Case 2:21-cv-00214-DRH-SIL Document 1 Filed 01/14/21 Page 1 of 12 PageID #: 1
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`CONCERT SPECIALS, INC., a corporation, and
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`STEVEN EBRANI, individually and as an officer of
`Concert Specials, Inc.,
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`Defendants.
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`Civil Action No.
`21-CV-214
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`COMPLAINT FOR
`PERMANENT INJUNCTION
`AND OTHER EQUITABLE
`RELIEF
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`Plaintiff, the United States of America, by its undersigned attorneys, acting upon
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`notification and authorization to the Attorney General by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
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`pursuant to Section 16(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. §
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`56(a)(1), for its Complaint alleges:
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`1.
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`Plaintiff brings this action under Sections 5(m)(1)(A), 13(b), 16(a), and 19 of the
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`Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), 53(b), 56(a), and 57b and
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`Section 2 of the Better Online Ticket Sales Act (“the BOTS Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 45c, to obtain
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`monetary civil penalties, permanent injunctive relief, and other relief for Defendants’ acts or
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`practices in violation of Section 2(a) of the BOTS Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45c(a) and Section 5 of the
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`FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
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`SUMMARY OF THE CASE
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`2.
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`Between January 1, 2017 and the present date, Defendants have used ticket bots
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`and other technology to gain access to tens of thousands of tickets for performances and events,
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`including concerts and sporting events. Defendants’ purchases exceeded posted ticket limits to
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`many popular events, like Elton John concerts. Defendants also have used hundreds of fictitious
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`Ticketmaster accounts, multiple credit cards (including some in the names of fictitious
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`individuals), and proxy or spoofed IP addresses to bypass, trick, or otherwise avoid security
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`measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or measures on Ticketmaster’s
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`websites, that would have otherwise blocked or prevented them from obtaining so many tickets.
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`Defendants then have resold or have attempted to resell the tickets on secondary ticketing websites.
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`Defendants have made more than $13.7 million in revenue selling the tickets they obtained from
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`Ticketmaster on secondary markets—often at a significant price markup. Their actions prejudiced
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`consumers, who otherwise may have been able to purchase those tickets directly from
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`Ticketmaster at a lower price. By their actions, Defendants have violated the BOTS Act and the
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`FTC Act.
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`1345.
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`3.
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`4.
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`JURISDICTION AND VENUE
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`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a),
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`Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (c)(1),
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`(c)(2), (c)(3) and (d), and 1395(a), and 15 U.S.C. § 53(b).
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`DEFENDANTS
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`5.
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`Defendant Concert Specials, Inc. (“Concert Specials”) is a New York corporation
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`with its principal place of business at 747 Middle Neck Road, Great Neck, NY 11024. Concert
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`Specials transacts or has transacted business in this District and throughout the United States.
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`6.
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`Defendant Steven Ebrani (“Steven Ebrani”) is the owner and president of Concert
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`Specials. At all times material to this Complaint, acting alone or in concert with others, he has
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`formulated, directed, controlled, or had the authority to control or participated in the acts and
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`practices of Concert Specials, including the acts and practices set forth in this Complaint. Steven
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`Ebrani resides in New York, and, in connection with the matters alleged herein, transacts or has
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`transacted business in this district.
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`7.
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`On July 26, 2016, Defendants signed an Assurance of Discontinuance with the New
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`York Attorney General relating to, among other things, their use of ticket bots. The New York
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`Attorney General alleged, among other things, that Defendants violated New York state law by
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`using automated ticket purchasing software, or any machine, device, or computer program that
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`navigates or runs automated tasks on retail ticket purchasing websites in order to bypass security
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`measures to purchase tickets. Under the Assurance of Discontinuance, Defendants agreed “not to
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`utilize automated ticket purchasing software, including Bots, in order to bypass security measures
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`to purchase tickets to events in New York, or to maintain an interest in or maintain control over
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`the operation of automated ticket purchasing software to bypass security measures to purchase
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`tickets.”
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`COMMERCE
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`8.
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`At all times material to this Complaint, Defendants have maintained a substantial
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`course of trade in or affecting commerce, as “commerce” is defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act,
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`15 U.S.C. § 44.
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`THE BOTS ACT
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`9.
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`Under the BOTS Act, it is unlawful for any person to “circumvent a security
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`measure, access control system, or other technological control or measure on an Internet website
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`or online service that is used by the ticket issuer to enforce posted event ticket limits or to maintain
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`the integrity of posted online ticket purchasing order rules.” 15 U.S.C. § 45c(a)(1).
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`10.
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`The BOTS Act defines an “event” to mean “any concert, theatrical performance,
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`sporting event, show, or similarly scheduled activity, taking place in a venue with a seating or
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`attendance capacity exceeding 200 persons that— (A) is open to the general public; and (B) is
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`promoted, advertised, or marketed in interstate commerce or for which event tickets are generally
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`sold or distributed in interstate commerce.”
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`11.
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`A violation of the BOTS Act is “a violation of a rule defining an unfair or a
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`deceptive act or practice under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15
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`U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)).” 15 U.S.C. § 45c(b)(1). Thus, pursuant to Section 18(d)(3) of the FTC Act,
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`15 U.S.C. § 57a(d)(3), a violation of the BOTS Act is an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or
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`affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
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`DEFENDANTS CIRCUMVENTED SECURITY MEASURES,
`ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEMS, OR TECHNOLOGICAL CONTROLS
`OR MEASURES ON TICKETMASTER’S WEBSITES
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`12.
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`Concert Specials is a ticket reseller. Its primary business involves purchasing
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`tickets from primary ticket issuers, and then reselling the tickets to consumers on secondary
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`ticketing websites.
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`13.
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`Steven Ebrani, as the President of Concert Specials, was involved in selecting the
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`tickets for purchase and arranging for their resale.
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`14.
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`Between January 1, 2017 and the current date, Defendants have made more than
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`34,513 Ticketmaster ticket purchases. They obtained more than 82,925 tickets from these
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`purchases.
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`15.
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`Ticketmaster is a ticket issuer that has implemented security measures, access
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`control systems, or other technological controls or measures on its websites to enforce posted event
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`ticket purchase limits and to maintain the integrity of posted online ticket purchasing order rules.
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`16.
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`In many instances, Defendants circumvented security measures, access control
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`systems, and other technological controls or measures on Ticketmaster’s websites by, among other
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`things, using ticket bots and other computer software and technologies, CAPTCHA bypass or
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`solving services, fictitious names and addresses, multiple credit card accounts (including some in
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`the names of fictitious individuals), and IP proxies.
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`17.
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` By their actions, Defendants have been able to purchase tickets far more rapidly
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`and in a greater volume than a consumer who was not using ticket bots or otherwise circumventing
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`security measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or measures on
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`Ticketmaster’s websites.
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`18.
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`Defendants later resold many of the tickets on secondary ticketing websites, for a
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`profit.
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`DEFENDANTS’ USE OF TICKET BOTS TO CIRCUMVENT
`SYSTEMS OR CONTROLS ON TICKETMASTER’S WEBSITES
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`19.
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`Between January 1, 2017 and at least March 2017, in numerous instances,
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`Defendants used an automated computer program called Automatick to purchase tickets on
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`Ticketmaster’s websites. The Automatick ticket bot is also known as Smartick.
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`20.
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`Defendants entered information into the Automatick ticket bot about the tickets that
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`they were interested in purchasing and the price they would pay for those tickets. The Automatick
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`ticket bot then would search Ticketmaster’s websites to see if the tickets were available to
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`purchase. The Automatick ticket bot would automatically reserve any tickets that fit Defendants’
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`search criteria. This reservation set aside the tickets for Defendants and blocked others from
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`purchasing them, at least until the reservation clock expired. Defendant Steven Ebrani would then
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`review the reserved tickets and select which tickets to purchase.
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`21.
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`The Automatick ticket bot saved Defendants’ credit card information and
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`Ticketmaster account information, and automatically entered that information into Ticketmaster’s
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`websites. The Automatick ticket bot also would bypass any CAPTCHAs it encountered on
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`Ticketmaster’s websites while searching for or reserving tickets on Defendants’ behalf.
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`CAPTCHA is an acronym for “Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and
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`Humans Apart.” At times, Ticketmaster used CAPTCHAs on its websites to try to ensure that
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`visitors to its website were humans, and not automated computer programs or ticket bots.
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`22.
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`Between approximately May 2017 and at least May 2019, in many instances,
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`Defendants used an automated computer program called Tixdrop to purchase tickets on
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`Ticketmaster’s websites. Defendants entered information into the Tixdrop ticket bot about the
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`tickets that they were interested in purchasing. The Tixdrop ticket bot then would repeatedly
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`search Ticketmaster’s websites to see if the tickets were available to purchase. The Tixdrop ticket
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`bot would automatically reserve any tickets that fit Defendants’ search criteria. This reservation
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`set aside the tickets for Defendants and blocked others from purchasing them, at least until the
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`reservation clock expired. Defendant Steven Ebrani would then review the reserved tickets and
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`select which tickets to purchase.
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`23.
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`The Tixdrop ticket bot also saved Defendants’ credit card information and
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`Ticketmaster account information, and automatically entered that information into Ticketmaster’s
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`websites. In addition, the Tixdrop ticket bot would automatically complete all CAPTCHAs that
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`appeared on Ticketmaster’s websites while it was searching for or reserving tickets at the direction
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`of Defendants.
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`24.
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`By using the Tixdrop and Automatick ticket bots, Defendants were able to purchase
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`multiple tickets across multiple Ticketmaster accounts within seconds—something that a
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`consumer abiding by Ticketmaster’s security, access control, and other technological measures
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`would be unable to do.
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`25.
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`Defendants’ use of the Tixdrop and Automatick ticket bots, along with other
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`technologies, allowed them to circumvent security measures, access control systems, or other
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`technological controls or measures on Ticketmaster’s websites that were used by Ticketmaster to
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`enforce posted event ticket purchase limits, or to maintain the integrity of posted online ticket
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`purchasing order rules.
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`DEFENDANTS HID THEIR IP ADDRESSES TO CIRCUMVENT
`SYSTEMS OR CONTROLS ON TICKETMASTER’S WEBSITES
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`26.
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`Between January 1, 2017 and the present date, Ticketmaster has had security
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`measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or measures on its websites that
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`were designed to prevent or block ticket purchasers from making multiple purchases on the same
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`day from the same IP address. An IP address is a unique string of numbers separated by periods
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`that Ticketmaster uses to identify a computer or affiliated computers making purchases.
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`Ticketmaster uses this technological system to enforce posted event ticket purchase limits and to
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`maintain the integrity of its posted online ticket purchasing order rules.
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`27.
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`In many instances, between January 1, 2017 and the present date, Defendants have
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`taken steps to conceal their IP address when making ticket purchases. For example, at times,
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`Defendants used rotating proxy services and IP address blocks. These services allowed
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`Defendants to hide their actual IP address from Ticketmaster and instead use a proxy IP address
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`or the IP address of a computer or network that belongs to someone else.
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`28.
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`Between January 1, 2017 and the present date, Defendants have used over 19,000
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`different IP addresses while making purchases on Ticketmaster’s websites.
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`29.
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`Defendants hid their true IP addresses from Ticketmaster because they believed it
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`would allow them to circumvent technological controls on Ticketmaster’s websites.
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`30.
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`By hiding
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`their
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`true IP addresses from Ticketmaster, Defendants have
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`circumvented security measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or
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`measures on Ticketmaster’s websites that were used by Ticketmaster to enforce posted event ticket
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`purchase limits, or to maintain the integrity of posted online ticket purchasing order rules.
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`DEFENDANTS’ USE OF FICTITIOUS NAMES, MULITIPLE TICKETMASTER
`ACCOUNTS, PROXY IP ADDRESES, AND MULTIIPLE CREDIT CARDS TO
`CIRCUMVENT SYSTEMS OR CONTROLS
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`31.
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`Between January 1, 2017 and the present date, Ticketmaster also has had security
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`measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or measures in place on its
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`websites that were designed to prevent individuals from purchasing more tickets than is otherwise
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`allowed under its posted event ticket limits. Among other things, these technological measures
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`monitor the following information to verify whether the purchase fell within posted purchase
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`limits: (a) the individual’s name, (b) billing address, (c) Ticketmaster accounts, and (d) the IP
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`address and cookies associated with the computer that made the purchase. From January 1, 2017
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`until or around October 2018, Ticketmaster also monitored the credit card number used by the
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`purchaser.
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`32.
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`In many instances, between January 1, 2017 and the present date, Defendants have
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`bypassed these security measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or
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`measures by using sham identities and addresses, multiple credit cards, multiple Ticketmaster
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`accounts, and IP proxy services.
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`33.
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`Defendants have used more than 700 Ticketmaster accounts to purchase tickets
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`during the relevant period. Each Ticketmaster account had a unique email address.
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`34.
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`Defendants typically did not open Ticketmaster accounts in their own names.
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`Instead, Defendants have used more than 650 different names to open the accounts. The names
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`were either fictitious or the names of Defendant Ebrani’s friends and family members.
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`35.
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`In many instances, Defendants also did not use their address as the primary address,
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`shipping address, or billing address for their Ticketmaster accounts. Instead, they used over 550
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`addresses that were either fake or unrelated to their business.
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`36.
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`Defendants have used more than 450 different credit cards to make purchases
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`through their Ticketmaster accounts. In numerous instances, Defendants’ Ticketmaster accounts
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`included credit cards in the names of fictitious individuals or the names of friends and family.
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`Defendants opened at least 150 corporate credit cards in the names of friends, family members,
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`and fictitious individuals. Defendants have used many of these credit cards to purchase tickets.
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`37.
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`As discussed above, Defendants also hid from Ticketmaster the true IP addresses
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`of the computers used by Defendants to make purchases.
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`38.
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`Defendants knew that if they purchased tickets using their true names, addresses,
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`and IP addresses, then Ticketmaster could prevent them from making all of the purchases they
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`wished to make, or their purchases could be cancelled.
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`39.
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`Defendants’ use of multiple names, addresses, IP addresses, credit cards, and
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`Ticketmaster accounts circumvented Ticketmaster’s a security measures, access control systems,
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`or other technological controls or measures that were designed to prevent ticket purchasers from
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`exceeding posted event ticket purchase limits.
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`PLAINTIFF HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT DEFENDANTS ARE VIOLATING
`AND WILL CONTINUE TO VIOLATE THE BOTS ACT AND THE FTC ACT
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`40.
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`Based on the facts and violations of law alleged in this Complaint, Plaintiff has
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`reason to believe that Defendants are violating or are about to violate laws enforced by the
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`Commission, because among other things, (a) Defendants have been aware of the BOTS Act since
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`early 2017, but continued to violate the Act; (b) Defendants continue to circumvent security
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`measures, access control systems, or other technological controls or measures on Ticketmaster’s
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`websites; and (c) Defendants are recidivists who continued to engage in unlawful conduct after
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`prior enforcement action.
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`COUNT I - VIOLATIONS OF THE BOTS ACT AND THE FTC ACT
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`41.
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`As alleged in paragraphs 1 through 40, in numerous instances, Defendants have
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`circumvented a security measure, access control system, or other technological control or measure
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`on Ticketmaster’s websites that is used by Ticketmaster to enforce posted event ticket limits or to
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`maintain the integrity of posted online ticket purchasing order rules.
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`42.
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`Therefore, Defendants’ acts or practices as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 40
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`violate the BOTS Act and the FTC Act.
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`CONSUMER INJURY
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`43.
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`Consumers have suffered and will continue to suffer substantial injury as a result
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`of Defendants’ violations of the BOTS Act and the FTC Act. In addition, Defendants have been
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`unjustly enriched as a result of their unlawful acts or practices. Absent injunctive relief by this
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`Court, Defendants are likely to continue to injure consumers and harm the public interest.
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`THIS COURT’S POWER TO GRANT RELIEF
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`44.
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`Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), empowers this Court to grant
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`injunctive and such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate to halt and redress violations
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`of any provision of law enforced by the FTC. The Court, in the exercise of its equitable
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`jurisdiction, may award ancillary relief, including rescission or reformation of contracts,
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`restitution, the refund of monies paid, and the disgorgement of ill-gotten monies, to prevent and
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`remedy any violation of any provision of law enforced by the FTC.
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`45.
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` Section 19 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b, and the BOTS Act authorizes this
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`Court to grant such relief as the Court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers resulting
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`from Defendants’ violations of the BOTS Act, including the rescission or reformation of contracts,
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`and the refund of money.
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`46.
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`Section 5(m)(1)(A) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A), as modified by
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`Section 4 of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461, as
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`amended, and as implemented by 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(d), authorizes this Court to award monetary
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`civil penalties. From August 1, 2016 to January 21, 2018, the Court was authorized to award a
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`penalty of up to $40,000 for each violation of the BOTS Act. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(d) (2016).
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`From January 22, 2018 to February 13, 2019, the maximum penalty amount was $41,484 per
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`violation, and effective February 14, 2019, the maximum penalty amount was adjusted to $42,530
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`per violation, pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act
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`of 2015. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(d) (2018); 84 Fed. Reg. 3980 (Feb. 13, 2019). Defendants’
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`violations of the BOTS Act were committed with the knowledge required by Section 5(m)(1)(A)
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`of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A).
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`47.
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`This Court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, may award ancillary relief,
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`including disgorgement, to prevent and remedy any violation of the BOTS Act and the FTC Act.
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`PRAYER FOR RELIEF
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`Wherefore, Plaintiff, pursuant to Sections 5(a), 5(m)(1)(A), and 13(b) and 19 of the FTC
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`Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 45(m)(1)(A), and 53(b), Section 2(a) of the BOTS Act, 15 U.S.C. §
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`45c(a)(1), and the Court’s own equitable powers, requests that this Court:
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`A.
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`Enter judgment against Defendants and in favor of Plaintiff for each violation
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`alleged in this Complaint;
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`B.
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`Enter a permanent injunction to prevent future violations of the BOTS Act by
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`Defendants;
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`C.
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`Award Plaintiff monetary civil penalties from each Defendant for every violation
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`of the BOTS Act;
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`D.
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`Award such relief as the Court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers
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`resulting from Defendants’ violations of the FTC Act, including rescission or reformation of
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`contracts, restitution, the refund of monies paid, and the disgorgement of ill-gotten monies;
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`E.
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`Award Plaintiff the costs of bringing this action, as well as such other and additional
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`relief, including disgorgement, as the Court may determine to be just and proper.
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`SETH D. DUCHARME
`Acting United States Attorney
`Eastern District of New York
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`/s/ Bonni J. Perlin
`BONNI J. PERLIN
`KEVIN YIM
`Assistant U.S. Attorneys
`Tel: (718) 254-6254
`Tel: (718) 254-6186
`bonni.perlin@usdoj.gov
`kevin.yim@usdoj.gov
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`Date: January 14, 2021
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`Respectfully submitted,
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`FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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`JENNIFER B. DICKEY
`Acting Assistant Attorney General
`Civil Division
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`DANIEL J. FEITH
`Deputy Assistant Attorney General
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`GUSTAV W. EYLER
`Director, Consumer Protection Branch
`
` /s/ Benjamin A. Cornfeld
`BENJAMIN A. CORNFELD
`Trial Attorney
`Consumer Protection Branch
`U.S. Department of Justice
`P.O. Box 386
`Washington, D.C. 20004
`Tel: 202-598-7276
`Fax: 202-514-8742
`Benjamin.A.Cornfeld2@usdoj.gov
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