`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
`----------------------------------------------------------x
`
`Case No. 1:21-cv-04995-JMF
`
`:::::::::::::::
`
`Micheli & Shel, LLC, individually and on
`behalf of others similarly situated,
`
`Plaintiffs,
`
`v.
`
`GRUBHUB INC., GRUBHUB INC. d/b/a
`SEAMLESS, SEAMLESS NORTH
`AMERICA, LLC, UBER TECHNOLOGIES
`INC., UBER EATS, POSTMATES LLC, and
`DOORDASH INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`----------------------------------------------------------x
`
`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT DOORDASH, INC.’S
`MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY
`
`Joshua Lipshutz (pro hac vice)
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
`Washington, DC 20036-5306
`Telephone: 202.955.8500
`Facsimile: 202.467.0539
`
`Ilissa Samplin
`Michael Holecek (pro hac vice)
`GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP
`333 South Grand Avenue
`Los Angeles, CA 90071-3197(cid:3)
`Telephone: 213.229.7000
`Facsimile: 213.229.7520
`
`Attorneys for Defendant DoorDash, Inc.
`
`
`
`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 2 of 16
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`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1
`
`II. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................ 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`D.
`
`E.
`
`The Federal Arbitration Act Governs The Parties’ Agreement ............................. 2
`
`An Arbitrator, Not This Court, Must Decide The Threshold Issue Of
`Arbitrability............................................................................................................ 3
`
`The Parties’ Arbitration Agreement Is Enforceable .............................................. 4
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The Arbitration Agreement Is Not Unconscionable .................................. 5
`
`Plaintiff’s Claims Are Within The Scope Of The Arbitration
`Agreement .................................................................................................. 6
`
`The Class-Action Waiver Is Enforceable .............................................................. 9
`
`There Is No Public Policy Requiring Litigation Of Plaintiff’s Claim ................. 10
`
`III. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 10
`
`
`i
`
`
`
`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 3 of 16
`
`
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Page(s)
`
`AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
`563 U.S. 333 (2011) .........................................................................................................1, 3, 10
`
`Badinelli v. Tuxedo Club,
`183 F. Supp. 3d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)......................................................................................10
`
`Bassett v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,
`93 F. Supp. 3d 95 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ...........................................................................................5
`
`BCB Holdings Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize,
`110 F. Supp. 3d 233 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, 650 F. App’x 17 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ........................10
`
`Benicorp Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Med. Health Card Sys., Inc.,
`447 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)........................................................................................9
`
`Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
`138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) ...............................................................................................................2
`
`Express Indus. & Terminal Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Transp.,
`93 N.Y.2d 584 (1999) ................................................................................................................9
`
`Forbes v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.,
`2009 WL 424146 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2009) ..............................................................................9
`
`Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
`534 N.E.2d 824 (N.Y. 1988) ......................................................................................................5
`
`Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph,
`531 U.S. 79 (2000) ...................................................................................................................10
`
`Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.,
`139 S. Ct. 524 (2019) .............................................................................................................1, 3
`
`Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
`537 U.S. 79 (2002) .....................................................................................................................3
`
`JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA,
`387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004)...................................................................................................6, 7
`
`Kai Peng v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
`237 F. Supp. 3d 36 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) .........................................................................................5
`
`ii
`
`
`
`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 4 of 16
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)
`
`Page(s)
`
`Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc.,
`252 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2001)...................................................................................................7, 8
`
`Mayaguez S.A. v. Citigroup, Inc.,
`2018 WL 1587597 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018) ...........................................................................6
`
`McFarlane v. Altice USA, Inc.,
`2021 WL 860584 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2021) ...............................................................................7
`
`Mehler v. Terminix Int’l Co. L.P.,
`205 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2000).........................................................................................................6
`
`Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
`848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016) ...................................................................................................5
`
`Morad v. Morad,
`812 N.Y.S.2d 126 (App. Div. 2006) ..........................................................................................6
`
`Nayal v. HIP Network Servs. IPA, Inc.,
`620 F. Supp. 2d 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)........................................................................................5
`
`Necchi S.p.A. v. Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp.,
`348 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1965).......................................................................................................8
`
`Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson,
`561 U.S. 63 (2010) .....................................................................................................................4
`
`Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
`482 U.S. 220 (1987) ...................................................................................................................2
`
`Southland Corp. v. Keating,
`465 U.S. 1 (1984) .......................................................................................................................2
`
`Sprinzen v. Nomberg,
`46 N.Y.2d 623 (1979) ..............................................................................................................10
`
`Suqin Zhu v. Hakkasan NYC LLC,
`291 F. Supp. 3d 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)........................................................................................6
`
`Titan Tire Corp. of Freeport v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg.,
`Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union,
`734 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2013) ...................................................................................................10
`
`United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
`363 U.S. 574 (1960) ...............................................................................................................1, 7
`
`iii
`
`
`
`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 5 of 16
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)
`
`Statutes
`
`Page(s)
`
`9 U.S.C. § 3 ......................................................................................................................................2
`
`9 U.S.C. § 4 ..............................................................................................................................1, 2, 4
`
`N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code § 20-848 .............................................................................................3
`
`Constitutional Provisions
`
`U.S. Const. art. VI ............................................................................................................................3
`
`
`iv
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`
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`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 6 of 16
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`I. INTRODUCTION
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`Plaintiff Micheli & Shel, LLC concedes that it voluntarily entered into an arbitration
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`agreement with DoorDash, whereby the parties mutually agreed to arbitrate “[a]ny dispute,
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`controversy or claim arising out of, relating to or in connection with” their agreement “or the
`
`relationship between the parties.” This dispute falls squarely within the scope of that agreement.
`
`The Court should reject Plaintiff’s attempts to avoid the parties’ mutual arbitration agreement.
`
`First, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs the arbitration agreement at issue here
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`and requires all aspects of this dispute to be arbitrated, including any dispute regarding the
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`enforceability and/or conscionability of the agreement itself. Indeed, the parties explicitly agreed
`
`to delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and the FAA requires courts to enforce
`
`arbitration agreements according to their terms. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer &
`
`White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529 (2019). Federal law dictates a strong presumption and public
`
`policy in favor of arbitration, see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 (2011),
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`and Plaintiff’s argument that a local law should “override” that presumption lacks support. The
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`Court should grant DoorDash’s motion on this basis alone.
`
`Second, even if the Court were to find that it should determine arbitrability despite the
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`parties’ intent to delegate that issue to an arbitrator, the Court should compel Plaintiff’s claims to
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`individual arbitration. The parties’ agreement is not unconscionable (as Plaintiff all but concedes),
`
`and both of the “gateway” issues under the FAA are met here: the parties entered into a valid
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`arbitration agreement that unambiguously covers Plaintiff’s claims in this case. See United
`
`Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960).
`
`Third, the class-action waiver is valid and enforceable, and no “public policy” requires that
`
`this dispute be litigated in court. Plaintiff does not (and cannot) distinguish recent Supreme Court
`
`precedent upholding the validity of class-action waivers like the one in the parties’ arbitration
`1
`
`
`
`
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`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 7 of 16
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`
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`agreement here. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018). Nor does Plaintiff
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`offer a convincing rationale for why an amorphous “public policy demands that this dispute remain
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`in open court.” Dkt. 75 at 17–19. In fact, there is no “public policy” exception to the FAA.
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`Plaintiff has not offered this Court any reason to break with the unanimous authority
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`upholding the enforceability of DoorDash’s arbitration agreement, because there is none.
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`DoorDash respectfully requests that the Court compel Plaintiff to arbitrate its claims individually,
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`stay this action pending resolution of this motion to compel arbitration, and stay all further
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`proceedings in this action pending completion of arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4.
`
`II. ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`The Federal Arbitration Act Governs The Parties’ Agreement
`
`Plaintiff acknowledges that the FAA promotes a strong presumption in favor of arbitration.
`
`See, e.g., Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1621. And yet, Plaintiff suggests that the local laws it says
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`DoorDash violated “clearly and unmistakably communicate[] a legislative intent to … overrid[e]
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`the FAA’s mandate” that Plaintiff be required to arbitrate its claims. Dkt. 75 at 7–8. This argument
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`misses the mark for at least two reasons.
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`First, the only legal authority Plaintiff cites in support of this theory states that the FAA
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`“mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims,” like those here. Shearson/Am.
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`Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (emphasis added). It adds that this “mandate
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`may be overridden by a contrary congressional command” and that the “burden … to show that
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`Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue” is on
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`“the party opposing arbitration.” Id. at 227 (emphases added). There is no directive from the
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`United States Congress for Plaintiff to rely on here. Plaintiff instead argues that a local law passed
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`by the New York City Council may override the FAA. No authority supports that novel theory.
`
`See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) (“We see nothing in the [FAA] indicating
`
`
`
`2
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`
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`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 8 of 16
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`
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`that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under State law.”).
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`It is black-letter preemption law that no state or local law could override the FAA, even if it
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`purported to do so. See U.S. Const. art. VI (“[T]he laws of the United States … shall be the supreme
`
`law of the land.”); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341 (“conflicting” state laws are “displaced by the FAA”).
`
`Second, there is no “contrary legislative command” in the municipal law on which Plaintiff
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`relies (which, in any case, does not even provide for a private right of action). Dkt. 75 at 8. That
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`law states that a “proceeding to recover any civil penalty … may be brought in any tribunal
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`established within the office of administrative trials and hearings or within any agency of the city
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`designed to conduct such proceedings.” N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code § 20-848 (emphasis added).
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`Even if the New York City Council had the power to preempt federal law (it does not), its use of
`
`the permissive “may” would not be a “legislative command” to do so. The FAA, and its “liberal
`
`federal policy” favoring arbitration, governs the parties’ agreement here. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346.
`
`B.
`
`An Arbitrator, Not This Court, Must Decide The Threshold Issue Of Arbitrability
`
`The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that the FAA allows parties to “agree that an
`
`arbitrator rather than a court will resolve disputes arising out of the contract,” including “threshold
`
`arbitrability questions as well as underlying merits disputes.” Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 527; see
`
`also Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002). Courts faced with a valid
`
`delegation clause must respect the parties’ choice to delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator:
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`“In those circumstances, a court possesses no power to decide the arbitrability issue.” Henry
`
`Schein, 139 S. Ct. at 529 (“When the parties’ contract delegates the arbitrability question to an
`
`arbitrator, a court may not override the contract.”).
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`Here, the parties’ arbitration agreement “clearly and unmistakably” provides that “[t]he
`
`arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to
`
`resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this
`3
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`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 9 of 16
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`
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`Arbitration Agreement.” Dkt. 60-8 at § 19(e); see also id. § 19(c) (incorporating the rules of ADR
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`Services, Inc., which similarly give arbitrators the power to decide threshold issues of arbitrability).1
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`Plaintiff does not grapple with the delegation clause in the parties’ arbitration agreement.
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`Plaintiff’s only argument against delegation is that the entire agreement is “unenforceable” because
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`it is “unrelated” to the claims asserted here and “no reasonable person would think” the agreement
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`“would obligate [Plaintiff] to arbitrate every possible dispute.” Dkt. 75 at 5–7. But the parties agreed
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`to delegate “any dispute relating to the … enforceability … of [their] Arbitration Agreement” to an
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`arbitrator, Dkt. 60-8 at § 19(e), so Plaintiff’s allegation must be resolved by an arbitrator, not this
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`Court. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 4 (courts must compel arbitration “in accordance with the terms of the
`
`agreement”); Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71 (2010) (arbitrator must determine
`
`threshold issues of enforceability where contract delegates “exclusive authority to resolve any
`
`dispute relating to … enforceability” of arbitration agreement). Where, as here, the party opposing
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`arbitration does not “challenge[] the delegation provision specifically, … any challenge to the
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`validity of the [a]greement as a whole” must be decided by the arbitrator. Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S.
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`at 72. The Court should compel arbitration on the basis of the delegation clause alone.
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`C.
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`The Parties’ Arbitration Agreement Is Enforceable
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`If the Court determines that it should resolve Plaintiff’s claims regarding enforceability of
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`the parties’ arbitration agreement despite the delegation clause, the Court should find the
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`agreement enforceable, as DoorDash explained in its opening brief. See Dkt. 59 at 11–21.
`
`
` 1 As DoorDash has explained, the Terms of Service (“TOS”) that took effect in June 2021 govern
`this dispute. See Dkt. 59 at 15–20. But the analysis is the same for the TOS to which Plaintiff
`originally assented in January 2020 (and for every other version of the TOS Plaintiff adopted
`through continued use of DoorDash’s services, see id.), because each version includes a
`materially identical arbitration provision. See Dkt. 60-8 at § 19; Dkt. 60-7 at § 19; Dkt. 60-6
`at § 19; Dkt. 60-5 at § 19; Dkt. 60-4 at § 19; Dkt. 60-2 at § 17. Older versions of the TOS
`incorporate JAMS’ arbitration rules and procedures, and those rules similarly provide that
`arbitrators may assess arbitrability issues. See Dkt. 61-9 at R.8(b); Dkt. 61-10 at R.11(b).
`4
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`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 10 of 16
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`
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`1.
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`The Arbitration Agreement Is Not Unconscionable
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`Plaintiff cannot establish that the parties’ arbitration agreement is unconscionable. See
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`Dkt. 75 at 5–7. New York law requires a finding of both procedural and substantive
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`unconscionability before a contract may be deemed unenforceable. See Nayal v. HIP Network
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`Servs. IPA, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 566, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Gillman v. Chase Manhattan
`
`Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988)). Plaintiff has established neither.
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`Procedural Unconscionability. By acknowledging that DoorDash’s arbitration agreement
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`“included an opt-out provision,” Plaintiff concedes it is not procedurally unconscionable. Dkt. 75
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`at 12. The opt-out right renders DoorDash’s arbitration agreement procedurally conscionable as a
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`matter of law. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2016)
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`(“[A]n arbitration agreement is not adhesive if there is an opportunity to opt out of it.”); Kai Peng
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`v. Uber Techs., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 3d 36, 55–56 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (contract not unconscionable if
`
`it affords opt-out right); Bassett v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 3d 95, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (same).
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`Plaintiff’s only retort is that its “opportunity to opt-out expired” months before the New
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`York City laws underlying its claim were enacted. Dkt. 75 at 12–13. That has nothing to do with
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`the conscionability of DoorDash’s arbitration agreement. Plaintiff was free to, but did not, exercise
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`its right to opt out of arbitration with DoorDash.
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`Substantive Unconscionability. Plaintiff also fails to prove substantive unconscionability.
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`A contract is substantively unconscionable only if it is “‘so grossly unreasonable or unconscionable
`
`in the light of the mores and business practices of the time and place as to be unenforcible [sic]
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`according to its literal terms.’” Nayal, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (quoting Gillman, 534 N.E.2d at
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`828). Plaintiff cannot come close to making this showing. DoorDash’s arbitration agreement
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`applies equally to both parties: it binds both parties to arbitrate their disputes, allows both parties
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`substantially similar discovery procedures available in civil actions, and makes comparable remedies
`5
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`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 11 of 16
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`
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`available to both parties. See Dkt. 60-8 at § 19. It thus “cannot be said” that the arbitration agreement
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`is substantively unconscionable. Suqin Zhu v. Hakkasan NYC LLC, 291 F. Supp. 3d 378, 392
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`(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (where “the terms of the Arbitration Agreement … apply equally to Plaintiffs and
`
`Defendants,” the agreement “cannot be said to [be] substantively unconscionable”). DoorDash’s
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`arbitration agreement applies to both parties and does not “‘shock the conscience [or] confound the
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`judgment of any person of common sense.’” Mayaguez S.A. v. Citigroup, Inc., 2018 WL 1587597,
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`at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018) (quoting Morad v. Morad, 812 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (App. Div. 2006)).
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`The lack of procedural or substantive unconscionability would be fatal to Plaintiff’s claim.
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`Here, both forms of unconscionability are lacking. The arbitration agreement is enforceable.
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`2.
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`Plaintiff’s Claims Are Within The Scope Of The Arbitration Agreement
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`The gravamen of Plaintiff’s opposition is that the claim asserted here falls outside the scope
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`of the arbitration agreement. See Dkt. 75 at 8–15. That, too, is wrong.
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`The parties agreed to arbitrate “[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, relating to
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`or in connection with” their agreement “or the relationship between the parties.” Dkt. 60-8 at § 19(a).
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`This broad agreement encompasses Plaintiff’s claim that DoorDash violated New York City laws
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`that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, capped the contracted-for fees DoorDash could charge merchants
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`in exchange for services provided pursuant to their agreement. Indeed, the factual underpinning of
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`Plaintiff’s complaint—the amount of the fee charged by DoorDash in exchange for its services—
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`is a key provision of Plaintiff’s contract with DoorDash (see Dkt. 60-1). See JLM Indus., Inc. v.
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`Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[I]f the allegations underlying the claims
`
`touch matters covered by the parties’ contracts, then those claims must be arbitrated, whatever the
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`legal labels attached to them.”); Mehler v. Terminix Int’l Co. L.P., 205 F.3d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 2000)
`
`(“In determining whether a particular claim falls within the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement,
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`we focus on the factual allegations in the complaint rather than the legal causes of action asserted.”).
`6
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`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 12 of 16
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`
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`Plaintiff contends that its claims are “wholly unrelated” to its contract with DoorDash and
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`that Plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate a cause of action that did not exist at the time it
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`entered into the arbitration agreement in question. Neither assertion is correct.
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`First, Plaintiff’s agreement with DoorDash specifically addresses “Payment & Pricing”
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`and “Fees.” Dkt. 60-1. Plaintiff’s claim that DoorDash charged fees in excess of those permitted
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`by law thus plainly “touch[es] matters covered by the parties’ contract.” JLM Indus., Inc., 387
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`F.3d at 172. By employing “expansive language” in the arbitration agreement—which provided
`
`for arbitration of “[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, relating to or in connection
`
`with” the parties’ agreement “or the relationship between the parties,” Dkt. 60-8 at § 19(a)—
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`Plaintiff and DoorDash “intend[ed] all issues that touch matters within” their contract “to be
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`arbitrated.” Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 252 F.3d 218, 225 (2d
`
`Cir. 2001). “[T]here arises,” in the context of such “broad” arbitration agreements, “a presumption
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`of arbitrability[,] and arbitration of even a collateral matter will be ordered if the claim alleged
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`implicates issues of contract construction or the parties’ rights and obligations under it.” Id. at 224.
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`Plaintiff acknowledges that “disputes connected in some way to the … agreement” must
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`be arbitrated. Dkt. 75 at 7. And if there were any “[d]oubts” regarding whether Plaintiff’s claims
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`fall within the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement—and there are not—those “[d]oubts
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`should be resolved in favor of coverage.” United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582–83 (“An order to
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`arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance
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`that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.”).
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`The question of coverage is plain from the face of the arbitration agreement.
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`Plaintiff’s primary authority—this Court’s decision in McFarlane v. Altice USA, Inc., 2021
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`WL 860584 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2021) (cited at Dkt. 75 at 4–7)—is inapposite. In that case, the
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`
`7
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`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 13 of 16
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`
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`Court denied the request of a telecommunications provider to compel arbitration of claims asserted
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`by employees pursuant to an arbitration agreement contained in the terms and conditions applicable
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`to subscribers. See id. at *4–9. The Court reasoned that the mere fact that some of the provider’s
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`employees were also its subscribers did not allow the provider to compel arbitration of employment-
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`related claims under the subscriber agreement. See id. at *9 (“Plaintiffs’ claims … lack any nexus
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`to the cable service agreement — that is, … they are not brought by Plaintiffs in their capacities
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`as current or former … subscribers.”). That is not the case here. DoorDash seeks to compel
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`arbitration of a dispute over the fees DoorDash charged Plaintiff, a merchant, in connection with
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`DoorDash’s commercial relationship with Plaintiff, pursuant to an arbitration agreement
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`DoorDash and Plaintiff entered into in connection with the merchant relationship. DoorDash is
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`not, for example, seeking to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s merchant claims pursuant to the
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`arbitration provision in the terms and conditions applicable to DoorDash consumers on the grounds
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`that one of Plaintiff’s representatives placed an order on the DoorDash platform as a consumer.2
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`Second, Plaintiff’s argument that it “could not have assented to be bound to arbitrate” its
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`claim with DoorDash “when the claim did not exist until after” it contracted with DoorDash is
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`unavailing. Dkt. 75 at 12–13. The parties’ agreement requires arbitration of claims “arising out of,
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`relating to or in connection with” their contract or relationship. Dkt. 60-8 at § 19(a). The agreement
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`is not limited to claims or causes of action in existence at the time of execution, and the Court should
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` 2 Nor does Necchi S.p.A. v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp., 348 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1965),
`aid Plaintiff. The arbitration provision in that case did not require arbitration of claims arising
`out of “the working relationship between the parties,” and thus certain claims that did not arise
`out of the agreement at issue were not arbitrable. Id. at 698. By contrast, DoorDash’s arbitration
`agreement is broad; it requires arbitration of “[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of,
`relating to or in connection with” not only the parties’ contract, but also their “relationship.”
`Dkt. 60-8 at § 19(a). Where an arbitration clause is so broad, “there arises a presumption of
`arbitrability,” even on “collateral matter[s].” Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A., 252 F.3d at 224.
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`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 14 of 16
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`not read in such a limitation. Plaintiff does not cite a single case for the proposition that an arbitration
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`agreement must specifically enumerate all possible claims and causes of action in scope, and DoorDash
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`is not aware of one. Plaintiff knew at the time it contracted with DoorDash that there could be a future
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`dispute between the parties over fees. It plainly agreed to arbitrate any such dispute, and the cause
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`of action used to assert that claim has no bearing on whether the claim is arbitrable.
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`Nor do the cases Plaintiff cites counsel in favor of such a requirement3—which would, in
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`any case, be impractical and run counter to the well-established policy favoring arbitration,
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`including of statutory claims. See Forbes v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 2009 WL 424146, at *3
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`(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2009) (“According to New York law, … statutory and common law claims can
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`be submitted to arbitration.” (collecting cases)).
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`D.
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`The Class-Action Waiver Is Enforceable
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`The parties have unambiguously agreed to waive their right to resolve claims within the
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`scope of the arbitration agreement on a class, collective, or representative basis. See Dkt. 60-8 at
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`§ 19(g). Plaintiff does not dispute this point, but instead states summarily that the class-action
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`waiver does not apply because the dispute is outside the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement.
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`See Dkt. 75 at 15–17. Because Plaintiff’s claim is within the scope of the parties’ agreement, this
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`tautological argument has no force. The class-action waiver in the parties’ agreement is valid and
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`enforceable for the reasons stated in DoorDash’s opening brief. See Dkt. 59 at 21–22.
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` 3 Plaintiff relies on Express Industries & Terminal Corp. v. New York State Department of
`Transportation, 93 N.Y.2d 584 (1999). There, the court concluded that an arbitration agreement
`that contained blank provisions contested in subsequent correspondence between the parties
`was unenforceable. DoorDash’s arbitration agreement is not comparable. And in Benicorp
`Insurance Co. v. National Medical Health Card Systems, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 329, 338 (S.D.N.Y.
`2006), the court refused to enforce a settlement agreement as to “all rebate claims” where one
`party had said the agreement “was not intended to cover all rebate claims.” Here, Plaintiff
`acknowledged its intent to be bound by the arbitration agreement in the TOS when it checked
`a box next to the words “I understand and agree.” Dkt. 59 at 3. And unlike in Benicorp, Plaintiff
`never objected to the scope of DoorDash’s arbitration agreement until it filed this lawsuit.
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`Case 1:21-cv-04995-JMF Document 78 Filed 10/15/21 Page 15 of 16
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`Accordingly, Plaintiff should be compelled to arbitrate its claim on an individual basis.
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`E.
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`There Is No Public Policy Requiring Litigation Of Plaintiff’s Claim
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`Plaintiff does not dispute that there is a “liberal federal policy” favoring arbitration.
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`Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346. Nor does it dispute that New York also “strongly favor[s] enforcing
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`arbitration agreements.” Badinelli v. Tuxedo Club, 183 F. Supp. 3d 450, 453 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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`And Plaintiff acknowledges that the “public policy exception to the FAA” may no longer exist.
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`Dkt. 75 at 17. Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that this case presents “one of the rare occasions in
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`which public policy demands that th[e] dispute remain in open court.” Id. at 17–19.
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`Plaintiff misconstrues the law. There is no “public policy” exception to the FAA requiring
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`that a claim alleging a violation of public policy not be arbitrated. To the contrary, the Supreme
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`Court has held that “even claims arising under a statute designed to further important social
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`policies may be arbitrated because so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his
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`or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute serves its functions.” Green Tree
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`Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (alteration in original).
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`Courts may—in rare circumstances—overturn arbitral awards that contravene public
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`policy. See, e.g., Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 46 N.Y.2d 623, 630 (1979) (“[A]n award which is
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`violative of public policy will not be permitted to stand.”). That is the import of the cases on which
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`Plaintiff relies. See Titan Tire Corp. of Freeport v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg.,
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`Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, 734 F.3d 708, 719 (7th Cir. 2013); BCB
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`Holdings Ltd. v. Gov’t of Be