Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 1 of 19
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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`------------------------------------------------------X
`CHRISTINA LESLIE, individually and on
`behalf of all others similarly situated,
`
`CASE NO. 1:22-CV-07936-JHR
`
`
`
`ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
`
`:::::::::::
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`-against-
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`THOMSON REUTERS CORPORATION,
`
`Defendant.
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`------------------------------------------------------X
`
`MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S RULE 23(d)(1)(D)
`MOTION TO STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS
`
`BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
`Eric R. Fish
`45 Rockefeller Plaza
`New York, NY 10111
`212.589.4200 (phone)
`212.589.4201 (fax)
`efish@bakerlaw.com
`
`Joel Griswold (pro hac vice)
`200 South Orange Avenue, Suite 2300
`Orlando, Florida 32801
`407.649.4088 (phone)
`jcgriswold@bakerlaw.com
`
`Bonnie Keane DelGobbo (pro hac vice)
`Amy L. Lenz (pro hac vice)
`One North Wacker Drive, Suite 4500
`Chicago, Illinois 60606
`312.416.6200 (phone)
`312.416.6201 (fax)
`bdelgobbo@bakerlaw.com
`alenz@bakerlaw.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Reuters News & Media, Inc., sued
`herein as Thomson Reuters Corporation
`
`
`
`

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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 2 of 19
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`
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1
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`BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................... 2
`
`ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 3
`
`I.
`
`Plaintiff’s Class Allegations Should Be Stricken .............................................................. 3
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`A. Legal Standard ............................................................................................................. 3
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`a. Assent To Online Terms .................................................................................. 4
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`b. Rule 23 ............................................................................................................. 5
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`B. Plaintiff’s Class Allegations Should Be Stricken Pursuant To Rule 23(d)(1)(D) ........7
`
`a. Plaintiff, Like All Readers, Assented To The Reuters Terms of Use, And
`Those Terms Contained A Class Action Waiver ............................................. 8
`
`b. Because She Has Waived Class Action Rights, Plaintiff Cannot Satisfy Basic
`Rule 23 Prerequisites ..................................................................................... 10
`
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 12
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`ii
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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 3 of 19
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page
`
`
`
`Cases
`
`Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,
`570 U.S. 228 (2013) .............................................................................................................9, 11
`
`Banyai v. Mazur,
`205 F.R.D. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) .............................................................................................11
`
`Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., of New Mexico,
`703 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1983) .................................................................................................6
`
`Brown v. Kelly,
`609 F.3d 467 (2d Cir. 2010).....................................................................................................11
`
`Brown v. Milwaukee Spring Co.,
`82 F.R.D. 103 (E.D. Wis. 1979) ................................................................................................6
`
`Calibuso v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
`893 F. Supp. 2d 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) .......................................................................................7
`
`Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
`877 F. Supp. 2d 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ........................................................................................6
`
`Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600 v. Byrd,
`456 F.2d 882 (7th Cir. 1972) .....................................................................................................6
`
`DeBose v. Fedex Corp.,
`No. 08-cv-07042, 2009 WL 1542572 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2009) ................................................5
`
`Fedotov v. Peter T. Roach & Assocs., P.C.,
`354 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ........................................................................................6
`
`Fteja v. Facebook, Inc.,
`841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ..................................................................................4, 10
`
`Hidalgo v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc.,
`148 F. Supp. 3d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ........................................................................................7
`
`Kassman v. KPMG LLP,
`925 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ..................................................................................7, 11
`
`Korea Wk., Inc. v. Got Cap., LLC,
`No. CV 15-6351, 2016 WL 3049490 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2016) ..........................................8, 11
`
`
`
`iii
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`

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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 4 of 19
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`
`
`Mantolete v. Bolger,
`767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) ...................................................................................................6
`
`Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
`868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017)...............................................................................................4, 5, 10
`
`Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc.,
`763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) ...................................................................................................4
`
`Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
`834 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2016).......................................................................................................5
`
`Osborn v. Pennsylvania–Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass’n,
`499 F. Supp. 553 (D. Del. 1980) ................................................................................................6
`
`Ott v. Mortg. Inv’rs Corp. of Ohio,
`65 F. Supp. 3d 1046 (D. Or. 2014) ............................................................................................6
`
`Palmer v. Convergys Corp.,
`No. 7:10-CV-145 HL, 2012 WL 425256 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2012) ...........................................9
`
`Pennsylvania Pub. Sch. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
`772 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.)..............................................................................................................11
`
`PFT of Am., Inc. v. Tradewell, Inc.,
`No. 98 CIV. 6413 (RPP), 1999 WL 179358 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999)....................................7
`
`Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC,
`660 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 2011) .....................................................................................................6
`
`Rahman v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc.,
`No. 06CIV6198(LAK)(JCF), 2008 WL 161230 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2008) .............................12
`
`Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,
`356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).......................................................................................................4
`
`Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp.,
`697 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012).............................................................................................4, 5, 10
`
`Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp.,
`306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).........................................................................................................4
`
`Thompson v. Merck & Co.,
`No. C.A. 01-1004, 2004 WL 62710 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2004) .....................................................5
`
`Tongo v. Derwinski,
`No. 90-cv-4986, 1991 WL 243421 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1991)............................................5, 11
`
`
`
`iv
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`

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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 5 of 19
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`
`
`Travis v. Navient Corp.,
`460 F. Supp. 3d 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) .......................................................................................6
`
`U1it4Less, Inc. v. FedEx Corp.,
`No. 11-CV-1713 KBF, 2015 WL 3916247 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2015) ......................................8
`
`Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,
`571 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................................................6
`
`Vitrano v. N.A.R., Inc., No. 18CV06754-KAM-RLM, 2020 WL 1493620, at *9
`(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020) ........................................................................................................12
`
`In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg.,
`275 F.R.D. 270 (S.D. Ill. 2011) ...........................................................................................7, 11
`
`Statutes
`
`18 U.S.C. § 2710 ..............................................................................................................................1
`
`Other
`
`5 Moore’s Federal Practice § 23-145 (3d ed. 2007) ........................................................................7
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) .........................................................................................................................6
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ................................................................................................................... passim
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1)(D) ............................................................................................................11
`
`
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`v
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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 6 of 19
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`Defendant Reuters News & Media Inc., sued herein as Thomson Reuters Corporation,
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`(collectively with its affiliates, “Reuters”) respectfully submits this Memorandum of Law in
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`support of its Motion to Strike Class Allegations pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
`
`23(d)(1)(D).
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`INTRODUCTION
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`Since the 1850s, using just telegraph cables and a fleet of carrier pigeons, Reuters—the
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`news and media division of Thomson Reuters—has provided news and information to all corners
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`of the world. Through the hard work of its thousands of journalists, Reuters supplies accurate,
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`unbiased reporting to news organizations globally while also operating a free news website,
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`Reuters.com.
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`Plaintiff Christina Leslie (“Plaintiff”) alleges she signed up in 2022 for free email
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`newsletters from Reuters and separately watched some short news clips on Reuters.com. Plaintiff
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`now brings a Class Action Complaint alleging violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18
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`U.S.C. § 2710 (“VPPA”), a statute that famously stems from the disclosure of information about
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`the video rental history of the family of Judge Robert H. Bork.
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`Decades after the VPPA was passed, and in the current digital, web-based age where few
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`video stores exist, Plaintiff asserts that Reuters violated the VPPA because it allegedly shared
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`users’ video viewing information and personally identifiable information (“PII”) to Facebook
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`through a “pixel”—an industry-standard tracking tool.
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`By signing up to receive email newsletters from Reuters, however, Plaintiff agreed to and
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`is bound by Reuters’ Terms of Use (“Terms”). Because Reuters’ Terms expressly contain a class
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`action waiver, Plaintiff cannot maintain her claim as a class action against Reuters in this case.1
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`1 Reuters preserves and does not waive any defenses and arguments in opposition to class certification.
`1
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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 7 of 19
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`Accordingly, and pursuant to Rule 23(d)(1)(D), the Court should enter an order requiring that the
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`Complaint be “amended to eliminate allegations about [Plaintiff’s] representation of absent
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`persons.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(D).
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`BACKGROUND
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`Reuters is a global news organization and the owner of Reuters.com. (Dkt. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 1,
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`13.) Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Reuters under the VPPA alleging she signed up
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`in 2022 for a Reuters email newsletter and separately watched news clips on Reuters.com. (Compl.
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`¶¶ 3-4, 20, 32, 46-47.)
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`Importantly, all individuals who signed up for a newsletter with Reuters during 2022
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`agreed to Reuters’ Terms, which contain an explicit class action waiver: “You also hereby
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`expressly waive any right to resort to any form of class action.” (Declaration of Phil Andraos
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`(“Andraos Decl.”) Exs. 2-3 ¶¶ 5,6, 21.). There are only four ways that Plaintiff could have signed
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`up to receive a Reuters newsletter:
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`1. By checking the “sign up for Reuters Daily Briefing Newsletter to get all the news you
`need to start your day” button or the “sign up for the Reuters Sustainable Switch
`newsletter to make sense of the latest ESG trends affecting companies and
`governments” button on Reuters.com’s Registration Page, and then checking the “I
`agree to the Reuters Terms & Conditions and Privacy Statement” box before
`clicking the “Sign Up” button in order to sign up for a newsletter. (Andraos Decl., Ex.4
`¶ 12(a));
`
`2. By signing up on Reuters’ general Newsletter landing page which contained Terms of
`Use and Privacy links right below the “Submit” button to sign up for a newsletter.
`(Decl., Ex. 5 ¶ 12(b));
`
`3. By signing up on any Reuters’ newsletter-specific landing page, where users are
`required to check the “I agree to Reuters Terms & Conditions and Privacy
`Statement” box before they would be able to click the “Sign up” button in order to
`sign up for a newsletter .” (Andraos Decl. Ex. 6 ¶ 12(c));
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`4. By signing up on any relevant article page containing a Newsletter sign-up box, where
`users were required to check the “I agree to Reuters Terms & Conditions and Privacy
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`2
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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 8 of 19
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`
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`Statement” box before they would be able to click the “sign up” button in order to sign
`up for a newsletter. (Andraos Decl. Ex. 7 ¶ 12(d).)
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`Thus, it would have been impossible for Plaintiff to sign up for a newsletter with Reuters during
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`2022, as she alleges in the Complaint, without first agreeing to this class action waiver. (Andraos
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`Decl. Exs. 2-7, ¶¶ 5, 6, 12 (a)-(d), 21.)
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`
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`Plaintiff does not assert that she watched videos in any newsletter at any time. Indeed,
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`Reuters newsletters do not contain any video content. (Andraos Decl. ¶ 14.)
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`Plaintiff repeatedly alleges that she watched videos on Reuters.com during 2022 (Compl.
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`¶¶ 47, 63), and Reuters’ Terms were available at the bottom of every webpage at all times during
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`2022. (Andraos Decl. ¶ 19.) Reuters’ Terms state that “by accessing, using and/or downloading
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`the Service, you agree to be legally bound and consent to these Terms.” (Andraos Decl. Exs. 2, 3,
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`¶ 5, 6, 20.)
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`After a thorough investigation of the email address information provided by Plaintiff,
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`Reuters located no evidence that Plaintiff registered for an account on Reuters.com.2 (Andraos
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`Decl. ¶ 16.) In addition, Reuters’ investigation identified no video viewing history for a “Christina
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`Leslie” or that could be in any way connected to Plaintiff. (Andraos Decl. ¶ 17.)
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`ARGUMENT
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`I.
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`PLAINTIFF’S CLASS ALLEGATIONS SHOULD BE STRICKEN.
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`A. Legal Standard
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`The law makes clear that (1) under standard contract principles, online users may validly
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`demonstrate assent to a website’s terms and conditions through various methods, including in
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`2 To the extent Plaintiff may assert she signed up for an account with Reuters.com, and not just a Reuters newsletter,
`Plaintiff still would have been presented with the Terms at sign-up. (See Exs. 4, 8, Andraos Decl. ¶¶ 15 (a)-(b).)
`3
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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 9 of 19
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`
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`“clickwrap” or “browsewrap” formats and (2) federal courts regularly strike class allegations from
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`a plaintiff’s complaint.
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`a. Assent to Online Terms
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`“While new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has
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`not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.” Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66,
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`75 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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`To form a contract, there must be “[m]utual manifestation of assent, whether by written or
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`spoken word or by conduct.” Meyer, 868 F.3d at 74 (quoting Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp.,
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`306 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2002)). One way in which courts distinguish web-based contracts “is the
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`manner in which the user manifests assent—namely, ‘clickwrap’ (or ‘click-through’) agreements,
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`which require users to click an ‘I agree’ box after being presented with a list of terms and
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`conditions of use, or ‘browsewrap’ agreements, which generally post terms and conditions on a
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`website via a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.” Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75. Courts routinely uphold
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`clickwrap agreements “for the principal reason that the user has affirmatively assented to the terms
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`of agreement by clicking ‘I agree.’” Id. (citing Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837
`
`(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (collecting cases)).
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`In upholding browsewrap agreements, courts consider “whether the user has actual or
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`constructive knowledge of a website’s terms and conditions.” Id. (quoting Nguyen, 763 F.3d at
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`1176 (citation omitted)). Even where “there is no evidence that the offeree had actual notice of the
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`terms of the agreement, the offeree will still be bound by the agreement if a reasonably prudent
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`user would be on inquiry notice of the terms.” Id. at 74-75 (citing Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp.,
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`697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2012); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir.
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`2014)). “Whether a reasonably prudent user would be on inquiry notice turns on the ‘[c]larity and
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`4
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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 10 of 19
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`
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`conspicuousness of [the] terms,’ (citing Specht, 306 F.3d at 30); in the context of web-based
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`contracts, . . . clarity and conspicuousness are a function of the design and content of the relevant
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`interface.” Meyer, 868 F.3d at 75 (citing Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 233 (2d Cir.
`
`2016)).
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`When considering “the question of reasonable conspicuousness, precedent and basic
`
`principles of contract law instruct that we consider the perspective of a reasonably prudent [] user.”
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`Id. at 77 (citing Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 124 (“[T]he touchstone of the analysis is whether reasonable
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`people in the position of the parties would have known about the terms and the conduct that would
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`be required to assent to them.”)).
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`b. Rule 23
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`Under Rule 23, the Court may issue orders that “require that the pleadings be amended to
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`eliminate allegations about representation of absent persons and that the action proceed
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`accordingly.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(D). As for timing, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) requires that, “[a]t an
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`early practicable time after a person sues . . . as a class representative,” a court “must determine
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`by order” whether the action can be certified as a class action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
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`When it is apparent that a plaintiff cannot meet one or more of the elements of Rule 23
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`required for class certification, it is appropriate for defendants to move to strike the class
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`allegations. DeBose v. Fedex Corp., No. 08-cv-07042, 2009 WL 1542572, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June
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`2, 2009) (striking class action allegations when plaintiff’s claims were “highly individualized”);
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`Tongo v. Derwinski, No. 90-cv-4986, 1991 WL 243421, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1991)
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`(explaining that when plaintiff seeking to bring class action under Rule 23 is unable to meet
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`requirements, courts are authorized to strike “part[s] of the complaint that seeks to assert an action
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`on behalf of a class”); Thompson v. Merck & Co., No. C.A. 01-1004, 2004 WL 62710, at *2 (E.D.
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`5
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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 11 of 19
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`
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`Pa. Jan. 6, 2004) (granting motion to strike class allegations in light of “subjective and intangible
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`differences of each class member's individual circumstances”); Ott v. Mortg. Inv’rs Corp. of Ohio,
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`65 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1070 (D. Or. 2014) (granting motion to strike subclass under Rule 12(f)).3
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`Procedurally, courts regularly hear such motions to strike as here before a plaintiff
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`affirmatively moves for class certification—a request sometimes styled as a motion to deny class
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`certification. Fedotov v. Peter T. Roach & Assocs., P.C., 354 F. Supp. 2d 471, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
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`(explaining that “defendant’s Motion for Denial of Class Certification – a procedural ‘preemptive
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`strike’ against this purported class action – is properly before this court”); Pilgrim v. Universal
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`Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943, 949 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming striking of class action allegations
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`despite the fact “[t]hat the motion to strike came before the plaintiffs had filed a motion to certify
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`the class”); Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 9341 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding
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`that defendant “filed its motion to deny class certification at a permissible point in the proceedings
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`[before plaintiffs’ had filed an ‘affirmative motion for class certification’]”).4
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`While not pertinent here, courts may disfavor motions to strike class allegations in certain
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`scenarios, e.g., where plaintiffs need to “to complete the discovery to which they would otherwise
`
`be entitled on questions relevant to class certification.” Travis v. Navient Corp., 460 F. Supp. 3d
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`269, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). But a motion to strike is properly brought where it “addresses issues
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`‘separate and apart from the issues that will be decided on a class certification motion.’” Travis,
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`3 See also Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming striking of class action allegations);
`Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., of New Mexico, 703 F.2d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 1983) (affirming striking of class action
`allegations).
`4 See also Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600 v. Byrd, 456 F.2d 882, 884-85 (7th Cir. 1972) (“One
`opposing a class action may move for an order determining that the action may not be maintained as a class suit [even
`when plaintiffs have not yet moved for formal certification].”); Osborn v. Pennsylvania–Delaware Serv. Station
`Dealers Ass’n, 499 F. Supp. 553, 560 (D. Del. 1980) (“Plaintiff’s briefing appears to incorrectly assume that
`defendants to purported class actions may only raise issues regarding the appropriateness of this procedure in response
`to class certification motions.”); Brown v. Milwaukee Spring Co., 82 F.R.D. 103, 104 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (“While the
`plaintiff has the burden of establishing her right to maintain a class action, the defendants may test the propriety of the
`action by means of a motion for denial of class certification.”).
`6
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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 12 of 19
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`
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`460 F. Supp. 3d at 286 (citing Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117
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`(S.D.N.Y. 2012)); see also Calibuso v. Bank of Am. Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 374, 383 (E.D.N.Y.
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`2012) (holding same).
`
`
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`Therefore, a motion to strike class allegations may be granted if it can be demonstrated
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`“from the face of the [c]omplaint that it would be impossible to certify the alleged class regardless
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`of the facts [the] [p]laintiffs may be able to obtain during discovery.” Hidalgo v. Johnson &
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`Johnson Consumer Companies, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 3d 285, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal citations
`
`omitted); see also 5 Moore’s Federal Practice § 23-145 (3d ed. 2007) (internal citations omitted)
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`(“where the basis for the motion to strike is distinct from those [class action] factors, [a] court may
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`order deletion of portions of a complaint’s class claims once it becomes clear that the plaintiffs
`
`cannot possibly prove the deleted portion of those claims”).
`
`
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`Courts have regularly struck class allegations on such grounds. Hidalgo, 148 F. Supp. 3d
`
`at 292; Kassman v. KPMG LLP, 925 F. Supp. 2d 453, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); PFT of Am., Inc. v.
`
`Tradewell, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 6413 (RPP), 1999 WL 179358, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999); In
`
`re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., 275 F.R.D. 270, 274 (S.D. Ill. 2011) (granting Rule
`
`23(d)(1)(D) motion to strike where no set of alleged facts could have supported granting class
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`certification).
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`B. Plaintiff’s Class Allegations Should Be Stricken Pursuant to Rule 23(d)(1)(D).
`
`In this action, Plaintiff seeks to bring her VPPA claim individually and on behalf of a class
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`defined as:
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`
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`All persons in the United States with a digital subscription to an online
`website owned and/or operated by Defendant that had their Personal
`Viewing Information disclosed to Facebook by Defendant.
`
`(Compl. ¶ 50.)
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`7
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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 13 of 19
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`In determining which persons have a “digital subscription,” Plaintiff alleges that to
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`“register for Reuters.com, users sign up for an online newsletter. (Compl. ¶ 20.) It is worth noting
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`that Plaintiff’s allegation is not accurate. Signing up for a Reuters email newsletter (such as Reuters
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`Daily Briefing or the Sustainable Switch) does not register a reader for a “digital subscription to”
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`Reuters.com—it merely means a reader will start receiving newsletters in their email inbox.
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`(Andraos Decl. ¶ 8.) To register for an account on Reuters.com, a reader must complete a separate
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`web-based form. (Andraos Decl. ¶ 9.) Moreover, there is no “subscription” to Reuters email
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`newsletters or Reuters.com, as access is free of charge. (Andraos Decl. ¶ 10.) In fact, at present,
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`Reuters.com can be accessed without registration for readers of up to three news articles per 30-
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`day period on a personal computer, and up to 10 articles per 30-day period on the Reuters mobile
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`app. (Andraos Decl. ¶ 11.)
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`However, because Plaintiff broadly defines the class as person in the U.S. “with a digital
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`subscription,” for the purposes of this Motion, we understand Plaintiff to define the class as
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`including persons who have (i) registered to Reuters.com and/or (ii) signed up for a newsletter.
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`a. Plaintiff, Like All Readers, Assented To The Reuters Terms of Use, And Those
`Terms Contained A Class Action Waiver
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`Regardless of whether a reader registered for an email newsletter or for Reuters.com, the
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`same Terms of Use governed the reader’s use of Reuters.com. Those Terms included an express
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`waiver of the ability to assert class action claims: “You also hereby expressly waive any right to
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`resort to any form of class action.” (Andraos Decl., Exs. 2-3 ¶¶ 5, 6, 21.)
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`Courts in New York and elsewhere have held that class waivers like the ones in Reuters’
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`Terms are enforceable. See U1it4Less, Inc. v. FedEx Corp., No. 11-CV-1713 KBF, 2015 WL
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`3916247, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2015) (holding similar independent class action waiver
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`enforceable in consumer contract); Korea Wk., Inc. v. Got Cap., LLC, No. CV 15-6351, 2016 WL
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`8
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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 14 of 19
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`3049490, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2016) (citing Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228,
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`236 (2013) (finding class action waiver independent of an arbitration agreement enforceable
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`because “Rule 23 does not ‘establish an entitlement to class proceedings for the vindication of
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`statutory rights,’” rather “[t]he class-action waiver merely limits arbitration to the two contracting
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`parties. It no more eliminates those parties’ right to pursue their statutory remedy than did federal
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`law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938.”)); Palmer v. Convergys Corp.,
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`No. 7:10-CV-145 HL, 2012 WL 425256, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2012) (independent “class action
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`waivers are upheld because they are contractual provisions that do not affect any substantive
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`rights”).
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`To be clear, all readers, including Plaintiff necessarily assented to such Terms, including
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`the class action waiver. The way in which this assent was captured depends on how a reader
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`interacted with Reuters.com.
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`All Readers of Reuters.com. Every webpage on Reuters.com contains a link to the Terms
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`at the bottom of the page. (Andraos Decl. ¶ 19.) The Terms specify that all website users are bound
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`to the Terms (Andraos Decl. Exs. 2-3 ¶¶ 5, 6, 20), so any reader’s use—whether Plaintiff’s or
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`anyone else’s—of Reuters.com demonstrated their assent to those Terms.
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`Registrants on Reuters.com. To register for Reuters.com, a reader fills out a web-based
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`form. (Andraos Decl. ¶ 15.) To complete this sign-up process, a reader clicks a box stating “I agree
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`to the Reuters Terms & Conditions and Privacy Statement.” (Andraos Decl. ¶ 15(a)-(b).) Should
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`a reader wish to review those terms before signing up, hyperlinks to both the Terms of Use and
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`the Privacy Statement are provided. (Andraos Decl. ¶ 15(a)-(b).) At all relevant times, the Terms
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`contained the class waiver. (Andraos Decl. Exs. 2-3 ¶ 5, 6, 21.)
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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 15 of 19
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`
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`Newsletter Recipients. Plaintiff alleges that she “began a digital subscription to
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`Reuters.com in 2022” on account of having signed up “for an online newsletter.” (Compl. ¶¶ 12,
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`20.) Notwithstanding the inaccuracy in that allegation, (Andraos Decl. ¶¶ 16-17), in 2022, there
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`were four ways for a person to sign up for an email newsletter from Reuters, and each of these
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`pathways presented users with clickwrap to the Terms containing the class waiver.5 Supra at 2-3.
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`Courts have found assent to a site’s terms of use in analogous settings. See Meyers, 868 F.3d at 78
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`(finding assent to Terms where notice of the Terms of Service were provided simultaneously to
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`enrollment, thereby connecting the contractual terms to the services to which they applied,
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`explaining that “a reasonably prudent smartphone user would understand that the terms were
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`connected to the creation of a user account.”); Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835
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`(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding assent to clickwrap terms where “the following sentence appears
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`immediately below [the sign-up] button: “By clicking Sign Up, you are indicating that you have
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`read and agree to the Terms of Service.”). Consequently, it would have been impossible for
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`Plaintiff to sign up for a newsletter during 2022 without agreeing to the class waiver. (Andraos
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`Decl. Exs. 2-3 ¶ 5, 6, 21.)
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`b. Because She Has Waived Class Action Rights, Plaintiff Cannot Satisfy Basic
`Rule 23 Prerequisites
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`Because Plaintiff agreed to a class waiver, she cannot satisfy Rule 23’s numerosity
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`requirement, that is, she cannot demonstrate that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all
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`members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Certification on the basis of numerosity only
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`“is appropriate where the number of class members is sufficiently large so that joinder of all
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`5 Even on the general Newsletter landing page, where the Terms were provided as a hyperlink directly below the
`“submit” button, (Andraos Decl. Ex. 5 ¶ 12(b)), a reasonable user would have known that by signing up for a
`recurring mailing they would be agreeing to these Terms. See Schnabel, 697 F.3d at 124 (“[T]he touchstone of the
`analysis is whether reasonable people in the position of the parties would have known about the terms and the
`conduct that would be required to assent to them.”).
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`Case 1:22-cv-07936-JHR Document 25 Filed 01/18/23 Page 16 of 19
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`members would make litigation needlessly complicated and inefficient.” Banyai v. Mazur, 205
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`F.R.D. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The Second Circuit has found that “[n]umerosity is presumed
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`for classes larger than forty members.” Pennsylvania Pub. Sch. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Morgan
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`Stanley & Co., 772 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir.), as amended (Nov. 12, 2014). Here, Plaintiff waived
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`her right to assert a class action and, therefore, cannot bring a suit against Reuters that is larger
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`than a single-plaintiff case.
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`Likewise, Plaintiff cannot show that she “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
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`the class,” Rule 23(a)(4), because she has already contractually agreed not to represent anyone else
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`in pursuing her claims. (Andraos Decl. Exs. 2-3 ¶ 5, 6, 21.) Thus, as a matter of law, she cannot
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`act as a class representative. See Korea Wk., 2016 WL 3049490, at *11 (“Class representatives
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`with rights to sue which vary from the absent class members are inadequate under Rule 23.”);
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`Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 479 (2d Cir. 2010) (“In order for a class representative