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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MARISSA KUBICKI, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, CONNIE PARK, in her individual capacity, LAURA WALSH, in her individual capacity, REBEKAH ALMANZAR, in her individual capacity, JACKIE QUIGLEY, in her individual capacity, and YONZEL BURT, in her individual capacity, Defendants.
` Case No. 26-cv-3882 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Demand for Trial by Jury
` Plaintiff Marissa Kubicki (“Plaintiff”), by her attorneys, The Dugger Law Firm, PLLC makes the following allegations against Defendant The Legal Aid Society (“The Legal Aid Society,” “Defendant” or “Defendant Legal Aid Society”),1 Connie Park (“Park” or “Defendant Park”), Laura Walsh (“Walsh” or “Defendant Walsh”), Rebekah Almanzar (“Almanzar” or “Defendant Almanzar”), Jackie Quigley (“Quigley” or “Defendant Quigley”), and Yonzel Burt (“Burt” or “Defendant Burt”) (collectively, “Defendants”). 1 References to actions by The Legal Aid Society or Defendant Legal Aid Society are inclusive of actions by its employees acting on behalf of the organization. Similarly, references to “Defendants” refer to two or more of the pled Defendants.
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 1 of 139
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`INTRODUCTION 1. Defendant The Legal Aid Society is a New York City nonprofit legal services organization that relies on skilled professionals to carry out its mission of serving indigent clients in criminal court. 2. Plaintiff is one of those professionals: a Forensic Social Worker who devoted years of her career to serving Defendant’s clients and supporting Defendant’s attorneys in court. 3. This case concerns Defendant’s response after Plaintiff developed a serious medical condition and began medical treatment that made unnecessary prolonged exposure to crowded courthouse environments medically risky. Plaintiff did not seek to avoid client-facing work, attorney support, hearings, or court-related duties. She sought to limit unnecessary courthouse exposure while remaining available to attend court when her physical presence was needed. Rather than provide interim protection or conduct a good-faith individualized assessment, Defendant delayed, diverted, and imposed a new, up to full-day, “court presence” requirement that exposed Plaintiff to the very risk her provider sought to reduce. 4. Plaintiff has ankylosing spondylitis and underwent medical treatment that rendered her immunocompromised. 5. Ankylosing spondylitis is a chronic inflammatory autoimmune condition associated with chronic low back pain. 6. Plaintiff’s medical provider advised her to limit unnecessary in-person court exposure, while Plaintiff remained willing and able to perform her job duties, including appearing in court when needed to meet with clients, assist attorneys, or address specific court-related needs.
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 2 of 139
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`7. Plaintiff had previously supported The Legal Aid Society’s staff and clients by working from the Legal Aid Society office across the street from the courthouse in the Bronx, and by attending court or meeting with clients at the courthouse when scheduled for a client meeting, court appearance, or specific attorney request for support in court, typically made the day before or the same day. 8. Working in this manner allowed Plaintiff to reduce avoidable exposure to crowded public courthouse settings that her medical provider had advised her to limit because of her disability and immunocompromised status. It also allowed Plaintiff to work on case matters and administrative work when not actually needed in court. 9. In short, Defendant Legal Aid Society refused to allow Plaintiff to continue working as she had successfully worked for years and instead it imposed a new requirement, applicable only to Plaintiff, that she remain physically present in court for up to seven hours a day, even when no client matter required her presence. 10. Plaintiff alleges that, in its zeal to deny and push back against disability-based remote work requests, as alleged herein, Defendant Legal Aid Society required Plaintiff to sit in the courtroom for up to seven hours a day rather than permit her to work on case matters from The Legal Aid Society office across the street from the courthouse, where she could remain available while reducing unnecessary public exposure. This requirement placed Plaintiff in a setting where she often could not work on her cases, typically could not speak during court proceedings, and was exposed to courthouse conditions for longer than was necessary when no client-specific or attorney-specific need required her physical presence. Plaintiff had successfully performed her role for years by attending court when needed to support specific client matters.
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 3 of 139
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`11. In other words, Defendant Legal Aid Society required Plaintiff to remain in
`court for as much as an entire workday, despite medical documentation advising that
`unnecessary prolonged courthouse exposure increased the risk of serious illness,
`hospitalization, and worsening of her disability-related condition.
`12. Plaintiff did ultimately become ill during the period when Defendant Legal Aid
`Society required the unnecessary, additional courthouse exposure.
`13. During the period when Defendant refused interim protection and continued to
`require disputed in-person courthouse coverage, Plaintiff became ill twice. Plaintiff does not
`allege that every court appearance during that period was unnecessary, nor that the precise
`source of either infection can be identified without medical and factual discovery. Plaintiff
`alleges that Defendant’s refusal to provide an interim accommodation required unnecessary or
`excessive courthouse exposure while Plaintiff was immunocompromised, materially increased
`her risk of infection, and may have contributed to the illnesses and disability -related
`deterioration that followed.
`14. Following this deterioration, Plaintiff’s health declined to the point that she now
`requires a wheelchair and assistance with many basic needs.
`15. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ refusal to provide a reasonable
`accommodation and interim protection increased her risk of infection while
`immunocompromised.
`16. This action seeks, on behalf of Plaintiff and several classes, declaratory and
`injunctive relief requiring Defendant to cease its unlawful accommodation practices and to
`implement lawful accommodation policies, including prompt interim measures while requests
`are pending, as well as attorneys’ fees, expert fees, and costs.
`--
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`17. Plaintiff additionally seeks a declaration as to whether Defendant Legal Aid Society’s conduct amounted to willful or wanton negligence, recklessness, conscious disregard of the rights of the Classes or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard. 18. This action further seeks, individually on behalf of Plaintiff, monetary relief including back pay (including lost wages, salary, employment benefits, and other compensation), compensatory damages, and punitive damages. 19. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA” or “Rehabilitation Act”) and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 et seq. (“NYCHRL”), challenging Defendant Legal Aid Society’s: (1) systemic failure to provide reasonable accommodations; (2) systemic delay in the provision of reasonable accommodations including provision of interim measures; (3) systemic failure to engage in a good faith cooperative dialogue; (4) systemic interference, coercion, and intimidation with respect to the employees’ exercise of disability rights; (5) systemic medical inquiry violations; (6) systemic screening of disabled employees; and (7) a pattern and/or practice of retaliation. 20. Plaintiff further brings an individual aiding and abetting violation under the NYCHRL. 21. Plaintiff challenges The Legal Aid Society’s policy, pattern, and/or practice of denying and/or delaying its employees’ valid disability-based remote and/or location-based disability accommodation requests. 22. Plaintiff challenges The Legal Aid Society’s policy, pattern, and/or practice of failing to engage in good-faith cooperative dialogues in response to and concerning its employees’ disability accommodation requests.
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 5 of 139
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`23. Plaintiff challenges The Legal Aid Society’s policy, pattern, and/or practice of retaliation against its employees who request disability-based accommodations. 24. Plaintiff challenges The Legal Aid Society’s policy, pattern, and/or practice of interference, coercion, threats, and/or intimidation, or attempts at the same, against its employees who request disability-based accommodations. 25. Plaintiff challenges The Legal Aid Society’s policy, pattern, and/or practice of illegal screening of disabled employees. 26. Plaintiff challenges The Legal Aid Society’s policy, pattern, and/or practice of illegal excessive medical inquiries of disabled employees seeking disability accommodations. 27. As reflective of these alleged policies, patterns, and/or practices, Plaintiff alleges that, upon information and belief, The Legal Aid Society: a. Partially denied and delayed an employee’s temporary post-surgical telecommuting accommodation after the employee returned from medical leave following hip surgery and was still recovering from mobility limitations. The employee requested to work remotely except when essential job functions required in-person work, explaining that she had only recently begun walking without a cane, that commuting three days per week was not realistic during recovery, and that requiring her to report onsite for work that consisted largely of phone calls, Teams meetings, emails, and virtual appearances would over-exert her for the sake of strict compliance rather than job-related necessity. Although The Legal Aid Society processed an accommodation through Matrix, it approved only two remote-work days per week from April 13, 2026 through August 11, 2026, and left additional remote-work flexibility to supervisor-by-supervisor discretion. When the employee asked whether she could appeal and why she had not been approved to work remotely except for essential in-person functions, The Legal Aid Society’s Senior Employee Relations Specialist, Defendant Walsh, responded that she did not view the matter as being at the appeal stage, stated that the practice generally defined the role as requiring attorneys to be onsite approximately three days per week, and suggested a further collaborative conversation with supervisors about onsite expectations. The employee reasonably understood this response as discouraging an appeal and leaving her dependent on discretionary approval rather than a clear accommodation matching her medical limitations and actual job duties;
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 6 of 139
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` b. Denied an employee’s request to return to work fully remotely, for an employee working in a unit relying significantly on remote work, after a disability-based leave, and forcing the employee to remain out of work (unpaid) until the request as originally made was withdrawn and the employee agreed to an ineffective alternative accommodation (at a risk to the employee’s health), when the employee’s economic situation became untenable on an extended unpaid leave. In this case, HR repeatedly sought additional duplicative unnecessary medical information from the employee regarding their disability accommodation request; c. Harassed, discriminated against, and retaliated against an employee after she disclosed a high-risk pregnancy (with respect to which she, upon information and belief, had an impairment of her reproductive system constituting a covered disability under the NYCHRL and requested accommodations of not going to Rikers and scheduling flexibility, by subjecting her to pretextual “coaching and counseling” (disciplinary) sessions for using medically necessary sick time, pressuring her to take unpaid FMLA instead of providing reasonable workplace flexibility, and making demeaning and inappropriate comments, including about her weight. Upon information and belief, after the employee disclosed her high-risk pregnancy and sought accommodations, The Legal Aid Society escalated scrutiny of her time and attendance and treated protected, medically necessitated absences as a performance/discipline issue -- calling her into “coaching and counseling” sessions and attempting to force her onto leave rather than accommodating her condition. In addition, The Legal Aid Society conflated protected leave categories with non-protected absences in documenting “attendance” concerns, and mischaracterized pregnancy-related medical limitations and restrictions (including limitations on assignments) as mere “requests.” Ultimately, the conduct became so severe that, upon information and belief, the employee filed a hostile work environment complaint with HR in or about May 2025, which upon information and belief, has still not been resolved; d. Denied disability accommodation requests from several Defendant Legal Aid Society employees, including Plaintiff, with serious post-COVID chronic conditions who requested flexible scheduling and/or additional telecommuting days to recuperate from constant fatigue and preserve their health. These denials were based on The Legal Aid Society’s knee-jerk, unexplained, non-individualized repeated response of the mantra that “the essential functions of the job” required in-person presence -- without provision of a single example of how this could not be navigated with a remote hybrid schedule. e. Failed to respond to or meaningfully respond to requests for disability-based accommodations for two months or longer (in one case more than five
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 7 of 139
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`months without a substantive response), without interim accommodation approvals (resulting in effective denials) even where the request was eventually partially or belatedly approved; f. Engaged in a bad-faith interactive process and/or cooperative dialogue process in which employees requesting disability-based accommodation were subjected to a repeated campaign of bad faith and/or harassing meetings, the purpose of which was not to engage in good faith cooperative dialogue, but to instead, filibuster, justify denial or delay, and/or find new grounds to deny the disability accommodation request. In turn, employees were exhausted and worn down by these bad faith meetings, each of which further delayed the approval of their requested disability accommodation (often without the grant of an interim accommodation), and were in turn accused of refusing to participate in the interactive process and/or cooperative dialogue; and g. Responded to requests for disability-based accommodation requests, including Plaintiff’s request, with retaliation and interference, by attempting to re-define the role to make the role’s essential functions retroactively incompatible with the requested disability accommodation. These back-handed denials, designed to circumvent accommodations rights, through job redefinition, impose exhausting costs on The Legal Aid Society employees already burdened with the underlying medical condition on which their disability accommodation was based. These employees were then forced to seek and legally qualify for disability-based accommodations -- an ever-moving target of evolving job duties being re-made to make their requested disability accommodation appear less reasonable and workable for accommodation than it was at the time of the disability accommodation request 28. Plaintiff alleges that The Legal Aid Society has engaged in organization-wide practices that have violated the disability rights of its employees. 29. These violations are especially unfortunate because The Legal Aid Society publicly positions itself as a premier public-interest organization committed to enforcing rights for low-income New Yorkers, including through affirmative and class-action law reform litigation. In fact, The Legal Aid Society maintains specialized disability-rights programs -- including its Government Benefits and Disability Advocacy Project -- and has itself brought
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 8 of 139
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`class-action litigation to secure reasonable accommodations for people (other than its own employees) with disabilities seeking access to public benefits. 30. Yet, when the mirror is turned inward to the legality of its own disability accommodation practices, The Legal Aid Society ignored the very principles it champions in court and enforces on others through public-interest litigation when Plaintiff sought reasonable accommodations and equal access to the workplace. 31. Instead, The Legal Aid Society denied and delayed reasonable accommodations, obstructed the interactive process, engaged in bad faith cooperative dialogues, interfered with its employees’ disability rights, and retaliated against its employees for requesting disability-based accommodations -- applying one standard to those against whom it brought public-interest litigation while applying a lower standard to its treatment of its own workforce. Plaintiff’s Work History 32. The Legal Aid Society employed Plaintiff as a Forensic Social Worker in the Parole Revocation Defense Unit (“PRDU”) beginning on March 1, 2023, following a transfer from her previous position as a Forensic Social Worker in the Bronx Criminal Defense Practice (“CDP”), where she had worked since 2019. 33. By 2024, Plaintiff had a disability and required medically necessary workplace accommodations. Upon information and belief, during 2024, The Legal Aid Society rolled back organization-wide hybrid work and limited employees to one work-from-home day per week. Plaintiff, however, was approved for a disability-based accommodation that permitted her to work from home three days per week and work in person two days per week. On or about November 8, 2024, Plaintiff returned from short-term disability leave with that
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 9 of 139
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`accommodation in place. The Legal Aid Society initially granted the accommodation on an interim basis, and the accommodation later became permanent in or about May 2025. 34. Plaintiff successfully performed the essential functions of her Forensic Social Worker position with this accommodation. The approval and continuation of this accommodation confirmed that Defendant knew Plaintiff had a disability, knew she required reduced exposure to in-person workplace environments, and knew that Plaintiff could perform her job while working remotely three days per week and appearing in person two days per week. 35. Defendant Legal Aid Society and Plaintiff’s supervisors knew of Plaintiff’s disability and accommodation status well before the later court-coverage dispute. On January 6, 2025, Defendant Quigley acknowledged in writing that Plaintiff had an accommodation in place to work from home with LAS equipment three days per week and to work in the office two days per week through May 2025. 36. In early 2025, Defendant Legal Aid Society also processed additional disability-related equipment accommodations for Plaintiff, including a screen protector and an ergonomic chair with lumbar support. Plaintiff’s treating provider had documented that Plaintiff had ankylosing spondylitis with chronic low back pain and needed a chair with lumbar support at all times. 37. These prior accommodations gave Defendant Legal Aid Society, Human Resources, and Plaintiff’s supervisors actual notice that Plaintiff had a documented chronic disability, that she required workplace modifications, and that she could successfully perform the essential functions of her PRDU Forensic Social Worker position with accommodations.
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 10 of 139
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`38. Plaintiff’s 2024 accommodation addressed her general weekly work schedule. It did not address the separate court-coverage issue that arose later, after Defendant Legal Aid Society began changing what it expected Plaintiff and another Bronx PRDU Forensic Social Worker to do during their in-person court-coverage days. 39. On July 14, 2025, Plaintiff’s treating provider again documented that Plaintiff was under medical care for treatment and monitoring of an autoimmune and/or auto-inflammatory disease, that the condition was chronic, and that Plaintiff should work from home three days per week followed by two in-person workdays. 40. The July 14, 2025 provider documentation explained that the accommodation was medically appropriate not only because of Plaintiff’s chronic pain and limited mobility, but also to reduce Plaintiff’s exposure to illnesses. 41. Accordingly, before Defendant escalated the court-coverage requirement and before Plaintiff submitted her amended court-exposure accommodation request, Defendant Legal Aid Society already knew that Plaintiff’s medical condition required reduced exposure to illness as part of her disability accommodation. 42. During June 2025, Defendant Walsh became the new Senior Employee Relations Specialist assigned to handle the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) accommodation requests, replacing Taryn Anderson (“Anderson”). 43. Shortly thereafter, during August 2025, Defendant Quigley told Plaintiff and Luca Verano Diaz (“Verano Diaz”), another Bronx PRDU Forensic Social Worker, during separate supervision meetings, that they were expected to be physically present in court during court-coverage days even when they did not have clients or an identified client-specific need.
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 11 of 139
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`44. The instruction was initially described as requiring court presence for approximately one hour on court-coverage days. 45. On August 22, 2025, Plaintiff contemporaneously documented that the new court-presence mandate was not in the PRDU Forensic Social Worker job description and was inconsistent with existing court-coverage guidance. 46. On August 22, 2025, Verano Diaz reported to social-work delegates that Defendant Quigley had stated during supervision that Bronx PRDU social workers would be required to be in court for at least one hour on court-coverage days to “build relationships” with attorneys. 47. That same day, 1199SEIU delegate Kim Wirt contacted Defendants Quigley and Almanzar to request a meeting regarding the new court-presence practice. 48. Defendant Legal Aid Society did not produce any written policy requiring continuous courthouse presence. Instead, management maintained that Plaintiff and Verano Diaz were expected to be in court for at least one hour on coverage days, rather than working from the Bronx office and going to court when needed. 49. Plaintiff and Verano Diaz involved 1199 SEIU delegate Kim Wirt because they disputed the new court-presence instruction as inconsistent with their job duties, the established PRDU court-coverage model, and prior practice. The existing PRDU court-coverage model required Plaintiff to remain available and responsive to attorney and client needs, including by going to court when needed. It did not require Plaintiff to sit in court when no attorney, client, or court-related need required her physical presence. 50. On or about November 24, 2025, after Defendant Legal Aid Society continued to maintain the disputed court-presence instruction, Plaintiff submitted updated medical
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 12 of 139
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`documentation and sought to amend her existing permanent disability accommodation. Plaintiff did so because her disease had progressed and, in or about October 2025, she had begun immunosuppressive treatment that made unnecessary courthouse exposure increasingly medically dangerous. 51. Specifically, Plaintiff requested an interim accommodation to work from The Legal Aid Society’s office during onsite court coverage shifts and to attend court when called, rather than maintaining physical presence in court for up to seven hours per day. 52. Upon information and belief, beginning no later than November 25, 2025, Defendant Walsh assumed a central role in Defendant Legal Aid Society’s disability-accommodation process for Plaintiff and similarly situated employees. After Walsh became involved, Defendant’s practices moved away from the more prompt, collaborative approach reflected by Taryn Anderson’s November 2024 interim accommodation for Plaintiff, and toward a more adversarial process involving pressure to accept alternatives, delays, repeated medical-information demands, refusal to provide interim measures, and reliance on asserted job-function requirements to narrow or deny accommodations. Plaintiff and other affected employees experienced Defendant Walsh as the principal Human Resources actor in these disputes. Upon information and belief, Defendant Walsh’s involvement escalated and consolidated practices that affected Plaintiff and other putative class members in materially similar ways, while reflecting practices already present within Defendant’s centralized process. 53. Plaintiff would not have disclosed details of her personal treatment plan to Defendant Legal Aid Society but for Defendant’s new and disputed court-presence instruction. Plaintiff’s amended accommodation request sought to limit unnecessary courthouse exposure
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 13 of 139
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`while preserving Plaintiff’s ability to perform all essential job duties, including attending court when needed for a client, attorney, hearing, meeting, or other specific court-related need. 54. Following this protected accommodation request, Defendant Legal Aid Society escalated the disputed instruction primarily against Plaintiff. 55. What began in August 2025 as an asserted one-hour court-presence instruction directed at both Bronx PRDU Forensic Social Workers became, after Plaintiff’s amended disability-accommodation request, an asserted requirement that Plaintiff be in court for up to seven hours per day during court-coverage days, interact with attorneys, and confer with Defendants Almanzar and Quigley before leaving court. 56. The escalation of the court-presence requirement against Plaintiff was not based on a new written policy, a preexisting job description, or longstanding PRDU practice. It arose during and because of Plaintiff’s accommodation process, after Plaintiff requested protection from unnecessary courthouse exposure because she was undergoing immunosuppressive treatment. 57. Despite Plaintiff’s medical documentation and repeated follow-ups, Defendant did not provide any interim accommodation while it evaluated Plaintiff’s request. Defendant left Plaintiff without any interim protection while her imminent court-coverage shifts approached, despite known medical risk and documented harm. 58. During this timeperiod, Plaintiff became ill twice while Defendant continued to require disputed in-person court coverage without granting interim protection. 59. On or about December 3, 2025, Plaintiff became ill with a stomach virus. 60. On or about December 22, 2025, Plaintiff became ill again with an upper respiratory infection.
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 14 of 139
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`61. Plaintiff’s second December illness lasted more than a week. 62. Upon information and belief, because Plaintiff was immunosuppressed, she was unable to fight off the virus without interrupting medically necessary immunosuppressant treatment for her autoimmune condition. 63. Upon information and belief, as a result of the interruption, Plaintiff’s autoimmune condition flared, and when her body was later able to tolerate treatment, the prior regimen became ineffective -- forcing Plaintiff to change her treatment course. 64. During this same time-period, Defendant delayed and diverted the matter to its third-party administrator (Reliance Matrix) and demanded additional provider information on a compressed timetable while providing no interim measures. 65. Defendants’ refusal to provide interim accommodation relief while the request remained pending required Plaintiff to continue working under conditions that posed medically documented risks to her health. Upon information and belief, Defendants’ refusal increased Plaintiff’s risk of the infection that, upon information and belief, later exacerbated her medical condition. 66. Plaintiff had proposed an interim modification that would have preserved full court-coverage availability while reducing unnecessary or excessive exposure. 67. While Defendant Legal Aid Society did not grant Plaintiff an interim accommodation while evaluating her amended request, between November and December 2025, Plaintiff repeatedly sought guidance and interim protection through emails and meetings. 68. With no meaningful interim relief and no timely resolution, Plaintiff -- through 1199 SEIU -- filed a grievance on or about December 19, 2025, challenging Defendant’s delay and failure to provide a timely interim accommodation, and challenging Defendant’s insistence
`Case 1:26-cv-03882-VSB Document 1 Filed 05/11/26 Page 15 of 139
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`that PRDU forensic social workers must remain continuously in court for extended periods (up to seven hours) as a unilateral change in job expectations affecting disabled employees. 69. Defendant Legal Aid Society left Plaintiff to choose between following medical guidance and risking discipline under Defendant Legal Aid Society’s newly asserted court-presence position. 70. In or about January 2026, Defendant Legal Aid Society continued to escalate the disputed court-presence requirement as to Plaintiff by asserting that Plaintiff was required to remain in court for up to seven hours during court-coverage days and could not leave court without first conferring with Defendants Almanzar and Quigley. 71. This was materially different from the earlier August 2025 one-hour instruction that had been directed at both Plaintiff and Verano Diaz. 72. Around the same time, Plaintiff began experiencing additional symptoms, including tachycardia, difficulty regulating body temperature, and other symptoms distinct from her original autoimmune condition. Plaintiff thereafter consulted with her cardiologist and rheumatologist. Plaintiff’s rheumatologist attempted to restart immunosuppressive treatment, but Plaintiff’s symptoms worsened, and Plaintiff was not able to resume consistent treatment until in or about April 2026. 73. Defendant Legal Aid Society used the accommodation process to reframe and enlarge Plaintiff’s job duties, rather than to engage in a good-faith individualized assessment of whether Plaintiff could continue performing court coverage from the nearby Defendant Legal Aid Society office and attend court when actually needed for a specific client or matter. 74. Defendant Legal Aid Society did not escalate the disputed one-hour instruction against Verano Diaz into the same seven-hour -- Plaintiff-specific accommodation
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`requirement. Instead, Defendant Legal Aid Society escalated the issue primarily against Plaintiff after she sought disability-related protection from unnecessary courthouse exposure. 75. Plaintiff explained that court coverage operated like emergency coverage, with attorneys directed to contact a forensic social worker by call, email, or other channels when support was needed. Previously, court coverage required availability and responsiveness, not continuous courthouse presence when no attorney or client needed in-person support. 76. The coercive effect of the new court-presence instruction was immediate. 77. Defendant’s disputed court-presence requirement placed Plaintiff in the position of risking discipline if she followed her medical restrictions and resisted unnecessary courthouse exposure. 78. Plaint

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