`
`QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
` Charles K. Verhoeven (CA Bar No. 170151)
` charlesverhoeven@quinnemanuel.com
` Sean S. Pak (CA Bar No. 219032)
` seanpak@quinnemanuel.com
` Jordan R. Jaffe (Cal. Bar No. 254886)
` jordanjaffe@quinnemanuel.com
` Patrick T. Burns (CA Bar No. 300219)
` patrickburns@quinnemanuel.com
`50 California Street, 22nd Floor
`San Francisco, California 94111
`(415) 875-6600
`(415) 875-6700 facsimile
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`Attorneys for Defendant GOOGLE INC.
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`OAKLAND DIVISION
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`MASTEROBJECTS, INC.,
`
`Case No. 4:15-cv-01775-PJH
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`GOOGLE INC.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT
`OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
`JUDGMENT ON COLLATERAL
`ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN
`DESCRIPTION
`Date:
`February 24, 2016
`Time:
`9:00 a.m.
`Place: Courtroom 3 - 3rd Floor
`Judge: Honorable Phyllis J. Hamilton
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`CASE NO. 4:15-CV-01775-PJH
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
`
`
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`Case 4:15-cv-01775-PJH Document 48 Filed 12/23/15 Page 2 of 27
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page
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`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................1
`
`THE CLAIMS OF THE ’024 PATENT LACK WRITTEN-DESCRIPTION
`SUPPORT UNDER MASTEROBJECTS’ CONSTRUCTIONS..........................................2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
`
`MasterObjects Misunderstands The Legal Standard..................................................3
`
`MasterObjects Admits That It Is Seeking To Broaden Its Patent Claims..................4
`
`The Written Description Of The ’024 Patent Does Not Disclose Re-sending
`The Entire Search String With Each Successive Message.........................................6
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`The ’024 Patent Does Not Expressly Disclose Re-Sending The
`Entire Search String From A Client To A Server In Successive
`Messages. .......................................................................................................6
`
`The Disclosure Of “Query Messages” Does Not Provide Written-
`Description Support........................................................................................8
`
`D.
`
`MasterObjects’ Argument Concerning What A Person Of Skill In The Art
`“Would Recognize” Is Irrelevant As A Matter Of Law.............................................9
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`4.
`
`MasterObjects’ and Its Expert’s “Obvious Variant” Analysis is
`Irrelevant as a Matter of Law. ........................................................................9
`
`MasterObjects’ Arguments Misapply The Law of Written
`Description. ..................................................................................................13
`
`The ’024 Patent’s Statement That The Disclosed Protocol Is
`“Optimized” Does Not Provide Written Description Support. ....................14
`
`MasterObjects’ Arguments Confuse The Written-Description
`Requirement With the Separate Enablement Requirement..........................15
`
`III.
`
`COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL PRECLUDES MASTEROBJECTS FROM
`DISPUTING THE LIMITING EFFECT OF THE SPECIFICATION IN THIS
`CASE....................................................................................................................................16
`
`A.
`
`MasterObjects Cannot Re-Litigate The Limiting Effect Of The Identical
`Specification That Is Now Contained In The ’024 Patent........................................17
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`This Case Presents The Identical Issue That Was Previously
`Litigated In MasterObjects I. .......................................................................17
`
`The Issue Presented Here Was Actually Litigated In MasterObjects
`I.....................................................................................................................17
`
`The Issue Presented Here Was Necessary to Judgment In
`MasterObjects I. ...........................................................................................18
`
`-i-
`CASE NO. 4:15-CV-01775-PJH
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
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`Case 4:15-cv-01775-PJH Document 48 Filed 12/23/15 Page 3 of 27
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`B.
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`MasterObjects’ Arguments Regarding New Claim Language Miss the
`Mark. ........................................................................................................................18
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`IV.
`
`CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................20
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`-ii-
`CASE NO. 4:15-CV-01775-PJH
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
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`Case 4:15-cv-01775-PJH Document 48 Filed 12/23/15 Page 4 of 27
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases
`
`Page
`
`Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
`601 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010)........................................................................................... 11
`
`Antares Pharma, Inc. v. Medac Pharma Inc.,
`771 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014)........................................................................................... 17
`
`Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
`598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc)................................................................. 3, 10, 13
`
`Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp.,
`279 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2002)........................................................................................... 18
`
`Capon v. Eshar,
`418 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................................. 3
`
`Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc.,
`541 F.3d 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2008)....................................................................................... 7, 12
`
`Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc.,
`505 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2007)............................................................................................... 16
`
`CreAgri, Inc. v. Pinnaclife, Inc.,
`Case No. 11-cv-6635, 2013 WL 6673676 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2013) .................................. 4
`
`e.Digital Corp. v. Futurewei Techs., Inc.,
`772 F.3d 723 (Fed. Cir. 2014)............................................................................................. 16
`
`Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.,
`134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998)............................................................................................. 3
`
`GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc.,
`Case No. 12-cv-2885, 2014 WL 1390039 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014) .................................... 4
`
`Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc.,
`452 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006)................................................................................. 8, 19, 20
`
`Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp.,
`204 F. 3d 880 (9th Cir. 2000).............................................................................................. 16
`
`ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc.,
`558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009)............................................................................................. 5
`
`ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc.,
`No. 04-cv-00689 MRP, 2007 WL 8081360 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2007)
`aff’d, 558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ................................................................................... 3
`
`Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc.,
`429 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................................. 4
`
`-iii-
`CASE NO. 4:15-CV-01775-PJH
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
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`Case 4:15-cv-01775-PJH Document 48 Filed 12/23/15 Page 5 of 27
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`LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc.,
`424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005)........................................................................................... 14
`
`Lockwood v. Am Airlines, Inc.,
`107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997)....................................................................................... 4, 10
`
`Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Masimo Corp.,
`254 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (C.D. Cal. 2003)............................................................................... 19
`
`Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc.,
`579 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009)..................................................................................... 13, 14
`
`MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc.,
`582 Fed. App’x 893 (Fed. Cir. 2014).............................................................................. 1, 20
`
`MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc.,
`Case No. 4:11-cv-01054-PJH (N.D. Cal.),
`aff’d, MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc.,
`582 Fed. App’x 893 (Fed. Cir. 2014)........................................................1, 2, 4-7, 14, 17-20
`
`Nazomi Comm’ns, Inc. v. Nokia Corp.,
`No. C-10-04686, 2013 WL 2951039 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 14, 2013)....................................18-19
`
`In re NTP, Inc.,
`654 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2011)............................................................................................. 9
`
`PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
`522 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008)................................................................................. 4, 10, 11
`
`ScriptPro, LLC v. Innovation Assocs.,
`762 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)..................................................................................... 13, 14
`
`Space Systems/Loral, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
`405 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 2005)............................................................................................. 14
`
`Textscape LLC v. Adobe Sys. Inc.,
`Case No. C 09-4550, 2010 WL 2293266 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2010).................................... 10
`
`Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc.,
`595 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................. 8, 19, 20
`
`Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc.,
`156 F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1998)..................................................................................... 10, 15
`
`TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
`264 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2001)........................................................................................... 13
`
`Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc.,
`358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004)............................................................................................. 16
`
`In re Westgate-Cal. Corp.,
`642 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1981)...................................................................................... 2, 18
`
`Wyeth v. Abbot Labs.,
`Case No. 08-1021, 2012 WL 175023 (D.N.J. 2012)............................................................. 4
`-iv-
`CASE NO. 4:15-CV-01775-PJH
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
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`Case 4:15-cv-01775-PJH Document 48 Filed 12/23/15 Page 6 of 27
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`MasterObjects attempts to reargue what it lost in MasterObjects I. It recites—oftentimes
`verbatim—the identical arguments that this Court and the Federal Circuit have already rejected.
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`E.g., compare dkt. 46 at 8 (“Allowed is not required.”), with MasterObjects’ Fed. Cir. Br.1 at 44
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`(“Allowed is not required.”).2
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`It argues that the specification’s description of the “present
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`invention” does not limit the “invention as a whole,” even though this Court, evaluating the
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`identical specification in MasterObjects I, held precisely the opposite. See MasterObjects I, dkt.
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`153 at 17.3 Remarkably, it also spends pages arguing about the scope of claim 1 of the ’529
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`patent—a claim not at issue here and as to which there is a final, binding judgment of non-
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`infringement from MasterObjects I.
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`In recycling the same arguments this Court and the Federal
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`Circuit already rejected, MasterObjects effectively concedes that it cannot distinguish this case
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`from MasterObjects I.
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`To prevail here, MasterObjects must convince this Court to upend its prior rulings
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`regarding the limiting effect of the specification shared by the ’529 and ’024 patents.
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`MasterObjects cannot do so. On one the hand, if the specification and the scope of the
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`“invention as a whole” are limited to sending just the changes as this Court previously held, then
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`MasterObjects’ claims cannot possibly cover all methods of transmitting information from a client
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`to a server. On the other hand, if MasterObjects were correct that its claims cover subject matter
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`exceeding the scope of its disclosed “invention,” then the claims are invalid for failing to meet the
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`
`1 Citations to “MasterObjects’ Fed. Cir. Br.” refer to MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc.,
`Case No. 14-1148 (Fed. Cir. 2014), dkt. 29.
`2 Compare dkt. 46 at 12 (“Far from limiting ’529 claim 1 to the client sending ‘only the
`changes,’ these remarks make clear that the client sends consecutive queries that include the
`‘growing string of characters,’ such that ‘each query contains a different query string that
`lengthens or shortens the previous one.’”), with MasterObjects’ Fed. Cir. Br. at 49 (“Far from
`limiting ’529 claim 1 to the client sending ‘only the changes,’ these remarks make clear that the
`client sends consecutive queries that include the ‘growing string of characters,’ such that ‘each
`query contains a different query string that lengthens or shortens the previous one.’”).
`3 Citations to “MasterObjects I” refer to MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc., Case No. 4:11-
`cv-01054-PJH (N.D. Cal.), aff’d, MasterObjects, Inc. v. Google Inc., 582 Fed. App’x 893 (Fed.
`Cir. 2014).
`
`-1-
`CASE NO. 4:15-CV-01775-PJH
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
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`Case 4:15-cv-01775-PJH Document 48 Filed 12/23/15 Page 7 of 27
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`written-description requirement. Either way, MasterObjects’ case cannot withstand scrutiny.
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`Principles of collateral estoppel also preclude MasterObjects from seeking to revisit this
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`Court’s prior holdings regarding the scope of “the invention” and the limiting effect of the
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`specification. MasterObjects attempts to escape collateral estoppel by arguing that the effect of
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`the specification was not “actually litigated” and was not “necessary” to the result of
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`MasterObjects I. But the first contention is counterfactual, as MasterObjects unsuccessfully
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`argued at length in the prior case—both before this Court and the Federal Circuit—that the
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`specification’s references to “the present invention” were not limiting and directed to a mere
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`embodiment. E.g., MasterObjects I, dkt. 119 at 7-9 (Plaintiff’s Reply Claim Construction Br.).
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`And the second contention conflicts with long-standing Ninth Circuit precedent, which instructs
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`that two alternative holdings, each of which is sufficient to support the result, are both
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`independently “necessary” to a judgment for collateral estoppel purposes. In re Westgate-Cal.
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`Corp., 642 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 1981).
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`For all of these reasons, Google is entitled to summary judgment.
`
`
`
`II.
`
`THE CLAIMS OF THE ’024 PATENT LACK WRITTEN-DESCRIPTION
`SUPPORT UNDER MASTEROBJECTS’ CONSTRUCTIONS.
`As Google explained in its Responsive Claim Construction Brief (dkt. 44), the newly
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`drafted claims of U.S. Patent No. 8,539,024 do not cover an embodiment where the entire input
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`string (as opposed to just the changes) is re-transmitted from a client to a server. Nevertheless, if
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`this Court were to find that the claims are as broad as MasterObjects contends, then they are
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`invalid for lack of written description.
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`This Court already has held that the specification of the ’024 patent limits the disclosed
`invention to sending only the changes to the input string with each successive message and has
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`rejected MasterObjects’ argument that the specification discloses resending the entire input string
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`as the user types a query. MasterObjects I, dkt. 153 at 17. As a result, MasterObjects cannot
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`argue that the ’024 specification contains an express disclosure of what MasterObjects contends its
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`claims cover. Rather, MasterObjects’ own expert, Dr. Gareth Loy, admitted that his analysis
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`focused on whether the purportedly claimed subject matter is an “obvious variation” of what the
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`-2-
`CASE NO. 4:15-CV-01775-PJH
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
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`Case 4:15-cv-01775-PJH Document 48 Filed 12/23/15 Page 8 of 27
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`specification discloses. Ex. A (Deposition of Gareth Loy, Ph.D., hereafter “Loy Depo.”) at
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`204:5-17.4 That analysis, however, is flatly inconsistent with the written-description requirement
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`and therefore irrelevant as a matter of law. Accordingly, under MasterObjects’ proposed
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`construction, Google is entitled to summary judgment that the claims are invalid for lack of
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`written-description support.
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`MasterObjects Misunderstands The Legal Standard.
`A.
`MasterObjects provides an incomplete and misleading statement of the written-description
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`requirement. As the Federal Circuit has recognized, “the hallmark of written description is
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`disclosure.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
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`banc). Thus, the written-description analysis requires “an objective inquiry into the four corners
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`of the specification” to determine whether the specification actually “describe[s] an invention
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`understandable to [a] skilled artisan . . . .” Claims exceeding a patent’s written description are
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`invalid. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998). For
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`patents issuing from continuation applications—which often include claims drafted years after the
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`invention—the written-description requirement is an important check, “ensur[ing] that the scope
`of the right to exclude . . . does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field
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`of art as described in the patent specification.” Capon v. Eshar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
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`2005) (quotation and citation omitted; emphasis added); see also ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med.
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`Sys., Inc., No. 04-cv-00689-MRP, 2007 WL 8081360, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2007) (holding that
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`subsequent claims that “differ significantly from the original written description” are “invalid,
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`particularly ‘[w]hen the scope of a claim has been changed by amendment in such a way as to
`justify an assertion that it is directed to a different invention than was the original claim . . . .’”)
`(citation omitted; emphasis added), aff’d, 558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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`Although the specification need not use the precise words of the claims, the written-
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`description requirement is not satisfied when the specification discloses only an obvious variant of
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`4 Citations to “Ex. A” refer to Exhibit A to the Declaration of Jordan R. Jaffe, filed
`herewith.
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`-3-
`CASE NO. 4:15-CV-01775-PJH
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
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`Case 4:15-cv-01775-PJH Document 48 Filed 12/23/15 Page 9 of 27
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`what is claimed. PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
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`Lockwood v. Am Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A]ll the limitations
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`must appear in the specification. The question is not whether a claimed invention is an obvious
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`variant of that which is disclosed in the specification.”). The proper test for written description is
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`whether the specification “actually or inherently” discloses each claim element. PowerOasis,
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`522 F.3d at 1307. Whether a skilled artisan “would recognize” the claimed variation as an
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`obvious possibility (as MasterObjects argues) is legally irrelevant to the written-description
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`inquiry. See infra Section II.D.
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`If there is no actual or inherent disclosure of the claimed
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`subject matter, then the claims are invalid—full stop.
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`Compliance with the written-description requirement is a question of fact, but this issue “is
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`amenable to summary judgment in cases where no reasonable fact finder could return a verdict for
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`the non-moving party.” PowerOasis, 522 F.3d at 1307 (citing Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech
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`Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1072-73 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Courts in this District and around the
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`country have granted summary judgment when a patentee has failed to raise a genuine issue of
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`material fact to dispute the lack of written-description support for a claimed invention, including
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`where the patentee offered expert testimony in opposition. See, e.g., GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc.,
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`Case No. 12-cv-2885, 2014 WL 1390039, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014) (granting summary
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`judgment of invalidity for lack of written description despite expert testimony offered by patentee
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`in opposition); CreAgri, Inc. v. Pinnaclife, Inc., Case No. 11-cv-6635, 2013 WL 6673676, at *13-
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`16 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2013) (same); Wyeth v. Abbot Labs., Case No. 08-1021, 2012 WL 175023,
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`at *10 (D.N.J. 2012) (same).
`
`MasterObjects Admits That It Is Seeking To Broaden Its Patent Claims.
`B.
`MasterObjects indisputably seeks a construction of the ’024 patent claims that exceeds the
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`scope of the claims in MasterObjects I. Specifically, MasterObjects contends that the newly
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`drafted claims are broad enough to capture sending the entire input string with each successive
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`message—including characters previously sent from a client to a server. Opp. at 4 (“The
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`-4-
`CASE NO. 4:15-CV-01775-PJH
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
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`Case 4:15-cv-01775-PJH Document 48 Filed 12/23/15 Page 10 of 27
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`language of the new ’024 claims does not limit the client to sending ‘only the changes’”).5
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`MasterObjects itself characterizes its claims as “drastically different” from the claims at issue in
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`MasterObjects I, and it candidly admits that it intentionally drafted these claims in an effort to
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`circumvent Google’s non-infringement arguments. Dkt. 40 at 18. In its Opposition,
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`MasterObjects continues to assert that it has effected a “profound change in [claim] language.”
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`Opp. at 2.
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`MasterObjects’ admission that it sought to broaden its claims after this Court found
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`limiting statements in an identical specification is troubling and raises immediate written-
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`description concerns. The Federal Circuit’s opinion in ICU Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical
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`Systems, Inc., 558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009), is both instructive and controlling. There, the
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`patents at issue related to medical valves used for intravenous (“IV”) applications. Id. at 1372.
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`The original patent application disclosed only a device comprising a “spike.” Id. at 1377. A
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`decade after the initial filing, however, the patentee added new claims, seeking to cover a
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`“spikeless” embodiment without any corresponding changes to the specification. Id. As a
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`result, the spikeless claims sought to cover “medical valves generically,” while the patent
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`specification “describe[d] only medical valves with spikes.” Id. at 1378. This transparent
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`attempt to extend the claims beyond the specification’s disclosure, the Federal Circuit held,
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`violated the written-description requirement, rendering the new claims invalid. Id. at 1379.
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`The Federal Circuit’s reasoning in ICU controls here. This Court has already found that
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`the “invention” disclosed in the specification of MasterObjects’ patents is limited to a protocol
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`that “send[s] just the changes to the input buffer, instead of sending the entire input buffer.”
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`MasterObjects I, dkt. 153 at 17 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 8,112,529, hereafter the “’529 patent,”
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`20:11-14). Indeed, in MasterObjects I, Google argued that “the key aspect of the invention is
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`that no character is ever re-sent to the server” and this Court “agreed with defendant here.”
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`5 Citations to “Opp. __” refer to Plaintiff MasterObjects, Inc.’s Combined Reply Claim
`Construction Brief And Opposition To Google Inc.’s Motion For Summary Judgment On
`Collateral Estoppel And Written Description. Dkt. 46.
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`-5-
`CASE NO. 4:15-CV-01775-PJH
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
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`Case 4:15-cv-01775-PJH Document 48 Filed 12/23/15 Page 11 of 27
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`MasterObjects I, dkt. 153 at 16. Yet, MasterObjects admits that it deliberately set out to draft
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`claims that attempt to capture an embodiment this Court has previously found to be undisclosed by
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`the specification and which is contrary to “the key aspect of the invention.” What is more,
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`MasterObjects never submitted to the examiner of the ’024 patent this Court’s claim construction
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`order and its discussion of the limiting effect of the specification. MasterObjects’ tactics are
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`precisely the sort of claim drafting abuse against which the written-description requirement is
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`intended to guard.
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`C.
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`The Written Description Of The ’024 Patent Does Not Disclose Re-sending
`The Entire Search String With Each Successive Message.
`In MasterObjects I, this Court held that MasterObjects could not provide “adequate
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`support for its argument that the entire character string is re-sent as the user types in a query.”
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`MasterObjects I, dkt. 153 at 17. The ’024 patent shares the same specification as the ’529 patent
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`previously considered by this Court. MasterObjects’ expert agreed the ’024 and ’529 patents
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`describe the same invention. Ex. A (Loy Depo.) at 171:1-9. He further conceded that all the
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`language from the ’024 patent that he relied on in his declaration is present in the ’529 patent. Id.
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`at 186:3-188:14. MasterObjects thus cannot provide support for its argument that the
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`specification somehow, contrary to this Court’s prior findings, now discloses re-sending the entire
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`character string from the client to the server as the user types in a query.
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`A detailed analysis confirms that the specification fails to disclose this subject matter.
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`MasterObjects I, dkt. 153 at 17. In an attempt to show sufficient disclosure, MasterObjects
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`misconstrues the specification’s disclosure and rehashes many of the same arguments previously
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`rejected by this Court and the Federal Circuit.
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`1.
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`The ’024 Patent Does Not Expressly Disclose Re-Sending The Entire
`Search String From A Client To A Server In Successive Messages.
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`MasterObjects cites two statements in the specification involving “sending several
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`characters at a time,” Opp. at 15:7-8, and “sending the complete string,” Opp. at 15:6-9
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`(incorporating argument from Opp. 8:10-26). These statements are of no help to MasterObjects,
`because they never disclose re-sending previously sent characters in a subsequent message.
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`The first statement merely describes an embodiment wherein a user “replaces the contents
`-6-
`CASE NO. 4:15-CV-01775-PJH
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
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`Case 4:15-cv-01775-PJH Document 48 Filed 12/23/15 Page 12 of 27
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`of an entry field” with an entirely new string. ’024 Pat., 12:7-8. In these circumstances, the
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`patent discloses that the “Client may then send the entire string all at once to the Server.” Id.,
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`12:8-10. Not only does this fail to disclose re-sending previously sent characters in a subsequent
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`message, but it actually indicates that sending an entire string “all at once” is limited to those
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`situations where the user “replaces” the previous contents of the entry field. MasterObjects
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`relied on this same disclosure in MasterObjects I, to no avail. See MasterObjects’ Fed. Cir. Br.
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`at 38.
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`The second statement cited by MasterObjects also does not disclose re-sending previously
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`sent characters in a subsequent message. Opp. at 8:10. To the contrary, this statement serves to
`distinguish the just-the-changes approach of “the present invention” from the alternate approach
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`of “sending the entire input buffer.” ’024 Pat., 20:14-17 (explaining that “the present invention”
`involves sending “just the changes to the input buffer, instead of sending the entire input buffer”
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`(emphasis added)). MasterObjects’ approach would turn the written-description requirement on
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`its head, permitting a patentee whose specification explains that “the invention is X instead of Y”
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`to seek claims directed to an invention involving Y. See Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154,
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`1159 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that specification failed to provide written-description support for
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`prior art approach where it “specifically distinguishes the prior art as inferior and touts the
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`advantages” of the purported invention over the prior art). Consistent with its limitation of “the
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`present invention,” the ’024 patent never once suggests that its disclosure encompasses sending
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`the entire input buffer in successive messages. As it did in MasterObjects I, this Court should
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`reject MasterObjects’ attempt to sweep within the scope of its claims that which the specification
`describes as not the invention. MasterObjects I, dkt. 153 at 17.
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`The testimony of MasterObjects’ expert highlights the fundamental flaws in
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`MasterObjects’ position. Dr. Loy testified that “when I read this specification, I took the term
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`the invention as being a shorthand for the current preferred embodiment or the preferred
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`embodiment or the embodiment.” Ex. A (Loy Depo.) at 150:6-10. That understanding flies in
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`the face of this Court’s prior holding regarding the specification’s use of “the present invention.”
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`Compare MasterObjects I, dkt. 153 at 17 (holding that the statement in the specification that the
`-7-
`CASE NO. 4:15-CV-01775-PJH
`GOOGLE INC.’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
`ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
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`Case 4:15-cv-01775-PJH Document 48 Filed 12/23/15 Page 13 of 27
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`“invention” sends “just the changes” describes the “invention as a whole” and not just an
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`embodiment), with Ex. A (Loy Depo.) at 156:12-21 (testifying that the same statement about the
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`“invention” is simply “shorthand” for a “preferred embodiment”). Indeed, it is flatly
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`contradicted by the Federal Circuit precedent relied on by this Court in MasterObjects I. See
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`MasterObjects I, dkt. 153 at 17 (citing Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340,
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`1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) and Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
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`2006)). The deposition also demonstrated that Dr. Loy applied the same kind of legally
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`erroneous approach to written description as MasterObjects. Ex. A (Loy Depo.) at 200:10-
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`201:24 (testifying that, based on his understanding of the law, a claim to a “blue car” would be
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`adequately supported by a specification disclosing that “the invention uses a red car embodiment
`instead of a blue car embodiment” (emphasis added)).
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`Accordingly, MasterObjects’ arguments are incorrect and premised on the wrong legal
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`standard. Under the correct standard for written description, there is no genuine dispute that the
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`’024 patent fails to disclose re-sending the entire search string from a client to a server.
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`2.
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`The Disclosure Of “Query Messages” Does Not Provide Written-
`Description Support.
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`MasterObjects next attempts to distort the specification’s use of the term “query message.”
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`Opp. at 15-17 (citing ’024 Pat., 18:64-19-2). That disclosure, however, does not prov