`WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
`CHARLOTTE DIVISION
`DOCKET NO. 3:22-CV-00148-FDW-DSC
`
`
`ORDER
`
`
`
`
`
`) )
`
`
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`
`
`
`
`
`SYCAMORE BREWING, LLC,
`
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`
`
`vs.
`
`
`STONE BREWING CO., LLC,
`
`
`Defendant.
`
`
`
`THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Sycamore Brewing, LLC’s Motion for
`
`Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (the “Motion”), (Doc. No. 5), filed April 8,
`
`2022. On April 11, 2022, the Court entered an Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to the extent it sought
`
`a Temporary Restraining Order and deferring on ruling to the extent it sought a Preliminary
`
`Injunction. On April 20, 2022, a hearing on the Motion took place before the undersigned. After
`
`reviewing the pleadings, exhibits thereto, and applicable law, and after hearing the evidence and
`
`arguments presented by counsel at the hearing, the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary
`
`injunction and GRANTS the Motion with modification as set forth below.
`
`Findings of Fact
`
`1. Plaintiff Sycamore Brewing, LLC (“Plaintiff”) is a limited liability company founded in 2013
`
`with its principal place of business in Charlotte, North Carolina. Plaintiff currently sells craft
`
`beer throughout North Carolina and across seven other states – South Carolina, Virginia, West
`
`Virginia, Tennessee, Ohio, Georgia, and Kentucky – and asserts it continues to expand its
`
`market.
`
`2. Plaintiff’s Juiciness IPA was introduced in 2019 and is currently sold throughout Plaintiff’s
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00148-FDW-DSC Document 22 Filed 04/21/22 Page 1 of 10
`
`
`
`distribution area, in eight states.
`
`3. In 2020, Plaintiff began marketing its Juiciness IPA with the slogan KEEP IT JUICY. The
`
`slogan is prominently printed on the retail packaging boxes that the beer is sold in:
`
`
`
`4. Plaintiff owns the name and mark KEEP IT JUICY (U.S. Reg. No. 6,464,651) (the “Mark”) and
`
`has registered the mark on the Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark
`
`Office (the “USPTO”) in International Class 32 for “Beer; Beer, ale, and lager; Craft beer.” The
`
`USPTO registered the mark on August 24, 2021, with a date of first use of September 12, 2020.
`
`5. Defendant Stone Brewing Co., LLC (“Defendant”) is a limited liability company founded in
`
`1996 with its principal place of business in Escondido, California. As of 2022, Defendant is the
`
`ninth largest craft brewery in the United States and has distributed and sold beers in all fifty states
`
`since 2017.
`
`6. In August 2021, Defendant launched its Hazy IPA.
`
`7. In March 2022, after Plaintiff obtained registration of the Mark with the USPTO, Defendant
`
`changed the packaging for its Hazy IPA, adding “KEEP IT JUICY” to the bottom flap of its
`
`retail box.
`
`8. Defendant now distributes its Hazy IPA in retail packaging boxes that prominently feature the
`
`Mark. Defendant also uses the Mark on the Hazy IPA page on its website. In addition,
`
`Defendant uses the Mark in video advertising for its Hazy IPA.
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00148-FDW-DSC Document 22 Filed 04/21/22 Page 2 of 10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`9. Defendant is using the Mark without Plaintiff’s consent, approval, or authority.
`
`
`
`Conclusions of Law
`
`1. To obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff must establish: “(1) it is likely to succeed on the
`
`merits; (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm without the preliminary injunction; (3) the balance
`
`of equities tips in its favor; and (4) the injunction is in the public interest.” Mountain Valley
`
`Pipeline, LLC. V. W. Pocahontas Props. Ltd. P’ship, 918 F.3d 353, 366 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing
`
`Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
`
`2. The Court concludes, and neither party disputes, that it has jurisdiction over the parties and subject
`
`matter of this action.
`
`3. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims
`
`for (1) Trademark Infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (2) Unfair Competition pursuant
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00148-FDW-DSC Document 22 Filed 04/21/22 Page 3 of 10
`
`
`
`to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); and (3) Deceptive Trade Practices pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-
`
`1.1.
`
`4. To establish Trademark Infringement, Plaintiff must show that (1) it has a valid trademark; (2)
`
`its mark can be protected; and (3) the defendant’s use of an imitation is likely to cause
`
`consumer confusion. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a); Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162,
`
`170 (4th Cir. 2006).
`
`5. A certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark, ownership by
`
`the registrant, and proper registration under the Lanham Act. Birttingham v. Jenkins, 914 F.2d
`
`447, 452 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b)); see 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a). Accordingly,
`
`the Mark is entitled to a presumption of validity, and Plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of
`
`ownership of the Mark. See Rebel Debutante LLC v. Forsythe Cosmetic Group, Ltd., 799 F.
`
`Supp. 2d 558, 568-69 (M.D.N.C. 2011). However, because KEEP IT JUICY was registered
`
`in 2021 and therefore has not been in continuous use for five consecutive years following
`
`registration, the Mark is not “conclusive” evidence and may be contested by Defendant. Id.
`
`(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115(b) (“Incontestability”), 1065 (“Incontestability of right to sue mark
`
`under certain conditions”)). In its response brief, Defendant contests the validity of the Mark.
`
`(Doc. No. 17, pp. 7-8). “In challenging the presumption, [Defendant] must introduce sufficient
`
`evidence, by a preponderance, to rebut the presumption of [Plaintiff’s] right to exclusive use.
`
`Id. (citing Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1529 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1984)). The
`
`Court concludes Defendant has failed to carry its burden of introducing sufficient evidence to
`
`rebut the presumption of validity and ownership of the Mark. Moreover, the Court concludes
`
`KEEP IT JUICY on its face appears to be at least suggestive, juxtaposing three words that
`
`connote, rather than describe, Plaintiff’s Juiciness IPA and together are not typically associated
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00148-FDW-DSC Document 22 Filed 04/21/22 Page 4 of 10
`
`
`
`with craft beer. Id. (citing U.S. Search, LLC v. U.S. Search.com Inc., 300 F.3d 517, 523 (4th
`
`Cir. 2002) (“Suggestive as well as arbitrary and fanciful marks are deemed inherently
`
`distinctive and receive the greatest amount of protection. A suggestive mark consists of words
`
`that connote, rather than describe, some quality or characteristic of a product or service.”).
`
`Accordingly, the Court finds the Mark, which the USPTO registered on August 24, 2021, is
`
`valid and can be protected.
`
`6. The Fourth Circuit generally balances the following relevant factors to assess the likelihood of
`
`confusion among consumers: (1) strength/distinctiveness; (2) similarity of the marks; (3)
`
`similarity of the goods; (4) similarity of the facilities used; (5) similarity of advertising; (6)
`
`defendant’s intent; (7) actual confusion; (8) proximity of products as sold; (9) probability that
`
`plaintiff will enter defendant’s market; (10) quality of defendant’s product compared to
`
`plaintiff’s; and (11) the sophistication of potential buyers. Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of
`
`Am., 110 F.3d 234, 241 (4th Cir. 1997). Here, nearly all the Shakespeare factors weigh in
`
`favor of granting a preliminary injunction. The Mark is distinctive in the craft beer context.
`
`The similarity of the marks is astounding, and the goods are not just similar, they are the same
`
`– a craft India Pale Ale. Both parties are already in the same market, at least within Plaintiff’s
`
`current distribution area of eight states in the Southeast, and utilize a network of wholesale
`
`distributors to access the retail beer markets attendant to chain retail, convenience and grocery
`
`stores, bottle shops, restaurants, and bars. In some retail locations, the two products are placed
`
`beside or above/below one another. Accordingly, the proximity of products as sold is again
`
`staggering. Moreover, the mark has been placed, as a prominent part of the packaging, on both
`
`the Juiciness IPA and Hazy IPA’s retail boxes. In addition, both parties advertise their beers
`
`on social media and the Internet. Further, Defendant does not dispute that the average
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00148-FDW-DSC Document 22 Filed 04/21/22 Page 5 of 10
`
`
`
`consumer is not meaningfully more sophisticated simply because craft beers or premium drinks
`
`are involved. Because of Defendant’s history of zealously protecting its intellectual property
`
`rights, the Court finds the sixth Shakespeare factor, Defendant’s intent, is at best neutral.
`
`Similarly, the Court finds the tenth factor is neutral, as there is no evidence that either product
`
`is of a higher quality than the other. Finally, although Plaintiff does not, at this early stage,
`
`provide evidence of actual confusion, the Court highlights “[t]he test is likelihood of confusion;
`
`evidence of actual confusion is unnecessary.” Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d
`
`455, 463 (4th Cir. 1996). The Court, nonetheless, notes its confusion in discerning the marks.
`
`Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes Plaintiff has sufficiently shown a likelihood of
`
`confusion among consumers. The Court, therefore, concludes Plaintiff has shown a likelihood
`
`of success on the merits of its trademark infringement claim.
`
`7. The test for likelihood of success on an unfair competition claim under the Lanham Act is
`
`nearly identical to the test for trademark infringement and requires Plaintiff to show: “(1) it
`
`possesses a mark; (2) the defendant used the mark; (3) defendant’s use of the mark occurred
`
`in commerce; (4) the defendant used the mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
`
`distribution, or advertising of goods and services; and (5) defendant used the mark in a manner
`
`likely to confuse consumers.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263
`
`F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001). It is undisputed that Defendant has used the Mark in commerce
`
`and in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of good and
`
`services. This, in conjunction with the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s trademark infringement
`
`claim above, is sufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of showing a likelihood of success on the
`
`merits of its unfair competition claim.
`
`8. In order to establish a claim under N. C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, a plaintiff must allege sufficient
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00148-FDW-DSC Document 22 Filed 04/21/22 Page 6 of 10
`
`
`
`facts to show that (1) the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) the
`
`action in question was in or affecting commerce; and (3) the act proximately caused injury to
`
`the plaintiff. S.N.R. Mgmt. Corp. v. Danube Partners 141, LLC, 659 S.E.2d 442, 448 (N.C.
`
`Ct. App. 2008) (citing Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (N.C. 2001)). An “unfair act or
`
`practice is one in which a party engages in conduct which amounts to an inequitable assertion
`
`of its power or position.” Id. Acts of trademark infringement are per se unfair and deceptive
`
`trade practices. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 80-11, 12. For the reasons set forth above, then,
`
`Plaintiff has also met its burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits of its
`
`Unfair Competition claim.
`
`9. The Court further concludes that Plaintiff has shown it is likely to suffer irreparable harm
`
`absent entry of an injunction. The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “irreparable injury
`
`regularly follows trademark infringement.” Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of
`
`Virginia, Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 939 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Trademark infringement
`
`gives rise to irreparable injury because such “infringement primarily represents an injury to
`
`reputation.” Id. (citations omitted). Based on the evidence presented, including the potential
`
`for reverse confusion and the fact that Plaintiff will never have a second chance to make a first
`
`impression, Plaintiff has met its burden of proving a likelihood of irreparable injury.1
`
`
`1 To the extent Defendant relies on High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551,
`1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995) and T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd. v. Consol. Med. Equip., Inc., 821 F.2d 646, 648 (Fed. Cir.
`1987) to support its assertion that Plaintiff’s suggestion of a licensing deal during settlement negotiations that would
`include Defendant’s immediate cessation of infringement is somehow dispositive on the issue of irreparably injury,
`the Court disagrees. The facts in High Tech are entirely distinguishable from the case at hand. Notably, in High
`Tech, the Federal Circuit found the patentee, who relied entirely on the presumption of irreparable harm, was not
`entitled to such presumption because the court found the record did not support a finding that the patentee was likely
`to succeed in proving its claim of patent infringement. High Tech, 49 F.3d at 1556. In addition, the Federal Circuit
`found significant the lack of commercial activity by the patentee and the nearly 17-month delay in bringing the suit
`after the issuance of the reexamination certificate for the relevant patent. Id. Similarly, in T.J. Smith, the Federal
`Circuit upheld the district court’s finding of an absence of irreparable harm and held the patentee, who also relied
`entirely on the presumption of irreparable harm, “did not show likelihood of success in respect of infringement,”
`waited 15 months before seeking a preliminary injunction, and “had long licensed its patent to two licensees.” T.J.
`Smith, 821 F.2d at 648. Thus, the case law Defendant relies on is inapposite to its contention and the present matter.
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00148-FDW-DSC Document 22 Filed 04/21/22 Page 7 of 10
`
`
`
`10. With respect to the balance of equities and the potential harm to the parties, the Court concludes
`
`that the harm to Plaintiff outweighs the potential harm to Defendant. Plaintiff is indisputably
`
`the senior user and owner of the Mark and, as set forth above, Plaintiff has sufficiently shown
`
`a likelihood of confusion. As a result of this confusion, Defendant’s use of the Mark, inter
`
`alia, is also likely to affect consumers’ opinion of Plaintiff and/or its products. As a result,
`
`Plaintiff’s reputation, goodwill, and business may be permanently damaged if Defendant
`
`continues to use the Mark and consumers associate Plaintiff with Defendant. On the other
`
`hand, Defendant has only recently – in March 2022 – changed its packaging to include the
`
`Mark. During the hearing, Defendant notified the Court of the steps it has taken to eliminate
`
`the use of the Mark in connection with Defendant’s Hazy IPA. Specifically, Defendant
`
`explained it will have new retail packaging that will be ready for use by May 5, 2022. The
`
`potential harm Defendant faces, therefore, can be minimized by narrowly tailoring the
`
`preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the balance of equities tips in favor of Plaintiff.
`
`11. Finally, the Court concludes that the entry of the requested injunction, as tailored below, serves
`
`the public interest. The purpose of trademark law is to protect the public from confusion about
`
`“the identity of the enterprise from which goods and services are purchased.” AMP Inc. v.
`
`Foy, 540 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (4th Cir. 1976). Preventing consumers from being confused and
`
`preventing trademarks from being used deceptively serves the public interest. Bowe Bell &
`
`Howell Co. v. Harris, 145 F. App’x 401, 404 (4th Cir. 2005).
`
`12. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes Plaintiff has sufficiently shown “(1) it is likely to
`
`
`Moreover, the Court reiterates its concern with Defendant’s proposition that the mere suggestion of a licensing deal
`would immediately shut the door to injunctive relief for a victim of trademark infringement. This bright line rule
`would impose a chilling effect on settlement negotiations; The same chilling effect that Rule 408 of the Federal
`Rules of Evidence seeks to prevent. See Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy, 856 F.2d 652, 654-55 (4th Cir. 1988)
`(Discussing the strong public policy favoring exclusion of settlement negotiations to foster frank discussions).
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00148-FDW-DSC Document 22 Filed 04/21/22 Page 8 of 10
`
`
`
`succeed on the merits; (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm without the preliminary injunction;
`
`(3) the balance of equities tips in its favor; and (4) the injunction is in the public interest.”
`
`Mountain Valley Pipeline, 918 F.3d at 366. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary
`
`injunction.
`
`13. As indicated above, however, the Court finds the diligent and proactive measures Defendant
`
`has taken, along with the relatively short time period that the infringing products will remain
`
`in the marketplace and the financial burden that Defendant would incur in removing these
`
`products, supports narrowly tailoring the preliminary injunction so as to allow Defendant to
`
`sell off its available supply of Hazy IPA packaged in the infringing retail box that is already in
`
`the marketplace – that is, on store shelves or in the possession of its distributors – provided,
`
`however, that Defendant shall use its best efforts to ensure a label is applied as soon as
`
`practicable to all infringing boxes of Defendant’s Hazy IPA that are already in the marketplace.
`
`See Lance Mfg., LLC v. Voortman Cookies Ltd., 617 F. Supp. 2d 424, 434-35 (W.D.N.C.
`
`2009).
`
`IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
`
`and Preliminary Injunction, (Doc. No. 5), is GRANTED WITH MODIFICATION to the extent it
`
`seeks a preliminary injunction.
`
`Defendant is HEREBY ENJOINED as follows:
`
`1. Except as set forth below, Defendant, its directors, officers, employees, representatives
`
`and agents, and any persons or entities in active concert or participation with them
`
`having actual notice of this Preliminary Injunction, are hereby immediately enjoined
`
`nationwide from using the KEEP IT JUICY name and mark, or confusingly similar
`
`variations thereof.
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00148-FDW-DSC Document 22 Filed 04/21/22 Page 9 of 10
`
`
`
`2. Defendant may sell off its available supply of Hazy IPA packaged in the infringing
`
`box, provided that Defendant shall use its best efforts to ensure a label is applied to all
`
`infringing boxes as soon as practicable. Defendant may use any reasonable label color
`
`that prohibits consumers from reading through the label. If Defendant so wishes,
`
`Defendant may also petition the Court to allow the label to include a new, non-
`
`infringing phrase or slogan.
`
`3. The injunction stated herein shall become effective only upon the posting of a cash
`
`bond in the amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) with the Clerk of Court for
`
`the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina for the
`
`payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred by Defendant should it
`
`ultimately be found to have been wrongfully enjoined. Upon such posting of bond, this
`
`Order shall remain in effect until a final disposition of this case, until the Court revises
`
`the Order, or until the parties agree otherwise.
`
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`
`
`
`
`
`Signed: April 21, 2022
`
`Case 3:22-cv-00148-FDW-DSC Document 22 Filed 04/21/22 Page 10 of 10
`
`