`Case 1:11—cv—O2794—KMW Document 1 Filed 04/26/11 Page 1 of 28
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`A0 440 (Rev. 12.109) Summons in a Civil Action
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT CoUR1;lUD§E 33mm
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`for the
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`Southern District of New York
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`YULIA TYMOSHENKO, and JOHN DOES 1 through
`10. on behalf of themselves and all those similany
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`iltttacttl 279 4
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`DMYTRO FIRTASH, ROSUKRENERGO AG("RUE")
`and JOHN DOES 1 through 100, et al.
`Defendant
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`)
`)
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`SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
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`To: (Defendant's name andaddress) DMYTRO FIRTASH. ROSUKRENERGO AG(“RUE") and JOHN DOES 1 through
`100. et al,
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`A lawsuit has been filed against you.
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`Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
`are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
`P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
`the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney,
`whose name and address are: McCALLION 8. ASSOCIATES LLP
`100 Park Ave. 16th floor
`New York, NY 1001?
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`If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the reliefdemanded in the complaint.
`You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
`
`Date:
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`04;'26!‘2C|I1 1
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`
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`Case 1:11-cv-02794-KMW Document 1 Filed 04/26/11 Page 2 of 28
`Case 1:11—cv—O2794—KMW DOCU d 04/26/11 Page 2 of 28
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`UNITED snares DISTRICT COURT
`
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`
`- QUDGE SULLIVPQE
`
`YULIA TYMOSHENKO, and JOHN DOES 1
`through 10, on behalf of themseives and
`
`allthose sirnifarlysituated,
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`Plaintiffs,
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`_\,-5-
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`'"de’‘ NC’:
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`1
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`2 I7 9 %
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`CIASS ACT1ON COMPLAINT
`
`
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`DMYTRO FIRTASH, ROSUKRENERGD
`
`AG("RUE") and 3OHN DOES 1 through 100,
`
`et ai,
`
`Defendants.
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`Plaintiffs Yulia Tymoshenko and John Does No. 1 through 10 (collectively
`
`referred to as “the Plaintiffs"), by their undersigned attorneys, bring this Complaint on
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`behalf of themselves and all other simiiariy situated in Ukraine who have had their
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`iundamentai human and political rights violated by defendants and others against the
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`named defendants and their co-conspirators who have, through various schemes and
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`concerted efforts, deprived plaintiffs and their fellow citizens of Ukraine of various
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`fundamentat human and poiiticai rights recognized under international law.
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`Piaintiffs bring this action pursuant to the Alien Torts Statute FATS”) and the
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`Yorture Victims Protection Act {"WPA”}, codified as part of the United States Code, 28
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`U.S.C.§1350, as well as under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act
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`
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`Case 1:11—cv—O2794—KMW Document 1 Filed 04/26/11 Page 3 of 28
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`(“RICO”), 18 United States Code, § 1964(c), to recover monetary damages and other
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`relief arising out of the defendants’ concerted efforts to defraud the Ukrainian people of
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`their valuable natural resources, as well as their poiiticai and human rights.
`
`PARTIES
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`Plaintiffs
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`1.
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`Plaintiff, YULIA TYMOSHENKO, the Ukrainian Prime Minister for the
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`period from 2007 to 2010, has been subjected by the defendants to politically-
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`motivated investigations and prosecutions by the administration of the current
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`Ukrainian government , which is led by President Victor Yanukovych ("the Yanukovych
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`administration”), as part of a concerted attempt to discredit her, deny her basic political
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`and human rights, and to intimidate her associates and opposition-party members from
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`exercising their fundamental politicai and human rights.
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`2.
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`Plaintiffs JOHN DOES ii 1 through 10 are former members of the previous
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`executive administration of Ukraine during the time period when Plaintiff Tymoshenko
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`served as Prime Minister. They have all been subjected to po|itica||y—motivated
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`investigations and selective prosecutions by the current Ukrainian administration under
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`the leadership of President Victor Yanukovych. The reason why their names are not
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`specifically listed as plaintiffs in this matter is that, in some cases, they are incarcerated
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`under conditions that severely restrict their ability to communicate freely, and both
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`those who are incarcerated and those that are not, but are under intense investigation,
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`
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`would likely be subjected to further intimidation and persecution if their names were
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`listed as plaintiffs in this action.
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`The Defendants
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`3.
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`Defendant DMYTRO FIRTASH ("Firtash”) owns 45% of RUE, and a partner
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`owns 5%. The other 50% of RUE is owned by Gazpron, the Russian natural gas
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`monopoly. Firtash has admitted that he got his start in the gas trading business with the
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`assistance of Semion Mogilevich, the Russian organized crime boss. Firtash is also a
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`close associate and advisor to the current Ukrainian President, Victor Yanukovych.
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`4.
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`Defendant RosUkrEnergo AG (“RUE”) is headquartered in the Swiss
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`canton of Zug. Firtash controls his shares in RUE through a company called Centragas
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`Holding, which has offices in Vienna, Austria and is affiliated with the DF Group, which
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`is also located in Austria.
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`5.
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`Defendants JOHN DOES it 1 through 100 are other individuals and
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`companies, some of whose identities are presently unknown, who conspired with
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`and/or aided and abetted the named defendants as part of a conspiracy and
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`racketeering enterprise designed to deprive plaintiffs and other class members of
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`fundamental political and human rights, and to divert natural gas and other natural
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`resources of Ukrainian natural resources of Ukraine for the benefit of themselves and
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`others associated with their racketeering enterprise.
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`
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`RI
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`ICTION
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`6.
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`This Court has subject matterjurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
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`the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350 with
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`regard to the Plaintiffs, who are Ukrainian citizens living in Ukraine and elsewhere, as
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`well as non—Ukrainian citizen who have been victimized and suffered damages as a
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`result of the defendants’ racketeering enterprise, in that the claims of the plaintiffs
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`involve violations of international law, including the deprivation of fundamental political
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`and human rights, as well as the systematic diversion of natural gas and other valuable
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`natural resources of Ukraine for the benefit of the defendants and their associates.
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`7.
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`This Court also has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the
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`Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. Section 1961 et
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`seq. in that the defendants conducted their multiple acts of fraud and racketeering
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`through a racketeering enterprise that had a continuity of structure and purpose over
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`an extended period of time.
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`8.
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`This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter with regards to
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`members of the Plaintiff class who may be United States Citizens, pursuant to the
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`Torture Victims Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. at 73, 28
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`U.S.C.§1350, and pursuant to23 USC §1331 that the claims of the plaintiffs and other
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`class members involve federal questions and international law questions which are
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`incorporated into federal common law-
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`FACTUAI. BACKGROQN D
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`9.
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`For many years, RUE bought cheap gas from Russia and Turkmenistan
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`and had Gasprom deliver it to the Ukrainian border, where most of the natural gas was
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`sold at a favorable price to the state-owned Ukrainian company, Naftogaz, and the rest
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`to European customers at global market prices. The rest of Ukraine's demand for gas
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`was supplied by Gazprom from Russian sources, also using RUE as the intennediary.
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`10.
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`In early 2009, defendants Firtash and RUE owed Gazprom, the Russian
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`gas monopoly, $1.7 billion for gas that Gazprom had already delivered but which Firtash
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`and RUE were storing in Ukraine, with the intention of exporting it to Poland and
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`Rumania.
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`11.
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`On January 19, 2009, following negotiations in Moscow, plaintiff
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`Tymoshenko, who was then the Ukrainian Prime Minister, and Prime Minister Putin of
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`Russia reached an agreement that eliminated RUE as the middleman in the natural gas
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`transactions between Russia and Ukraine. It was agreed that Gazprom would transfer
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`RUE’s debts to Naftogaz, which would then pay Russia the $1.7 million that was owed by
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`RUE and Firtash. In return, Naftogaz would receive access to the 11 billion cubic meters
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`of gas that Firtash and RUE was storing in Ukrainian government storage tanks. Under
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`the agreement, the governments of Russia and Ukraine would conduct their gas
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`dealings directly with each other in the future.
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`
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`12.
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`Pursuant to the January 19"‘ agreement, Naftogaz paid Gazprom $1.7
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`million for 11 billion cubic meters of gas and complied with all other provisions of the
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`agreement.
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`13.
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`Naftogaz Deputy Chairman Ihor Didenko signed the agreement on behalf
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`of Ukraine at the express instructions of then-Prime MinisterTymoshenko. However,
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`while he was in Moscow and about to sign the agreement, he received threatening
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`phone calls from Kiev warning him that he would "do time” if he signed the agreement.
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`14.
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`The January 19, 2009 agreement, which basically eliminated RUE as a
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`costly middleman in the natural gas transactions between the two countries, was
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`celebrated by the Western European countries who were the major recipients and users
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`of the natural gas. Even the U.S. Embassy, which had described Firtash as a
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`"questionable character” in cables to Washington, expressed the view that the
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`elimination of RUE could introduce "transparency and accountability” into the gas trade.
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`15.
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`Firtash was understandably outraged by the January 19"‘ agreement,
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`which basically eliminated one of the most lucrative aspects of RUE’s business. He
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`complained to the U.S. Ambassador to Kiev that the agreement was “criminal” and that
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`if anyone other than Tymoshenko had made the agreement, "he would have already
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`been hanging from the street lights." One Firtash aliy, Yury Boyko, energy minister in the
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`opposition’s shadow cabinet and a former member of the coordinating council of RUE,
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`called the agreement a "betrayal of national interests."
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`16.
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`Firtash and his associates filed an arbitration claim with the Arbitration
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`institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. Firtash claimed the agreement
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`between Russian and Ukraine was illegal. However, the Ukraine Government, appearing
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`confident that it would win the arbitration, arguing that Naftogaz, not RUE, had actually
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`paid for the gas, so there was no monetary consideration for RUE’s claim to the
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`ownership of the gas.
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`17.
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`While the arbitration proceedings in Stockholm were still ongoing, the
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`Ukraine government changed hands. In February 2010, Tymoshenko's rival, Victor
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`Yanukovych, became president. Since Firtash was one of the key fina nciai backers of the
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`new president, he was immediately included in Yanukovych's inner circle.
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`18.
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`Many of Firtash’s associates were appointed to government posts in the
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`new Yanukovych administration. Two of his close friends and associates, Yury Boyko and
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`Serhiy Lyovochkin, became energy minister and the president's chief of staff,
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`respectively. In addition, Firtash's confident, Valeriy Khoroshkovsky, owner of the Inter
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`media empire, in which Firtash owned a purchase option at the time, was named the
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`chief of the SBU, the Ukrainian state security system and successor to the KGB.
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`19.
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`The entire management team of the state-owned Naftogaz were
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`replaced with managers loyal to Yanukovych, Firtash and the rest of their associates and
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`inner circle. One of the managers that was removed was Igor Didenko, who had signed
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`the January 19, 2009 agreement and was the subject of a politically-motivated
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`investigation that led to his arrest and imprisonment.
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`20.
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`Since the entire management team at Naftogaz now reported to the
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`Yanukovych administration, the two parties that were facing each other in the
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`Stockholm arbitration were now friends and allies. Indeed, there was now really only
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`one side. Firtash was negotiating in the interest of RUE and himself, while the Ukrainian
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`government, which was supposed to be on the other side of the table, was represented
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`by Energy Minister Boyko, who was a longstanding friend and ally of Firtash.
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`21.
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`Not surprisingly, once the Ukrainian government changed hands in
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`February-March of 2010, it also its position in the Stockholm arbitration proceedings
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`180 degrees, now “admitting” that the gas in dispute had always been owned by RUE.
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`As the Supreme Court of Ukraine later noted in its November 2010 written opinion on
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`the matter, “Naftogaz of Ukraine admitted completely that there were no legal reasons
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`[for it] to acquire [the] disputed quantity of natural gas, thus [admitting] the illegality of
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`[the] seizure of [the] natural gas from RosUkrEnergo...."
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`22.
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`Upon information and belief, Naftogaz’s "change of position” was due to
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`the fundamental conflict of interests, collusion and corrupt agreement between
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`defendants Firtash/RUE and the Yanukovych administration.
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`23.
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`Since the Ukraine government and Naftogaz had basically defaulted by
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`withdrawing their opposition to RUE’s claim to ownership of the gas, the Stockholm
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`Arbitration Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) was left with no alternative to granting RUE’s claim.
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`In June 2010, the Tribunal ruled that Naftogaz owed its former gas supply intermediary,
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`RUE, 11 billion cubic meters of natural gas, which RUE claimed was illegally confiscated
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`
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`in January 2009 and which the Yanukovych administration and the new management of
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`Naftogaz did not contest. In addition, the Tribunal fined Naftogaz 1.1 billion cubic
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`meters, for a total award of 12.1 billion cubic meters of gas.
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`24.
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`The Stockholm arbitration ruling in favor of Firtash’s company (RUE) has
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`been widely perceived as a means of generating huge sums of cash with which Firtash
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`and his associates could continue to illegally fund the pervasive system of corruption
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`that encompasses every level of government, while at the same time suppressing
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`political dissent through intimidation, racketeering and other violations of fundamental
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`human and political rights.
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`25. When RUE moved to affirm the Tribunal award in the Ukrainian courts,
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`Naftogaz and the current Ukraine administration again essentially defaulted and failed
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`to provide the courts with any facts or proof that the recognition and enforcement of
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`the Tribunal award was contrary to the public policy of the state and would result in
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`untold hardship and suffering to the Ukrainian people. As the Ukrainian Supreme Court
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`noted in its November 24, 2010 decision, Naftogaz failed to furnish any proof of even
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`the most basic facts that should not have been in dispute, namely, that the transfer of
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`the natural gas to RUE "exceeds 50% of the total volume of natural gas extracted in the
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`country annually from [the] country's own resources, and 50% of [the] annual needs of
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`natural gas by the population.” Accordingly, since Naftogaz and the administration failed
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`to provide the courts with any facts or proof that would have provided a basis for the
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`courts to reject the Tribunal award as contrary to the public policy and welfare of the
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`country, the Supreme Court of Ukraine was left with no alternative but to recognize and
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`confirm the Tribunal award.
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`26.
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`Another reason why the Ukrainian courts had to confirm the Tribunal
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`award was that the Yanukovych administration had succeeded in stripping away all
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`remaining vestiges of an independent judiciary and the Rule of Law. The administration,
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`in collusion with its allies in the Parliament, including the members affiliated with the
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`Party of Regions (POR), declared that the 2004 Constitution, which had been established
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`after the pro-democratic "Orange Revolution” had swept away the corrupt
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`administration in power, was procedurally “defective,” and should be replaced by the
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`prior constitution from 1996, which gave much greater power to the President and the
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`executive branch of government.
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`27.
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`The POR, with the full support of the administration, petitioned the
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`Ukraine Constitutional Court to set aside the 2004 Constitution in favor of the prior one.
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`While the matter was under consideration of the Constitutional Court, four of the
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`eighteen judges on the Court resigned on the same day, and two of the four admitted
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`that they had been pressured to resign. After these four judges were replaced with
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`more “reliable” judges, the Constitutional Court voted unanimously during the summer
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`of 2010 to set aside the 2004 Constitution and to replace it with the prior one, giving the
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`President the power of appointment over the Chief Prosecutor’5 Office and virtually
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`every other important office and branch of government.
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`10
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`28.
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`In July 2010, under the guise of “Judicial Reform,” the administration also
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`granted the Supreme Council ofludges certain powers not specifically enumerated or
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`even mentioned in the constitution, including the power to appoint the head judges of
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`all the courts, to control the assignment of cases and the allocation of offices,
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`computers and other resources, and to remove judges within one month's period
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`without hearing, the right to defend against the charges, or other indicia of due process.
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`Since the Yanukovych administration has the allegiance of at least 16 of the 20 members
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`on the Supreme Council of Judges, through the increase powers granted to the Supreme
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`Council, the administration has virtual complete control over the hiring and firing of
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`judges, thus precluding the possibility of any independent judiciary.
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`29.
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`The administration has also consolidated its control over the judiciary by
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`establishing new courts, such as the High Special Court, which can hear both civil and
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`criminal cases, and is headed up by the President’s hand-picked appointee, a former
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`POR member of the Parliament.
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`30.
`
`Perhaps the most powerful assault on any residual independence on the
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`part of the judiciary came when government prosecutors initiated a criminal case
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`against the younger daughter of the Chairman of the Supreme Court, Vasyl Onopenko,
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`and arrested 0nopenko’s son-in-law, Yevhen Korniychuk, an attorney and former
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`Deputy Justice Minister. On December 22, 2010, Korniychuk was summoned to the
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`Prosecutor's office from the hospital, where his wife had just delivered their newborn
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`child. At the time of Korniychu|<’s pre-trial detention and arrest in December, 2010,
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`11
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`Onopenko was the last Ukrainian in a high position of power not politically aligned with
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`the Yanukovych regime.
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`31.
`
`Korniychuk was accused of rigging the government procurement process
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`in 2009 in favor of his old law firm, Magisters, as attorneys for Naftogaz, a charge that
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`both he and his former law firm vigorously denied. These changes had been previously
`
`reviewed twice by the courts and found to be meritiess. Korniychuk was eventually
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`released after 55 days in jail, after a clear “message” had been sent to Supreme Court
`
`Judge Onopenko.
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`32.
`
`At about the same time, after the Prosecutor's office bought an obviously
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`po|itica||y—motivated criminal case against 0nopenko’s younger daughter, designed to
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`either intimidate Onopenko and/or force him to resign. Rather than discussing the
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`matter with the Prosecutor’s office that was investigating and prosecuting the case,
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`Onopenko decided to go directly to the Prosecutor’s boss, President Yanukovich. The
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`charges against 0nopenko’s daughter were dismissed the day after Onopenko and
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`Yanukovich had their meeting.
`
`33.
`
`Another scheme hatched by the current administration to solidify control
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`over the Supreme Court was to reduce the number of Supreme Court judges from 49 to
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`20, and to hold what has been referred to as "casting calls" for all of the judges to
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`determine which ones will stay on the Court and which ones will be dismissed.
`
`34.
`
`The loss of an independent judiciary and resulting transfer of huge
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`amounts of natural gas from Naftogaz to RUE after the confirmation by the Ukrainian
`
`12
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`
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`courts of the Tribunal award had a dramatic and immediate impact on the Ukrainian
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`economy and the social well-being of its citizens.
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`35.
`
`Although the Tribunal award was technically against Naftogaz, since that
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`company is state owned, the payments we re made with natural gas that was, in
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`essence, owned by Ukraine and its citizens. This represented a colossal disaster. Not
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`only had the gas that was now transferred to RUE already been paid for through a
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`transfer of $1.7 from Naftogaz to Gasprom, but the Ukrainian economy and its citizens
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`were now being deprived of a huge amount of the gas that was needed domestically
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`within Ukraine to heat homes, hospitals, schools and other facilities critical to the well-
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`being of Ukrainian people. In order to fill this shortfall in supply of gas for domestic
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`consumption, Naftogaz had to go purchase gas from foreign sources; however, the price
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`of the 12.1 billion cubic meters of gas had increased dramatically since the pricing at the
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`time of the original transaction, which averaged out to $1.7 billion, and was now worth
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`at least $3.5 billion.
`
`36.
`
`in order to understand the enormity of the transaction, it should be
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`noted that the 12.1 billion cubic meters of gas that Naftogaz transferred to RUE
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`following the Tribunal award represented approximately 50% of the 25 billion cubic
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`meters of gas produced in Ukraine annually, and approximately one-sixth of Naftogaz’s
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`total annual "gas balance” of 75 billion cubic meters, which includes the gas shipped by
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`pipeline into Ukraine from Russia and Turkmanistan.
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`37.
`
`Prior to the transfer of the 12.1 billion cubic meters of gas from Naftogaz
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`to RUE, the gas prices used for domestic consumption within Ukraine each year were
`
`13
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`
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`maintained significantly below the market price of the natural gas that was exported
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`from Ukraine to Western Europe. These domestic charges were stabilized at below-
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`market prices in recognition of the inability of individual citizens, pensioners,
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`homeowners, small businesses, hospitals and schools to pay for gas at any price other
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`than substantially below the market price.
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`38.
`
`This all changed when the Yanukovych administration took control in
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`February and March of 2010. Domestic gas prices were increased by 50%, which most
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`homeowners, pensioners, hospitals and schools could not afford to pay. As a result, the
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`gas pressure to homes, hospitals, schools and other facilities was reduced to the point
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`where the inside temperature of many of these facilities was barely above the freezing
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`level during the winter of 2010-2011. This not only resulted in widespread pain and
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`suffering among the Ukrainian populace, but also dramatically added to the already
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`serious health care crisis in the country, particularly in the public hospitals.
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`39.
`
`Since Firtash and RUE did not pay either the $1.7 billion original price or
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`the $3.5 billion that the 12.1 billion cubic meters of gas was worth at the time that it
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`was recently transferred from Naftogaz to RUE/Firtash, the defendants reaped a
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`windfail profit of at least 53.5 billion when they sold the gas (for which they had paid
`
`nothing) on the open market.
`
`40.
`
`Upon information and belief, Firtash and his associates have used part of
`
`those funds to purchase at least three petrochemical plants in Ukraine, thus creating a
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`virtual monopoly on the production of fertilizer in the country, which is critical to the
`
`14
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`entire agricultural sector of the Ukrainian economy. Moreover, Firtash is well positioned
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`to acquire a huge portion of the agricultural farm land that the current administration
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`plans to sell off through privatization plans.
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`41.
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`Also, upon information and belief, Firtash has used $600 million of the
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`huge financial windfall from the Tribunal award to exercise his option to buy a
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`percentage interest in the Inter media empire from his co-owner and close associate
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`Valeriy Khoroshkovsky, who is also the chief of the SBU, the Ukrainian state security
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`system.
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`42.
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`The corrupt agreement with the current administration that permitted
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`Firtash/RUE to make a windfall profit of at least $3.5 billion also has permitted those
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`defendants to extend their control over the natural gas distribution sector in Ukraine
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`since, upon information and belief, Firtash and his associates owns and controls
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`approximately 75% of the regional gas distribution companies in Ukraine, which are
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`commercial, privately owned companies.
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`43.
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`The failure of the current Ukrainian government to mount a credible
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`opposition during the Stockholm arbitration proceedings, due to fundamental conflicts
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`of interest, self-dealing, political manipulation and corruption, and the subsequent
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`rubber-stamping of the Tribunal award by the Ukrainian courts, is but one aspect of the
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`alarming deterioration of the rule of law in Ukraine. Another major aspect is the
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`selective and politically motivated investigation and prosecution of virtually every
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`significant executive in the administration of former Prime Minister Tymoshenko.
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`Case 1:11-cv-02794-KMW Document 1 Filed 04/26/11 Page 17 of 28
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`Indeed, the situation has become so alarming that a senior official of the European
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`Union, Stefan Fuele, warned the Ukraine government in January 2011 not to use
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`criminal law for political ends, a clear reference to the prosecution of Plaintiff
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`Tymoshenko and other opposition leaders by the Yanukovych administration.
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`Unfortunately, the protestations and warnings by the EU and international human rights
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`organizations have fallen on deaf ears.
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`44.
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`Since taking power, the Yanukovich administration, aided and abetted by
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`the defendants and other co-conspirators, have launched a wave of arrests and
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`investigations aimed at Plaintiff Tymoshenko and her political allies in what most
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`objective observers consider to be a concerted campaign to intimidate, suppress and
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`ultimately eliminate any and all political opposition in Ukraine.
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`45.
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`In addition to the investigations and prosecutions of Plaintiff
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`Tymoshenko, Yevhen Kornychuk, and the younger daughter of Chief Justice Vasyl
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`Onopenko, as described above , YURIY LUTSENKO, the former Interior Minister of
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`Ukraine, was arrested on criminal charges brought be the Prosecutor's General Office
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`on November 5, 2010, and remains jailed at the Lukyanivska prison in Kiev on politically
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`motivated and trumped-up charges of "overpaying" his former official driver and other
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`alleged "misappropriation" of state funds.
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`46.
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`In addition, ANATOLY MAKARENKO, the former Customs Chief of
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`Ukraine, was jailed in July 2010 and charged on August 30, 2010 on politically
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`motivated charges, as part of the defendants’ concerted effort to intimidate all political
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`Case 1:11-cv-02794-KMW Document 1 Filed 04/26/11 Page 18 of 28
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`opponents and to suppress political and human rights. Specifically, Mr. Maka renko was
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`charged with "suspicion of the abuse of official position” relating to the customs
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`clearance of 11 billion cubic meters of gas, which ownership was challenged by
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`defendant RosUkrEnergo ("U|(E”) in 2009.
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`47.
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`Similarly, IHOR DIDENKO, the former First Deputy Head of the National
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`Joint Stock Company “Naftogaz of Ukraine” (“ Nafogaz”] and political ally of plaintiff
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`Tymoshenko, was arrested and jailed on July 9, 2010 by officers of the Ukraine Security
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`Service (SUB) on false and politically motivated charges as a “person involved in a care
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`regarding infliction of damages on the State of Ukraine” relating to the claim to 11
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`billion cubic meters of gas that were submitted by RUE for arbitration in Stockholm. Mr.
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`Didenko, like Lutscenko and other political prisoners who were targeted for selective
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`prosecution, was incarcerated at the notorious Lukyanivska prison in Kiev, which was
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`designed to house 2800 prisoners, but is now overfilled with 4000 men, including other
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`political prisoners.
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`48.
`
`TARAS SHEPITKO, the former Deputy Head of the Department of the Kyiv
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`Regional Customs Office, was arrested on July 21, 2010 and selectively prosecuted on
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`charges of “misappropriation of property” relating to the transfer of the natural gas
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`claimed by RUE from Naftogaz.
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`49.
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`TETYANA SLYUZ, the former head of the State Treasury of Ukraine, and
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`TETYANA GRYTSUN, the fonner First Deputy Head of the State Treasury, were also
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`Case 1:11-cv-02794-KMW Document 1 Filed 04/26/11 Page 19 of 28
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`selectively prosecuted on political-motivated criminal charges allegedly involving his
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`“abuse of official position.”
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`50.
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`On August 5, 2010, criminal proceedings were initiated against BOGTDAN
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`DANYLYSHYN, the former Minister of the Economy, on charges of abuse of his official
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`position relating to procurement procedures. He was granted asylum by the Czech
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`Republic, where he remains.
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`51.
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`On August 21, 2010, VALERIY IVASHCHENKO, the former Acting Minister
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`of Defense, was arrested on charges of "abuse of power of official position."
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`52.
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`This systematic suppression of the political opposition in Ukraine by
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`means of poiiticaliy-motivated investigations and criminal prosecutions, forcing a
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`number of opposition leaders into exile or imprisonment, violates fundamental human
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`and political rights recognized by various international conventions and covenants, and
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`itself could provide the factual basis for a civil action in U.S. courts against the
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`government and various individuals for violations of international law.
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`C
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`A
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`N ALLEGATIONS
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`53.
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`Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action on behalf of a class of all
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`Ukrainian people that who have had their fundamental political and human rights
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`violated either through politically-motivated investigations, prosecutions and}or
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`incarceration, or who suffered damages as a result of the Tribunal award that has
`
`18
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`Case 1:11-cv-02794-KMW Document 1 Filed 04/26/11 Page 20 of 28
`Case 1:11—cv—O2794—KMW Document 1 Filed 04/26/11 Page 20 of 28
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`severely depleted the national treasury and resulting in the looting and theft of valua ble
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`national resources.
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`54.
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`The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is
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`impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this
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`time and can only be learned through appropriate discovery, Plaintiffs’ claims are typical
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`of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of each Class are similarly
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`affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of the federal, state and
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`international law complained of herein.
`
`55.
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`Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members
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`of the Class and have retained counsel competent and experienced in class action and
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`complex