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` Paper 27
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` Entered: September 13, 2017
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`FITBIT, INC.,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`ALIPHCOM, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2016-00714
`Patent 8,446,275 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before BRYAN F. MOORE, TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, and
`MIRIAM L. QUINN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`MOORE, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. 318(a)
`
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`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`Fitbit, Inc. (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) to institute
`an inter partes review of claim claims 1–5, 8–10, 13–15, and 18–19 of U.S.
`Patent No. 8,446,275 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’275 patent”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
`§§ 311–319. AliphCom, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response
`to the Petition. (Paper 7, “Prelim. Resp.”). On September 15, 2016, we
`instituted an inter partes review of claims 1–5, 8–10, 13–15, and 18–19.
`Paper 10 (“Dec. on Inst.”).
`After institution, Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper
`11, “PO Resp.”), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 18, “Reply”). An oral
`hearing for this case was held on June 13, 2017, and a transcript of the
`hearing has been entered into the record of the proceeding as Paper 26
`(“Tr.”).
`We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. This Final Written
`Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). For the reasons that
`follow, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the
`evidence that claims 1–5, 8–10, 13–15, and 18–19 are unpatentable.
`
`A. Related Proceedings
`The parties state that the ’275 patent has been asserted in AliphCom
`d/b/a Jawbone and Body Media, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc., No 3:15-cv-02579 (N.D.
`Cal.), and Certain Activity Tracking Devices, Systems, and Components
`Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-963 (ITC). Pet. 2; Paper 5, 2. Petitioner also has
`filed petitions for inter partes review challenging claims 1–26 of the U.S.
`Patent No. 8,529,811 patent and claim 2 of U.S. Patent No. 8,793,522 patent,
`Fitbit, Inc. v. AliphCom, Inc., Nos. IPR2016-00607 and IPR2016-00658.
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`B. The ʼ275 Patent
`The ’275 patent relates to a health and wellness monitoring system
`and device. Ex. 1001, Abstract. The system claims to be a “general health
`and wellness management” device and system which receives “user data”
`from the user that includes “profile” and “preferences” information (id. at
`20:62–64), tracks the user’s activity using wearable devices having sensors
`(id. at Abstract), and then rewards a user’s activity with “points” determined
`based on “reference values” that define activity-to-point conversion rates.
`(Id. at 44:6–12). The system can also set a “target score” for a user as a
`means of increasing user motivation to reach health and wellness goal. Id. at
`38:58–59.
`
`C. Challenged Claim
`Independent claim 1 is reproduced below (Ex. 1001, 30:41–31:7):
`1. A method comprising:
`receiving data representing a profile defining
`parameters upon which a target score is established based
`on one or more health-related activities;
`acquiring data representing one or more subsets of
`acquired parameters based on one or more sensors
`disposed in a wearable computing device;
`determining data representing values for the one or
`more subsets of the acquired parameters based on
`reference values for the parameters set forth in the profile;
`calculating at a first processor a score based on data
`representing the values, the score representing an attained
`portion of the one or more health-related activities;
`causing presentation of a representation of the score
`relative to the target score; and
`adjusting a determination upon which to modify the
`target score,
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`wherein the target score is indicative of one or more
`standards against which to compare one or more groups of
`the values aggregated to form the score.
`
`
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`Ex. 1001, 47:25–44.
`
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`D. Instituted Grounds of Unpatentability
`We instituted trial on the following grounds. Dec. on Inst. 15.
`
`Reference[s]
`
`Basis
`
`Hoffman1
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`35 U.S.C. § 102
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`Hoffman and Gilley2
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`35 U.S.C. § 103
`
`Claims
`1–5, 8–9, 13–15,
`and 19
`10, 18, and 19
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`II. ANALYSIS
`
`A. Relevant Law
`1. Anticipation
`To prevail in its challenges to the patentability of claims, the
`Petitioner must establish facts supporting its challenges by a preponderance
`of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d). A claim is
`anticipated, and, thus, unpatentable, if a single prior art reference discloses
`each and every element of the claimed invention. See Schering Corp. v.
`Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
`
`
`1 U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2012/0041767 published Feb. 16, 2012
`(“Hoffman”) (Ex. 1003).
`2 U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2008/0076637 published Mar. 27, 2008
`(“Gilley”) (Ex. 1004).
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`2. Obviousness
`A claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the differences
`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject
`matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was
`made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
`pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The
`question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual
`determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level
`of skill in the art; and, (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary
`considerations, including commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs,
`failure of others, and unexpected results. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
`U.S. 1, 17−18 (1966) (“the Graham factors”).
`3. Level of Skill
`The level of ordinary skill in the art usually is evidenced by the
`references themselves. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355
`(Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In
`re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978). For an obviousness analysis,
`prior art references must be “considered together with the knowledge of one
`of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480
`(Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562 (CCPA 1978)).
`Moreover, “it is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the
`reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would
`reasonably be expected to draw therefrom.” In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826
`(CCPA 1968). That is because an obviousness analysis “need not seek out
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`precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged
`claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
`person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see
`also In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d at 1259.
`4. Claim Interpretation
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). Under this standard, we
`interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in
`their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in
`the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or
`otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the
`applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
`1997).
`We presume that claim terms have their ordinary and customary
`meaning. See Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1062 (Fed. Cir.
`2016) (“Under a broadest reasonable interpretation, words of the claim must
`be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with the
`specification and prosecution history.”); In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504
`F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary and customary meaning is
`the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art
`in question.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). A patentee,
`however, may rebut this presumption by acting as his or her own
`lexicographer, providing a definition of the term in the specification with
`“reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision.” In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d
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`1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Only those terms that are in controversy need
`to be construed, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.
`Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir.
`1999).
`
`B. Claim Interpretation
`1. Level of Skill
`Petitioner asserts “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would have
`had at least two years of relevant college-level coursework in an engineering
`field with one to two years of post-education relevant work experience.” Pet.
`8 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 16–19). Patent Owner does not offer a proposed level
`of skill in its Patent Owner Response. Nevertheless, Patent Owner’s
`Declarant Dr. Darrin J. Young asserts “a person of ordinary skill in the
`relevant field in June 2011 would have had experience working with
`electrical and electronic hardware, computer software, wired and wireless
`network communications, or computing devices.” Ex. 2001 ¶15.
`Petitioner argues that the level of skill offered by Dr. Young is
`“flawed” because it does not include “any experience with health and
`wellness management.” Reply 5–6. As evidence, Petitioner points to Dr.
`Young’s alleged inability to answer a question regarding the “difference
`between ‘health and physical wellness.’” Id. at 6. Thus, according to
`Petitioner, “Dr. Young’s opinions should be given minimal, if any, weight.”
`Id. We find that characterizing one of ordinary skill as having experience in
`health and wellness does not affect the claim construction, anticipation, or
`obviousness determinations in this case. Thus, we considered Dr. Young’s
`answer to that question in the context of his deposition and his assertion that
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`one of ordinary skill would not need to have experience in health and
`wellness and we, nevertheless, give full weight to his testimony.
`To determine the level of ordinary skill in the art in this case we
`consider the type of problems encountered in the art, the prior art solutions
`to those problems, the rapidity with which innovations are made, and the
`sophistication of the technology. Custom Accessories Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan
`Indus. Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
`We agree with level of skill in the art cited by Petitioner. To the
`extent Patent Owner suggests, through its Declarant, that the pertinent field
`is limited to the electrical and electronic hardware, computer software, wired
`and wireless network communications, or computing devices fields but
`excluding health and wellness experience, we disagree. Instead, we agree
`with Petitioner that the field includes relevant work experience which may
`be in the health and wellness field. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 1:24–33
`(characterizing that field of endeavor as generally relating to electrical and
`electronic hardware, computer software, wired and wireless network
`communications, and computing devices and, in particular, to “general
`health and wellness management techniques and devices for use with a data-
`capable personal worn or carried device.”).
`2. Patent Owner’s Construction of “target score”
`
`Claim 1 recites “receiving data representing a profile defining
`parameters upon which a target score is established based on one or more
`health-related activities” and “adjusting a determination upon which to
`modify the target score, wherein the target score is indicative of one or more
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`standards against which to compare one or more groups of the values
`aggregated to form the score.”
`Patent Owner asserts “[i]n the context of the claims and specification
`of the ’275 patent, a POSITA would reasonably understand that a ‘target
`score’ is a value indicative of a state or conditions of health and physical
`wellness for a user that the user strives to attain, which . . . excludes the cited
`subject matter of Hoffman relating to reward goals bought with reward
`points.” PO Resp. 4.
`Patent Owner relies on language in claim 1, recited two paragraphs
`above, and claim 2, which recites that the “target score” is “indicative of an
`ability of a user to achieve a targeted level of health and wellness associated
`with the target score.” PO Resp. 5. Patent Owner also cites various sections
`of the Specification consistent with its construction. Id. at 5–6 (citing
`generally Ex. 1001, 33:16–45:17 (for how scores are calculated); Ex. 1001,
`36:16–21, 37:37–43, 38:24–32, 38–48, 51–55, 39:62–40:3, 40:60–63,
`41:29–35, 42:38–42, Fig. 15B; Ex. 2001 ¶¶ 24–31.
`3. Petitioner’s Construction of “target score”
`
`Petitioner asserts “all terms should be given their plain and ordinary
`meaning.” Pet. 9; see also Reply 1 (asserting support for the “plain and
`ordinary meaning” construction in the Board’s Institution Decision). We
`stated in the Institution Decision that “while it may be true [in Hoffman] that
`the user ultimately selects the reward . . . the activity point price of the
`reward, which is the claimed “target score,” is established based on the
`activity, for example athletics.” Inst. Dec. 9. Petitioner agrees with this and
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`further states that “a POSITA would have understood a ‘target score,’ under
`its ordinary meaning, to encompass a ‘goal’ or ‘reward.’” Reply 2.
`Petitioner relies on the Specification which explains that “target
`scores” can provide indicators of “progress or fulfillment of . . . health and
`wellness goals.” Id. (quoting Ex. 1001, 36:19–21). Additionally, the
`Specification states: “target value or score can be modified dynamically to
`motivate a user to continue toward a health and wellness goal” (id. at 35:29–
`31); “[modifying the “target score” requires a] baseline profile against which
`a user’s progress can be measured in modifying behavior when working
`toward a goal (e.g., overall target score) that is consistent with a healthy
`lifestyle” (id. at 41:21–251); and, “if the user attains or fulfills the goals,” it
`can correspond to “the target score having a value of 100.” Ex. 1001,
`43:61–64.
`4. Construction of “target score” Does not Specifically Exclude
`Hoffman
`As an initial matter, we do not agree with Patent Owner that this claim
`term should be construed to specifically exclude the prior art. See PO Resp.
`4; Reply 3. Such an exclusion would normally require a clear disavowal of
`claim scope. See Omega Eng’g, Inc, v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1324
`(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]here the patentee has unequivocally disavowed a
`certain meaning to obtain his patent, the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer
`attaches and narrows the ordinary meaning of the claim congruent with the
`scope of the surrender.”) Patent Owner has not presented sufficient
`evidence of a clear disavowal in this case.
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`5. A “target score” is not Separate and Distinct from “reward points”
`
`Patent Owner also argues that the concept of “target score” is separate
`and distinct from “reward points.” Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that
`the calculated points and scores addressed in Figure 8 (Ex. 1001, 33:16–
`45:17) are entirely unrelated to and distinct from the points and scores
`shown in Figures 10–11 (Ex. 1001, 27:3–29:8), which they contend describe
`“reward points.” See PO Resp. 11–12.
`Patent Owner asserts that “Petitioner conflates the separate and
`distinct concepts of ‘scores’ and reward points . . . [such that Petitioner’s
`implied construction] of ‘target score’ is inconsistent with the term’s use in
`the claims and the specification of the ’275 patent, and must be rejected.”
`PO Resp. 9. Specifically, Patent Owner asserts that in “citing to the 41:21–
`22 and 38:45–46 [portions] of the ’275 patent, Petitioner misleadingly states
`that the ’275 patent discloses a system that can ‘generate data representing a
`subset of acquired parameters,’ which represent activities used by the system
`to award points to a user” and that “[t]he points awarded to the user can then
`be ‘aggregated to form an overall health and wellness score.’” PO Resp. 9
`(internal quotation omitted) (quoting Pet. 5). According to Patent Owner the
`cited portions of the Specification relate “only to ‘scores’,” not reward
`points. Id. Thus, according to Patent Owner the Specification treats reward
`points and “target score” as distinct and separate. PO Resp. 11–12.
`Patent Owner also asserts,
`the ’275 patent specification occasionally generally refers to
`“point values,” the term in those contexts is properly understood
`as referring to units of measure rather than to “points” as
`currency. See Ex. 1001 at 25:60-64, 35:64-67, 44:6-32, 44:47-
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`57; Ex. 2001 at ¶ 35. In other words, regardless of whether a
`target score might use points as a unit of measurement, a target
`score is still a fundamentally different and distinct concept
`compared to a rewards system as in Hoffman—even if the latter
`system also uses points as a unit of measurement.
`PO Resp. 12 (emphasis added).
`Patent Owner also asserts the “description of reward ‘points’ as virtual
`currency [in the Specification at Ex. 1001, 28:7–11] contrasts with the
`description of ‘target scores,’ which indicate a user’s state or conditions of
`health and physical wellness that a user strives to attain.” Id. at 11.
`Nevertheless, Patent Owner has not provided sufficient evidence in the
`Specification separating reward points from the “health and wellness” aspect
`of the disclosed system. As Patent Owner admits, points are simply a unit of
`measurement in the Specification. Indeed, the Specification emphasizes
`these points are for use as “virtual or actual currency” in “an online wellness
`marketplace,” as described herein, “e.g., a fitness marketplace” and can be
`used for prizes such as fitness bands. Ex. 1001, 28:62−65.
`We agree with Petitioner that the Specification describes reward
`points as something that can be used to measure progress toward a desired
`reward, which can be considered a “target score.” For example, the
`Specification expressly ties Figure 8 to Figures 10–11, explaining that the
`latter are depictions of the points and scores calculated in Figure 8. Ex.
`1001 at 25:38–26:54.3 The Specification emphasizes “these points may be
`
`3 The Specification describes that for a parameter for which a goal is desired
`(e.g., nutrition, sleep, activity, etc.), scores are calculated and aggregated as
`“points” or “reward points,” which are redeemable for rewards. See Ex.
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`used for obtaining various types of rewards, or as virtual or actual currency,
`for example, in an online wellness marketplace.” Pet. at 6 (citing Ex. 1001
`at 28:62–65, 28:7–23). In sum, Patent Owner has not shown that the
`Specification indicates that reward points cannot be a “target score.”
`6. The Relatedness of “scores,” “target scores,” and “reward points”
`
`We agree with Petitioner that the Specification discloses a single point
`system, which is both a component of the “score” and “target score,” and
`used as a reward currency. Reply 11–12. For example, the Specification
`explains how a user can achieve a “target score” for nutritional goals by
`earning points. Pet. 6 (citing Ex. 1001 at 44:12–21). For a user “goal to
`consume 45 milligrams of vitamin C per day,” the system may create a
`profile for that user “that equates 45 milligrams as 20 points (i.e., a target
`score for this nutrient).” Id.; Ex. 1002 ¶ 23. And if the user consumes 22
`milligrams of vitamin C, it will achieve “approximately half of the goal,” or
`“10 points as the value.” Pet. 6. This “[s]core can be calculated at a first
`processor based on data representing the values,” and represents “an attained
`portion” of the “goal,” or “target score for this nutrient.” Ex. 1001 at 44:15–
`24.
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`1001, 25:55−64. Whether the score is a target score, because the system
`tracks a desired goal, or an aggregate score, because the system adds up the
`overall performance, we find that the Specification describes all calculations
`as corresponding indiscriminately to “points” or “scores.” Id.
`Consequently, because the points (and, therefore, scores) depicted in Figures
`10−11 are also rewards, the target score, and the recited score, may also be
`rewards. Said another way, the Specification and arguments of the parties
`suggest that the description of both target score and rewards are intertwined.
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`The point system discussed in the above paragraph can be also used to
`buy a reward. For example, the Specification states “types of sleep 812,
`types of meals 814, and miscellaneous activities 816 can correspond to
`different point values of which one or more scores can be derived to
`determine aggregate value 830, which can be expressed in terms of points or
`a score.” Ex. 1001, 25:60–64. The Specification also states “points may be
`used for obtaining various types of rewards, or as virtual or actual currency,
`for example, in an online wellness marketplace, as described 10 herein (e.g.,
`a fitness marketplace).” Ex. 1001, 28:7–10. Again, Patent Owner has not
`cited to sufficient evidence that the points earned to calculate a score are
`“separate and distinct” from points used to buy rewards.
`Patent Owner cites Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d
`1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original) for the proposition that
`when a specification separately and distinctly describes separate
`components, a claim term that refers to one component cannot be construed
`to include both components. Id. at 10. Patent Owner also cites Engel Indus.,
`Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1996) for this
`proposition. Construing “reward points” to be “target scores” does not
`conflict with that proposition. As explained in the previous two paragraphs,
`in the challenged patent, the “reward points” at issue may be used for two
`purposes, i.e. either to increase a user’s score or to buy goods. Thus, a
`“target score” is not described separately from a reward point but rather in
`conjunction with reward points.
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`7. Petitioner’s Declarant Performs a Proper Analysis
`Patent Owner also asserts that Petitioner’s Declarant Dr. Mark A.
`Musen’s positions should be “given little, if any, weight” as lacking
`underlying facts because he does not construe “target score” and because he
`allegedly does not acknowledge Patent Owner’s asserted distinction between
`“target score” and reward points. PO Resp. 13. We disagree. Experts may
`be relied on to discuss claim terms even if they are given a plain meaning
`construction. Cf. IGT v. Bally Gaming Int'l, Inc., 659 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed.
`Cir. 2011) (finding a claim not to be indefinite relying in part on an expert’s
`testimony regarding plain meaning). Additionally, although Dr. Musen does
`not discuss Patent Owner’s alleged distinction between “target score” and
`“reward points,” he supports his opinions with facts, i.e. citations to the
`challenged patent. See generally, Ex. 1002.
`8. A “target score” is not Limited to Physical Activity
`Patent Owner’s proposed construction includes the phrase “health and
`physical wellness.” Petitioner asserts this is an apparent attempt to exclude
`from the scope of the claims scores that are related to non-athletic activity.
`Reply 6. To the extent that Patent Owner suggests that non-athletic
`activities are excluded from the claims, we disagree. Claim 1 states only
`that the “target score” is “indicative of . . . standards against which to
`compare . . . groups of the values aggregated to form the score,” and “based
`on” data representing “health-related activities.” Further, dependent claims
`6 and 7 require the claimed “target score” to encompass participation in
`location-related events and tracking of social-related activities. Id. at 47:63–
`48:2. We find that social-related activities, at a minimum, can be non-
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`athletic. Accordingly, the plain language of the claim, together with the
`surrounding words, and in context of other recited limitations preclude us
`from limiting “target score” to physical activity.
`9. Construction of “target score”
`For the reasons above, we construe “target score” to have its plain
`meaning as evidenced by the explicit language of the claim, i.e. that it is
`“indicative of . . . standards against which to compare . . . groups of the
`values aggregated to form the score,” and it is “based on” data representing
`“health-related activities.” We do not accept Patent Owner’s assertion that
`“reward points” are separate and distinct from a “target score,” thus “target
`score” may include a score that can be achieved through the accumulation of
`reward points.
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`10. Other Terms
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`We need not construe any other terms to resolve a controversy
`between the parties or a distinction with the prior art. Vivid Techs., Inc. v.
`Am. Science & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803, (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[O]nly
`those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent
`necessary to resolve the controversy.”). For purposes of this Decision, we
`determine that no other terms require explicit construction.
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`C. Anticipation Based on Hoffman (Ex. 1003)
`1. Overview of Hoffman
`Hoffman teaches an activity monitoring system that can, among other
`things, “encourage individuals to participate in athletic activities and
`improve their fitness levels.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 4. In particular, the system
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`motivates users to perform activities by rewarding them with “activity
`points” when they perform certain athletic and nonathletic activities. Id. ¶ 5.
`Accumulated activity points can then be “spent” on rewards such as
`products, services, discounts, and status upgrades. Id.
`The system includes a “platform that maintains user account
`information.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 69. This allows users to “register with [the
`system] to track and monitor their athletic performance and other types of
`activity.” Id. The system collects and stores information likely to “produce
`insights into various aspects of the user” such as their interests in sports,
`personal styles, and strengths, their preferences for events or event locations,
`shopping and/or browsing interests, their social network memberships, and
`event participation and workout data. Id. ¶ 73. This allows the system to
`“customize content based [] user interests” and to “personalize the user’s
`experience” with the system. Id.
`Based on the user’s interests in their profile, the system can suggest
`rewards that may be “purchased” with a certain number of activity points.
`See Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 5, 114, 122–23. These rewards can include “VIP treatment”
`at stores or events, product and/or service discounts, and “video game
`related items.” Id. ¶ 122. Hoffman teaches modifying the “cost” of these
`rewards based on the user’s interests, for example discounting the price for
`items relating to those interests. See id.
`The system also displays the user’s accumulated activity points
`relative to their reward in order to “visually represent [the] progress a user
`has made toward earning a number of activity points needed to purchase [a]
`corresponding reward.” Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 87, 114, 123, 130, Figs. 14–16. This
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`allows the user to compare their progress towards their reward over multiple
`types of athletic and non-athletic activities. See id. ¶¶ 91, 123.
`2. Overview
`Petitioner contends that claims 1–5, 8–9, 13–15, and 19 are
`anticipated by Hoffman. Pet. 10. To support its contentions, Petitioner
`provides detailed explanations as to how the prior art meets each claim
`limitation. Id. at 10–43. Petitioner also relies upon a Declaration of
`Dr. Musen, who has been retained as a Declarant by Petitioner for the
`instant proceeding. Ex. 1002.
`3. Claim 1 – Petitioner’s Contentions
`Hoffman discloses “receiving data representing a profile defining
`parameters upon which a target score is established based on one or more
`health-related activities,” as recited in claim 1. Pet. 10–14; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 5,
`69, 73, 77, 78, 109, 114, 118; Ex. 1002 ¶ 40. For example, Petitioner
`contends that Hoffman’s reward goal is a “target score” defined in terms of a
`number of activity points. Id. at 14 (citing Ex. 1003 at ¶¶ 114, 123, Figs.
`14–16). We agree and adopt this contention. These points represent and are
`based on athletic or exercise activities (i.e., health-related activities) such as
`those measured by the sensors in the system’s wearable athletic-monitoring
`device. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 80, 91). Hoffman discloses that a user’s
`interests defined in their profile comprise a parameter based on health-
`related activities such as the user’s exercise history. Id. (citing Ex. 1003 at
`¶¶ 115 (“A user’s interests [i.e., a parameter in the user’s profile] may be
`determined based on a history of user activity including types of workouts
`[i.e., health-related activities].”), 73 (“interests” are part of “a user’s
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`profile”)). Also, Hoffman discloses establishing such an activity-point goal
`for a reward (i.e., a target score) upon parameters defined in a user’s profile,
`such as a user’s interests: “The rewards 1425 displayed in portion 1405 may
`be selected in a variety of ways including based on a user’s interests.” Id.
`(citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 115).
`Hoffman discloses “acquiring data representing one or more subsets
`of acquired parameters based on one or more sensors disposed in a wearable
`computing device,” as recited in claim 1. Pet. 15–16; Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 38, 49,
`62, 63, 70, 93, 109, 116, Figs. 7 A–B; Ex. 1002 ¶ 40. For example,
`Hoffman’s sensors acquire data representing parameters such as calories
`burned, miles run, steps taken, heart-rate, amount of time exercised, and the
`speed and/or distance traveled by the user. Pet. 15 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 38,
`96, 82).
`Hoffman discloses “determining data representing values for the one
`or more subsets of the acquired parameters based on reference values for the
`parameters set forth in the profile,” as recited in claim 1. Pet. 16–17; Ex.
`1003 ¶¶ 39, 42, 69, 77, 78, 80, 92, 111, 130–131; Ex. 1002 ¶ 40. For
`example, the “electrical signals output by the sensors” of Hoffman indicate
`athletic parameters—these parameters are converted into a representation of
`measured athletic activity. Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 39, 42). Then,
`Hoffman converts the activity metric(s) for the subset of athletic parameters
`(i.e., acquired parameters) into activity points (i.e., data representing values)
`using conversion rates (i.e., reference values). Id. at 17 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶
`7).
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`Hoffman discloses “calculating at a first processor a score based on
`data representing the values, the score representing an attained portion of the
`one or more health-related activities,” as recited in claim 1. Pet. 17–18; Ex.
`1003 ¶¶ 64, 82, 87–89, 91, 109–11, 114, 131, Fig. 14–16; Ex. 1002 ¶ 40.
`For example, Hoffman discloses an exercise watch with a processor that
`determines values for various measured athletic activities. Id. at 17 (citing ¶
`0091 (“[W]atch 10 (FIGS. 7A and 7B) may be configured to measure
`athletic performance information [i.e., acquiring data . . . representing
`parameters] for a