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` Paper 28
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` Entered: October 10, 2018
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`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`ONE WORLD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`d/b/a TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES POWER EQUIPMENT,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-01132
`Patent 6,998,977 B2
`____________
`
`
`Before JONI Y. CHANG, JUSTIN T. ARBES, and
`JON M. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHANG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318 (a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
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`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`One World Technologies, Inc. d/b/a Techtronic Industries Power
`Equipment (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting an inter partes review of
`claims 12–21 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 6,998,977 B2
`(Ex. 1001, “the ’977 patent”) and a Declaration of Stuart Lipoff (Ex. 1008).
`Paper 2 (“Pet.”). The Chamberlain Group, Inc. (“Patent Owner”) filed a
`Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Upon consideration of
`the Petition and Preliminary Response, we instituted the instant inter partes
`review as to all of the challenged claims for all of the grounds of
`unpatentability presented in the Petition. Paper 7 (“Dec.”).
`Subsequent to institution, Patent Owner filed a Response (Paper 10,
`“PO Resp.”) and a Declaration of Nathaniel J. Davis IV, Ph.D. (Ex. 2001).
`Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 16, “Reply”) and a second Declaration of
`Mr. Lipoff (Ex. 1014). A combined oral hearing with Case IPR2017-01137
`was held on June 14, 2018, and a transcript has been entered into the record
`as Paper 27 (“Tr.”).
`This Final Written Decision is entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
`For the reasons that follow, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance
`of the evidence that claims 12−21 of the ’977 patent are unpatentable.
`
`A. Related Matters
`Petitioner also challenges claims 1−11 and 22−25 of the ’977 patent in
`Case IPR2017-01137. Petitioner indicates that the ’977 patent has not been
`asserted against Petitioner. Pet. 1. Petitioner also identifies other related
`proceedings—e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 7,224,275 and 7,635,966 are involved in
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`The Chamberlain Group., Inc. v. Techtronic Industries Co. Ltd., Case No.
`1:16-cv-06097 (N.D. Ill.). Id. at 1–2.
`
`B. The ’977 Patent
`The ’977 patent describes a method and an apparatus for monitoring a
`movable barrier (e.g., a garage door) over a network. Ex. 1001, 1:12−15.
`Figure 3 of the ’977 patent is reproduced below with color
`highlighting added by Petitioner (Pet. 5).
`
`
`
`Figure 3 above illustrates a block diagram of a garage door operator
`connected to network 102. Ex. 1001, 3:36−43. Barrier movement controller
`300 (in orange) controls the movement and/or position of the barrier (e.g.,
`garage door). Id. at 3:9−12. Network interface 36 is connected to network
`102 and coupled to controller 300, which provides network interface 36 with
`information regarding the status of the garage door operator, allowing an
`individual to receive the status of the garage door through network 102. Id.
`at 3:20−35. Network interface 36 includes micro-controller 304, electrically
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`erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) 306, port 308, media
`access control layer 310, physical layer device 312, jack 314, and modem
`50. Id. at 3:48−51, Fig. 3.
`
`C. Illustrative Claim
`Of the challenged claims, claim 12 is independent. Claims 13–21
`depend, indirectly or directly, from claim 12. Claim 12 is illustrative:
`12. A method for checking the status of a movable barrier
`comprising the steps of:
`receiving from a network client over a network, a status request
`for a movable barrier;
`determining a status of the movable barrier;
`sending a status of the movable barrier over the network to the
`network client in response to the status request and;
`wherein the movable barrier comprises a barrier movement
`operator for controlling the movement of the barrier and the
`method comprises receiving a status change request from the
`network client and controlling movement of the barrier in
`response to the status change request.
`Ex. 1001, 5:38–6:4.
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`D. Prior Art Relied Upon
`Petitioner relies upon the references listed below.
`Menard
`US 2002/0183008 A1 Dec. 5, 2002
`Lee
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`US 5,475,377
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`Dec. 12, 1995
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`(Ex. 1003)
`(Ex. 1007)
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`E. Asserted Grounds of Unpatentability
`Petitioner asserts the following grounds of unpatentability (Pet. 2−3)1:
`
`Claims
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`12–21
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`13 and 21
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`Basis
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`Reference(s)
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`§§ 102(a), 102(e)(1)
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`Menard
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`§ 103(a)
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`Menard and Lee
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`II. DISCUSSION
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`A. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). “Under a broadest
`reasonable interpretation, words of the claim must be given their plain
`meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with the specification and
`prosecution history.” Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1062
`(Fed. Cir. 2016).
`The parties propose constructions for several claim terms. Pet. 6–14;
`Prelim. Resp. 2−3. Upon review of the parties’ contentions, we addressed
`two claim terms identified by the parties in our Institution Decision. Dec.
`
`1 Because the claims at issue have a filing date prior to March 16, 2013, the
`effective date of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
`125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), we apply the pre-AIA versions of 35 U.S.C.
`§§ 102 and 103 in this Decision.
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`5−7. After institution, neither party challenges any aspect of our claim
`constructions. Based on the entire record presented during trial, we discern
`no reason to modify our analysis or claim constructions of those claim terms
`in this Final Written Decision. Our claim construction analysis from the
`Institution Decision is reproduced in substance below in Sections II.A.1−2.
`
`1. “status of the movable barrier”
`Claim 12 recites “determining a status of the movable barrier.”
`
`Ex. 1001, 5:42. Petitioner asserts that the term “status of the movable
`barrier” should be construed as the state of the moveable barrier (e.g.,
`whether a door is open or closed). Pet. 7. Petitioner argues that the
`Specification supports this construction as it discloses that, “[i]n order to
`check the status of the movable barrier[,] the user would go look at the
`movable barrier to see if it was open or closed.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001,
`1:26−28) (emphasis omitted). Petitioner further notes claims 15 and 16
`recite “wherein the status of the movable barrier is open,” and “wherein the
`status of the movable barrier is closed,” respectively. Id. at 7−8; Ex. 1001,
`6:11−14.
`Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed claim
`construction as to this term. See Prelim. Resp. 2−3; PO Resp. 2. In light of
`the Specification including the dependent claims, we agree with and adopt
`Petitioner’s claim construction, construing “status of the movable barrier” as
`“the state of the moveable barrier (e.g., whether a door is open or closed).”
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`2. “barrier movement operator for controlling movement
`of a movable barrier”
`Claim 12 recites “a barrier movement operator for controlling the
`
`movement of the barrier.” Ex. 1001, 5:45−6:1. Petitioner asserts that, apart
`from the claim, the Specification does not use the claim term “barrier
`movement operator,” but rather “movable barrier operator,” which is
`described as a garage door operator. Pet. 9−10. Petitioner also alleges that
`the claim term “barrier movement operator” should be construed as a
`“device that moves a barrier, such as a garage door.” Id.
`
`Patent Owner argues that the claim term does not require construction.
`See Prelim. Resp. 2−3; PO Resp. 2. The parties also agree that the term is
`not a means-plus-function limitation under 35 U.S.C. § 112, sixth paragraph.
`See Pet. 9; Prelim. Resp. 2−3; PO Resp. 2. In light of the Specification, we
`adopt Petitioner’s proposed claim construction, construing “barrier
`movement operator” as a “device that moves a barrier, such as a garage
`door.”
`
`3. “network”
`Claim 12 recites “receiving from a network client over a network, a
`status request for a movable barrier,” and “sending a status of the movable
`barrier over the network to the network client in response to the status
`request.” Ex. 1001, 5:40−45 (emphases added).
`Although Patent Owner, in its Response discussing the construction of
`the terms, “submits that no construction is necessary for any claim term, and
`asks that the plain language of the claims be given its broadest reasonable
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`interpretation,” Patent Owner nevertheless argues, in its Response discussing
`the prior art, that claim 12 “requires that the status request be received over a
`network from a network client, and the status be sent over the same network
`to the network client in response to the status request.” Compare PO Resp.
`2, 4−5, with id. at 14−15 (emphases in original).
`Petitioner counters that the claims do not require a single network, but
`rather permit multiple networks to be used. Reply 17−21. Petitioner also
`argues that, in any event, Menard discloses an example of a single network
`client on a single network requesting and receiving a garage door position
`status, and controlling the door. Id.
`We agree with Petitioner that claim 12 does not require a single
`network. As the Federal Circuit has explained, “an indefinite article ‘a’ or
`‘an’ in patent parlance carries the meaning of ‘one or more’ in open-ended
`claims containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising.’” Baldwin Graphic
`Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal
`quotation marks and citations omitted). “The subsequent use of definite
`articles ‘the’ or ‘said’ in a claim to refer back to the same claim term does
`not change the general plural rule, but simply reinvokes that non-singular
`meaning.” Id. An exception to this general rule “only arises where the
`language of the claims themselves, the specification, or the prosecution
`history necessitate[s] a departure from the rule.” Id. at 1342−43.
`Here, the Specification of the ’977 patent discloses that “[t]he network
`interface 36 is connected to a network 102, e.g., the internet, which allows
`an individual to connect to the network interface 36 over the network 102
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`and receive the status of the garage door 12.” Ex. 1001, 3:26−30 (emphasis
`added). Petitioner notes that, as of the priority date of the ’977 patent, the
`term “Internet” encompassed a plurality of networks, citing to several
`dictionary definitions for support. Reply 19 n.12 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 50−51;
`Ex. 1021, 354; Ex. 1022, 579; Ex. 1026, 972). For example, The Internet
`Dictionary (1995) defines the “Internet” as “[a]n international network of
`well over ten thousand networks linked using the TCP/IP protocols (see
`illustration, next page).” Ex. 1026, 97. The Illustration is reproduced below
`(id. at 98).
`
`
`The Illustration shows that “[t]he Internet isn’t one specific network, but a
`formless mass of interconnected networks, all capable of passing
`
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`2 The citations are referring to the original page numbers, not the page
`numbers added by Petitioner.
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`information via Internet protocols.” Id. As another example, the Webster’s
`II New College Dictionary (1995) defines the “Internet” as “[a]n
`interconnected system of networks that connects computers around the
`world via the TCP/IP protocol.” Ex. 1022, 579.
`At the oral hearing, both parties agreed that the claimed “network”
`can comprise multiple networks because, as disclosed in the ’977 patent, at
`the time of the invention, the Internet included many networks connected
`together. Tr. 26:3−12 (Petitioner noted “the ’977 patent . . . shows that the
`network interface is connected to multiple networks, not to a single
`network,” and “that it’s connected to a cable or DSL line which then in turn
`is connected to the internet”), 48:15−25 (Patent Owner explained “you could
`use multiple networks in a bridging context, so one network bridges to
`another network that bridges to another network . . . [and] they collectively
`act as a network”). Patent Owner further clarified that the claimed
`“network” can comprise multiple networks connected together acting
`collectively as a single network, such as a cellular phone network connected
`to the Internet to establish a communication channel between a cellular
`phone and the system for the garage door opener. Id. at 49:8−51:6.
`Upon consideration, in light of the Specification of the ’977 patent,
`we interpret a “network” as recited in claim 12 to mean “a single network or
`a plurality of networks connected together acting individually or collectively
`to allow communication between a communication device and a system.”
`We also agree with Patent Owner that claim 12 “requires that the status
`request be received over a network from a network client, and the status be
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`sent over the same network(s) to the network client in response to the status
`request,” because the subsequent usages of definite article “the” refer back
`to the same “network client” and “network.” See PO Resp. 2, 4−5, 14−15
`(emphases in original). To illustrate, as just one example, if “a network”
`were the Internet, “the network” would also refer to the Internet.
`
`4. “computer”
`Claim 17 recites “wherein the network client is a computer.”
`Ex. 1001, 6:15−16. Patent Owner asserts that the term “computer” should
`be interpreted as a “personal computer” because the ’977 patent consistently
`describes and refers to a “computer” as a device distinct from other devices,
`such as a PDA or cellular telephone. PO Resp. 21–22.
`However, Patent Owner’s proposed claim construction, interpreting
`“computer” as “personal computer,” would improperly import a limitation
`from a preferred embodiment or specific example into the claims. See In re
`Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (limitations are not to be
`read from the specification into the claims). Our reviewing court “has
`repeatedly cautioned against limiting the claimed invention to preferred
`embodiments or specific examples in the specification.” Williamson v.
`Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citations and
`quotation marks omitted); SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.,
`358 F.3d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that “it is important not to import
`into claim limitations that are not a part of the claim”). Moreover, Dr. Davis
`conceded during his cross-examination that the term “computer” as used in
`the ’977 patent is broader than the term “personal computer.” Ex. 1015,
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`87:3−7 (stating that “if you look at all of the devices back in column 2 [of
`the ’977 patent], a cellular phone, a personal computer, a PDA, at some
`level, they’re all a computer”). Thus, we decline to adopt Patent Owner’s
`narrow construction, and conclude that no further construction of
`“computer” is necessary.
`
`B. Principles of Law
`To establish anticipation, each and every element in a claim, arranged
`as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net
`MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
`There is no requirement that the prior art must use the same words to
`describe a claim element in order to be deemed as teaching or disclosing that
`claim element. Identity of terminology is not required, for a claim element
`to be met directly by the prior art, without resort to obviousness. See In re
`Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831,
`832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Even in a non-obviousness setting, it is proper to take
`into account not only the literal and specific teachings of the reference, but
`also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be
`expected to draw therefrom. In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968).
`For anticipation, the dispositive question is whether one skilled in the art
`would reasonably understand or infer from a prior art reference that every
`claim element is disclosed in that reference. Eli Lilly v. Los Angeles
`Biomedical Res. Inst., 849 F.3d 1073, 1074–75 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness.3 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
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`C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors
`may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art;
`prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are
`made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active
`workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
`(citation omitted). Mr. Lipoff testifies that a person with ordinary skill in the
`art “would have had at least an undergraduate degree in electrical
`engineering, or equivalent education, and one to two years of work
`experience in the fields of: (i) network communication systems; (ii) systems
`for access control or automated door systems; or (iii) equivalent work
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`3 Neither party presents objective evidence of nonobviousness in this trial.
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`experience or training.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 30. Patent Owner does not dispute
`Mr. Lipoff’s assessment regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See
`generally PO Resp. Based on the record before us, we agree with and apply
`Mr. Lipoff’s assessment regarding the general knowledge of a person with
`ordinary skill in the art. We further note that the prior art of record in the
`instant proceeding reflects the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art.
`See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the
`prior art itself reflects an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art).
`
`D. Anticipation by Menard
`Petitioner asserts that claims 12–21 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
`§§ 102(a) and (e) as anticipated by Menard. Pet. 2–3, 15–53. To support its
`contentions, Petitioner directs our attention to Mr. Lipoff’s Declaration.
`Ex. 1008. Citing Dr. Davis’ Declaration for support, Patent Owner counters
`that Menard does not describe certain claim limitations. PO Resp. 2–29.
`For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has
`demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 12–21 are
`anticipated by Menard. We begin our discussion with a brief summary of
`Menard, and then we address the relevant contentions advanced by the
`parties in turn.
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`Menard
`Menard describes a wireless system for controlling and monitoring a
`power door. Ex. 1003 ¶ 1. Figure 1 of Menard illustrates a garage door
`opener, and is reproduced below.
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`Figure 1 of Menard shows garage door opener system 10 that includes
`power unit 15 that has an electric motor to open and close garage door 40.
`Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 4, 5. Power unit 15 can be operated by using switch 65 or
`remote control 85. Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
`Menard discloses a system and a method that allow remote control
`and management of a single door opener or multiple door openers using a
`wired or wireless communication device, including a cellular telephone, a
`pager, a personal digital assistant, a computer, or other device that
`communicates using a network. Id. ¶ 9. The door opener system includes a
`processor executing programming, a position sensor, and a wireless
`transceiver that communicates using both a long range communication
`protocol and a short range communication protocol, allowing a user to
`control and manage the door opener remotely. Id. ¶ 10. The door opener
`receives commands and transmits status information using either or both of
`the long range and short range protocols. Id. The communication link
`provides a channel for communicating information from the door opener to
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`the device and for communicating instructions from the device to the door
`opener. Id. For example, the long distance network may include a two-way
`pager network, “enabling bidirectional communication” with a user
`controlled pager. Id. ¶ 44.
`Figure 2 of Menard is reproduced below.
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`Figure 2 of Menard “illustrates a block diagram of one embodiment of
`the present system.” Id. ¶ 13. As shown in Figure 2 of Menard, system 100
`is connected to garage door opener (“GDO”) 10. System 100 includes
`processor 120, programming 150, position sensor 155, and transceiver 130.
`Id. ¶¶ 21–26. Processor 120 may include a microprocessor and memory to
`perform the programmed functions and to retain settings and configuration
`information. Id. ¶ 23. Position sensor 155 is coupled to processor 120, and
`provides an electrical signal corresponding to the position of the door. Id.
`¶¶ 30, 69 (disclosing that “sensor 155 provides the position information to
`processor 120”).
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`Transceiver 130 may be compatible with more than two
`communication protocols. Id. ¶ 47. For example, transceiver 130 may be
`compatible with three protocols, such as a cellular telephone communication
`protocol, a two-way pager communication protocol, and Bluetooth protocol.
`Id. In such a case, the garage door opener may be operable using a cellular
`telephone, a two-way pager, or a device compatible with Bluetooth. Id.
`Figure 7 of Menard “illustrates one embodiment of programming in
`accordance with one embodiment of the present system” and is reproduced
`below. Id. ¶ 18.
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`As shown in Figure 7 of Menard, programming 150 has various
`features: web server programming 240, auxiliary sensors programming 260,
`GDO programming 215, auxiliary actuator programming 285, and voice
`recognition programming 310. Id. ¶ 58. For example, web server
`programming 240 provides an interface to allow remote control of system
`100. Id. ¶ 59. The wireless application protocol (WAP) server of web
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`server programming 240 is coupled to a communication network to allow a
`user to operate, program, and monitor system 100. Id. The WAP server
`generates data that can be accessed using an Internet browser. Id.
`Auxiliary sensors programming 260 includes position sensor
`programming 265 that receives and interprets position information derived
`from door position sensor 165. Id. ¶ 60. GDO programming 215 includes
`position sensor programming 220 and actuator programming 225 that
`includes door open programming 230 and door close programming 235 for
`opening or closing garage door 40 in response to commands received by
`processor 120. Id. ¶ 61.
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`Claims 12, 15, and 16
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`1. Checking the status of a movable barrier (e.g., the position of a door)
`The preamble of claim 12 recites “[a] method for checking the status
`of a movable barrier.”4 Ex. 1001, 5:38−39. In addition, claim 15 further
`recites “wherein the status of the movable barrier is open,” and claim 16
`further recites “wherein the status of the movable barrier is closed.” Id. at
`6:11−14 (emphases added).
`Petitioner explains in detail how Menard describes each of these
`limitations, citing to Mr. Lipoff’s Declaration for support. Pet. 15−16,
`
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`4 The parties do not dispute that the language appearing in the preamble is a
`claim limitation. Pet. 15−16; see generally PO Resp. We proceed on the
`assumption that the preamble of claim 12 is a limitation.
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`35−37 (citing Ex. 1008). Specifically, Petitioner notes Menard discloses a
`method that “allows remote control and management of single or multiple
`door openers using a wired or wireless communication device.” Id. at
`15−16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 9) (emphasis added by Petitioner). Petitioner
`explains Menard describes a method for checking the status (the position of
`a door) of a movable barrier (a door). Id. at 16 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 69). As
`shown in step 365 of Figure 8 of Menard, “door position information is
`received by the user,” who has a wireless device capable of communicating
`with transceiver 130 of system 100. Ex. 1003 ¶ 69, Fig. 8.
`Based on the evidence of record, we determine Petitioner has
`established that Menard discloses a “method for checking the status of a
`movable barrier,” as recited in the preamble of claim 12. Patent Owner does
`not dispute Petitioner’s showing as to this limitation. See generally PO
`Resp.
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`As to the limitations expressly recited in claims 15 and 16, Petitioner
`notes “power unit 15 drives door 40 to an open position if door 40 [is]
`closed, and to a closed position if open” in Menard. Pet. 35−37 (citing
`Ex. 1003 ¶ 6) (emphases added by Petitioner). Menard discloses that
`position “sensor 155 includes a first magnetic switch to detect door 40 in an
`open position and second magnetic switch to detect door 40 in a closed
`position.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 30 (emphases added). At step 370 of Figure 8 in
`Menard, “the user receives notification of the door position information.”
`Id. ¶ 69, Fig. 8. Menard explains that “[t]he door position may be indicated
`by a pair of lights on a pager (one light labeled ‘open’ and another ‘close’),
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`by a graphical image on a screen, a recognizable audio tone, a recognizable
`vibration, or any other means of indicating position to a user.” Id.
`Upon consideration of Petitioner’s contentions and supporting
`evidence, we determine Petitioner has demonstrated that Menard discloses
`“wherein the status of the movable barrier is open,” as recited in claim 15,
`and “wherein the status of the movable barrier is closed,” as recited in claim
`16. Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertions and supporting
`evidence as to these limitations. See generally PO Resp.
`
`2. Status request from a network client over a network
`Claim 12 recites (1) “receiving from a network client over a network,
`a status request for a movable barrier”; (2) “determining a status of the
`movable barrier”; and (3) “sending a status of the movable barrier over the
`network to the network client in response to the status request.” Ex. 1001,
`5:38−45.
`
`Petitioner’s contentions
`Petitioner explains in detail how Menard describes each of these
`limitations. Pet. 16−24, 37−39. As to the limitation “receiving from a
`network client over a network, a status request for a movable barrier,”
`Petitioner first points out that transceiver 130 of system 100, as shown in
`Figure 2 of Menard, is coupled to a short range network via short-range
`transceiver 140 and a long range network via long range transceiver 135. Id.
`at 17−18 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 21, 26−28, Figs. 2−4). For example, “the long
`distance network may include a telephone network . . . [that] may include
`
`20
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`communicating using an intranet or the Internet.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 44. Mr. Lipoff
`testifies an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood that Menard
`thus discloses connecting to a “network,” as recited in claim 12. Ex. 1008
`¶¶ 74−75.
`Petitioner also explains that Menard discloses various types of
`network client, including a pager, a computer, a personal digital assistant,
`and a cellular telephone. Pet. 18−19. Petitioner notes Menard discloses a
`method that “allows remote control and management of single or multiple
`door openers using a wired or wireless communication device,” including “a
`cellular telephone, a pager, a personal digital assistant, a computer or other
`device that communicates using a network.” Id. at 16−19, 23, 37−39
`(emphasis omitted); Ex. 1003 ¶ 9; Ex. 1008 ¶¶ 77, 145−162. Menard further
`discloses that “a user may communicate with system 100 using a telephone
`coupled to the public switched telephone network (PSTN), a cellular
`telephone, a pager (either one way or two way), a personal communication
`device (such as a personal digital assistant, PDA), a computer, or other wired
`or wireless communication device.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 29. Having reviewed the
`evidence in the entire trial record, we are persuaded that Menard discloses a
`“network client,” as recited in claim 12.
`Furthermore, Petitioner argues that Menard discloses receiving status
`requests from the network clients. Pet. 19−20. Petitioner notes Menard
`discloses, for example, “system 100 provides a pager signal to indicate the
`position of the door or any other information relative to the garage or the
`door opener.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 50. Menard explains “[u]sing a two way pager,
`
`21
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`IPR2017-01132
`Patent 6,998,977 B2
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`
`the user may operate the door opener, or operate an actuator, using the reply
`communication channel of the pager,” and “[t]he outbound signal (e.g.,
`indicating the door position) may be transmitted to the pager on a
`predetermined schedule, or upon inquiry, or upon a change of position of the
`door (or actuator) at any time.” Id. (emphasis added). Mr. Lipoff explains
`that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood from this disclosure
`that an “inquiry” is another word for a “status request,” i.e., a request from
`the user of the device for the status of the garage door. Ex. 1008 ¶ 78.
`Mr. Lipoff testifies such an artisan would have recognized that Menard
`discloses receiving the status request from the network client, and
`responding to this request by sending the door position status (e.g., open or
`closed) to the network client. Id. ¶¶ 78−79.
`Having considered the evidence in this entire trial record, we credit
`Mr. Lipoff’s testimony as it is consistent with Menard’s disclosure (e.g.,
`Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 9−11, 29, 50, 69). We determine Petitioner has shown
`sufficiently that Menard discloses “receiving from a network client over a
`network, a status request for a movable barrier,” as recited in claim 12. We
`address Patent Owner’s arguments regarding this limitation in the next
`subsection under “Patent Owner’s contentions.”
`As to the limitation “determining a status of the movable barrier,”
`Petitioner notes that Menard discloses “a processor executing programming
`and coupled to a door opener, a position sensor, and a wireless transceiver
`that communicates using both a long range communication protocol and a
`short range communication protocol.” Pet. 20−22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 10)
`
`22
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`IPR2017-01132
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`(emphasis omitted). Petitioner explains that, to determine the status of a
`movable barrier (a door), position sensor 155 in Menard “includes a first
`magnetic switch to detect door 40 in an open position and second magnetic
`switch to detect door 40 in a closed position.” Id. (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 30,
`Fig. 2) (emphases omitted). Position sensor 155 “provides an electrical
`signal corresponding to the position of door 40.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 30. Based on
`the evidence of record, we are persuaded that Menard discloses “determining
`a status of the movable barrier,” as expressly recited in claim 12, and as
`required by its dependent claims. Patent Owner does not
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