throbber
Paper 12
`Entered: March 13, 2017
`
`
`Trials@uspto.gov
`Tel: 571-272-7822
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`_______________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`_______________
`
`RESMED LIMITED, RESMED INC., AND RESMED CORP,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`FISHER & PAYKEL HEALTHCARE LIMITED,
`Patent Owner.
`_______________
`
`Case IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`_______________
`
`
`
`Before RICHARD E. RICE, BARRY L. GROSSMAN, and
`JAMES J. MAYBERRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`GROSSMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`
`I. INTRODUCTION
`A. Background
`ResMed Limited, ResMed Inc., and ResMed Corp (collectively,
`“Petitioner”) filed a Petition (Paper 4, “Pet.”) requesting an inter partes
`review of claims 2–4, 6–10, 12–17, 19, 20, and 35 of U.S. Patent No.
`8,479,741 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’741 patent”). Petitioner supported the
`Petition with a 142 page declaration from John Izuchukwu, Ph.D., P.E.
`(Ex. 1008). Fisher & Paykel Healthcare Limited (“Patent Owner”) filed a
`Preliminary Response (Paper 10, “Prelim. Resp.”).
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, an inter partes review may not be instituted
`“unless . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail
`with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C.
`§ 314(a). The Board acts on behalf of the Director. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a).
`Upon considering the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we determine
`that Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood that it would prevail
`with respect to at least one of the challenged claims. Accordingly, we do not
`institute an inter partes review.
`
`B. Related Proceedings
`The parties identify a related federal district court case involving the
`’741 Patent: Fisher & Paykel Healthcare Ltd. v. ResMed Corp., Case No.
`3:16-cv-02068-GPC-WVG (S.D. Cal.). Pet. 1; Paper 7, 1–2.
`The parties also inform us that Petitioner filed and then voluntarily
`dismissed, without prejudice, a declaratory judgment action challenging the
`validity of the ’741 Patent (ResMed Inc. v. Fisher & Paykel Healthcare
`Corporation Limited, Case No. 3:16-cv-02072-JAH-MDD (S.D. Cal.).
`
`2
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`Pet. 1–2; Paper 7, 1; see Ex. 1046 (Petitioner’s Notice of Voluntary
`Dismissal Without Prejudice).
`There are several pending inter partes reviews between the parties
`related to the ’741 patent. Petitioner is seeking inter partes review of claims
`1, 21–25, 27–31, 33, and 34 of the ’741 patent in a separate petition
`(IPR2016-01714). The ’741 patent is a continuation of the application that
`matured into Patent No. 8,443,807 (“the ’807 patent”). Petitioner also is
`seeking inter partes review of the claims in the ’807 patent (IPR2016-01726;
`01734).
`Petitioner also seeks inter partes review of several patents related to
`the general subject matter of the ’741 patent, including IPR2016-01716;
`01717; 01719; 01723; 01724; 01725; 01727; 01729; 01730; 01731; and
`01735.
`
`C. Statutory Bar Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)
`Patent Owner argues that the Petition is barred under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 315(a)(1) because Petitioner filed a declaratory judgment action for
`invalidity of the ’741 Patent on August 16, 2016, and before filing the
`instant Petition. Prelim. Resp. 10–17. That action, however, was voluntarily
`dismissed without prejudice on August 18, 2016, well before the instant
`Petition was filed. Pet. 1–2 (citing Ex. 1046). As such, Patent Owner’s
`argument fails because prior Board decisions have consistently interpreted
`35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) as not barring inter partes review if the previously
`filed civil action was dismissed without prejudice, which is the case here.
`See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Parallel Networks Licensing, LLC, Case
`IPR2015-00486, slip op. at 6–7 (PTAB Jul. 15, 2015) (Paper 10); Oracle
`
`3
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`Corp. v. Click-to-Call Techs. LP, Case IPR2013-00312, slip op. at 12–13
`(PTAB Oct. 28, 2014) (Paper 52).
`Patent Owner now challenges the Board’s consistent interpretation of
`35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1). Prelim. Resp. 10–17. But Patent’s Owner’s
`arguments are in direct contrast to a decision in the related district court
`action, which relied upon the Board’s consistent interpretation of 35 U.S.C.
`§ 315(a)(1) in deciding whether to impose a stay pending our resolution of
`this proceeding. Ex. 3001. There, Patent Owner argued the statutory bar as
`a reason the court should not impose a stay. Id. at 3. Noting that
`Petitioner’s declaratory judgment action was voluntarily dismissed “without
`prejudice” prior to the instant Petition being filed, the district court held that
`“the effect of a voluntary dismissal w/out prejudice is to render the prior
`action a nullity” such that it is “treated as if it was not ‘filed’ at all” and thus
`“cannot give rise to a statutory bar under 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1).” Id. at 4. In
`doing so, the district court relied upon, and expressly adopted, the reasoning
`of prior Board decisions that came to a similar conclusion.1 Id. Moreover,
`the district court in the related action noted that “at least eight Circuits had
`likewise determined that a dismissal without prejudice makes the situation as
`if the action never had been filed.”2 Id.
`
`
`1 The district court may have recognized that “an agency’s interpretation of
`the statute under which it operates is entitled to some
`deference.” Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411
`(1979).
`2 See, e.g., Holloway v. U.S., 60 Fed. Cl. 254, 261 (2004), aff’d 143 F. App’x
`313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (treating civil action dismissed without prejudice “as if
`it never existed.”); Bonneville Assoc., Ltd. P’ship v. Barram, 165 F.3d 1360,
`1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The rule in the federal courts is that ‘[t]he effect of a
`
`4
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`
`We see no reason to deviate from our prior decisions interpreting 35
`U.S.C. § 315(a)(1) or the district court’s concurring analysis of this issue,
`and Patent Owner’s arguments to the contrary do not persuade us
`otherwise. As such, we hold that the Petition is not barred by 35 U.S.C.
`§ 315(a)(1).
`
`D. Prior Consideration of Arguments under § 325(d)
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 325(d), the Board, acting on behalf of the Director,
`may take into account whether, and reject a petition because, the same or
`substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were presented to
`the Office. Patent Owner argues that the Board should exercise its discretion
`under § 325(d) and deny institution of a trial because Gunaratnam was
`expressly considered by the PTO during prosecution of the ’741 patent.
`Prelim. Resp. 38–39. We recognize that Gunaratnam was considered and
`applied by the Examiner during the PTO proceedings leading to issuance of
`the ’741 patent. The specific combination of references asserted in the
`Petition, the evidence provided by the Declaration testimony of Dr.
`Izuchukwu, and the specific factual issues raised by the Petition and newly
`cited references, however, were not previously considered. Accordingly, we
`do not reject or deny the Petition under § 325(d).
`
`E. The ’741 Patent
`In an effort to treat obstructive sleep apnea, a technique known as
`Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) was devised to supply
`
`
`voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a) is to render the
`proceedings a nullity and leave the parties as if the action had never been
`brought.’”) (citations and some internal quotations omitted).
`
`5
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`pressurized air to a patient, usually through a nasal mask. Ex. 1002, 1:39–
`43. The pressurized air supplied to the patient “acts as a pneumatic splint”
`(id. at 1:48) and thus assists the muscles to keep the patient’s airway open
`(id. at 1:43–45). The ’741 patent discloses that prior art devices provide the
`pressurized air to “a nose, full face, nose and mouth, or oral mask” that is
`sealingly engaged to a patient’s face by a harness or other headgear.
`Id. at 1:50–54.
`The ’741 patent relates to a headgear and respiratory mask that
`provides a nasal interface for the supply of air from a CPAP machine. Id. at
`1:16–18.
`Figures 2 and 3 of the ’741 patent, as annotated by Petitioner (Pet. 6),
`are reproduced below.
`
`Figures 2 and 3 of the ’741 patent as annotated by Petitioner.
`Figure 2 is a perspective view of a nasal mask and headgear.
`Figure 3 is an exploded view of the nasal mask and headgear of Figure 2.
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`
`The annotated figures above depict a patient interface embodiment
`including mask 2 and headgear 21. Mask 2 includes mask base 22 (see Fig.
`5 below) and mask body 23 (see Fig. 7 below).
`
`
`
`
`
` Mask body 23
`
`
`
` Mask base 22
`
`As shown in Figure 7, mask body 23 includes nasal pillows 24, 25.
`Ex. 1001, 5:28–36. Nasal pillows 24, 25 are frustoconical in shape and in
`use rest against a patient’s nares,3 to substantially seal the patient’s nares.
`Ex. 1001, 5:32–34; Figs. 6, 7. As shown in Figure 5, mask base 22 is a ring
`or sleeve type attachment. Id. at 6:22–23. One end of swivel elbow
`connector 30 is connected to one side of mask base 22 (id. at 6:42–46), and
`mask body 23 is connected to the other side of mask base 22 (id. at 5:34–
`36). The other end of connector 30 is attached to tube 31, which connects to
`a source of pressurized air. Id. at 6:47–50; see Figs. 1 and 2. In use, air
`flows through tube 31, connector 30, mask base 22 and mask body 23, and
`exits from nasal pillows 24, 25 through outlets 26, 27 into the patient’s
`nostrils.
`
`
`3 Nares also are referred to as nostrils. See Ex. 1002, 6:12–13 (“This allows
`easier insertion of the pillow 24 into a user’s nostrils . . . .”).
`
`7
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`
`Mask 2 and its related components, as described above, are held in
`place on the patient by headgear 21. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, headgear
`21 includes headgear straps 35, 36, 37, 38 and substantially curved, rigid,
`elongate member 34. Id. at 6:61–65. Elongate member 34 of headgear 21
`includes central section 42 and contoured side arms 41, 54. Id. at 7:8–10.
`Preferably the side arms of curved member 34 are integrally molded with
`central section 42. Id. at 21–22; see also 7:53–54 (“The central section 42 is
`a half circle that is integrally moulded with the side arms 41, 54.”).
`A substantial length of each of side arms 41 and 54 overlaps and is
`attached to respective side straps 37, 38. Side straps 37, 38 are made from a
`soft foam type material to make the headgear more comfortable, whereas
`curved member 34 and side arms 41, 54 are made from a more rigid material
`to provide stability to headgear 21 and nasal mask 2. See generally
`id. at 7:8–18.
`When everything is assembled, elongate member 34 supports mask
`base 22 and mask body 23 such that pillows 24, 25 are positioned properly
`against the patient’s nares. In an alternative form, the mask base and the
`curved elongate member are integrally formed, such as by molding or the
`like. Id. at 8:3–6.
`Of the challenged claims in this Petition, claim 2 is the only
`independent claim and is reproduced below:
`2. A patient interface comprising:
`a mask body comprising a molded elastomeric material,
`the mask body comprising two extending nasal pillows and a lip,
`the nasal pillows, in use, resting in a substantially sealed manner
`against corresponding nares of a user;
`a ring engaged with the lip of the mask body;
`
`8
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`
`a plane substantially bisecting the ring, each of the two
`nasal pillows positioned on opposite sides of the plane;
`an elbow rotatably engaged with the ring, the elbow
`comprising a wall, a vent being formed in the wall of the elbow,
`the vent comprising a plurality of holes;
`a tube or conduit extending from the elbow; and
`a headgear comprising side straps that pass down the
`cheeks of the user, a top strap connected to the side straps, a back
`strap extending from at least one of the side straps and the top
`strap, the headgear further comprising molded side arms
`extending away from the ring to connect with the side straps,
`wherein the molded side arms overlap the side straps and the side
`straps are made from a soft foam material, and wherein the side
`straps overlap the molded side arms on a portion of the molded
`side arms that is spaced from the ring, the side straps extending
`away from the ring along the molded side arms;
`the elbow being capable of swiveling in the ring such that
`the tubing can be attached to the top strap or can fall freely;
`in use, gases flow from the tube or conduit, through the
`elbow, through the ring, through the mask body and through the
`pillows;
`wherein the ring is configured to connect to only two
`molded side arms and wherein each of the two molded side arms
`is configured to connect with a single side strap.
`
`
`F. Prosecution History
`During prosecution, the Examiner rejected independent application
`claim 31, which became patent claim 2, under 35 U.S.C. §103 as
`unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 7,210,481 (Ex. 2006, “Lovell”) and U.S.
`Patent Publication No. 2004/0226566 A1 (Ex. 1004, “Gunaratnam”).
`Ex. 1010, 466–471. Concerning Gunaratnam, the Examiner stated that
`Gunaratnam “discloses another nasal mask that incorporates a pair of arms
`in numerous embodiments (see elements 608 and the unnumbered arms in
`Figure 135) so as to enhance the fit between the mask and face of a user by
`
`9
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`adding rigidity between the straps and mask.” Id. at 468. Independent
`application claim 30, which became patent claim 1, was rejected only on the
`non-statutory ground of obviousness-type double patenting based on
`pending claims in its parent application, which matured into the ’807 patent.
`Id. at 470.
`Following a substantive amendment to application claim 31 (patent
`claim 2) (id. at 493–501), the application was allowed by the Examiner
`(id. at 513–515). The Examiner’s reason for allowance was:
`none of the prior art of record including the device defined by the
`patented claims of Application 12/307,993 [now the parent ’807
`patent], alone or in combination, teach a patient interface
`including the feature of a [sic] first and second side arms that are
`three dimensionally molded and having a varying cross-sectional
`thickness that overlap with a first and second side strap of
`headgear, as claimed.
`Ex. 1010, 514.
`
`G. The Asserted Grounds
`Petitioner challenges claims 2–4, 6–10, 12–17, 19, 20, and 35 under
`35 U.S.C. § 103(a)4 on the following grounds (Pet. 3–4):
`
`
`
`
`
`
`4 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
`Stat. 284, 296–07 (2011), took effect on September 16, 2012. Because the
`application for the patent at issue in this proceeding has an effective filing
`date before that date, we refer to the pre-AIA versions of the statute.
`
`10
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`
`
`
`Reference(s)
`
`Claims Challenged
`2–4, 6–9, 12–17, 19, 20,
`and 35
`10
`2–4, 6–9, 12–17, 19, 20,
`and 35
`10
`
`Gunaratnam and Ging5
`Gunaratnam, Ging, and
`Kopala6
`Gunaratnam, Ging,
`McAuley7
`Gunaratnam, Ging,
`McAuley, Kopala
`II. ANALYSIS
`A. Level of Skill in the Art
`Petitioner asserts that a person of ordinary skill in the art “would have
`had a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering, biomedical engineering,
`or a related discipline, and at least five years of relevant product design
`experience in the field of medical devices or respiratory therapy, or an
`equivalent advanced education.” Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 17). Patent
`Owner does not propose a level of skill. We adopt Petitioner’s proposed
`level of skill for the purposes of our Decision.
`
`B. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, the Board gives claim terms in an unexpired
`patent their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification of
`the patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); see Cuozzo Speed
`Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016). Under that standard, a
`claim term generally is given its ordinary and customary meaning, as would
`
`
`5 U.S. Patent Publication No. 2003/0196658 A1 (Ex. 1005, “Ging”).
`6 U.S. Patent No. 4,919,128 (Ex. 1025, “Kopala”).
`7 PCT Pub. WO 2005/079726 (Ex. 1034, McAuley).
`
`11
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire
`disclosure. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
`2007).
`Petitioner proposes a specific construction for the term “ring”
`(Pet. 11) and the phrase “a plane substantially bisecting the ring, each of the
`two nasal pillows positioned on opposite sides of the plane” (id. at 15),
`which are recited in independent claim 2.
`Patent Owner does not propose any specific construction, but disputes
`Petitioner’s proposed construction of “ring.” Prelim. Resp. 31–36.
`We consider the construction of the term “ring” below.
`
`1. “ring”
`Claim 2 recites “a ring engaged with the lip of the mask body”
`(emphasis added). Petitioner asserts “[t]he claimed “ring” is a structure with
`a generally circular inner passage to enable the claimed rotatable
`engagement with an elbow that fits into the ring, and does not require a
`particular outside shape for the ring.” Pet. 11.
`According to Petitioner, the structure in the ’741 Specification
`corresponding to the “ring” is “mask base” 22. Id. at 12. As discussed
`above, the Specification discloses that mask base 22 is “a ring or sleeve type
`attachment.” Ex. 1002, 6:22–23 (referring to Figs. 4 and 5).
`Petitioner states that the term “ring” does not have a special meaning
`in the applicable field of the ’741 patent, and is not defined in the ’741
`Specification. Pet. 11–12 (citing Ex. 1008, ¶ 27–28). Petitioner argues that
`“nothing within the plain language of the term ‘ring’ or from the intrinsic
`record requires that the outer surface of the ring be of a particular shape.”
`Id. at 13.
`
`12
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`
`Dr. Izuchukwu testifies that a person of ordinary skill would have
`understood that the term “ring” “does not require a particular outside shape.”
`Ex. 1008 ¶ 27. Dr. Izuchukwu also testifies that “although the term ‘ring’
`implies a structure having a circular inner passage, there is no requirement
`that its outer geometry also be circular.” Id. at ¶ 28.
`Patent Owner disagrees with Petitioner’s construction, and argues that
`“the term ring should be given its ordinary meaning, namely ‘a generally
`circular band of material.’” Prelim. Resp. 31. Patent Owner asserts that its
`proposed construction is consistent with the description in the Specification
`of mask base 22 as “a ring or sleeve like type attachment.” Id. at 31–32
`(citing Ex. 1001, 6:22–23). Patent Owner also asserts that its proposed
`construction is supported by standard dictionary definitions. Id. at 32–33
`(citing Ex. 2001, 3; Ex. 2003, 3). Patent Owner further argues that
`Petitioner’s construction is overly broad because it encompasses “[v]irtually
`any structure, regardless of its shape, that includes ‘a generally circular inner
`passage.’” Id. at 33.
`We agree with, and adopt, Patent Owner’s proposed claim
`construction. It is more consistent with the “ring” structure claimed,
`disclosed in the Specification, and supported by the dictionary definitions of
`record. We are aware that the Specification also discloses that mask base 22
`may include additional structures, such as a channel 45 on one side of base
`22 to receive lip 28 on mask body 23, and a semi-tubular projection 29 on
`the other side of base 22 to receive a ball joint connector end to
`accommodate connector 30. Ex. 1002, 6:27–30; 42–46. Various other
`structures also are disclosed for allowing mask body 23 and connector 30 to
`connect to base 22. Id. at 6:30–42. Neither channel 45, semi-tubular
`
`13
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`projection 29, nor the other disclosed structures are recited in claim 2 as part
`of the “ring.” The structure recited in claim 2 is simply a ring.
`For the purposes of this Decision, we determine that the broadest
`reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification of the term “ring”
`is a generally circular band of material.
`
`2. Other Claim Terms
`We determine that no other explicit claim interpretation is required for
`the purposes of this Decision. See Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g,
`Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
`
`C. Asserted Obviousness
`A claim is unpatentable for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if
`the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
`prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
`at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the
`art to which the subject matter pertains. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the
`basis of underlying factual determinations, including: (1) the scope and
`content of the prior art; (2) any differences between the claimed subject
`matter and the prior art; (3) the level of skill in the art; and (4) objective
`evidence of nonobviousness, i.e., secondary considerations. See Graham v.
`John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`1. Asserted Obviousness over Gunaratnam and Ging
`Claims 2–4, 6–9, 12–17, 19, 20, and 35
`Gunaratnam is a published patent application relating to a nasal
`assembly patient interface for a mask used in treating sleep apnea. Ex. 1004,
`¶ 2. It is a comprehensive disclosure, including 109 pages of drawings, with
`
`14
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`135 drawing figures, and 404 paragraphs of explanatory text. Figure 135 of
`Gunaratnam is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 135 of Gunaratnam depicts a headgear and respiratory mask
`that provides a nasal interface for the supply of air from a CPAP machine.
`Id. ¶ 403.
`Ging also is a published patent application that relates to a headgear
`and respiratory mask that provides a nasal interface for the supply of air
`from a CPAP machine. Figure 6b from Ging is reproduced below.
`
`15
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`
`
`Figure 6b from Ging is an exploded view
`of an elbow assembly, mask frame, cushion, and air delivery tube
`
`Ging discloses nasal mask assembly 10, having frame 20, cushion 40,
`and elbow assembly 60 (see Figure 1). A headgear assembly (see Figure 1)
`can be attached to frame 20. C-clip 23 is used to attach elbow 60 to mask
`frame 20.
`Throughout the 55 page Petition, Petitioner provides a detailed clause-
`by-clause analysis of each limitation in the challenged claims along with an
`analysis of why, in Petitioner’s view, it would have been obvious to a person
`of ordinary skill to glean selected features from the disclosures in the cited
`references and combine them. Throughout its analysis, Petitioner relies on
`the Declaration testimony of Dr. John Izuchukwu. Dr. Izuchukwu earned a
`Ph.D. in Industrial and Mechanical Engineering and an MBA degree.
`Ex. 1008 ¶ 2. He has extensive experience in the development of various
`
`16
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`medical technologies, including CPAP machines, ventilators for respiratory
`support, and sleep masks. Id. at ¶¶ 3–4.
`
`a. A Ring Engaged With the Lip Of the Mask Body
`Claim 2 recites “a ring engaged with the lip of the mask body.”
`Patent Owner asserts, among other issues, that this asserted ground of
`unpatentability “fails because neither Gunaratnam nor Ging disclose or make
`obvious the claimed ‘ring.’” Prelim. Resp. 42. We agree and find this issue
`dispositive.
`Petitioner asserts that “Gunaratnam’s Figure 135 design includes ‘a
`ring engaged with the mask body’ inherently, or at a minimum obviously in
`view of Ging, which shows a similar or identical mask body to that in Figure
`135 of Gunaratnam in greater detail.” Pet. 28. According to Petitioner,
`Ging discloses a “ring” in the form of mask frame 20, in that mask frame 20
`is a structure that includes a circular inner passage that is configured to
`receive an elbow. Id. (citing Ex. 1005, Fig. 6b). Additionally, Petitioner
`asserts Ging discloses that the central portion of mask frame 20 is engaged
`with mask cushion 40. Id. Petitioner concludes that mask cushion 40 “is
`engaged with a mask body as claimed. Id. (citing Ex. 1005).
`Regarding the requirement in claim 2 that the “ring” is “engaged with
`the lip of the mask body,” Petitioner asserts this feature is disclosed by
`Gunaratnam alone or in combination with Ging. Id. at 29 (citing Pet. 24–27
`for the discussion of the lip structure in Gunaratnam and Ging).
`Petitioner’s argument is based on Petitioner’s proposed construction
`of “ring,” which we have rejected in our claim construction discussion
`above. As we have determined for purposes of this decision, the broadest
`reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification of the term “ring”
`
`17
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`is a generally circular band of material. The claimed ring is not any
`structure that includes a circular inner passage.
`Patent Owner argues that the mask frames in Gunaratnam and Ging
`are not a generally circular band of material and thus are not a “ring.”
`Prelim. Resp. 42–45. We agree with, and adopt, Patent Owner’s argument.
`As Patent Owner argues, the mask frame in the Gunaratnam/Ging
`combination is “oblong” or “horseshoe-shaped”—i.e., it “includes upper and
`lower peripheral edges that form two surfaces that are generally parallel with
`each other across the length of the frame”—and thus is not a generally
`circular band of material as required under our claim interpretation of “ring.”
`Id.
`
`Petitioner bears the burden of establishing a reasonable likelihood of
`unpatentability of one or more claims. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c). Here, the
`evidence on which Petitioner relies does not meet this burden.
`“Ring” is an ordinary, simple English word, the meaning of which is
`clear and unquestionable. It means exactly what it says. See Chef Am., Inc.
`v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The claim
`construction inquiry begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the
`claim. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248
`(Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). The intrinsic evidence, and, in some
`cases, the extrinsic evidence, can shed light on the meaning of the terms
`recited in a claim, either by confirming the ordinary meaning of the claim
`terms or by providing special meaning for claim terms. Id. (citations
`omitted). As Petitioner acknowledges, the term “ring” “does not have a
`special meaning in the applicable field of the ’741 patent, and is not defined
`in the ’741 Specification. Pet. 11. The resulting claim interpretation must,
`
`18
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`in the end, accord with the words chosen by the patentee to stake out the
`boundary of the claimed property. Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1248. Ultimately,
`the interpretation to be given a term can be determined and confirmed only
`with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and
`intended to envelop with the claim. Id. at 1250. The construction that stays
`true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s
`description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction. Id.
`Claim 2 simply recites a ring. Dependent claim 3 adds the limitation
`that the ring comprises a channel for receiving the lip of the mask body.
`Dependent claim 35 recites that the ring is configured to releasably connect
`to the two molded side arms. These additional limitations indicate that the
`structure recited in claim 2, a ring, is just that, a generally circular band of
`material. The structures relied on by Petitioner from Gunaratnam and Ging
`admittedly have a generally circular inner passage. That alone, however,
`does not establish that these structures are a generally circular band of
`material.
`Neither curved, rectangular frame 20 of Ging nor the horseshoe-
`shaped frame in Gunaratnam is a generally circular band of material.
`Moreover, Petitioner’s proposed ground of unpatentability under § 103 is
`based on a combination of Gunaratnam and Ging. Pet. 4, 20. Petitioner
`asserts that the “ring” element is “disclosed by Gunaratnam alone, or in
`combination with Ging.” Pet. 29. We determined that neither Gunaratnam
`nor Ging disclose a ring. In asserting the combination of Gunaratnam and
`Ging, however, Petitioner offers no rationale in the Petition in its Ground 1
`analysis as to why a person of ordinary skill would modify Gunaratnam’s
`frame with the frame in Ging. In determining whether there would have
`
`19
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`been a motivation to combine prior art references to arrive at the claimed
`invention, it is insufficient to simply conclude the combination would have
`been obvious without identifying any reason why a person of skill in the art
`would have made the combination. Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. The Toro
`Co., No. 2016-2433, 2017 WL 631749, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).
`“[W]e cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together
`prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention.” Id. at *5
`In general, taken out of a specific context, modifying the shape or
`structure of an element to be a “ring” may seem like a simple, common
`sense modification that would have been obvious to a person of ordinary
`skill and creativity. We do not abandon our common sense in considering
`obviousness of claimed inventions. KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
`421 (2007) (“Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to
`common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor
`consistent with it.”). Our decision is based on the evidence and arguments
`before us. See Arendi S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., 832 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
`2016) (“[R]eferences to ‘common sense’ . . . cannot be used as a wholesale
`substitute for reasoned analysis and evidentiary support . . . .”). The
`evidence on which Petitioner relies does not disclose or suggest the “ring”
`recited in the challenged claims. In the highly developed field of patient
`interfaces and nasal masks for the supply of air to a patient, small
`differences may produce a nonobvious advance. See Outside the Box
`Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc., 695 F.3d 1285, 1298 (Fed. Cir.
`2012). See also Unigene Labs., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 655 F.3d 1352, 1360–61
`(Fed.Cir.2011) (providing that the inquiry under § 103 is not whether the
`claimed invention is “sufficiently simple to appear obvious to judges after
`
`20
`
`

`

`IPR2016-01718
`Patent 8,479,741 B2
`
`the discovery is finally made”). “The emphasis on nonobviousness is one of
`inquiry, not quality” of the advance. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
`17 (1966). While “the common sense of those skilled in the art
`demonstrates why some combinations would have been obvious where
`others would not,” (Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher–Price, Inc., 485 F.3d
`1157, 1161 (Fed.Cir.2007)), the determination is made not after observing
`what the inventor actually did, but in light of the state of the art before the
`invention was made. Outside the Box Innovations, 695 F.3d at 1298.
`For the reasons discussed above, we determine that Petitioner has not
`established a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenge to
`independent claim 2 as obvious over Gunaratnam and Ging. Petitioner’s
`arguments and evidence with respect to dependent claims 3, 4, 6–9, 12–17,
`19, 20, and 35 do not remedy the deficiencies with respect to independent
`claim 2. Accordingly, we also determine that Petitioner has not established
`a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its challenges to those dependent
`claims.
`
`2. Asserted Obviousness over Gunaratnam, Ging, and Kopala
`Petitioner asserts claim 10, dependent from claim 2, would have been
`obvious based on Gunaratnam, Ging and Kopala. Pet. 51–53. K

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket