Fritz” or “Petitioner”), commenced this proceeding by
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`filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on December 7, 2012. (ECF
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`No. 1.) The Petition sought relief on the alleged basis of ineffectiveness of trial counsel,
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`ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, ineffective assistance of post-conviction-relief
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`(“PCR”) counsel, and excessive sentence. (Id.) In July 2013, after Respondents had answered
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`the Petition, Fritz sought a protective stay of the proceeding to permit him to exhaust previously
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`unexhausted claims in a second PCR petition filed in state court. (ECF Nos. 18 & 20.) The
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`Court denied the stay motion, finding that the only unexhausted ground was alleged ineffective
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`assistance of PCR counsel, which is not a cognizable claim under § 2254. (ECF No. 23.)
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`In May 2015, the Court issued an Opinion and Order denying Fritz’s habeas petition on
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`the merits. (ECF Nos. 24 & 25.) Among other conclusions, the Court denied Fritz’s claim of
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`ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) in connection with his guilty plea, finding appropriate
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`the Appellate Division’s rejection of this claim because there was no evidence that Fritz had
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`been misled or coerced into accepting his plea deal and as, in fact, the evidence showed that Fritz
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`Case 3:12-cv-07530-FLW Document 36 Filed 08/01/19 Page 2 of 5 PageID: 1048
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`understood the plea deal and entered into it voluntarily. (ECF No. 24 at 9–10.) The Court
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`further found that the state courts had not acted unreasonably by denying relief on Fritz’s IAC
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`arguments regarding the failure to obtain a competency evaluation or seek funds for an expert
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`witness on the basis, given the significant evidence before the trial court regarding Fritz’s
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`competence, that he had failed to show a likelihood of a different outcome had trial counsel
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`taken the steps Fritz claims he should have. (Id. at 11–16.) The Court rejected Fritz’s claim that
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`PCR counsel provided ineffective assistance as not cognizable in a § 2254 habeas proceeding.
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`(Id. at 17–20.)
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`Nearly three years later, in April 2018, Fritz filed a motion seeking relief from the final
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`Opinion and Order, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). (ECF No. 26.) Fritz mainly
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`argued that the denial of his petition should be set aside and his case should be reexamined “due
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`to appointed counsel at the initial-review collateral proceeding (Post-Conviction relief) was
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`ineffective under Strickland v. Washington,” which Fritz contends makes his case “reviewable
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`under the standard set forth in Martinez v. Ryan.” (Mem. of Law in Supp., ECF No. 26-1 at 1–
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`2.) Specifically, Fritz asserted that his PCR counsel failed to obtain various medical records that
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`allegedly would have supported his trial counsel IAC claims. (See id. at 18–23.)
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`The Court denied Fritz’s Rule 60(b) motion on two bases. (ECF Nos. 32 & 33.) First,
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`the Court found that, although Fritz sought relief under Rule 60(b)(6), which does not have a
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`strict, one-year filing limitation, he still had not filed the motion within a “reasonable time,” nor
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`had he provided any justification for the delay. (ECF No. 32 at 5–6.) The Court further found
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`that Fritz had not demonstrated extraordinary circumstances requisite for relief under Rule
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`60(b)(6), nor asserted any potentially meritorious basis for relief. (Id. at 6–7.) Addressing
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`Fritz’s attempt to invoke Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the Court found that case
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`2
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`Case 3:12-cv-07530-FLW Document 36 Filed 08/01/19 Page 3 of 5 PageID: 1049
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`inapplicable, as the state courts had denied Fritz’s IAC claims on their merits, not on the basis
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`that they were procedurally defaulted. (See id.)
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`Fritz now moves for reconsideration of the Court’s prior Opinion and Order denying his
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`motion for relief under Rule 60(b). (ECF Nos. 34 & 35.)1 He asserts that his Rule 60(b) motion
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`raised newly discovered evidence showing that he had a Martinez claim concerning trial
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`counsel’s alleged failure to adequately address Fritz’s mental competence when he pleaded
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`guilty, which claim PCR counsel failed to adequately raise due to ineffectiveness. (See id.) He
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`further asks the Court to grant him equitable tolling. (Id.)
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`Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy and is granted only sparingly. See Buzz Bee
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`Toys, Inc. v. Swimways Corp., 20 F. Supp. 3d 483, 515 (D.N.J. 2014); Andreyko v. Sunrise
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`Senior Living, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 2d 475, 477 (D.N.J. 2014). The movant has the burden of
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`demonstrating one of three bases for reconsideration: “(1) an intervening change in the
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`controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court
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`[rendered its original decision]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent
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`a manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677
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`(3d Cir. 1999). A party seeking reconsideration must “set[] forth concisely the matter or
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`controlling decisions which the party believes the Judge . . . has overlooked.” L. Civ. R. 7.1(i).
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`Motions for reconsideration are not intended as opportunities to reargue old matters or raise
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`issues that could have been raised previously. See Andreyko, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78; P.
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`Schoenfeld Asset Mgm’t LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (D.N.J. 2001).
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`1 Fritz in fact filed two motions for reconsideration, four days apart, which, while not
`completely identical, are substantially the same. (ECF Nos. 34 & 35.) The Court treats them as
`one motion.
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`3
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`Case 3:12-cv-07530-FLW Document 36 Filed 08/01/19 Page 4 of 5 PageID: 1050
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`Fritz does not allege any intervening change in the law, and, while he contends that his
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`Rule 60(b) motion included newly discovered evidence, he does not assert that reconsideration of
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`the denial of that motion is warranted because of any newly discovered evidence. (See ECF Nos.
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`34 & 35.) Accordingly, the Court construes his motion as asserting that reconsideration is
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`needed to correct a clear error of law or fact. Fritz does not, however, identify any specific error
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`of law or fact or need to prevent a manifest injustice. (See id.) Had the Court construed the Rule
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`60(b) motion as seeking relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence, under Rule 60(b)(2),
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`rather than “any other reason that justifies relief,” under Rule 60(b)(6), his motion would have
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`been even more clearly untimely, as a motion under Rule 60(b)(2) must be filed within one year
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`of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). In any case, Fritz does not demonstrate
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`that he has any potential Martinez claim, as his focus remains on his PCR counsel’s alleged
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`failure to find certain of his medical records related to his mental competency at the time of plea,
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`not upon any failure to raise the argument at all. (See ECF Nos. 34 & 35.) Furthermore, Fritz’s
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`IAC claims related to competency were denied on their merits, not as procedurally defaulted.
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`(See ECF No. 24 at 7–16.)
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`It is unclear in what way Fritz contends that the Court should apply equitable tolling, but,
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`nonetheless, apparent that Fritz has failed to demonstrate that any tolling is warranted. He
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`focuses primarily on delays in resolution of his second PCR petition and asserts that he could not
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`have asserted his claims until that proceeding was complete. (See id.) In denying Fritz’s stay
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`motion, however, the Court made it quite clear that “[t]he exhaustion of Fritz’s only unexhausted
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`ground—his challenge to the effectiveness of state PCR counsel—would have no effect on his §
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`2254 Petition, since this ground is not a cognizable claim for habeas relief.” (ECF No. 23 ¶ 7.)
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`Thus, Fritz’s apparent belief that he was obligated to fully exhaust his second PCR petition
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`4
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`Case 3:12-cv-07530-FLW Document 36 Filed 08/01/19 Page 5 of 5 PageID: 1051
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`before he could seek relief under Rule 60(b) was unwarranted. Overall, Fritz offers no
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`potentially meritorious basis for reconsideration. Instead, it seems he simply desires yet another
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`opportunity to reargue his IAC claims that this Court previously denied on their merits. As the
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`Court has previously informed Fritz, reconsideration motions are not intended for this purpose.
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`See Andreyko, 993 F. Supp. 2d at 477–78; P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgm’t LLC, 161 F. Supp. 2d at
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`352.
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`For these reasons, Fritz’s motions for reconsideration, (ECF Nos. 34 & 45), are DENIED.
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`An appropriate Order will be entered.
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`DATED: August 1, 2019
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`/s/ Freda L. Wolfson
`Hon. Freda L. Wolfson
`U.S. Chief District Judge
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`5
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