`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`Paper 39
`Entered: June 25, 2015
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`TRW AUTOMOTIVE US LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`MAGNA ELECTRONICS INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`_______________
`
`
`Before JUSTIN T. ARBES, BENJAMIN D. M. WOOD, and
`NEIL T. POWELL, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`WOOD, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`
`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Background
`A.
`TRW Automotive US LLC (“TRW”) filed a Petition (Paper 2, “Pet.”)
`to institute an inter partes review of claims 30–32, 34–41, 43–46, 48, and 49
`of U.S. Patent No. 7,994,462 B2 (Ex. 1002, “the ’462 patent”). Magna
`Electronics Inc. (“Magna”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 9. In our
`Decision on Institution (Paper 17, “Dec.”), we instituted an inter partes
`review of claims 30, 34, and 38 based on the proposed ground that these
`claims were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by
`Kenue.1 Dec. 16. We subsequently granted-in-part TRW’s Request for
`Rehearing and instituted review of claims 31 and 37 on the same proposed
`ground of unpatentability. Paper 21, 4–5.
`After the Board instituted trial, Magna filed a Patent Owner Response
`(Paper 26, “PO Resp.”), to which TRW replied (Paper 29, “Pet. Reply”). An
`Oral Hearing was held on February 19, 2015, and the Hearing Transcript
`(Paper 38, “Tr.”) has been entered in the record.
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(c). This Final Decision is
`entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). We determine that TRW has shown
`by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claims are
`unpatentable.
`
`Related Proceedings
`B.
`TRW discloses that the ’462 patent has been asserted in Magna
`Electronics, Inc. v. TRW Automotive Holdings Corp., Case No. 1:12-cv-
`00654-PLM (W.D. Mich. 2012). Pet. 7; Paper 2, 2.
`
`1 U.S. Patent No. 4,970,653 to Kenue, Ex. 1004.
`
` 2
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`
`The ’462 Patent (Ex. 1002)
`C.
`The ’462 patent, titled “Vehicular Image Sensing System,” describes a
`system for controlling a vehicle—e.g., dimming the vehicle’s headlights—in
`response to detecting “objects of interest” in front of the vehicle—e.g., the
`headlights of oncoming vehicles and the taillights of leading vehicles.
`Ex. 1002, Abst., 1:22–27. The system uses an image sensor that divides the
`scene in front of the vehicle into “a plurality of spatially separated sensing
`regions.” Id. at 2:16–19. A control circuit with a processor receives image
`data from the image sensor and determines if individual regions include light
`sources having particular characteristics, such as a “spectral characteristic”
`(color), or intensity. Id. at 1:65–2:9, 3:43–51. By comparing the lights’
`characteristics with the distribution of the lights across the regions, such as
`the lights’ proximity to each other and to the vehicle’s central axis, the
`system can distinguish oncoming headlights and leading taillights from
`streetlights and other lights that are not of interest. Id. at 9:32–61, 10:53–56.
`The system also may detect traffic signs and lane markers, and assist the
`driver in other ways, such as alerting the driver to lane changes. Id. at
`11:60–12:13.
`
`Illustrative Claims
`D.
`Claims 30 and 34 are independent, and each is drawn to an image-
`sensing system for a vehicle. Ex. 1002, 15:18–47, 15:60–16:22. These
`claims share at least three common limitations: (1) an image sensor
`comprising a two-dimensional array of light-sensing photosensor elements;
`(2) the image sensor being inside the vehicle on which it is mounted, having
`a forward field of view through the vehicle’s windshield; and (3) a control
`
` 3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`comprising a processor that processes the image data to identify objects of
`interest. Id.
`Claim 30 is illustrative and is reproduced below:
`30. An image sensing system for a vehicle, said image sensing
`system comprising:
`an imaging sensor comprising a two-dimensional array of
`light sensing photosensor elements;
`said imaging sensor having a forward field of view to the
`exterior of a vehicle equipped with said image sensing system
`and through the windshield of the equipped vehicle;
`wherein said imaging sensor is operable to capture image
`data;
`a control comprising an image processor;
`wherein said image sensing system identifies objects in said
`forward field of view of said image sensor via processing of
`said captured image data by said image processor;
`wherein said image processing comprises pattern
`recognition and wherein said pattern recognition comprises
`detection of at least one of (a) a headlight, (b) a taillight and (c)
`an object, and wherein said pattern recognition is based at least
`in part on at least one of (i) shape, (ii) reflectivity, (iii)
`luminance and (iv) spectral characteristic; and
`wherein said control at least one of (a) controls a headlamp
`of the equipped vehicle as a function of a speed of the equipped
`vehicle, (b) controls a headlamp of the equipped vehicle in
`response to said image processing, (c) controls a speed of the
`equipped vehicle in response to said image processing, and (d)
`generates an alert to the driver of the equipped vehicle in
`response to said image processing.
`
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`
`Claim Construction
`A.
`“A claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest reasonable
`construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.”
`37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see In re Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271,
`
` 4
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`1281 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We conclude that Congress implicitly adopted the
`broadest reasonable interpretation standard in enacting the AIA.”). Under
`that standard, the claim language should be read in light of the specification
`as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Suitco
`Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, we generally
`give claim terms their ordinary and customary meaning. See In re
`Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary
`and customary meaning is the meaning that the term would have to a person
`of ordinary skill in the art in question.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
`We expressly interpret below only those claim terms that require
`analysis to resolve arguments related to the patentability of the challenged
`claims.
`
`“pattern recognition”
`1.
`In the Decision on Institution we construed “pattern recognition” to
`mean “detection of an object of interest based upon shape, reflectivity,
`luminance, or spectral characteristic.” Dec. 7. We based this construction
`on an express definition of the term in the Specification:
`Pattern recognition may be used to further assist in the
`detection of headlights, taillights, and other objects of interest.
`Pattern recognition identifies objects of interest based upon
`their
`shape,
`reflectivity,
`luminance,
`and
`spectral
`characteristics. For example, the fact that headlights and
`taillights usually occur in pairs could be used to assist in
`qualifying or disqualifying objects as headlights and taillights.
`By looking for a triad pattern, including the center high-
`mounted stoplight required on the rear of vehicles, stoplight
`recognition can be enhanced.
`
`Ex. 1002, 11:1–10 (emphasis added). We further noted that although the
`Specification describes pattern recognition as identifying objects of interest
`
` 5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`based on their shape, reflectivity, luminance, and spectral characteristics,
`i.e., based on all four of these characteristics, the claims require pattern
`recognition to be based on only one of the characteristics. For example,
`claim 30 requires the image processing to comprise “pattern recognition . . .
`wherein said pattern recognition is based at least in part on at least one of
`(i) shape, (ii) reflectivity, (iii) luminance and (iv) spectral characteristic.” Id.
`at 15:33–39 (emphasis added). Claim 34 includes similar language. In
`addition, the examples of pattern recognition provided in the Specification—
`e.g., recognizing headlights and taillights because they occur in pairs—seem
`to be limited to the shape of the object of interest rather than to any of its
`other characteristics. For these reasons we construed “pattern recognition”
`to mean detection of objects of interest based upon their shape, reflectivity,
`luminance, or spectral characteristic. Dec. 7.
`Neither TRW nor Magna expressly disputes this construction.
`Furthermore, we find nothing in the record adduced subsequent to institution
`that contradicts it. Therefore, we adopt this construction as our final
`construction of this term.
`2.
`“detection” and “identification”
`a.
`The Parties’ Positions
`Claims 30 and 34 recite an image sensing system that “identifies
`objects” via image “processing,” the image processing comprising “pattern
`recognition,” which itself comprises “detection” of, e.g., an object. Magna
`argues that “identification” and “detection” have different meanings, and
`that the claims require both “functions” to be performed. PO Resp. 7–9.
`According to Magna, “detection can be said to mean the discovery of the
`
` 6
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`presence or existence of something,” whereas “‘[i]dentification’ requires
`establishing or indicating or knowing what an object is.” Magna explains:
`That identification is not a synonym for detection is evidenced
`by the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms. “Detect” is
`dictionary-defined to mean “to discover or notice the presence
`of” (Merriam-Webster definition of “detect”, Exhibit 2035),
`whereas “Identify” is dictionary-defined to mean “to know and
`say who someone is or what something is” (Merriam-Webster
`definition of “identify”, Exhibit 2036.) Plainly, identification is
`different from and more than detection. The presence of an
`object may be detected but the object may not necessarily be
`identified.
`
`Id. at 7 n.3 (emphasis added). Magna also provides a number of examples of
`how these terms are used in the Specification to support its position that the
`two terms have different meanings. Id. at 6–9.
`TRW disagrees with Magna’s construction. In particular, TRW
`disagrees that identification of an object requires something more than
`detecting the object. TRW asserts that the claims do not merely recite
`detection of an unknown object, but rather recite detection of specific
`objects of interest, e.g., a headlight and taillight, in the first instance. Pet.
`Reply 3–4 (citing Ex. 1002, claims 30, 34). TRW reasons that
`[U]sing Magna’s definitions [for detection and identification],
`to ‘detect a headlight’ (i.e., to determine that a headlight is
`present) the image sensing system must also ‘identify a
`headlight’ (i.e., recognize that the thing detected is a headlight).
`(Id.) Identifying an object as a headlight, therefore, does not
`“require[] more than” detecting a headlight—identifying a
`headlight and detecting a headlight are one and the same.
`
` 7
`
`
`
`Id. at 4.
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`
`b.
`Analysis
`In determining the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term,
`the Board may consult a general dictionary definition of the word for
`guidance. Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
`2010). Based on the dictionary passages submitted by Magna, there is
`substantial similarity between the definitions of “detect” and “identify.”
`According to these dictionary excerpts, one definition of “detect” is “to
`discover the true character of” (Ex. 2035), whereas a definition of “identify”
`is “to find out . . . what something is” (Ex. 2036). Given this similarity, it is
`understandable that the Specification uses the terms interchangeably. For
`example, according to the Specification, the invention “identifies” oncoming
`headlights and leading taillights, but it also “detects” oncoming headlights
`and leading taillights. Ex. 1002, 3:2–3, 6:3–12, 7:7–8. Likewise, the
`Specification describes “pattern recognition” as assisting in the “detection”
`of objects of interest, but it also “identifies” objects of interest. Id. at 11:1–
`3. Although different terms in a claim are presumed to have different
`meanings, that presumption may be rebutted when, as here, the Specification
`uses the terms interchangeably. See In re Magna Elecs., Inc., Case Nos.
`2014–1798, 2014–1801, 2015 WL 2110525, at *5 (Fed. Cir. May 7, 2015)
`(rejecting Magna’s argument that a “positional relationship” has a different
`meaning than “an indication of a distance” because the patent “essentially
`treats the two terms coextensively”).
`Even assuming arguendo that a distinction exists between ”detect”
`and “identify,” and that Magna is correct that “the presence of an object may
`be detected but the object may not necessarily be identified” (PO Resp. 7
`n.3), we disagree with Magna that identification requires more than
`
` 8
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`detection in the context of the claims at issue. As stated above, claims 30
`and 34 recite an image sensing system that “identifies” objects via image
`processing, the image processing comprising pattern recognition, the pattern
`recognition, in turn, comprising “detection” of, e.g., an object. In other
`words, the claimed system identifies objects by detecting them.2 The claim
`does not present the terms as two separate requirements (e.g., a system that
`“identifies and detects”), but rather is structured such that performing one
`satisfies the other. “[I]dentif[ying]” an object is satisfied when the system
`“detect[s]” an object, the only additional requirement being that the
`detection be the result of “pattern recognition . . . based at least in part on at
`least one of (i) shape, (ii) reflectivity, (iii) luminance and (iv) spectral
`characteristic.”
`
`Kenue
`B.
`Kenue describes a “computer vision system” that detects lane markers
`and obstacles in front of an automobile. Ex. 1004, 1:53–61. Figure 1 of
`Kenue, reproduced below, depicts Kenue’s system in block-diagram form:
`
`
`2 Conversely, claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,459,664 B2 (“the ’664 patent”),
`the grand-parent of the ‘462 patent, recites a system that “detects” objects by
`“identifying” them—that is, the “detects” and “identifies” terminology is
`reversed compared to the analogous language in claims 30 and 34 of the
`’462 patent. See IPR2015-00256, Ex. 1002, 13:35–36 (“said sensing system
`detecting objects by processing said image data to identify objects”).
`Generally, claims in patents in the same family that share a common written
`description are interpreted consistently. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion,
`Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by
`Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en
`banc). The reversal of terms between claim 1 of the ’664 patent and claims
`30 and 34 of the ‘462 patent lends support to the notion that the drafter of
`these claims considered the terms to be interchangeable.
`
` 9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`
`
`As depicted in Figure 1, Kenue’s system comprises black and white CCD
`[charge coupled device] video camera 10—mounted on a vehicle’s
`windshield to capture the driver’s view of the road in front of the vehicle—
`coupled to computer 14 via analog-to-digital converter 12. Id. at 2:28–34,
`Fig. 1. Computer 14 processes the image data received from the CCD
`camera, and drives output devices—i.e., display 16, obstacle warning alarm
`18, and utilization circuit 20—in response to the data. Id. at 2:34–48, Fig. 1.
`The “raw image” from the camera is “digitized . . . into a 512x512x8
`image.” Id. at 3:44–45. Computer 14 receives the digitized image data from
`the camera and, using one of two main algorithms, template matching and a
`Hough transform, “dynamically define[s] the search area for lane markers
`based on the lane boundaries of the previous [image] frame, and provide[s]
`estimates of the position of missing markers on the basis of current frame
`and previous frame information.” Id. at 2:32–48. The system also detects
`and alerts the driver to obstacles in the lane within about 50 feet of the
`vehicle. Id. at 2:48–51.
`
`Claim 30—Anticipation—Kenue
`C.
`TRW asserts that Kenue anticipates claim 30. Its contentions in this
`regard are summarized in the claim chart at pages 14–17 of the Petition.
`Magna disputes that claim 30 is anticipated. In particular, Magna argues
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`that Kenue fails to disclose (1) a “two-dimensional array of light sensing
`photosensor elements,” (2) both “detection” and “identification,” and (3)
`“pattern recognition” based on either “shape” or “luminance.” PO Resp. 10–
`19. Magna further asserts that Kenue does not identify objects in “the
`forward field of view of [the] sensor,” and does not “process[] . . . image
`data.” Id. at 20–23.
`1.
`“an imaging sensor comprising a two-dimensional array
`of light sensing photosensor elements”
`Claim 30 recites “an imaging sensor comprising a two-dimensional
`array of light sensing photosensor elements.” TRW identifies Kenue’s CCD
`video camera as corresponding to the claimed imaging sensor. Pet. 14. In
`describing a block diagram of its system depicted in Figure 1, Kenue states
`that it uses a “black and white CCD video camera”; the raw image from the
`camera is “digitized . . . into a 512x512x8 image.” Ex. 1004, 2:27–30, 3:44–
`46, Fig. 1. This refers to a two-dimensional image that is 512 pixels high
`and 512 pixels wide, with each pixel represented by eight bits. Ex. 1020 ¶ 4.
`TRW argues that this shows that Kenue uses a two-dimensional array of
`light sensing photosensor elements to capture the raw image. Pet. 14.
`Magna disagrees. First, Magna argues that “a CCD camera is not
`explicitly, necessarily or inherently two-dimensional.” PO Resp. 11 (citing
`Ex. 2032 ¶¶ 35, 36–46). Magna notes, for example, that “a line-scan camera
`and a printer scanhead use a one-dimensional CCD.” Id. (citing Ex. 2032
`¶ 46). Second, Magna argues that “Kenue never discloses explicitly,
`necessarily or inherently that forming a two-dimensional image requires use
`of a two-dimensional sensor.” Id. Rather, Magna argues, “an image may be
`represented by a multidimensional matrix without the image sensor itself
`
`
`
`
`11
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`utilizing a two-dimensional array of light sensing photosensor elements.”
`Id. According to Magna, “Kenue’s search functions and algorithms could
`also be just as easily implemented using data from a one-dimensional array
`of light sensors.” Id. at 12–13 (citing Ex. 2032 ¶¶ 51–53).
`TRW responds that a person of ordinary skill would understand from
`Kenue’s discussion of the creation of a two-dimensional digital image that
`Kenue uses a two-dimensional image sensor to capture the raw image from
`which the digital image is created. Citing its declarant, Jeffrey A. Miller,
`Ph.D., TRW asserts that “[b]y pointing out that the digitized image is 512 x
`512 x 8, Kenue explicitly teaches to the skilled artisan use of a two-
`dimensional imaging array.” Pet. Reply 2 (citing Ex. 1020 ¶ 6). According
`to TRW, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to create a two-dimensional
`512x512 image in real time using, e.g., a 1x512 sensor array, because such a
`sensor would have to take “512 distinct images . . . [that] would need to be
`individually pieced together.” Id. at 1–2. TRW further notes that Kenue
`describes digitizing a single “raw image” into a 512x512 image, rather than
`multiple “raw images,” indicating that the patent does not contemplate such
`piecing together of multiple raw images as would be required if a one-
`dimensional sensor were used. Id. at 2. Furthermore, TRW contends that
`“Magna’s own expert . . . admits Kenue does indeed teach a two
`dimensional image sensor.” Id.
`“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in
`the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
`art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d
`628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). However, “the reference need not satisfy an
`ipsissimis verbis test.” In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
`
`
`
`
`12
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`(internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the reference must provide
`sufficient description of the claim elements so that a person of ordinary skill
`in the art would understand them to be present. See Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int’l
`Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that the
`Commission did not apply an improper ipsissimis verbis test in its
`anticipation analysis, but rather considered whether the prior art reference
`disclosed the claimed invention to one of ordinary skill in the art); In re
`Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that prior art
`references must be “considered together with the knowledge of one of
`ordinary skill in the pertinent art”). Thus, it is not dispositive that Kenue
`does not state that it uses a “two-dimensional array of light sensing
`photosensor elements” in so many words, as long as a person of ordinary
`skill would understand from the disclosure that the reference is describing
`such structure.
`We find that Kenue discloses to a person of ordinary skill that its
`black and white CCD video camera system uses a two-dimensional array of
`photosensor elements. First, we credit the testimony of Dr. Miller that a
`person of ordinary skill would understand that, because Kenue’s system
`creates a two-dimensional digital image from a raw image, the system uses a
`two-dimensional photosensor array to capture the raw image. See Ex. 1020
`¶ 6. Further, we rely on Kenue’s disclosure that it digitizes a single raw
`image, rather than multiple raw images, to create the 512x512x8 digital
`image, indicating to a person of ordinary skill that the single raw image
`would had to have been captured by a 512x512 array of photosensor
`elements. Finally, although Magna’s declarant, Matthew A. Turk, Ph.D.,
`originally testified that Kenue’s CCD camera does not “necessarily” include
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`a two-dimensional array of photosensor elements (Ex. 2032 ¶ 36), and that
`“Kenue never discloses explicitly, necessarily or inherently that forming a
`two-dimensional image requires use of a two-dimensional sensor” (id. ¶ 47),
`Dr. Turk provided testimony in his deposition that supports the opposite
`conclusion. Dr. Turk noted that the “camera image plane” depicted in
`Figure 2 “correspond[s] to the image sensor in Kenue,” and that a plane is “a
`two-dimensional surface.” Ex. 1013, 198:1–13.
`2.
`“said imaging sensor having a forward field of view to
`the exterior of a vehicle equipped with said imaging
`sensing system and through the windshield of the
`equipped vehicle”
`Kenue’s CCD video camera is “mounted in a vehicle, say at the upper
`center of the windshield to capture the driver’s view of the road ahead.”
`Ex. 1004, 2:29–32. We agree with TRW that this teaching corresponds to
`the claimed requirement that the imaging sensor has “a forward field of view
`to the exterior of a vehicle . . . and through the windshield of the equipped
`vehicle.”
`
`“said imaging sensor is operable to capture image data”
`3.
`Kenue teaches that its computer “is programmed with algorithms for
`processing the images sensed by the camera.” Id. at 2:40–41. We agree
`with TRW that this teaching corresponds to the claimed requirement that the
`imaging sensor is operable to capture image data.
`4.
`“a control comprising an image processor”
`As depicted in Figure 1, Kenue’s system comprises computer 14, and
`“output devices driven by the computer.” Id. at 2:33–35. We agree with
`TRW that this teaching corresponds to the claimed requirement for a control
`that comprises an image processor.
`
`
`
`
`14
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`
`5.
`
`“wherein said image sensing system identifies objects in
`said forward field of view of said image sensor via
`processing of said captured image data by said image
`processor”
`TRW argues that Kenue teaches this limitation because it identifies
`lane markers and obstacles in the forward field of view of the equipped
`vehicle by digitizing raw image data and processing the digital image using
`either a template-matching algorithm or a Hough transform. Pet. 15 (citing
`Ex. 1004, 2:41–51, 3:44–46, 59–66).
`Magna makes two arguments with respect to this limitation. First,
`Magna argues that Kenue does not identify objects in the “forward view of
`[the] sensor.” According to Magna, Kenue is limited to searching for lane
`markers only in a restricted view, and “‘forward field of view’ means more
`than th[is] restricted view.” PO Resp. 20–21. Magna derives this position
`from the fact that the Specification of the ’462 patent teaches that the
`invention is capable of “evaluation of light source characteristics made in
`each portion of the scene forward of the vehicle.” Id. (citing Ex. 1002,
`1:65–67, 2:1–4).
`As an initial matter, it is unclear from Magna’s Response whether it
`believes that this claim limitation requires that all objects present in the
`camera’s field of view be identified, or whether it just requires something
`more than searching for lane markers in Kenue’s limited search area. In any
`event, we do not find support in either the claim language or the
`Specification for Magna’s position. The limitation simply requires that
`“objects” be identified in the forward field of view of the image sensor, but
`does not otherwise specify what objects must be identified or where in the
`field of view the objects must be found (there does not seem to be any
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`dispute that a lane marker is an “object” or that Kenue’s limited search areas
`are in the forward view of view of Kenue’s system). As the limitation does
`not expressly require more than this, we decline Magna’s invitation to read
`additional requirements into the claim.
`Second, Magna argues that “Kenue does not ‘process[] . . . data’
`because it does no more than convert analog to digital.” PO Resp. 22. TRW
`responds that Kenue’s computer 14 processes data as required by the claim.
`Pet. Reply 13. We agree. Kenue’s computer 14 receives digitized image
`data and processes it to detect lane markers using one of two algorithms:
`template matching or a Hough transform. Ex. 1004, 2:40–44. This
`corresponds to the claimed processing of image data.
`6.
`“wherein said image processing comprises pattern
`recognition, and wherein said pattern recognition
`comprises detection of at least one of (a) headlight, (b) a
`taillight and (c) an object, and wherein said pattern
`recognition is based at least in part on at least one of (i)
`shape, (ii) reflectivity, (iii) luminance and (iv) spectral
`characteristics”
`TRW asserts that Kenue discloses “a template matching algorithm and
`a Hough transform algorithm for detecting lane markers (i.e., ‘an object’)[,
`and b]oth these image processing algorithms comprise pattern recognition
`and are based at least in part on at least one of shape and luminance.” Pet.
`15–16.
`Magna disputes that Kenue discloses this limitation, making two
`arguments in this regard. First, Magna argues that Kenue does not disclose
`both the “detection” and “identification” functions. According to Magna,
`“TRW collapses [‘detection’ and ‘identification’] into one [requirement] and
`does not explain how Kenue’s teachings ‘identify’ objects.” PO Resp. 13.
`
`
`
`
`16
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`According to Magna, “[t]his is because Kenue does not need to nor does it
`identify objects as all of Kenue’s teachings are only specific to lane
`markers.” Id.
`TRW responds that the “skilled artisan would understand that
`detection and identification do not require the imaging system to perform
`two distinct functions.” Pet. Reply 6. TRW further argues that Kenue’s
`system identifies lane markers (i.e., more than one lane marker), and also
`identifies “objects as obstacles.” Id. According to TRW, the “claims do not
`require that the identified objects be identified with greater precision.” Id.
`Magna’s argument is based on its contention that this limitation
`requires the system to both “identify” and “detect” objects, i.e., that
`identification and detection are two separate required “functions.” As
`discussed above, however, we disagree with this construction. Instead, this
`limitation makes clear that, as recited in claim 30, detection of an object
`satisfies the requirement that an object be identified. Here, Kenue clearly
`teaches detection of lane markers and obstacles, both of which are
`indisputably objects. See, e.g., Ex. 1004, 1:59–62 (“The invention is . . . a
`method of detecting lane markers.”); id. at 2:49–51 (“preprocessing
`procedures detect obstacles in the lane within about 50 feet of the vehicle”);
`id. at 3:3–4 (“broken line boxes 28 around the markers 24 define the area to
`be searched for detecting markers”).
`Magna argues that “[a] system that only cares about one object does
`not need to, nor would it, identify objects as is recited in the claims.” PO
`Resp. 15. This argument implicitly reads into the claim the requirement that
`the system be able to identify more than one “type” of object; e.g., a lane
`marker and something other than a lane marker. But the claim language
`
`
`
`
`17
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`contains no such requirement. It merely requires that the system identifies
`“objects,” which Kenue satisfies by identifying lane markers. Even if this
`limitation did contain such a requirement, Kenue would satisfy it because it
`detects both lane markers and “obstacles,” e.g., other vehicles, both of which
`would correspond to the claimed “object.”
`Second, Magna argues that neither Kenue’s template matching
`algorithm nor its Hough transform discloses pattern recognition based on
`either shape or luminance. PO Resp. 16–20. Magna argues that the term
`“shape” in this limitation only “refers to the object of interest’s shape.” Id.
`at 18. According to Magna, “Kenue only checks edges of a pre-processed,
`digitized, and altered image,” or “the shape of a Hough transform,” but
`“does not detect the shape of an object or pattern.” Id. (citing Ex. 1004,
`6:30–46; Ex. 2032 ¶ 73). Magna further argues that “intensity,” which is
`“the measurable amount of a property,” is not the same as “luminance,”
`which “describes the amount of light that passes through or is emitted from a
`particular area.” Id. at 19 (citing Ex. 1004, 4:49–66; Ex. 2032 ¶ 74).
`According to Magna, TRW has not explained how the correlation of a
`window of constant “gray level” with the “gray level” of the image relates to
`luminance. Id.
`TRW responds that Dr. Turk admitted in his deposition that template
`matching is a form of pattern recognition, and that Kenue teaches that in
`template matching “‘a template or window of desired intensity and shape is
`correlated with the image to create a correlation matrix’ which is
`subsequently used to identify lane markers.” Pet. Reply 9–10 (citing Ex.
`1004, 3:23–26). In addition, TRW asserts that “shape” may refer to more
`than the shape of the object of interest, and that Kenue’s teaching of using
`
`
`
`
`18
`
`
`
`IPR2014-00266
`Patent 7,994,462 B2
`
`the desired shape of its template window falls within the scope of this
`limitation. Id. at 12 (citing Ex. 1002, claims 30 and 34; Ex. 1004, 3:23–26;
`Ex. 1020 ¶ 19). TRW further argues that the “lines (and the points to which
`they are transformed in the Hough space) have shapes, and these shapes are
`specifically utilized in the calculus.” Id.
`We have reviewed the record, including the declarations submitted by
`Dr. Turk and Mr. Miller, and determine that TRW has established by a
`preponderance of the evidence that Kenue teaches pattern recognition based
`at least in part on shape. First, as Dr. Turk acknowledges, template
`matching is a type of pattern recognit