Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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` Paper 8
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` Entered: February 21, 2017
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`ONE WORLD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`d/b/a TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES POWER EQUIPMENT,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01774
`Patent 7,224,275 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before JONI Y. CHANG, JUSTIN T. ARBES, and
`JON M. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHANG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
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`
`571-272-7822
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` Paper 8
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`
`
` Entered: February 21, 2017
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`ONE WORLD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`d/b/a TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES POWER EQUIPMENT,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2016-01774
`Patent 7,224,275 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before JONI Y. CHANG, JUSTIN T. ARBES, and
`JON M. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHANG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`DECISION
`Denying Institution of Inter Partes Review
`37 C.F.R. § 42.108
`
`
`
`
`
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`INTRODUCTION
`I.
`One World Technologies, Inc. d/b/a Techtronic Industries Power
`Equipment (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting an inter partes review of
`claims 24–31 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,224,275 B2
`(Ex. 1001, “the ’275 patent”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). The Chamberlain Group,
`Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim.
`Resp.”).
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a), an inter partes review may not be instituted
`unless the information presented in the petition “shows that there is a
`reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at
`least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” For the reasons stated
`below, we determine that Petitioner has not established a reasonable
`likelihood that it would prevail with respect to any of the challenged claims.
`We hereby decline to institute an inter partes review in this proceeding.
`
`A. Related Matters
`The parties indicate that the ’275 patent is involved in The
`Chamberlain Group., Inc. v. Techtronic Industries Co. Ltd., Case No. 1:16-
`cv-06097 (N.D. Ill.) and other proceedings. Pet. 1; Paper 4, 2.
`
`B. The ’275 Patent
`The ’275 patent describes a movable barrier operator (e.g., a garage
`door opener) having a controller, movable barrier interface, and wireless
`status condition data transmitter. Ex. 1001, Abs., 2:57–61.
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`Figure 1 of the ’275 patent is reproduced below.
`
`
`As shown in Figure 1 of the ’275 patent, movable barrier operator 10
`includes controller 11, which is coupled to movable barrier interface 12 and
`wireless status condition data transmitter 15. Id. at 3:27–30. Movable
`barrier interface 12, which also is coupled to movable barrier 13, causes
`movable barrier 13 to move to a desired position (e.g., an opened or closed
`position) and/or restricts such motion. Id. at 3:36–53.
`Controller 11 can have a plurality of potential operational status
`conditions, for example: moving the movable barrier in a first or second
`direction (e.g., towards a closed or an opened position); reversing movement
`of the movable barrier (e.g., to alter movement from a closed position and
`towards an opened position); and detecting a likely presence of an obstacle
`(e.g., a person or pet) in the likely path of movement of the movable barrier.
`Id. at 4:5–44. Controller 11 can be self-aware of the operational status
`conditions (e.g., controller 11 is aware that it has switched a given ambient
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`light fixture on or off) or controller 11 can be provided with externally
`developed information regarding the condition, using status condition
`sensors 14. Id. at 4:52–63.
`Wireless status condition data transmitter 15 transmits a status
`condition signal that represents a present operational status condition of
`controller 11. Id. at 4:64–67. In a preferred embodiment, the transmission
`occurs automatically in response to when controller 11 detects at least one
`predetermined condition, or on a regular periodic basis. Id. at 4:67–5:7. The
`status condition signal reflects the actions being taken by controller 11
`and/or the other operational conditions being experienced by controller 11.
`Id. at 5:24–37. The status condition signal can include an identifier that
`correlates uniquely to the controller and/or the movable barrier operator. Id.
`at 2:67–3:5.
`
`C. Illustrative Claim
`Of the challenged claims, claim 24 is independent. Claims 25–31
`depend directly or indirectly from claim 24.
`Claim 24 is illustrative:
`24. An apparatus comprising:
`a movable barrier operator having:
`a controller having a plurality of potential operational
`status conditions defined, at least in part, by a plurality of
`operating states; and
`a wireless status condition transmitter operably coupled to
`the controller, wherein the wireless status condition data
`transmitter transmits a status condition signal that:
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`to a present operational status
`corresponds
`condition defined, at least in part, by at least two
`operating states from the plurality of operating
`states; and
`comprises an identifier that is at least relatively
`unique to the movable barrier operator, such that the
`status condition signal substantially uniquely
`identifies the movable barrier operator;
`a remote peripheral having:
`a wireless receiver that is communicatively compatible
`with the wireless transmitter;
`a peripheral controller that is operably coupled to the
`wireless receiver.
`Ex. 1001, 10:36–55 (emphases added).
`
`
`
`D. Prior Art Relied Upon
`Petitioner relies upon the references listed below.
`(Ex. 1003)
`Menard
`US 2002/0183008 A1 Dec. 5, 2002
`(Ex. 1007)
`Tazumi
`US 6,392,537 B1
`
`May 21, 2002
`(Ex. 1012)
`Lee
`
`US 5,475,377
`
`Dec. 12, 1995
`SPECIFICATION OF THE BLUETOOTH SYSTEM, Wireless Connections
`Made Easy, v1.0B (Dec. 1, 1999) (Ex. 1004, “the Bluetooth Specification”).
`Chatschik Bisdikian, An Overview of the Bluetooth Wireless
`Technology, IEEE COMMUNICATION MAGAZINE, December 2001, at 86–94
`(Ex. 1005, “the Bluetooth Article”).
`MATTHEW S. GAST, 802.11 WIRELESS NETWORKS: THE DEFINITIVE
`GUIDE, 40–60, 411–417 (Mike Loukides & Matt Hutchinson eds., O’Reilly
`& Associates, Inc. 2002) (Ex. 1006, “the 802.11 Guide”).
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`E. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability (Pet. 3)1:
`
`Claims
`
`Basis
`
`References
`
`24–31
`
`24–31
`
`24–31
`
`
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`§ 103(a) Menard and Lee
`§ 103(a) Menard, Lee, the Bluetooth references,2 and
`the 802.11 Guide
`
`§ 103(a) Menard, Lee, and Tazumi
`
`II. DISCUSSION
`A. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b); Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
`LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144–46 (2016) (upholding the use of the
`broadest reasonable interpretation standard as the claim interpretation
`standard to be applied in inter partes reviews). Under the broadest
`
`
`1 Because the claims at issue have a filing date prior to March 16, 2013, the
`effective date of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
`125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), we apply the pre-AIA versions of 35 U.S.C.
`§§ 102 and 103 in this Decision.
`2 In this Decision, we refer to the Bluetooth Specification and the Bluetooth
`Article, collectively, as the Bluetooth references.
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`reasonable interpretation standard, claim terms generally are given their
`ordinary and customary meaning, as would be understood by one of ordinary
`skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. See In re Translogic
`Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
`Petitioner proposes constructions for several claim terms. Pet. 9–18.
`Patent Owner disagrees with some of those proposed claim constructions,
`and argues that no construction is necessary for any claim term, as the words
`of the claims should be given their plain meaning. Prelim. Resp. 6–23. We
`note that only those claim terms that are in controversy need to be construed,
`and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy. Vivid Techs.,
`Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). For
`purposes of this Decision, we find it necessary to construe only the claim
`terms identified below.
`
`“controller”
`Claim 24 recites a movable barrier operator having a controller.
`
`Ex. 1001, 10:37–40. Petitioner proposes to construe “controller” as “any
`programmable platform, such as a microprocessor, microcontroller,
`programmable logic or gate array, or the like.” Pet. 9. Patent Owner does
`not dispute this proposed construction. Prelim. Resp. 6–23. We observe
`that Petitioner’s proposed construction is consistent with the Specification of
`the ’275 patent. Ex. 1001, 3:30–36. In light of the Specification, we
`construe the claim term “controller” to encompass “any programmable
`platform, such as a microprocessor, microcontroller, programmable logic or
`gate array, or the like.”
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`“controller having a plurality of potential operational status conditions”
`Claim 24 recites “a controller having a plurality of potential
`
`operational status conditions defined, at least in part, by a plurality of
`operating states.” Ex. 1001, 10:38–40. Petitioner proposes to construe the
`claim language “controller having a plurality of potential operational status
`conditions” to mean:
`a controller that knows a plurality of potential operational status
`conditions, e.g., where the plurality of operational status
`conditions can be self-generated by the controller or received
`from a sensor, user
`input, or
`from another device
`communicatively coupled to the controller.
`Pet. 9–10 (emphasis added).
`Patent Owner disagrees with that proposed claim construction because
`it essentially replaces the claim term “having” with “knowing.” Prelim.
`Resp. 7–21. According to Patent Owner, the language recited in claim 24
`should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id.
`There is a presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and
`customary meaning. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359,
`1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). To overcome this presumption, the patentee must
`“clearly set forth” and “clearly redefine” a claim term away from its
`ordinary meaning. Bell Atlantic Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns
`Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The disavowal must be
`“unmistakable” and “unambiguous.” Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d
`1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`Here, Petitioner’s proposed claim construction is inconsistent with the
`plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language. As Patent Owner notes,
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`by using the possessive term “having,” the language recited in claim 24
`unambiguously references the controller’s potential operational status
`conditions. Prelim. Resp. 8. The claim language makes clear that the
`controller itself has the potential operational status conditions, not any other
`component.
`Petitioner’s proposed claim construction also is inconsistent with the
`Specification of the ’275 patent, which describes that, typically, the
`controller “will have a plurality of potential operational status conditions.”
`Ex. 1001, 4:5–6 (emphasis added). The Specification further provides
`specific examples of potential operational status conditions that the
`controller might have. Id. at 4:6–44 (“For example, the controller 11 might
`have two or more of the following potential operational status conditions:
`moving the movable barrier in a first direction . . . detecting a likely
`presence of an obstacle . . . a lighting status change (as when, for example,
`the controller switches ambient lighting in a garage.) . . .”).
`We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that Patent Owner’s
`expert in the district court proceeding testified that the term “having” means
`the controller “knows” the garage door opener’s present operational status
`conditions. Pet. 10–11 (citing Ex. 1010, 533:2–6, 140:10–16, 531:10–532:2,
`538:19–23). “[W]hile extrinsic evidence can shed useful light on the
`relevant art, . . . it is less significant than the intrinsic record in determining
`the legally operative meaning of the language.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415
`F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). On this record, Petitioner does
`not identify, nor can we find, any portion of the Specification or prosecution
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`history that unambiguously defines the term “having” as “knowing.”
`Accordingly, we agree with Patent Owner that the claim language should be
`given its plain and ordinary meaning.
`To be clear, we do not construe “controller” to require that the
`controller be “self-aware” or to prohibit the controller from “rely[ing] upon
`any external sensors to obtain status conditions.” As our reviewing court has
`determined in connection with the related district court proceeding that
`involves the same patent as here, “[c]laim 1 neither recites nor requires a
`‘self-aware controller,” and “[t]he written description of the ’275 patent
`makes clear that the controller can obtain the operational status conditions
`through self-awareness or through externally-developed information, e.g.,
`sensors.” The Chamberlain Grp., Inc., v. Techtronic Indus. Co. Ltd., No.
`2016-2713, 2017 WL 360561, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 25, 2017) (citing the ’275
`patent, Ex. 1001, 2:56–64, 4:52–59, 6:33–36).3 Our interpretations herein
`are consistent with the Federal Circuit’s decision.
`Petitioner’s reliance on claim 25 to support its proposed claim
`construction also is misplaced. See Pet. 11–12. Petitioner’s argument
`improperly rests on the premise that having a sensor operably coupled to the
`controller supports its proposed construction that replaces “having” with
`“knowing.” As our reviewing court in Chamberlain explains, the use of the
`
`
`3 The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction
`because the district court’s incorrect construction was the sole basis for
`determining that the defendants have not raised a substantial question of
`invalidity. Chamberlain, 2017 WL 360561, at *6.
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`terms “having” and “potential” in claim 1 does not limit the claim to a
`self-aware controller. Chamberlain, 2017 WL 360561, at *4 (noting that
`“the written description explains that, typically, ‘the controller 11 will have a
`plurality of potential operational status conditions,’” Ex. 1001, 4:5–6
`(emphases added by the Court) and “[t]his statement is not limited to
`self-aware controller embodiments”). Accordingly, claim 25 does not
`support Petitioner’s proposed claim construction.
`For the foregoing reasons, we decline to adopt Petitioner’s proposed
`claim construction, but rather give the claim term “controller having a
`plurality of potential operational status conditions” its plain and ordinary
`meaning.
`
`“a present operational status condition”
`Claim 24 recites “transmit[ting] a status condition signal that[]
`
`corresponds to a present operational status condition defined, at least in
`part, by at least two operating states from the plurality of operating states.”
`Ex. 1001, 10:43–46 (emphases added).
`Petitioner proposes to construe the claim language “operational status
`condition defined, at least in part, by at least two operating states” as “a
`status of any operation that has two or more potential operating states.”
`Pet. 14 (emphasis added). As support, Petitioner argues that the
`Specification discloses that “operational status conditions” can include, for
`example, “moving the movable barrier,” “detecting a likely presence of an
`obstacle,” or “a lighting status change.” Id. 14–15 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:9–45).
`Petitioner takes the position that “moving a movable barrier” is the status of
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`a door moving operation, and that “a light status change” is a condition of a
`light that has the operating states of (1) light on and (2) light off. Id. at 14.
`However, that portion of the Specification relied upon by Petitioner
`does not support Petitioner’s proposed claim construction. In fact, those
`examples in the Specification are examples of potential operational status
`conditions of the controller, not the operating states of other components
`(e.g., the door or light), as alleged by Petitioner (id.). Ex. 1001, 4:5–45
`(“[T]he controller 11 will have a plurality of potential operational status
`conditions,” and “[f]or example, the controller 11 might have two or more of
`the following potential operational status conditions: moving the movable
`barrier in a first direction . . . a lighting status change . . . .”). Notably, the
`Specification explains that “a light status change” is an operation performed
`by the controller—“(as when, for example, the controller switches ambient
`lighting in a garage to an off condition a predetermined period of time
`following closure of the movable barrier).” Id. at 4:32–35 (emphasis added).
`Petitioner’s reliance on extrinsic evidence that was generated at the
`time of, and for the purpose of, litigation also is misplaced. Pet. 14–15
`(citing Ex. 1011 ¶ 40; Ex. 1010, 113:3–12, 118:18–22). As our reviewing
`court has explained, “extrinsic evidence may be used only to assist in the
`proper understanding of the disputed limitation; it may not be used to vary,
`contradict, expand, or limit the claim language from how it is defined, even
`by implication, in the specification or file history.” Bell Atl. Network Servs.
`v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., 262 F.3d 1258, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “Apart
`from the claim language itself, the specification is the single best guide to
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`the meaning of a claim term.” AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A, 657
`F.3d 1264, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted);
`Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
`(“[W]hile helpful, extrinsic sources . . . cannot overcome more persuasive
`intrinsic evidence.”).
`More importantly, Petitioner’s proposed construction is inconsistent
`with the claim language itself, which requires “a present operational status
`condition,” not a status of any operation. We decline to adopt a claim
`construction that would ignore the word “present” in the claim term. “A
`claim construction that gives meaning to all the terms of the claim is
`preferred over one that does not do so.” Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharms.
`USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Elekta Instrument
`S.A. v. O.U.R. Sci. Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
`In addition, we agree with Patent Owner that “a present operational
`status condition” is a condition that the controller has, and that it is relates to
`operations being performed by the controller at the present time. Prelim.
`Resp. 22, 37. As the Specification explains, “the wireless status condition
`data transmitter 15 serves to transmit a status condition signal that represents
`a present operational status condition of the controller 11.” Ex. 1001, 4:64–
`67 (emphasis added). The Specification also discloses that the status
`condition signal “simply reflects the actions being taken by the controller 11
`and/or the other operational conditions being experienced by the controller
`11. Id. at 5:33–36 (emphases added).
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`For the foregoing reasons, we decline to adopt Petitioner’s proposed
`claim construction. Rather, in light of the Specification, we construe “a
`present operational status condition” as “a present status condition of the
`controller’s operation.”
`
`B. Principles of Law
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`
`C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors
`may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art;
`prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are
`made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active
`workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
`(citation omitted). Petitioner alleges that a person with ordinary skill in the
`art “would have had at least an undergraduate degree in electrical
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`engineering, or equivalent education, and one to two years of work
`experience in the fields of: wireless communication systems, sensors for
`security systems or appliance monitoring, and systems for access control or
`automated door systems, or equivalent work experience or training.” Pet. 8–
`9 (citing Ex. 1008 ¶ 30). Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s
`statement regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. Based on the
`current record, we apply Petitioner’s proposed level of ordinary skill in the
`art for purposes of this Decision. We further note that the prior art of record
`in the instant proceeding reflects the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the
`art. See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
`(“the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art).
`
`D. Obviousness over Menard and Lee
`Petitioner asserts that claims 24–31 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
`§ 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Menard and Lee. Pet. 18–62.
`To support its contentions, Petitioner directs our attention to a Declaration of
`Mr. Stuart Lipoff. Ex. 1008. Patent Owner counters that the combination
`does not teach or suggest certain claim limitations. Prelim. Resp. 24–37.
`For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has not
`demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its assertion that
`claims 24–31 are obvious over Menard and Lee. We begin our discussion
`with a brief summary of Menard and Lee, and then we address the relevant
`contentions advanced by the parties in turn.
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`Menard
`Menard describes a wireless system for controlling and monitoring a
`power door. Ex. 1003, ¶ 1. Figure 2 of Menard is reproduced below.
`
`
`As shown in Figure 2 of Menard, system 100 is connected to garage
`door opener (“GDO”) 10. System 100 includes processor 120, programming
`150, position sensor 155, and transceiver 130. Id. ¶¶ 21–26.
`
`Lee
`Lee describes an electronic identification system having remote
`
`automatic response capability. Ex. 1012, Abstract. Figure 1 of Lee is
`reproduced below.
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`As Figure 1 of Lee illustrates, portable electronic apparatus 100
`comprises input means 110, control means 120, storage means 130,
`receiving means 140, transmitting means 150, and display means 160. Id. at
`5:60–63. Automatic identification control apparatus 200 comprises input
`means 210, control means 220, enable means 230, transmitting means 250,
`receiving means 260, drive means 270, operation detecting means 280, and
`alarm means 290. Id. at 5:63–67.
`
`Analysis
`
`Claim 24 requires wireless transmission of a status condition signal
`that “corresponds to a present operational status condition defined, at least
`in part, by at least two operating states from the plurality of operating
`states.” Ex. 1001, 10:41–46 (emphases added). By virtue of their
`dependency, all other challenged claims, claims 25–31, each require this
`limitation.
`Petitioner takes the position that Menard discloses the aforementioned
`limitation, arguing that Menard discloses a system (a movable barrier
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`operator), which includes a garage door opener (a movable barrier interface),
`a processor (a controller), a position sensor, and a transceiver (a wireless
`status condition data transmitter). Pet. 19–31. According to Petitioner,
`Menard describes that “the operational status condition of the door’s
`position is defined at least two operating states, namely door open or door
`closed.” Id. at 27, 29 (citing to Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 75–78) (emphasis added,
`original emphasis omitted). Petitioner alleges that Menard’s processor “has
`or knows” a plurality of potential operational status conditions (e.g., door
`position; door open and obstruction present; door moving; temperature and
`lighting) that are each defined by a least two operating states. Id. at 29.
`Petitioner also contends that Menard discloses that information about any
`present operational status condition (which would include the condition of
`open door and obstruction present) can be transmitted wirelessly to a user
`device. Id. at 29–31.
`Patent Owner opposes, advancing several arguments. Prelim. Resp.
`24–37. First, Patent Owner alleges that Petitioner’s argument is based on its
`improper claim construction, and argues that the term “present operational
`status condition” clearly relates to the operations being performed by the
`controller at the present time. Id. at 31–32, 37. Second, Patent Owner
`argues that the claims require a controller to transmit its own present
`operational status condition, as opposed to Menard’s processor that merely
`transmits information received from external sensors. Id. at 25, 32–37.
`Finally, Patent Owner contends that the positon of the door and the state of
`the light or HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning) system, as
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`described in Menard, are merely external sensor readings, and do not
`disclose a present operational status condition of the alleged controller. Id.
`at 32–37.
`On this record, we agree with Patent Owner’s arguments (id. at 22–
`32) and determine that Petitioner fails to show Menard, in combination with
`Lee, teaches or suggests wireless transmission of a status condition signal
`that “corresponds to a present operational status condition defined, at least in
`part, by at least two operating status,” as required by the challenged claims.
`At the outset, for the reasons given in our claim construction analysis,
`we decline to adopt Petitioner’s construction that interprets “operational
`status condition defined, at least in part, by at least two operating states” as
`“a status of any operation that has two or more potential operating states.”
`Pet. 14 (emphasis added). Rather, we construe “a present operational status
`condition” as “a present status condition of the controller’s operation.”
`We are not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument and Mr. Lipoff’s
`testimony that Menard discloses the claimed “status condition signal”
`because “the operational status condition regarding the door’s position is
`defined at least two operating states, namely door open or door closed.”
`Pet. 27, 29 (citing to Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 75–78, 80–84) (emphasis added, original
`emphasis omitted). Petitioner’s argument and Mr. Lipoff’s testimony
`conflate the status information regarding the door (e.g., the door’s position)
`with the present operational status condition of the controller, which is
`defined by at least two operating states of the controller (e.g., moving the
`door towards an opened or closed position). See Pet. 30; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 75–78,
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`80–84. Notably, the door’s position (e.g., open or closed) indicates the
`status of the door. By contrast, moving the door towards an open or closed
`position identifies an action being taken by the controller. Ex. 1001, 10:56–
`11:4. As recited in claim 25, for example, a plurality of operating states of
`the controller include: “moving a movable barrier in a first direction; . . . a
`lighting status change; . . . and receiving an operating parameter alteration
`signal.” Id. Indeed, each item on this list describes an action being taken by
`the controller. Id.
`As noted above, the Specification of the ’275 patent also explains that
`“the wireless status condition data transmitter 15 serves to transmit a status
`condition signal that represents a present operational status condition of the
`controller 11.” Ex. 1001, 4:64–67 (emphasis added). The Specification
`further discloses that a status condition signal reflects “the actions being
`taken by the controller and/or the other operational conditions being
`experienced by the controller.” Id. at 5:33–36. Contrary to Petitioner’s
`argument (Pet. 22, 29–30), the position of the door does not describe an
`operation of the controller, much less a present operational status condition
`of the controller.
`More importantly, the portions of Menard cited by Petitioner do not
`support its argument, or Mr. Lipoff’s testimony, that “Menard discloses that
`information about any present operational status condition (which would
`include the condition of open door and obstruction present) can be
`transmitted wirelessly to a user device.” Pet. 29–31 (emphasis omitted)
`(citing Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 10, 11, 66, 69); Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 80–84. Indeed, those cited
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`portions of Menard describe a transmission of status information of the door,
`light, and HVAC system, but not a present operational status condition of
`the controller, as required by the challenged claims. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 10–11
`(“Position information is transmitted to the device by a transceiver coupled
`to the processor. Other information, such as temperature or light levels, may
`also be transmitted to the device.” (emphases added)), 66 (“Programming
`150 may include instructions to cause processor 120 to transmit position
`information, or any other information, using all modes of communication.”
`(emphasis added)), 69 (“[The] door position information is received by the
`user.” (emphasis added)).
`The following passage of Menard also does not support Petitioner’s
`argument or Mr. Lipoff’s testimony (Pet. 29–31; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 80–84):
`[I]f a garage door position sensor indicates that the door is in a
`raised position and an obstruction in the path of the garage door
`travel is detected by an optical sensor, then a signal received by
`the processor requesting the door to be closed is met with
`programming requesting that the obstruction be cleared before
`the door will travel.
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 25. Notably, a request “that the obstruction be cleared before the
`door will travel” does not teach or suggest a transmission of a status
`condition signal that corresponds to a present operational status condition of
`the controller that is defined by at least two operating states. Petitioner does
`not explain specifically, and it is not apparent to us, how Menard discloses
`such a transmission. See Pet. 29–31; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 80–84. In regard to this
`passage, Petitioner merely states that Menard discloses “detecting an
`operational status condition that is defined by the operating states of two
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`different components.” Pet. 29 (first emphasis added); Ex. 1008 ¶ 81.
`However, “detecting” is not “transmitting.” It is unclear what information,
`if any, beyond the information regarding the presence of an obstruction, is
`being transmitted with the request. The presence of an obstruction is not an
`operating state of the controller, let alone a present operational status
`condition of the controller that is defined by at least two operating states.
`
`To the extent that Petitioner argues that “the condition of open door
`and obstruction present” is a present operational status condition of the
`controller (id. at 29–31), Petitioner’s argument improperly rests on the
`premise that the position of the door and the presence of an obstruction
`describe two operating states of the controller. As discussed above, the
`position of the door is status in
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