`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`-----------------------------------------------x
`KALMAN ROSENFELD, individually
`and on behalf of all others similarly
`situated,
`
`
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`AC2T, INC., BONNER ANALYTICAL
`TESTING CO., and JEREMY HIRSCH,
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`
`------------------------------------------------x
`
`
`
`
`
`-against-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
`
`Case No. 1:20-cv-04662-FB-PK
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`For the Defendants:
`DANIEL R. BENSON
`Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP
`1633 Broadway
`New York, New York 10019
`
`EDWARD P. BOYLE
`ANNA G. DIMON
`Venable LLP
`1270 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, New York 10020
`
`
`
`Appearances:
`For the Plaintiffs:
`YITZCHAK KOPEL
`ALEC M. LESLIE
`Bursor & Fisher, P.A.
`888 Seventh Avenue
`New York, New York 10019
`
`
`
`
`BLOCK, Senior District Judge:
`
`
`
`Plaintiff Kalman Rosenfeld (“Rosenfeld”) claims that Defendants AC2T, Inc.
`
`(“AC2T”), Bonner Analytical Testing Co. (“Bonner”), and Jeremy Hirsch
`
`(“Hirsch”) fraudulently marketed a mosquito control product called “Spartan
`
`1
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-04662-FB-PK Document 41 Filed 09/15/21 Page 2 of 9 PageID #: 398
`
`Mosquito Eradicator.” Bonner and Hirsch have moved to dismiss the complaint as
`
`against them for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
`
`Procedure 12(b)(2), and each defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint in its
`
`entirety for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the following
`
`reasons, this Court GRANTS Bonner and Hirsch’s motions to dismiss for lack of
`
`personal jurisdiction and DENIES AC2T’s remaining motion to dismiss for failure
`
`to state a claim.
`
`
`
`
`The following facts are taken from the complaint. For the purposes of the
`
`I.
`
`pending motions to dismiss, the Court accepts them as true and draws all reasonable
`
`inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Gamm v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 944
`
`F.3d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 2019).
`
`
`
`In the summer of 2019, Rosenfeld purchased a mosquito control product
`
`known as “Spartan Mosquito Eradicator” (“Spartan”), believing it would
`
`“effectively eliminate mosquitos.” Complaint at ¶ 33. Rosenfeld used Spartan as
`
`directed but was disappointed when it did not provide “effective mosquito control.”
`
`Id.
`
`
`
`Each defendant is connected to Spartan, which is manufactured and sold by
`
`AC2T. Id. at ¶ 34. Hirsch served as president and spokesperson of AC2T. Id. at ¶
`
`35. And Bonner conducted allegedly fraudulent testing of Spartan. Id. at ¶ 36.
`
`2
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-04662-FB-PK Document 41 Filed 09/15/21 Page 3 of 9 PageID #: 399
`
`
`
`Spartan’s advertising represents that the product will “significantly decrease[]
`
`[mosquito] population within 15 days,” and “[p]rovid[e] up to 95% mosquito control
`
`for up to 90 days.” Id. at ¶ 3. The product purports to work through three crucial
`
`ingredients: sugar, salt, and yeast. Id. at ¶ 7. Spartan advertising represents that
`
`when the product is mixed with water and ingested by a mosquito, the “crystalline
`
`structure” of salt cuts the mosquito’s stomach, “causing it to rupture.” Id. at ¶ 8.
`
`Meanwhile, the fermentation process of the yeast produces carbon dioxide inside the
`
`mosquito, also causing its stomach to rupture. Id.
`
`
`
`The only problem, according to Rosenfeld, is that none of this is true. Id. at
`
`¶ 9. Rosenfeld alleges that, as a matter of biology, sugar, salt, yeast and water simply
`
`cannot kill a mosquito in the way that the Spartan advertising represents. Id. at ¶ 10.
`
`Rosenfeld cites a number of studies to this effect. Moreover, he alleges that the
`
`defendants knew Spartan was an ineffective product, and nonetheless produced a
`
`phony study allegedly demonstrating Spartan’s efficacy, which they used to
`
`fraudulently market and sell it. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 25.
`
`
`
`On September 30, 2020, Rosenfeld filed this lawsuit, alleging counts of
`
`deceptive acts or practices (Count I); false advertising (Count II); unjust enrichment
`
`(Count III); breach of express warranty (Count IV); violations of the Magnuson-
`
`Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (Count V); and fraud (Count VI).
`
`Complaint at ¶¶ 47-87.
`
`3
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-04662-FB-PK Document 41 Filed 09/15/21 Page 4 of 9 PageID #: 400
`
`II.
`
`A.
`
`
`
`There are two means by which a court can acquire personal jurisdiction over
`
`a defendant: generally and specifically. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud.
`
`Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021). A court has general jurisdiction when a
`
`defendant is “essentially at home” in the forum state. Id. By contrast, specific
`
`jurisdiction arises only where a defendant makes deliberate contacts with the forum
`
`state and the plaintiff’s claim arises from those contacts. Id. at 1025.
`
`
`
`To fend off a Rule 12(b)(2) jurisdictional challenge, a plaintiff must
`
`demonstrate a prima facie case for jurisdiction. Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of
`
`Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2018). “Such a showing entails making legally
`
`sufficient allegations of jurisdiction, including an averment of facts that, if
`
`credited[,] would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. (quoting
`
`Penguin Grp. (USA) v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2010)).
`
`B.
`
`
`
`This Court lacks general jurisdiction over Bonner and Hirsh, because no facts
`
`have been pleaded indicating that either has affiliations with New York “so
`
`continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home” here. Daimler AG
`
`v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 119 (2014). Per the complaint, which must be construed
`
`in the light most favorable to Rosenfeld at this stage of the litigation, Dorchester
`
`4
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-04662-FB-PK Document 41 Filed 09/15/21 Page 5 of 9 PageID #: 401
`
`Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013), Bonner is a
`
`Mississippi corporation with its primary place of business in Mississippi, and Hirsch
`
`is a Mississippi resident. Complaint at ¶¶ 35-36.
`
`
`
`Nor has Rosenfeld adequately alleged specific jurisdiction. As the defendants
`
`note, the complaint does not allege any actions undertaken by either Bonner or
`
`Hirsch in New York. Nonetheless, Rosenfeld argues that each is subject to this
`
`Court’s jurisdiction based upon a theory of conspiracy jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s
`
`Memorandum in Opposition at 18.
`
`
`
`“To establish personal jurisdiction on a conspiracy theory, Plaintiff[] must
`
`make a prima facie showing of conspiracy, allege specific facts warranting the
`
`inference that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy, and show that the
`
`defendant’s co-conspirator committed a tort in New York.” In re Terrorist Attacks
`
`on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 805 (S.D.N.Y.), on reconsideration in part,
`
`392 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), and aff’d, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), and
`
`aff’d, 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008), and aff’d, 714 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal
`
`citation and quotation omitted). Vague and general allegations of conspiracy are not
`
`enough: “[T]he bland assertion of conspiracy . . . is insufficient to establish
`
`jurisdiction[.]” Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
`
`
`
`Yet vague and general allegations of conspiracy are all that Rosenfeld has
`
`offered. The complaint does not include a count of conspiracy. Nor does it factually
`
`5
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-04662-FB-PK Document 41 Filed 09/15/21 Page 6 of 9 PageID #: 402
`
`allege an agreement between Bonner, Hirsch, and AC2T. Rosenfeld’s opposition
`
`brief attempts to retrofit the complaint with allegations of conspiracy; however, it is
`
`the complaint, not the briefs, being tested at this stage. Put simply, the complaint
`
`fails to factually allege a conspiracy; therefore, no conspiracy jurisdiction lies here.
`
`
`
`This Court is similarly unpersuaded by Rosenfeld’s novel invocation of
`
`“endorser” jurisdiction with respect to Hirsch. While endorsement may be a source
`
`of liability in proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission, no authority
`
`suggests that it may be a basis of personal jurisdiction before this Court. Nor has
`
`Rosenfeld alleged that Hirsch made statements in or directed towards New York.
`
`
`
`Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with respect to
`
`Bonner and Hirsch is GRANTED.
`
`III.
`
`A.
`
`What remains is AC2T’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint in its
`
`
`
`entirety for failure to state a claim. “To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule
`
`12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
`
`‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
`
`678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim
`
`is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
`
`to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
`
`6
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-04662-FB-PK Document 41 Filed 09/15/21 Page 7 of 9 PageID #: 403
`
`alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The pleading must offer more than
`
`“bare assertions,” “conclusory” allegations, and a “formulaic recitation of the
`
`elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
`
`
`
`A complaint is “deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an
`
`exhibit, materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that, although not
`
`incorporated by reference, are ‘integral’ to the complaint.” Sierra Club v. Con-Strux,
`
`LLC, 911 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 67 (2d
`
`Cir. 2004)).
`
`B.
`
`
`
`Here, AC2T argues that the complaint should be dismissed in its entirety
`
`because Rosenfeld has failed to adequately allege the falsity of AC2T’s statements
`
`about Spartan’s effectiveness.
`
`
`
`The complaint alleges that “[S]partan is ineffective for mosquito control
`
`because it does not kill mosquitoes or decrease mosquito populations.” Complaint
`
`at ¶ 4. Noting that this conclusory statement alone does not suffice to clear the
`
`plausibility hurdle, AC2T argues that the scientific studies Rosenfeld cites are
`
`insufficiently tailored to the facts of this case. AC2T Memorandum in Support at
`
`23. It argues that because those studies did not test Spartan’s particular chemical
`
`formulation, but rather tested only its constituent ingredients, they cannot support
`
`7
`
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-04662-FB-PK Document 41 Filed 09/15/21 Page 8 of 9 PageID #: 404
`
`conclusions regarding Spartan’s effectiveness or establish the plausibility of the
`
`complaint. Id. at 23.
`
`
`
`This Court does not agree. At this stage, all Rosenfeld must do is meet the
`
`standard of plausibility. The claim that a product physically cannot work is a valid
`
`legal theory. See Tomasino v. Estee Lauder Cos. Inc., 44 F. Supp. 3d 251, 258
`
`(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Hughes v. Ester C Co., 930 F. Supp.2d 439, 450 (E.D.N.Y.
`
`2013)). Here, Rosenfeld has made such an allegation, and factually substantiates it
`
`with studies indicating that Spartan’s individual active ingredients cannot work in
`
`the manner that Spartan’s detailed advertising represents. Complaint at ¶¶ 4-20.
`
`This is sufficient, and Rosenfeld’s complaint satisfies the plausibility standard.
`
`
`
`AC2T’s arguments about the applicability of those studies are unavailing.
`
`While the studies are sufficient to nudge the complaint into the realm of plausibility,
`
`their weight or interpretation is a question of fact not appropriate for resolution on a
`
`motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Quinn v. Walgreen Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 533, 544
`
`(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`Brooklyn, New York
`September 15, 2021
`
`
`Case 1:20-cv-04662-FB-PK Document 41 Filed 09/15/21 Page 9 of 9 PageID #: 405
`
`Accordingly, AC2T’s motion to dismiss all counts pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
`
`is DENIED.
`
`SO ORDERED.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`_/S/ Frederic Block__________
`FREDERIC BLOCK
`Senior United States District Judge
`
`9
`
`