throbber
Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Paper No. 44
`
`
`
` Entered: February 10, 2017
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`DISH NETWORK, LLC,
`Petitioner,
`
`v.
`
`TQ DELTA, LLC,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before SALLY C. MEDLEY, TREVOR M. JEFFERSON, and
`MATTHEW R. CLEMENTS, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`JEFFERSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`Inter Partes Review
`35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`We instituted inter partes review, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 314, on a
`Petition (Paper 1, “Pet.”) filed by DISH Network L.L.C. (“Petitioner”)
`requesting inter partes review of claims 1, 2, 4, 11, 12, 14, 16 and 18 of U.S.
`Patent No. 9,094,268 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’268 patent”) owned by TQ Delta,
`LLC (“Patent Owner”). This Final Written Decision is entered pursuant to 35
`U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons discussed below,
`Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged
`claims are unpatentable. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is dismissed.
`
`A. Procedural History
`Petitioner filed a Petition requesting an inter partes review of claims 1,
`2, 4, 11, 12, 14, 16 and 18 of the ’268 patent. Pet. Patent Owner filed a
`Preliminary Response to the Petition. (Paper 8, “Prelim. Resp.”). We
`instituted inter partes review of (1) claims 1, 2, 11, and 12 of the ’268 patent
`as unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bowie,1 Morelli,2
`and ANSI T1.413,3 and (2) claims 4, 14, 16, and 18 of the ’268 patent as
`unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bowie and Morelli.
`Paper 13 (“Inst. Dec.”), 21.
`
`
`1 U.S. Patent No. 5,956,323; issued Sep. 21, 1999 (Ex. 1004, “Bowie”).
`2 U.S. Patent No. 6,236,674 B1; issued May 22, 2001 (Ex. 1005, “Morelli”).
`3 Network and Customer Installation Interfaces – Asymmetric Digital
`Subscriber Line (ADSL) Metallic Interface, AMERICAN NATIONAL
`STANDARDS INSTITUTION (ANSI) T1.413-1995 STANDARD (Ex. 1006,
`“ANSI T1.413”).
`
`2
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`
`Patent Owner filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 26, “PO Resp.”),
`and Petitioner filed a Corrected Reply to Patent Owner’s Response (Paper 32,
`“Reply”).
`We held a hearing on November 8, 2017, and a transcript of the hearing
`is included in the record. Paper 43 (“Tr.”).
`
`B. Related Proceedings
`Petitioner states that the ’268 patent is asserted in TQ Delta LLC v.
`Comcast Corp., et. al., Case No. 1:15-cv-00611 (D. Del.); TQ Delta LLC v.
`CoxCom LLC et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-00612 (D. Del.); TQ Delta LLC v.
`DirecTV et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-00613 (D. Del.); TQ Delta LLC v. DISH
`Network Corp. et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-00614 (D. Del.); TQ Delta LLC v.
`Time Warner Cable Inc., et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-00615 (D. Del.); and TQ
`Delta LLC v. Verizon Services Corp., Case No. 1:15-cv-00616 (D. Del.). Pet.
`1–2, Paper 4, 2–3. The ’268 patent is related to U.S. Patent No. 8,611,404,
`which is involved in IPR2016-01160, IPR2016-01466, and IPR2016-01470.
`
`C. The ʼ268 Patent
`The ’268 patent describes “a multicarrier transmission system having a
`low power sleep mode and a rapid-on capability.” Ex. 1001, 3:35–37. The
`sleep mode idles a multicarrier transceiver when it is not needed to transmit or
`receive data, with transmission and reception capabilities quickly restored
`without requiring full initialization after inactivity. Id. at Abstract. The
`system includes a transceiver at the local central telephone office’s location
`(“CO transceiver”) and a transceiver at the customer’s premises (“CPE
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`transceiver”), which communicate over a telephone line. Id. at 3:66–4:9.
`Figure 1 reproduced below depicts a preferred embodiment of the invention.
`
`
`Figure 1 shows a block diagram of a multicarrier transmission system. Id. at
`3:50–53. Each transceiver includes “DSL transceiver 10” with “transmitter
`section 12 for transmitting data over digital subscriber line 14 and receiver
`section 16 for receiving data from the line.” Id. at 4:18–21, FIG. 1. In one
`embodiment, the transmitter and receiver sections 12, 16 enter a low power
`mode (or “sleep” mode), where power is reduced or cut off to the digital
`modulators/demodulator portions (sections 12, 16) of the transmitter and
`receiver sections (corresponding to the IFFT 20 (data modulator) and FFT 56
`(demodulator) of the CPE transceiver of Figure 1). Id. at 6:66–7:21. In
`
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`another embodiment, the transceiver is placed into a “partial” sleep mode “in
`which only part of each transceiver is powered down.” Id. at 8:52–60.
`The ’268 patent specification discloses that a transceiver entering a low
`power mode must first store a variety of line parameters comprising its “state
`memory.” Id. at 6:66–7:14. During sleep mode state, the CO transceiver
`monitors data subscriber line 14 for an “Exiting Sleep Mode” signal from the
`CPE transceiver. Id. at 6:64–69. The CPE transceiver transmits this signal
`when the “controller receives an ‘Awaken’ indication. . . . In response to the
`‘Awaken’ signal, the CPE transceiver retrieves its stored state from the state
`memory 38 [and] restores full power to its circuitry.” Id. at 7:64–8:6.
`
`
`
`D. Illustrative Claims
`Claims 1 and 11 are independent and reproduced below as illustrative
`of the claims at issue:
`1. A method, in a multicarrier transceiver, comprising:
`transmitting or receiving a message to enter a low
`power mode; and
`entering the low power mode, wherein a transmitter
`portion of the transceiver does not transmit data during the
`low power mode and a receiver portion of the transceiver
`receives data during the low power mode, wherein the
`transceiver is a device that is capable of transmitting or
`receiving internet and video data.
`
`11. A method, in a multicarrier transceiver, comprising:
`transmitting or receiving a message to enter a low
`power mode for a transmitter portion while a receiver
`portion remains in a full power mode; and
`
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`
`entering the low power mode for the transmitter
`portion while the receiver portion remains in the full power
`mode, wherein the transceiver is a device that is capable of
`transmitting or receiving internet and video data.
`Ex. 1001, 10:6–14, 10:64–11:4.
`
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Claim Interpretation
`We interpret claims of an unexpired patent using the broadest
`reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent in which they
`appear. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136
`S. Ct. 2131, 2142–46 (2016). Under the broadest reasonable construction
`standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as
`would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the
`entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
`2007). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth with
`reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475,
`1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
`
`1. “low power mode
`Our Decision on Institution construed “low power mode” to mean “a
`mode in which power to the circuitry is reduced for the purpose of power
`conservation.” Inst. Dec. 7. Patent Owner does not propose a different
`construction for this term (PO Resp. 23–24) and Petitioner does not address
`this construction. Based on the record developed during this proceeding, we
`continue to apply this construction.
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`
`2. “transceiver”
`Our Decision on Institution construed “transceiver” as “a
`communications device capable of transmitting and receiving.” Inst. Dec. 8.
`Patent Owner does not propose a different construction for this term (PO
`Resp. 23–24) and Petitioner does not address this construction. Based on the
`record developed during this proceeding, we continue to apply this
`construction.
`
`3. “data”
`Our Decision on Institution determined that no further interpretation is
`required for “data.” Inst. Dec. 8. Neither party addressed this determination
`in subsequent briefing. Based on the record developed during this proceeding,
`we determine that no further interpretation is required for “data.”
`4. “maintaining synchronization”
`Dependent claims 2 and 12 recite “maintaining synchronization with a
`second transceiver during the low power mode.” Petitioner did not propose a
`construction for, and our Decision on Institution did not construe this term.
`Patent Owner argues that
`“maintaining
`interpretation of
`the broadest
`reasonable
`synchronization with a second transceiver,” in view of the
`specification, is “maintaining a timing relationship between two
`transceivers by correcting errors or differences in the timing of the
`timing reference of the transceiver and the timing reference of a
`second transceiver,” and the Board should adopt this construction.
`PO Resp. 26 (citing Ex. 2012 ¶ 57). Patent Owner argues that the ’268 patent
`explains synchronization based on clock synchronization reference signals
`between the transmitter and receiver clocks and not synchronization of
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`incoming packet data. PO Resp. 25–27 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:62–5:4, 5:44–50;
`Ex. 2012 ¶¶ 56, 59). Patent Owner further contends that the ’268 patent
`explains that the clock of a ‘remote transceiver, such as that at a
`subscribers premises will be synchronized’ to the clock in CO
`transceiver, i.e., a master clock. Ex. 1001 at 4:64-67. Thus, in the
`context of the ’268 patent maintaining synchronization is the
`process used to ‘drive[] clock 30 [in one transceiver] in
`synchronism with the Master Clock in the driving transmitter [in
`another transceiver].’ Ex. 1001 at 5:53-55.
`PO Resp. 25. Thus, Patent Owner argues that the construction consistent with
`the specification of the ’268 patent requires maintaining synchronization as
`described in the ’268 patent, which means “maintaining a timing relationship
`between two transceivers by correcting errors or differences in the timing of
`the timing reference of the transceiver and the timing reference of a second
`transceiver.” PO Resp. 26–27.
`Patent Owner argues that their proposed construction is consistent with
`technical dictionaries that refer to checking and correcting variations in
`timing. PO Resp. 27 (citing Ex. 2017, 360; Ex. 2012 ¶ 59). Patent Owner
`also asserts that the Board’s preliminary construction in its Decision to
`Institute in a related case, IPR2016-01466, credits an argument that
`maintained synchronization between transceivers based on timing and
`correction of timing errors between DSL transceivers. PO Resp. 27–28 (citing
`Cisco Sys., Inc. v. TQ Delta, LLC, No. IPR2016-01466, slip op. at 11 (PTAB
`Feb. 9, 2017) (Paper 7) (“Petitioner explains that ANSI T1.413 uses a
`synchronization symbol in order to maintain timing by correcting timing
`errors in communication between DSL transceivers.” (citing Ex. 1007, 64));
`Ex. 2012 ¶ 59).
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`
`Petitioner responds that the ’268 patent describes two types of
`synchronization, timing and frame synchronization, both of which are used to
`maintain synchronization. Reply 1–2 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:5–20, 5:42–67, 6:50,
`8:64–9:10; 9:31–36; Ex. 2012 ¶ 55;4 Ex. 1060, 15:6–16:8, 19:4–10)). Thus,
`Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s proposed construction is too narrow, as
`the ’268 patent does not disclose synchronizing as limited to time synching
`“by correcting errors or differences between a timing reference of the
`transmitter and a timing reference of the receiver of the signal.” Reply 2.
`Indeed, Petitioner contends that the embodiment in the ’268 patent
`specification that uses timing reference signals (Ex. 1001, 5:42–67) does not
`require correcting errors or differences between timing references and is
`merely a preferred embodiment that does not limit “maintaining
`synchronization” to the embodiment discussed. Id. at 2–3 (citing Ex. 1001,
`3:51–53, Fig. 1).
`Petitioner argues that Patent Owner’s declarant admits that the claims
`of the ’268 patent do not specify a particular type of synchronization.
`Reply 1–2 (Ex. 1060, 19:4–10). Furthermore, Petitioner asserts the Patent
`Owner’s declarant admits that frame synchronization can be used to maintain
`superframe alignment or synchronization. Reply 1–2 (citing Ex. 1001, 5:5–
`20; Ex. 1060, 24:6–15); see also Ex. 1001, 7:52-54 (discussing frame
`synchronization during low power mode). Thus, Petitioner argues that Patent
`Owner’s proposed construction of “maintaining synchronization” improperly
`
`
`4 Petitioner’s Reply cites Exhibit 2003, but appears to refer to Exhibit 2012,
`which is the Declaration of Douglas A. Chrissan, PhD. Reply 1.
`9
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`limits the claim term to just timing synchronization and excludes frame
`synchronization. Reply 2.
`Petitioner argues that the dictionary definition cited by Patent Owner
`quotes the definition for “synchronous transmission” and not
`“synchronization” as recited in the claims. Reply 3–4; Ex. 1061, 6. Petitioner
`also notes that the related proceeding, IPR2016-01466, cited by Patent Owner
`(PO Resp. 27–28) involved a different set of claim terms—“synchronization
`signal” and “synchronization frame”—that are not present in the challenged
`claims of the ’268 patent. Reply 4. Finally, Petitioner argues that
`“maintaining synchronization,” which must encompass both time and frame
`synchronization, is not limited to time synchronization and should be given its
`plain and ordinary meaning. Id.
`Having considered the parties’ arguments and evidence, we do not
`agree with Patent Owner’s proposed construction that “maintaining
`synchronization” requires timing synchronization by correcting errors or
`differences between timing references. The claims of the ’268 patent do not
`recite “synchronization signal” or “synchronization frame” but refer only to
`“maintaining synchronization” during low power mode without specification
`as to the method of synchronization. See, e.g., Ex. 1001, 10:6–17 (claims 1
`and 2). Indeed, claims 2 and 12 do not recite any particular synchronization
`signal or synchronization frame as a limitation.
`We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the broad
`recitation of “maintaining synchronization” excludes the frame
`synchronization described in the ’268 patent specification. Patent Owner’s
`declarant testified that “in the context of the ’268 patent, there are two
`10
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`different types of synchronization that occur between transceivers: timing
`(clock) synchronization and frame synchronization” (Ex. 2012 ¶ 55) and that
`the ’268 specification provides an example of both types of synchronization
`(Ex. 1060, 15:6–16:8). In the examples cited by Patent Owner’s declarant
`(Ex. 1001, 4:42–58, 5:16), we find no support for limiting “maintaining
`synchronization,” as recited in claims 2 and 12, to timing synchronization by
`“maintaining a timing relationship between two transceivers by correcting
`errors or differences in the timing of the timing reference of the transceiver
`and the timing reference of a second transceiver” as Patent Owner asserts. PO
`Resp. 26; see Ex. 1060, 15:6–16:8. Instead, we find that the ’268 patent
`discusses several types of synchronization, including synchronization frames,
`synchronizing pilot tones, and timing signals. See Ex. 1001, 5:5–20, 5:42–67,
`6:50, 8:64–9:10; 9:31–36.
`We also are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument regarding the
`preliminary construction of limitations in a related case, IPR2016-01466,
`being consistent with Patent Owner’s narrow construction. The claim terms at
`issue in that case involved limitations on distinct synchronization signals that
`are not present in the claims of the ’268 patent. Petitioner also points to
`testimony in a related case, IPR2016-01466, in which Patent Owner’s
`declarant admitted that the “by correcting” language in Patent Owner’s
`proposed construction was added in response to arguments made by
`Petitioner’s expert in that case and not because of teachings in the ’268 patent
`specification. Reply 4 (citing Ex. 1062, 85:12–15). Thus, we do not find the
`related case persuasive with respect to the recited “maintaining
`synchronization” construction Patent Owner proposes. We also are not
`11
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`persuaded by Patent Owner’s dictionary definition, which does not address
`“synchronization” as recited in the challenged claims, but instead, is directed
`to “synchronous transmission.” PO Resp. 27 (citing Ex. 2017; Ex. 2012 ¶ 59).
`In sum, we agree with Petitioner that “maintaining synchronization”
`encompasses both timing and frame synchronization. Reply 2. Accordingly,
`we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s proposed construction that narrowly
`limits maintaining synchronization to timing synchronization by correcting
`errors, as Patent Owner proposes. Based on the full record, we determine that
`“maintaining synchronization” encompasses both timing and frame
`synchronization, but carries its ordinary and customary meaning.
`5. “parameter associated with [a/the] full power mode”
`Independent claim 4 recites “at least one parameter associated with a
`full power mode,” and independent claim 14 recites a similar limitation. Ex.
`1001, 10:29–30, 11:17–20.
`Patent Owner proposes construing this term to mean “parameter
`associated with the transmission and/or reception of data during normal
`operation.” PO Resp. 28 (citing Ex. 2012 ¶ 61). The ’268 patent describes
`storing a list of parameters comprising the “state” of transceiver. Ex. 1001,
`6:66–7:14. Patent Owner argues that this list “includes communication
`protocol-specific parameters that are used for the transmission of data and
`does not include loop characteristics.” PO Resp. 29 (citing Ex. 2012 ¶ 62).
`Petitioner counters that the term should have its ordinary and customary
`meaning. Reply 5–6. Petitioner argues that the list of characteristics Patent
`Owner relies on are merely exemplary. Petitioner contends that the ’268
`patent expressly states that stored parameters “preferably include at least” the
`12
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`items listed, indicating that other parameters may be stored. Reply 5–6 (citing
`Ex. 1001, 7:8–9). Absent a clear disavowal of scope, Petitioner argues that
`the claims are simply not limited to the types of parameters listed in the
`specification. Reply 5–6 (citing Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC,
`669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding full scope of plain and ordinary
`meaning is appropriate “unless the patentee explicitly redefines the term or
`disavows its full scope”); In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
`1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that features relating to particular
`embodiments may not be read into the claims absent clear disclaimer in the
`specification)).
`In light of the arguments and evidence presented, we are not persuaded
`that this term requires an express construction. Patent Owner’s proposed
`construction does not add necessary clarity to the claims, as it merely replaces
`“full power mode operation” with “transmission and/or reception of data
`during normal operation.” The parties, however, do not dispute the meaning
`of “full power mode operation.” Accordingly, an express construction is not
`necessary to resolve the disputes between the parties.
`
`
`B. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`Petitioner contends that a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the
`art, with respect to and at the time of the’268 patent, “would hold a bachelor’s
`degree or the equivalent in electrical engineering (or related academic fields)
`and at least four years of additional work experience in the area of digital
`and/or telecommunication system design, as applicable to DSL systems, or,
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`alternately, eight years of equivalent work experience.” Pet. 12 (citing Ex.
`1002 ¶¶ 26–33).
`Patent Owner contends that such a person “would have had a bachelor’s
`degree in electrical engineering (or a similar technical degree or equivalent
`work experience) and at least 3 years of experience working with such
`multicarrier communication systems.” PO Resp. 21.
`We determine that no express finding on a specific corresponding level
`of technical education and experience is necessary. Here, the level of ordinary
`skill in the art is reflected by the prior art of record. See Okajima v.
`Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d
`1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91 (CCPA 1978).
`
`C. The Parties’ Post-Institution Arguments
`In our Decision on Institution, we concluded that the arguments and
`evidence advanced by Petitioner demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that
`claims 1, 2, 11, and 12 of the ’268 patent are unpatentable as obvious under 35
`U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bowie, Morelli, and ANSI T1.413 and that claims 4, 14,
`16, and 18 of the ’268 patent are unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 103(a) over Bowie and Morelli. Inst. Dec. 21. We must now determine
`whether Petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the
`specified claims are unpatentable over the cited prior art. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
`Our Order previously instructed Patent Owner that “any arguments for
`patentability not raised in the [Patent Owner Response] will be deemed
`waived.” Paper 14, 5–6; see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.23(a) (“Any material fact not
`specifically denied may be considered admitted.”); In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842
`F.3d 1376, 1379–1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding Patent Owner waived an
`14
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`argument addressed in Preliminary Response by not raising the same
`argument in the Patent Owner Response). Additionally, the Board’s Trial
`Practice Guide states that the Patent Owner Response “should identify all the
`involved claims that are believed to be patentable and state the basis for that
`belief.” Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,766
`(Aug. 14, 2012).
`With the complete record before us, we note that we have reviewed
`arguments and evidence advanced by Petitioner to support its unpatentability
`contentions where Patent Owner chose not to address certain limitations in its
`Patent Owner Response. In this regard, we determine that the record now
`contains persuasive, unrebutted arguments and evidence presented by
`Petitioner regarding the manner in which the asserted prior art teaches
`corresponding limitations of the claims against which that prior art is asserted.
`Based on the preponderance of the evidence before us, we conclude that the
`prior art identified by Petitioner teaches or suggests all uncontested limitations
`of the reviewed claims. The limitations that Patent Owner contests in the
`Patent Owner Response are addressed below.
`
`D. Obviousness of Claims 1, 2, 11, and 12 based on Bowie, Morelli,
`and ANSI T1.413 and Obviousness of Claims 4, 14, 16, and 18 based on
`Bowie and Morelli
`Petitioner contends that Bowie, Morelli, and ANSI T1.413 teach the
`limitations of claims 1, 2, 11, and 12. Pet. 23–43. Petitioner provides
`citations to prior art, argument, and declaration of Petitioner’s declarant, Mr.
`Hoarty (Declaration of W. Leo Hoarty, Ex. 1002), in support of its
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`contentions. Id. Petitioner also contends that Bowie and Morelli teach the
`limitations of claims 4, 14, 16, and 18. Pet. 43–48.
`1. Principles of Law
`A claim is unpatentable under § 103(a) if the differences between the
`claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the subject matter, as a
`whole, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
`person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of
`obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations,
`including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) any differences
`between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in
`the art; and (4) when in evidence, objective indicia of non-obviousness (i.e.,
`secondary considerations). Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18
`(1966). We analyze this asserted ground based on obviousness with the
`principles identified above in mind.
`2. Bowie (Ex. 1004)
`Bowie discloses a power conservation system for transmission systems
`in which data is modulated over a communications loop from a central office
`location to a customer premise. Ex. 1004, 1:4‒8. Bowie discloses that to
`provision ADSL service, ADSL units are located at each end of a wire loop, a
`first ADSL unit at the customer premises (CPE) and a second ADSL unit at
`the telephone company central office (COT). Id. at 3:51‒58.
`ADSL units enter a low power mode to reduce power requirements. Id.
`at 5:6‒8. CPE unit initiates low power mode by sending a “shut-down” signal
`to the COT unit. Id. at 5:8‒10. Both the CPE unit and COT unit may store
`16
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`loop characteristics that enable rapid resumption of user data transmission
`when units return to full power mode. Id. at 5:18‒25. Each unit then enters
`low power mode by shutting off the now unnecessary sections of the signal
`processing, transmitting, and receiving circuitry, including signal processing
`111, transmitting 112, and receiving 113 circuitry. Id. at 5:26‒28. After
`shutdown, the loop is in an inactive state. Id. at 5:28‒29. During low power
`operation, circuitry 115 remains capable of detecting the resume signal. Id. at
`5:28–29. This resume signal may be detected by the COT unit using a 16 kHz
`AC signal detector 115 that employs conventional frequency detection
`techniques and remains operative when the COT unit is in low-power mode.
`Id. at 5:52–56. The units return to full power mode after the CPE unit
`transmits to the COT unit a resume signal. Id. at 5:48‒59. The stored loop
`characteristics are used to restore the loop parameters. Id. at 5:60‒66.
`3. Morelli (Ex. 1005)
`Morelli discloses a transceiver with a low power mode (or sleep mode)
`operation. Ex. 1005, Abstract. Morelli includes a transmitter 12 and a
`receiver 16, where transmitter 12 can be placed in a low power mode to
`conserve power when data transmission is not necessary. Id. at 1:11–15, 2:4–
`10, 6:54–62. Receiver 16 can also be placed in a low power mode when
`packets are not being received, but upon detection of a packet, can be awoken
`from the low power mode to resume full power receipt of packets. Id. at
`1:11–15, 2:37–58, 6:66–7:17, 8:43–49, 9:53–57, 14:6–19, 14:57–64, 19:7–10.
`Morelli also discloses that the receiver 16 remains in “active mode” while the
`transmitter 12 switches between a low power mode and full power mode, as
`needed to conserve power. Id. at 21:51–54. Morelli also discloses “data
`17
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`packets” are communicated between transceivers, which include
`“synchronizing bits for synchronizing the receiver 16.” Id. at 9:1–3, 1:45–50,
`FIG. 2.
`
`4. ANSI T1.413 (Ex. 1006)
`ANSI T1.413 discloses electrical characteristics of Asymmetric Digital
`Subscriber Line (ADSL) signals appearing at a network interface. Ex. 1006,
`Abstract. ADSL allows for the provision of Plain Old Telephone Service
`(POTS) and a variety of digital channels. Id. at 1. Digital channels consist of
`full duplex low-speed channels and simplex high-speed channels in the
`direction from the network to the customer premises, and low-speed channels
`in the opposite direction. Id.
`5. Petitioner’s Contentions
`Petitioner contends that Bowie, Morelli, and ANSI T1.413 teach the
`limitations of claims 1, 2, 11, and 12. Pet. 23–43. Petitioner also contends
`that Bowie and Morelli teach the limitations of claims 4, 14, 16, and 18.
`Pet. 43–48.
`Petitioner argues that Bowie, Morelli and ANSI T1.413 are analogous
`art from the same field of endeavor and directed to the field of power
`conservation (low power and sleep modes) in multicarrier communication
`systems. Pet. 26 (citing Ex. 1004, Abstract, 3:24–4:9, 4:55–58; Ex. 1005,
`Abstract, 11:45–53; Ex. 1006, 45, 70; Ex. 1002 ¶ 119).
`Petitioner further argues that Bowie teaches a multicarrier transceiver
`and transmitting a message to enter low power mode, where the transceiver
`does not transmit data during low power mode of claim 1. Pet. 26–28.
`Petitioner argues that Bowie combined with Morelli discloses a low power
`18
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`mode where the transmit transceiver (as Morelli suggests) is shut down while
`the receiver remains in active mode to receive data packets. Pet. 29–30 (citing
`Ex. 1005, 1:11–15, 1:45–50, 2:4–10, 6:43–51, 54–62, 8:16–20, 8:46–59; Ex.
`1002 ¶¶ 148–149). Petitioner asserts that Bowie’s system can be modified to
`incorporate the teachings of Morelli by applying known techniques to yield
`predictable results. Pet. 30–34 (citing Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 151–55).
`Petitioner argues that Bowie, Morelli, and ANSI T1.413, in
`combination, teach the “transceiver is a device that is capable of transmitting
`or receiving internet and video data” limitation of claim 1. Pet. 33–38.
`Petitioner provides articulated reasoning to combine the ADSL functions and
`capabilities of Bowie and ANSI T1.413 with the data transmission and low
`power system of Morelli in the transmission of video data. Id. (citing Ex.
`1002 ¶¶ 156–65, 167–69).
`With respect to dependent claim 2, which recites “maintaining
`synchronization with a second transceiver during the low power mode,”
`Petitioner cites Morelli, which teaches that “incoming data packets received
`by receiver portion 16 include ‘a synchronization field 46 including
`synchronizing bits for synchronizing the receiver 16.’” Pet. 38 (quoting
`Ex. 1005, 9:1–3; citing Ex. 1005, 8:60–9:17, 11:1–44, 1:45–50, FIG. 2).
`Petitioner argues that the system of Bowie could be modified to use the data
`packets and synchronization bits of Morelli in combination with ANSI
`T1.413. Pet. 39–40 (Ex. 1002 ¶¶ 113, 173–74). Specifically, Petitioner
`argues that:
`It would also be obvious to maintain this synchronicity when
`Bowie’s modified system is the low power mode because the
`receiver is still operating at full power and receiving messages
`19
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01469
`Patent 9,094,268 B2
`
`
`while the unit 232, 242 is overall in a low power mode state. (Id.,
`¶ 174.) Thus, a POSITA would understand that, because the first
`transceiver’s receiver is still receiving data packets from the
`second transceiver, the two communicating transceivers must be
`synchronized. (Id., ¶ 174.)
`Pet. 39–40. With respect to independent claim 11 and dependent claim 12,
`which recite limitations similar to claims 1 and 2, Petitioner relies on the same
`arguments presented for claims 1 and 2. Pet. 40–43. With respect to claims 4,
`14, 16, and 18, Petitioner relies on the arguments presented above for Bowie
`and Morelli with respect to claims 1, 2, 11, and 12 with respect to Bowie and
`Morelli. Id. at 43–49 (citing id. at 26–43).
`Notwithstanding Patent Owner’s arguments, which we have considered
`and which we address below, we are persuaded by a preponderance of the
`evidence by Petitioner’s showing, which we adopt as our own findings and
`conclusions, that claims 1, 2, 11, and 12 of the ’268 patent are unpatentable as
`obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bowie, Morelli, and ANSI T1.413; and
`that claims 4, 14, 16, and 18 of the ’268 patent are unpatentable as obvious
`under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bowie and Morelli.
`6. Patent Owner’s Contentions
`Patent Owner argues that Petitioner has failed to show that the
`combination of Bowie, ANSI T1.143, and Mor

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket