throbber
Paper 19
`Date: June 25, 2015
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`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`TRW AUTOMOTIVE US LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MAGNA ELECTRONICS INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Cases IPR2014-00256, IPR2014-00260, and IPR2014-00264
`Patent 7,459,664 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, NEIL T.
`POWELL, and JO-ANNE M. KOKOSKI, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`POWELL, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`

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`IPR2014-00256, IPR2014-00260, and IPR2014-00264
`Patent 7,459,664 B2
`
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`TRW Automotive US LLC (“TRW”) filed three Petitions requesting
`inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4, 13–25, 27–31, 32, 34–40, 42–45, 48–
`53, and 55–59 of U.S. Patent No. 7,459,664 B2 (Ex. 1002,1 “the ’664
`patent”), as listed in the following chart.
`
`
`
`Petition
`Paper No.
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`Case No.
`Claims
`IPR2014-00256 2, 4, 13, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27–
`31, 32, and 34
`IPR2014-00260 1, 14–18, 21–23, 35, 37–
`39, 42, 44, 53, and 55–59
`IPR2014-00264 33, 36, 40, 43, 45, and 48–
`52
`On June 26, 2014, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1, 2,
`4, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20–24, 27–30, 32, 34–36, 39, 42, 43, 45, and 49–52 on
`three grounds of unpatentability (Paper 16, “Dec. on Inst.”). Additionally,
`we consolidated the proceedings of IPR2014-00260 and IPR2014-00264
`with the proceeding of IPR2014-00256. Dec. on Inst. 2.
`Magna Electronics Inc. (“Magna”) filed a Patent Owner Response
`(Paper 23, “PO Resp.”). TRW filed a Reply (Paper 26, “Reply”).
`An oral hearing was held on February 19, 2015. A transcript of the
`hearing is included in the record. Paper 35 (“Tr.”).
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). This Final Written
`Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73.
`
`
`1 For the purposes of clarity and expediency, we use IPR2014-00256 as
`representative of the three proceedings. Unless otherwise noted, all citations
`to “Pet.” and “Ex.” refer to the Petition and exhibits, respectively, in
`IPR2014-00256.
`
`2
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`IPR2014-00256, IPR2014-00260, and IPR2014-00264
`Patent 7,459,664 B2
`
`
`For the reasons that follow, we determine that TRW has shown, by a
`preponderance of the evidence, that claims 1, 2, 4, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20–24, 27–
`30, 32, 34–36, 39, 42, 43, 45, and 49–52 of the ’664 patent are unpatentable.
`A.
`The ’664 Patent (Ex. 1002)
`The ’664 patent describes “[a]n image sensing system for a vehicle.”
`Ex. 1002, Abstract. The image sensing system operates to detect certain
`external light sources, including oncoming headlights, leading taillights,
`road markers, and lane markers. Id. at col. 3, ll. 16–21; col. 12, ll. 61–63.
`The ’664 patent discloses performing various control functions based on the
`detection of light sources. For example, based on the detection of oncoming
`headlights or leading taillights of other vehicles, the system can control the
`headlights of the vehicle that includes the system. Id. at col. 2, ll. 25–30;
`col. 6, ll. 40–42. Additionally, based on the detection of lane markers, the
`system may assist with steering or provide a warning to the vehicle’s driver.
`Id. at col. 12, ll. 61–63. Figure 2 of the ’664 patent is reproduced below.
`
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`Figure 2 shows components of one embodiment of the system. Id. at
`col. 3, ll. 35–37. The system includes imaging sensor module 14. Id. at
`col. 3, ll. 58–62. Imaging sensor module 14 includes optical device 36, e.g.,
`a lens, array 38 of photon-accumulating light sensors, and filter array 40. Id.
`at col. 4, ll. 39–44. The ’664 patent discloses that array 38 may be
`implemented using a variety of different technologies, including a charge
`couple device (CCD) array, a complementary metal oxide semiconductor
`(CMOS) array, a hybrid of CCD and CMOS, or other photosensing
`technologies like a charge injection device (CID), a metal oxide
`semiconductor (MOS), photo diodes, and the like. Id. at col. 8, ll. 57–64.
`The system also includes digital signal processor 13 and lighting control
`logic module 16 connected to imaging sensor module 14 and headlamps 18.
`Id. at col. 3, ll. 58–66. The ’664 patent discloses that these components may
`form part of vehicle headlight dimming control 12, shown in Figure 1, which
`is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 1 shows headlight dimming control 12, rearview mirror 30,
`windshield 32, and bracket 34. Id. at col. 3, ll. 58–60; col. 4, ll. 19–23. The
`’664 patent discloses that bracket 34 may fixedly mount imaging sensor
`module 14 “to, or near, the vehicle’s windshield 32.” Id. at col. 4, ll. 19–22.
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`IPR2014-00256, IPR2014-00260, and IPR2014-00264
`Patent 7,459,664 B2
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`The ’664 patent indicates that some light sources constitute objects of
`interest and other light sources do not constitute objects of interest. For
`example, the ’664 patent states that “headlights of oncoming vehicles and
`taillights of leading vehicles are of interest to the control, irrespective of
`separation distance from the controlled vehicle, if the source is on the central
`axis of travel of the vehicle.” Id. at col. 2, l. 66–col. 3, l. 2. The ’664 patent
`further states that off-axis headlights and taillights also may be of interest,
`“but only if the source has a higher intensity level and is spatially larger.”
`Id. at col. 3, ll. 2–5. The ’664 patent also suggests that some light sources
`may be objects that are not of interest, such as “streetlights and reflections of
`the controlled vehicle’s headlights off signs, road markers, and the like.”
`Id. at col. 3, ll. 16–21.
`The ’664 patent discloses using various aspects of the light received
`by the system to identify accurately objects of interest. For example, the
`’664 patent discloses that its system may detect “spectral signatures” to
`identify taillights and headlights. Id. at col. 10, ll. 50–64. This technique
`leverages the fact that taillights are required to use red spectral bands and
`headlights “have a visible spectral signature which is predominantly white
`light.” Id. at col. 10, ll. 54–56, 60–61.
`The ’664 patent also discloses discriminating between light sources
`based on their location within the image. For example, the ’664 patent
`discloses that “[a]dditional discrimination between oncoming headlights and
`leading taillights may be accomplished by taking into account the relative
`location of the source of light within the scene.” Id. at col. 9, ll. 44–47.
`The ’664 patent further discloses that “[p]attern recognition may be
`used to further assist in the detection of headlights, taillights, and other
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`objects of interest.” Id. at col. 11, ll. 14–16. Regarding pattern recognition,
`the ’664 patent further discloses that
`[p]attern recognition identifies objects of interest based
`upon their shape, reflectivity, luminance, and spectral
`characteristics. For example, the fact that headlights and
`taillights usually occur in pairs could be used to assist in
`qualifying or disqualifying objects as headlights and
`taillights. By looking for a triad pattern, including the
`center high-mounted stop-light required on the rear of
`vehicles, stoplight recognition can be enhanced.
`Id. at col. 11, ll. 16–23.
`Claims 1, 24, 35, and 45 of the ’664 patent are independent. Each of
`claims 2, 4, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20–23, 27–30, 32, 34, 36, 39, 42, 43, and 49–52
`depends, directly or indirectly, from one of claims 1, 24, 35, and 45. Claim
`1 is illustrative and is reproduced below:
`1.
`An image sensing system for a vehicle, said image
`sensing system comprising:
`an imaging sensor;
`said imaging sensor comprising a two-dimensional array of
`light sensing photosensor elements formed on a
`semiconductor substrate;
`said imaging sensor disposed at an interior portion of the
`vehicle proximate the windshield of the vehicle, said
`imaging sensor being supported by a mounting structure
`fixedly attached to an interior surface of the vehicle
`windshield so as to physically fixedly position said
`imaging sensor within the interior cabin of the vehicle
`and close to and rearward of the windshield;
`said imaging sensor having a fixed field of view to the exterior
`of the vehicle through a window of the vehicle, the field
`of view encompassing the road traveled by the vehicle;
`a logic and control circuit;
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`said logic and control circuit comprising an image processor for
`processing image data derived from said imaging sensor;
`said image processing comprising at least one of (i) spatial
`differentiation, and (ii) pattern recognition; and
`wherein said image sensing system detects objects external of
`the vehicle associated with the road traveled by the
`vehicle and present in the field of view of said imaging
`sensor, said image sensing system detecting objects by
`processing said image data to identify objects based on at
`least one of (i) spatial differentiation, and (ii) pattern
`recognition, said image sensing system generating at
`least one control output responsive to said detection of
`objects.
`Ex. 1002, col. 13, ll. 9–40.
`B.
`Prior Art
`The pending grounds of unpatentability in this inter partes review are
`based on the following prior art:
`U.S. Patent No. 4,970,653, issued November 13, 1990 (“Kenue,” Ex. 1004).
`U.S. Patent No. 5,096,287, issued March 17, 1992 (“Kakinami,” Ex. 1005).
`Oliver Vellacott, CMOS in camera, IEE Rev., May 1994, at 111
`(“Vellacott,” Ex. 1006).
`Japanese Unexamined Patent Publication No. S62-131837, published
`June 15, 1987 (“Yanagawa,” Ex. 1007).2
`
`
`2 We refer to “Yanagawa” as the English translation of the original
`reference. TRW provided an affidavit attesting to the accuracy of the
`translation. See Ex. 1007; 37 C.F.R. § 42.63(b).
`
`7
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`IPR2014-00256, IPR2014-00260, and IPR2014-00264
`Patent 7,459,664 B2
`
`C.
`
`
`
`
`Pending Grounds of Unpatentability
`This inter partes review involves the following grounds of
`unpatentability:
`References
`Kenue and Kakinami
`
`Basis
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Claims challenged
`1, 14, 16, 17, 21–23,
`35, 39, 42, and 43
`2, 4, 24, 27–30, 32,
`34, 36, 45, and 49–
`52
`13 and 20
`
`Kenue, Kakinami,
`and Vellacott
`
`Kenue, Kakinami,
`and Yanagawa
`Dec. on Inst. 41–42.
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A.
`
`Claim Interpretation
`The claims of the ’664 patent have expired. See Pet. 1; Tr. 12, l. 16–
`13, l. 8. For claims of an expired patent, the Board’s claim interpretation is
`similar to that of a district court. See In re Rambus Inc., 694 F.3d 42, 46
`(Fed. Cir. 2012). We are guided, therefore, by the principle that the words
`of a claim “are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning” as
`understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of
`the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir.
`2005) (en banc) (internal citations omitted). Only those terms in controversy
`need to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the
`controversy. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803
`(Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`8
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`
`1.
`
`
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`IPR2014-00256, IPR2014-00260, and IPR2014-00264
`Patent 7,459,664 B2
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`“spatial differentiation” (claims 1, 22–24, 34, 35, 39, 43, 45,
`51, and 52)
`In the Decision on Institution, we interpreted the claim term “spatial
`differentiation” to mean “discrimination between objects accomplished by
`taking into account relative location.” Dec. on Inst. 13–14. The parties do
`not dispute this construction, and we see no reason to modify that
`interpretation in light of the record developed at trial.
`2.
`“pattern recognition” (claims 1, 16, 22–24, 29, 34, 35, 43, 45,
`51, and 52)
`In the Decision on Institution, we interpreted the claim term “pattern
`recognition” to mean “detection of an object of interest based upon shape,
`size, contour, motion, reflectivity, luminance, or spectral characteristics.”
`Dec. on Inst. 15. The parties do not dispute this construction, and we see no
`reason to modify that interpretation in light of the record developed at trial.
`3.
`“field of view” (claims 1, 21, 22, 24, 32, 35, 42, 43, 45, 49, and
`50)
`In the Decision on Institution, we interpreted the claim language
`“field of view” as referring to the range of space from which the imaging
`sensor receives light. Dec. on Inst. 17–18. The parties do not dispute this
`construction, and we see no reason to modify that interpretation in light of
`the record developed at trial.
`4.
`“said image sensing system detecting objects by processing
`said image data to identify objects” (claim 1) and “said image
`sensing system detects objects by processing said image data to
`identify objects” (claims 35 and 45)
`With respect to these claim limitations, Magna argues that “‘detects
`objects’ should be construed to mean sensing the existence of different types
`of objects and ‘identify objects’ should be construed to mean distinguishing
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`an object among many objects and indicating what that object is.” PO
`Resp. 11. Similarly, Magna argues that the claims require that “different
`types of objects are detected and identified.” Id. at 9. Magna further argues
`that “‘detects objects . . . to identify objects’ should be construed also to
`mean that these are two distinct functions, detect and identify” (id. at 11),
`asserting that “[a] [person of ordinary skill in the art] would understand
`‘detects’ and ‘identify’ as being distinct and separate functions” (id. at 8). In
`support of these arguments, Magna cites the claim language itself, certain
`other portions of the ’664 patent, and the testimony of Matthew A. Turk,
`Ph.D., as discussed in more detail below. See id. at 8–11.
`TRW disagrees with Magna’s assertion that “detects” and “identify”
`are “distinct and separate functions” required by the claims. Reply 1. TRW
`argues that Magna arrives at its construction by discussing the claim
`language with key words—“by processing said image data”—replaced by an
`ellipsis. Id. TRW asserts that the claim language “clearly requires that
`‘detects’ is accomplished through ‘processing data to identify objects,’” and
`that “[t]he two functions are not separate at all—they are made the same by
`the causal link of processing.” Id. (citing Ex. 1012 ¶ 5). Additionally, TRW
`proposes that “the process of detection/identification is to confirm that an
`object in the field of view is of the type being sought by the processing
`algorithm.” Id. at 2. In connection with this, TRW cites dictionary
`definitions and Jeffrey A. Miller, Ph.D.’s Rebuttal Declaration. Id.
`Specifically, TRW argues that Webster’s Dictionary “defines ‘identify’ in
`context: ‘2a. to establish the identity of,’” and defines “identity” as “3: the
`condition of being the same with something described or asserted.” Id.
`(citing Ex. 1009, 3).
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`We do not agree with Magna that the disputed claim language
`requires that detecting objects and identifying objects involve entirely
`separate functions. We agree with TRW that, according to its plain
`meaning, the disputed claim language does not require separately
`“detecting” and “identifying,” but is structured so that performing one
`satisfies the other. See Ex. 1012 ¶ 5. Specifically, objects are not “detected”
`in isolation; they are detected “by processing . . . image data to identify
`objects.”
`Magna does not persuade us that the other portions of the
`Specification warrant construing the claim language differently than its plain
`meaning. Magna cites some passages in which the ’664 patent discloses that
`it “detects” objects, and other passages in which the ’664 patent discloses
`“identifying” objects. PO Resp. 9–11. Magna, however, does not cite
`anything in the Specification that discloses “detecting” objects to separately
`“identify” objects, as it contends is required by the disputed claim language.
`In connection with his testimony in support of Magna’s claim
`construction position, Dr. Turk cites certain portions of the ’664 patent as
`purportedly using the terms “detect” and “identify” differently. Ex. 2032
`¶¶ 27–29, 31–32. With respect to “detect,” Dr. Turk testifies that “[f]or
`example, the ‘664 patent states that it has the ability to ‘detect’ a red light
`source having an intensity above a particular threshold, a white light source
`having an intensity above a particular threshold, and a light level that is
`present over a long period of time.” Id. ¶ 31 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 5, ll. 19–
`20, 28–31, 37–42). With respect to “identify,” Dr. Turk testifies that “[f]or
`example, the ‘664 patent discusses its ability to ‘identify the headlights of
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`oncoming vehicles and the taillights of leading vehicles.’” Id. ¶ 32 (quoting
`Ex 1002, col. 2, ll. 25–30) (emphasis added by Dr. Turk).
`These examples do not persuade us that the ’664 patent uses the terms
`“detect” and “identify” differently, as the ’664 patent also uses the term
`“detection” in substantially the same manner that the above example uses
`“identify.” For instance, the ’664 patent discloses that “[p]attern recognition
`may be used to further assist in the detection of headlights, taillights, and
`other objects of interest.” Ex. 1002, col. 11, ll. 14–16 (emphasis added).
`Similarly, in addition to describing “pattern recognition” as assisting in
`“detection” of objects, the ’664 patent in the very next sentence discloses
`that “pattern recognition” “identifies” objects of interest. Id. at col. 11, l. 16.
`Although different terms in a claim are presumed to have different
`meanings, that presumption may be rebutted when, as here, the Specification
`uses the terms interchangeably. See In re Magna Elecs., Inc., 2015 WL
`2110525, *5 (Fed. Cir. May 7, 2015) (rejecting Magna’s argument that a
`“positional relationship” has a different meaning than “an indication of a
`distance” because the patent “essentially treats the two terms
`coextensively”).
`Additionally, Magna does not persuade us that the disputed claim
`language requires distinguishing between different types of objects or
`detecting and identifying different types of objects. Magna argues that the
`claims’ use of the plural word “objects” suggests this meaning. See PO
`Resp. 9. We disagree; in the claim recitations “detecting objects,” “detects
`objects,” and “identify objects,” the plain meaning of “objects” is more than
`one object, not more than one type of object. Magna also argues that “[t]he
`’664 patent discloses a vehicular imaging system capable of controlling
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`vehicular functions based on the detection and identification of many types
`of objects.” Id. at 5. For this assertion, Magna cites the Abstract of the ’664
`patent and Dr. Turk’s testimony that cites the Abstract. Id. The Abstract
`does not support Magna’s assertion about a system detecting and identifying
`many different types of objects. The Abstract refers to only one type of
`object, stating that “[t]he imaging system detects lane markers.” Ex. 1002,
`Abst.
`
`
`
`Magna and Dr. Turk also cite examples where the ’664 patent
`discusses detecting multiple types of objects or identifying multiple types of
`objects. PO Resp. 9–11; Ex. 2032 ¶¶ 30–32. We are not persuaded that the
`disclosure of a few examples where the system can detect or identify
`multiple types of objects warrants narrowing the claims from their plain
`meaning, particularly when the Abstract of the ’664 patent suggests that the
`invention may encompass a system that “detects lane markers.” See
`SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir.
`2004) (holding that “a particular embodiment appearing in the written
`description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader
`than the embodiment”). Accordingly, we do not interpret claims 1, 35, and
`45 as requiring separate detection and identification functions, or the
`detection or identification of multiple types of objects, and conclude that no
`further interpretation of the claim language is necessary.
`5.
`“detects objects . . .present in the field of view of said imaging
`sensor” (claims 1 and 24) and “detects objects present in the
`field of view of said imaging sensor” (claims 35 and 45)
`Magna argues that “[a] [person of ordinary skill in the art] would
`understand the ‘detects objects . . . present in the field of view’ to mean to
`detect objects that are ‘present in substantially the entire field of view.’” PO
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`Resp. 11 (citing Ex. 2032 ¶ 35). TRW disagrees, arguing that “the claim
`language merely requires the object to be present in the field of view.”
`Reply 4.
`Magna argues that its proffered construction builds from our
`construction that “field of view” means “the range of space from which the
`imaging sensor receives light.” PO Resp. 12 (citing Dec. on Inst. 18).
`Magna and Dr. Turk also assert that certain statements in the Specification
`support Magna’s proffered construction. Id. at 12–13; Ex. 2032 ¶¶ 36–41.
`For example, they cite the following statement in the ’664 patent:
`The present invention provides a vehicle control which is
`capable of identifying unique characteristics of light
`sources based upon a precise evaluation of light source
`characteristics made in each portion of the scene forward
`of the vehicle, in the vicinity of each light source, by
`separating each light source from the remainder of the
`scene and analyzing
`that source
`to determine
`its
`characteristics.
`Ex. 1002, col. 2, ll. 14–20 (emphasis added by Magna); PO Resp. 12;
`Ex. 2032 ¶¶ 37–38.
`Magna argues that this passage “emphasizes the ability of the ’664
`patent to sense objects across each portion of its field of view.” PO Resp.
`12. Magna also argues that “[t]he ’664 patent . . . repeatedly discusses its
`ability to sense objects that are in different locations in its field of view.” Id.
`at 12–13. Magna elaborates that “[f]or example, the specification discloses
`sensing headlights, taillights, streetlights, traffic lights, traffic signs, and lane
`markers.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002, col. 2, ll. 25–27, col. 11, ll. 10–13, col. 12, ll.
`13–17, 22–25, 61; Ex. 2032 ¶ 40). Additionally, based on the argument that
`“the ’664 patent discusses using spatial differentiation in order to
`differentiate and distinguish lights at a periphery of the scene versus lights
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`located in the center of the scene,” Magna argues that “the ’664 patent
`specifically discusses its ability to sense substantially the entire field of
`view.” PO Resp. 13 (citing Ex. 1002, col. 9, ll. 56–65, col. 10, ll. 7–10; Ex.
`2032 ¶ 39).
`TRW argues that Magna improperly proposes to import limitations
`into the claims from the Specification. Reply 4. TRW further argues that
`Magna cites statements in the ’664 patent that do not support Magna’s claim
`construction. Id.
`The plain meaning of the claim language does not comport with
`Magna’s proffered construction, and Magna does not persuade us that the
`disclosures in the Specification warrant narrowing the claim language from
`its plain meaning to Magna’s construction. We do not agree with Magna’s
`characterization that column 2, lines 14–20 of the ’664 patent “emphasize[]
`the ability of the ’664 patent to sense objects across each portion of its field
`of view.” See PO Resp. 12. Additionally, Magna’s argument that the ’664
`patent “repeatedly discusses its ability to sense objects that are in different
`locations in its field of view” facially does not support Magna’s assertion
`that the claims require detecting objects “present in substantially the entire
`field of view.” See PO Resp. 11–13 (emphases added). Furthermore, even
`assuming, arguendo, that the ’664 patent’s discussion of spatial
`differentiation constitutes an example of sensing substantially the entire field
`of view, as Magna asserts, this one example does not persuade us to narrow
`the claims from their plain meaning, particularly given that each of
`independent claims 1, 24, 35, and 45 recites “spatial differentiation” as an
`optional aspect of the claimed invention. See, e.g., Ex. 1002, col. 13, ll. 35–
`38 (“said image sensing system detecting objects by processing said image
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`data to identify objects based on at least one of (i) spatial differentiation,
`and (ii) pattern recognition” (emphasis added)); SuperGuide, 358 F.3d at
`875. Accordingly, we do not interpret claims 1, 24, 35, and 45 as requiring
`detection of objects present in substantially the entire field of view, and
`conclude that no further interpretation of the claim language is necessary.
`B.
`Obviousness of Claims 1, 14, 16, 17, 21–23, 35, 39, 42, and 43 over
`Kenue and Kakinami
`TRW asserts that claims 1, 14, 16, 17, 21–23, 35, 39, 42, and 43 are
`unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of
`Kenue and Kakinami. IPR2014-00260 Pet. 17–42, 44–46; IPR2014-00264
`Pet. 32–38, 54–57; Reply 1–11. TRW explains how a combination of Kenue
`and Kakinami allegedly discloses or suggests the claimed subject matter, and
`also relies on the Declarations of Dr. Miller. IPR2014-00260 Ex. 1008;
`IPR2014-00264 Ex. 1010; IPR2014-00256 Ex. 1012. Magna disagrees with
`TRW’s assertions and relies on the Declaration of Dr. Turk. PO Resp. 1–4,
`8–31 (citing Ex. 2032).
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the differences
`between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
`that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). In the Decision on Institution, we adopted TRW’s proposed
`definition of a person having ordinary skill in the art of the ’664 patent at the
`time of the invention, which was supported by Dr. Miller’s testimony. Dec.
`on Inst. 18–19. The parties have not disputed this definition, and we see no
`reason to modify it in light of the record developed during trial. Therefore,
`we conclude that a person having ordinary skill in the art would have had at
`16
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`

`
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`IPR2014-00256, IPR2014-00260, and IPR2014-00264
`Patent 7,459,664 B2
`
`
`least the qualifications of or equivalent to either (1) a master’s degree in
`electrical engineering or computer science, with course work or research in
`vision systems, or (2) an undergraduate degree in electrical engineering or
`computer science with at least two years of work making optical vision
`systems. Id. at 18 (citing Pet. 17–18; IPR2014-00256 Ex. 1011 ¶ 16).
`Prior art references must be “considered together with the knowledge
`of one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475,
`1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). A party that petitions the Board for a determination
`of obviousness must show that “a skilled artisan would have been motivated
`to combine the teachings of the prior art references to achieve the claimed
`invention, and that the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable
`expectation of success in doing so.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharms.
`USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v.
`Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
`1.
`Overview of Kenue
`Kenue discloses a method of using an image from a camera to detect
`lane markers and obstacles. Ex. 1004, Abstract. Figure 1 of Kenue is
`reproduced below.
`
`
`
`17
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`

`
`
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`IPR2014-00256, IPR2014-00260, and IPR2014-00264
`Patent 7,459,664 B2
`
`
`Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the components of the system used to
`implement Kenue’s method. Id. at col. 2, ll. 7–8. The system includes CCD
`camera 10; analog-to-digital converter 12; computer 14; and output devices,
`including display 16, obstacle warning alarm 18, and utilization circuit 20.
`Id. at col. 2, ll. 28–36. Kenue discloses that CCD camera 10 is “mounted in
`a vehicle, say at the upper center of the windshield to capture the driver’s
`view of the road ahead.” Id. at col. 2, ll. 30–32. Figure 2 of Kenue is
`reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 2 shows an example of an image received in the camera image
`plane. Id. at col. 2, ll. 9–10. When processing the image to detect lane
`markers, Kenue’s system defines search areas in which to look for the lane
`markers. Id. at col. 1, ll. 59–66; col. 2, ll. 44–48; col. 3, ll. 3–6. For
`example, boxes 28 in Figure 2 illustrate search areas defined by the system.
`Id. at col. 3, ll. 3–6.
`Kenue discloses two approaches to searching for lane markers within
`the search areas. One approach uses template matching, and the other
`approach uses a Hough transform. Id. at col. 2, ll. 41–44. In the template
`
`18
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`

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`
`
`IPR2014-00256, IPR2014-00260, and IPR2014-00264
`Patent 7,459,664 B2
`
`
`matching approach for detecting lane markers, “a template or window of
`desired intensity and shape is correlated with the image to create a
`correlation matrix.” Id. at col. 3, ll. 22–26.
`In the approach implementing the Hough transform, the system
`searches the left and right edges of the lane markers for at least two adjacent
`edge pixels, and then traces the boundaries of the lane marker until the top of
`the image is reached or no edge pixels are found. Id. at col. 6, ll. 12–17.
`Subsequently, if no obstacle is detected within the lane boundaries, the
`system performs a Hough transform. Id. at col. 6, ll. 18–26. This involves
`approximating the lane boundaries with several straight lines represented in
`the Hough domain. Id. at col. 6, ll. 27–35. Figures 7a and 7b of Kenue are
`reproduced below.
`
`
`
`Figures 7a and 7b illustrate representations of a line in the Hough
`domain. More specifically, Figure 7a illustrates a line in the image plane,
`and Figure 7b illustrates the Hough transform of the same line. Id. at col. 6,
`ll. 36–37. The parameters defining the Hough transform of the line include
`19
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`IPR2014-00256, IPR2014-00260, and IPR2014-00264
`Patent 7,459,664 B2
`
`
`R, which is the minimum distance from the line to the origin, and A, which
`is the “angle between the normal to the line and the x axis.” Id. at col. 6,
`ll. 36–41.
`In both the template matching and Hough transform approaches, the
`system detects obstacles by counting strong edge points in the area between
`the lane boundaries. Id. at col. 3, ll. 59–63; col. 6, ll. 18–22. If this count
`indicates an obstacle closer than 50 feet away, the system generates an
`obstacle warning. Id. at col. 3, ll. 65–68; col. 6, ll. 22–23; col. 3, ll. 10–17.
`As to how the system determines whether an obstacle is closer or farther
`than 50 feet away, Kenue discloses:
`The obstacle distance is determined by the ground level
`obstacle image since the image plane calibration does not
`take into account the vertical height of the object. As
`seen in FIG. 3, the top of the vehicle 30 appears to be
`beyond the horizon as seen in the image plane although
`the vehicle 30 is actually close as is realistically shown
`near ground level. Thus for obstacle detection, only the
`bottom of the vehicle 30 image is scanned since it is in
`the near portion of the image plane.
`Id. at col. 4, ll. 2–10.
`2.
`Overview of Kakinami
`Kakinami discloses “[a] video camera for an automobile.” Ex. 1005,
`Abstract. Figure 2a, reproduced below, provides a cross-sectional view of
`the automobile and the video camera mounted to it. Id. at col. 2, ll. 6–7.
`
`20
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`
`

`
`IPR2014-00256, IPR2014-00260, a

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