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` Paper 30
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` Entered: October 10, 2018
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`Trials@uspto.gov
`571-272-7822
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`UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`____________
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`____________
`
`ONE WORLD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
`d/b/a TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES POWER EQUIPMENT,
`Petitioner,
`v.
`THE CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC.,
`Patent Owner.
`____________
`
`Case IPR2017-01137
`Patent 6,998,977 B2
`____________
`
`
`
`Before JONI Y. CHANG, JUSTIN T. ARBES, and
`JON M. JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
`
`CHANG, Administrative Patent Judge.
`
`
`
`
`
`FINAL WRITTEN DECISION
`35 U.S.C. § 318 (a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73
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`I.
`INTRODUCTION
`One World Technologies, Inc. d/b/a Techtronic Industries Power
`Equipment (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition requesting an inter partes review of
`claims 1–11 and 22−25 (“the challenged claims”) of U.S. Patent No.
`6,998,977 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’977 patent”) and a Declaration of Stuart
`Lipoff (Ex. 1008). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). The Chamberlain Group, Inc. (“Patent
`Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 6 (“Prelim. Resp.”). Upon
`consideration of the Petition and Preliminary Response, we instituted the
`instant inter partes review as to claims 1−11 and 22−25. Paper 7 (“Dec.”).
`Subsequent to institution, Patent Owner filed a Response (Paper 10,
`“PO Resp.”) and a Declaration of Nathaniel J. Davis IV, Ph.D. (Ex. 2001).
`Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 14, “Reply”) and a second Declaration of
`Mr. Lipoff (Ex. 1014). A combined oral hearing with Case IPR2017-01132
`was held on June 14, 2018, and a transcript has been entered into the record
`as Paper 29 (“Tr.”).
`This Final Written Decision is entered pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
`For the reasons that follow, Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance
`of the evidence that claims 1−11 and 22−25 of the ’977 patent are
`unpatentable.
`
`A. Related Matters
`Petitioner also challenges claims 12−21 of the ’977 patent in Case
`IPR2017-01132. Petitioner indicates that the ’977 patent has not been
`asserted against Petitioner. Pet. 1. Petitioner also identifies other related
`proceedings—e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 7,224,275 and 7,635,966 are involved in
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`The Chamberlain Group., Inc. v. Techtronic Industries Co. Ltd., Case No.
`1:16-cv-06097 (N.D. Ill.). Id. at 1–2.
`
`B. The ’977 Patent
`The ’977 patent describes a method and an apparatus for monitoring a
`movable barrier (e.g., a garage door) over a network. Ex. 1001, 1:12−15.
`Figure 3 of the ’977 patent is reproduced below with color
`highlighting added by Petitioner (Pet. 5).
`
`
`
`Figure 3 above illustrates a block diagram of a garage door operator
`connected to network 102. Ex. 1001, 3:36−43. Barrier movement controller
`300 (in orange) controls the movement and/or position of the barrier (e.g.,
`garage door). Id. at 3:9−12. Network interface 36 is connected to network
`102 and coupled to controller 300, which provides network interface 36 with
`information regarding the status of the garage door operator, allowing an
`individual to receive the status of the garage door through network 102. Id.
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`at 3:20−35. Network interface 36 includes micro-controller 304, electrically
`erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) 306, port 308, media
`access control layer 310, physical layer device 312, jack 314, and modem
`50. Id. at 3:48−51, Fig. 3.
`
`C. Illustrative Claims
`Of the challenged claims, claims 1 and 22 are independent. Claims 2–
`11 depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 1, and claims 23−25 depend,
`ultimately, from claim 22. Claims 1 and 22 are illustrative:
`1. An apparatus comprising:
`a movable barrier operator including a controller for controlling
`movement of a movable barrier; and
`a network interface electronically connected to the controller for
`connecting the controller to a network;
`wherein the network interface responds to requests received on
`the network by sending a status of the movable barrier over the
`network and;
`wherein the network interface receives a status change request
`from the network and the controller responds to the status change
`request by moving the barrier.
`Ex. 1001, 5:5–15.
`22. An apparatus comprising:
`a barrier status monitor coupled to a movable barrier; and
`a network interface electronically connecting the barrier status
`monitor to a network;
`a controller coupled to the network interface and the moveable
`barrier;
`wherein the network interface responds to network conveyed
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`requests by sending a status of the movable barrier over the
`network in response to a request for the status of the movable
`barrier; and
`wherein the network interface receives a status change request
`from the network and the controller responds to the status change
`request by moving the barrier.
`Id. at 6:27−39.
`
`D. Prior Art Relied Upon
`Petitioner relies upon the references listed below.
`(Ex. 1003)
`Menard
`US 2002/0183008 A1 Dec. 5, 2002
`(Ex. 1007)
`Lee
`
`US 5,475,377
`
`Dec. 12, 1995
`(Ex. 1010)
`Jacobs
`US 5,467,266
`
`Nov. 14, 1995
`HOMERF SPECIFICATION REVISION 2.0 (HomeRF Working Group,
`Inc.) (May 7, 2001) (Ex. 1012, “the HomeRF v2.0 Specification”).
`HOMERF SPECIFICATION REVISION 2.01 (HomeRF Working Group,
`Inc.) (July 1, 2002) (Ex. 1004, “the HomeRF v2.01 Specification”).1
`NETWORK DESIGN: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS, (Gilbert Held ed.
`2000 CRC Press, LLC) (Ex. 1005, “Held”).2
`
`
`
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`
`
`1 Petitioner refers to the two specifications together in its arguments. See
`Pet. 3, 71–74. We refer to the HomeRF v2.0 Specification and HomeRF
`v2.01 Specification collectively as “the HomeRF Specifications.”
`2 Citations to Held refer to the original page numbers, not the page numbers
`added by Petitioner.
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`E. The HomeRF Specifications and Held are Prior Art
`Printed Publication under § 102.
`Petitioner asserts that the HomeRF v2.01 Specification (Ex. 1004) is
`prior art under § 102(a) because it was published at least as early as on
`July 1, 2002. Pet. 3. Petitioner also avers that the HomeRF v2.0
`Specification (Ex. 1012) is prior art under § 102(b) because it were
`published at least as early as May 7, 2001. Pet. 3. Each reference includes a
`revision date on its first page. Ex. 1004, 1; Ex. 1012, 1. Moreover,
`Petitioner proffers the Declaration of Wayne Caswell, who confirms the
`publicly-available dates of these references. Ex. 1011 ¶ 6. In addition,
`Petitioner asserts that Held (Ex. 1005) is prior art under § 102(b) because it
`was published on May 31, 2000 by CRC Press LLC, and it was publicly
`available in Stanford University’s Engineering Library at least as early as
`October 26, 2000. Pet. 3. Petitioner proffers a copy of Held showing a date
`stamp of “OCT 26 2000” from Stanford University’s Engineering Library.
`Ex. 1006, 4.
`Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s assertions and supporting
`evidence regarding the publication dates of these references. See generally
`PO Resp. Based on the evidence before us, we find Petitioner has
`established that the HomeRF Specifications and Held are prior art printed
`publications under 35 U.S.C. § 102. See Pet. 3; Exs. 1006, 1011.
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`F. Grounds of Unpatentability
`In our Decision on Institution, we originally instituted this trial based
`on only the following grounds of unpatentability (Dec. 28−29):
`
`Claim(s)
`
`Basis
`
`Reference(s)
`
`1−4, 6−11, and
`22−25
`
`11 and 25
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`5
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`3
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`§§ 102(a), 102(e)(1)3 Menard
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`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`§ 103(a)
`
`Menard and Lee
`
`Menard and Held
`
`Menard and the HomeRF
`Specifications
`
`On April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a
`decision to institute under 35 U.S.C. § 314 may not institute on less than all
`claims challenged in the petition. SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S.Ct.
`1348, 1359–60 (2018). In light of the Guidance on the Impact of SAS on
`AIA Trial Proceedings4 posted on April 26, 2018, we modified our
`Institution Decision to institute on all of the grounds presented in the
`
`
`3 Because the claims at issue have a filing date prior to March 16, 2013, the
`effective date of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
`125 Stat. 284 (2011) (“AIA”), we apply the pre-AIA versions of 35 U.S.C.
`§§ 102 and 103 in this Decision.
`4 See https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-
`appeal-board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial.
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`Petition, namely adding one additional ground with respect to claim 3 based
`on Menard and Jacobs. Paper 17. Subsequently, the parties filed a Joint
`Motion to Limit the Petition to remove the additional ground from
`consideration, limiting the Petition to the aforementioned originally
`instituted grounds. Paper 22. Upon consideration, we granted the parties’
`Joint Motion. Paper 23.
`
`II. DISCUSSION
`
`A. Claim Construction
`In an inter partes review, claim terms in an unexpired patent are given
`their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the
`patent in which they appear. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). “Under a broadest
`reasonable interpretation, words of the claim must be given their plain
`meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with the specification and
`prosecution history.” Trivascular, Inc. v. Samuels, 812 F.3d 1056, 1062
`(Fed. Cir. 2016).
`The parties propose constructions for several claim terms. Pet. 7–21;
`Prelim. Resp. 2−6. Upon review of the parties’ contentions, we addressed
`three claim terms identified by the parties in our Institution Decision. Dec.
`6−10. After institution, neither party challenges any aspect of our claim
`constructions. Based on the entire record presented during trial, we discern
`no reason to modify our analysis or claim constructions of those claims in
`this Final Written Decision. Our claim construction analysis from the
`Institution Decision is reproduced in substance below in Sections II.A.1–3.
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`1. “controller for controlling movement of a movable barrier”
`Claim 1 recites “a controller for controlling movement of a movable
`
`barrier.” Ex. 1001, 5:6−7. Petitioner asserts that the term invokes § 112,
`¶ 6, because the term “controller” fails to disclose sufficient structure for
`performing the claimed function. Pet. 8. Petitioner also argues that the
`Specification fails to disclose the corresponding structure for the recited
`function. Id. 8−11.
`Patent Owner counters that the claim term does not use “means for”
`and, therefore, it is presumed not to invoke § 112, ¶ 6, and Petitioner fails to
`demonstrate that this presumption is overcome. Prelim. Resp. 4−5 (citing
`Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en
`banc)).
`We agree with Patent Owner. As stated by the United States Court of
`Appeals for the Federal Circuit, “[t]he standard is whether the words of the
`claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a
`sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Williamson, 792
`F.3d at 1349. Petitioner does not account sufficiently for how the term
`“controller” is used in the context of the ’977 patent and the relevant art.
`For example, as Patent Owner notes, the Specification of the ’977
`patent “describes ‘a moveable barrier operator’ that includes a ‘power drive
`unit 20’ having a ‘controller 300 . . . which controls the motor of power
`drive 20 to control the movement and/or position of the barrier.’” Prelim.
`Resp. 4 (citing Ex. 1001, 2:47−49). The Specification also indicates that
`such moveable barrier operators were known in the art. Id. 2:49−53
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`(explaining “[i]t should be well understood that . . . any properly equipped
`system for controlling a moveable barrier can make use of the status
`identifying apparatus disclosed herein.”). Therefore, controllers were known
`in the art as components of existing barrier movement operators. See also
`Pet. 10–11 (acknowledging that controllers for “controlling movement of a
`movable barrier” were “well-known in the prior art”). Moreover, Petitioner
`does not explain why a person ordinarily skilled in the field of controlling
`and monitoring power doors would not have appreciated a “controller” to
`have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure, in view of the
`prior art of record—for example, Menard discloses a system with a
`processor for controlling and managing a door opener remotely from a pager
`or a cellular telephone (Ex. 1003 ¶ 9, Fig. 2).
`In light of the foregoing, we decline to adopt Petitioner’s proposed
`claim construction that interprets “a controller for controlling movement of a
`movable barrier” as a means-plus-function claim element invoking § 112,
`¶ 6. Rather, we conclude that the term is not governed by § 112, ¶ 6, and
`that no further interpretation is necessary.
`
`2. “status of the movable barrier”
`Claim 1 recites “sending a status of the movable barrier over the
`network.” Ex. 1001, 5:11−12. Petitioner asserts that the term “status of the
`movable barrier” should be construed as the state of the moveable barrier
`(e.g., whether a door is open or closed). Pet. 11. Petitioner argues that the
`Specification supports this construction as it discloses that, “[i]n order to
`check the status of the movable barrier[,] the user would go look at the
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`movable barrier to see if it was open or closed.” Id. (citing Ex. 1001,
`1:26−28) (emphasis omitted). Petitioner further notes claims 15 and 16
`recite “wherein the status of the movable barrier is open,” and “wherein the
`status of the movable barrier is closed,” respectively. Id. at 11−12;
`Ex. 1001, 6:11−14.
`Patent Owner does not dispute Petitioner’s proposed claim
`construction as to this term. See generally PO Resp. In light of the
`Specification including the dependent claims, we agree with and adopt
`Petitioner’s claim construction, construing “status of the movable barrier” as
`“the state of the moveable barrier (e.g., whether a door is open or closed).”
`
`3. “serial interface between the push button control unit and
`the network interface”
`Petitioner argues that the claim term—“serial interface between the
`
`push button control unit and the network interface”—in claim 3 is indefinite
`because it lacks written description support. Pet. 17–21. Alternatively, and
`without any supporting argument, Petitioner urges us to construe it as
`“a communication link capable of communicating using a serial protocol.”
`Id. at 20−21. Patent Owner counters that the term has adequate written
`description support because claim 3, including this term, was present at the
`time of filing in the application that issued as the ’977 patent. Prelim. Resp.
`5−6. Figure 2 of the ’977 patent also shows push button control unit 32
`connected to drive unit 20, which is connected to network interface 36.
`We agree with Patent Owner. In light of the Specification, we
`construe the term “serial interface between the push button control unit and
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`the network interface” as “a communication link between the push button
`control unit and the network interface, using a serial protocol.”
`
`4. “network”
`Claim 1 recites “a network interface electronically connected to the
`controller for connecting the controller to a network,” “wherein the network
`interface responds to requests received on the network by sending a status of
`the movable barrier over the network.” Ex. 1001, 5:8−12 (emphases
`added). Claim 22 recites “a network interface electronically connecting the
`barrier status monitor to a network” and “sending a status of the movable
`barrier over the network in response to a request for the status of the
`movable barrier.” Id. at 6:33−37 (emphases added).
`Although Patent Owner, in its Response discussing the construction of
`the terms, “submits that no construction is necessary for any claim term, and
`asks that the plain language of the claims be given its broadest reasonable
`interpretation,” Patent Owner nevertheless argues, in its Response discussing
`the prior art, that claims 1 and 22 “require that a status request be received
`over a network, and the status be sent over the same network to the network
`client in response to the status request.” Compare PO Resp. 3, 5, with id. at
`14−16 (emphases in original).
`Petitioner counters that the claims do not require a single network, but
`rather permit multiple networks to be used. Reply 18−22. Petitioner also
`argues that, in any event, Menard discloses an example of a single network
`client on a single network requesting and receiving a garage door position
`status, and controlling the door. Id.
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`We agree with Petitioner that claims 1 and 22 do not require a single
`network. As the Federal Circuit has explained, “an indefinite article ‘a’ or
`‘an’ in patent parlance carries the meaning of ‘one or more’ in open-ended
`claims containing the transitional phrase ‘comprising.’” Baldwin Graphic
`Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, 512 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal
`quotation marks and citations omitted). “The subsequent use of definite
`articles ‘the’ or ‘said’ in a claim to refer back to the same claim term does
`not change the general plural rule, but simply reinvokes that non-singular
`meaning.” Id. An exception to this general rule “only arises where the
`language of the claims themselves, the specification, or the prosecution
`history necessitate[s] a departure from the rule.” Id. at 1342−43.
`Here, the Specification of the ’977 patent discloses that “[t]he network
`interface 36 is connected to a network 102, e.g., the internet, which allows
`an individual to connect to the network interface 36 over the network 102
`and receive the status of the garage door 12.” Ex. 1001, 3:26−30 (emphasis
`added). Petitioner notes that, as of the priority date of the ’977 patent, the
`term “Internet” encompassed a plurality of networks, citing to several
`dictionary definitions for support. Reply 20 n.12 (citing Ex. 1014 ¶¶ 50−51;
`Ex. 1021, 354; Ex. 1022, 579; Ex. 1026, 975). For example, The Internet
`Dictionary (1995) defines the “Internet” as “[a]n international network of
`well over ten thousand networks linked using the TCP/IP protocols (see
`
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`5 The citations are referring to the original page numbers, not the page
`numbers added by Petitioner.
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`illustration, next page).” Ex. 1026, 97. The Illustration is reproduced below
`(id. at 98).
`
`
`The Illustration shows that “[t]he Internet isn’t one specific network, but a
`formless mass of interconnected networks, all capable of passing
`information via Internet protocols.” Id. As another example, the Webster’s
`II New College Dictionary (1995) defines the “Internet” as “[a]n
`interconnected system of networks that connects computers around the
`world via the TCP/IP protocol.” Ex. 1022, 579.
`At the oral hearing, both parties agreed that the claimed “network”
`can comprise multiple networks because, as disclosed in the ’977 patent, at
`the time of the invention, the Internet included many networks connected
`together. Tr. 26:3−12 (Petitioner noted “the ’977 patent . . . shows that the
`network interface is connected to multiple networks, not to a single
`network,” and “that it’s connected to a cable or DSL line which then in turn
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`is connected to the internet”), 48:15−25 (Patent Owner explained “you could
`use multiple networks in a bridging context, so one network bridges to
`another network that bridges to another network . . . [and] they collectively
`act as a network”). Patent Owner further clarified that the claimed
`“network” can comprise multiple networks connected together acting
`collectively as a single network, such as a cellular phone network connected
`to the Internet to establish a communication channel between a cellular
`phone and the system for the garage door opener. Id. at 49:8−51:6.
`Upon consideration, in light of the Specification of the ’977 patent,
`we interpret a “network” as recited in claims 1 and 22 to mean “a single
`network or a plurality of networks connected together acting individually or
`collectively to allow communication between a communication device and a
`system.” We also agree with Patent Owner that the claim language in claims
`1 and 22 requires that a status request be received over a network and the
`status be sent over the same network in response to the status request
`because the subsequent usages of definite article “the” refer back to the same
`“network.” See PO Resp. 3, 5, 14–16. To illustrate, as just one example, if
`“a network” were the Internet, “the network” would also refer to the
`Internet.
`
`B. Principles of Law
`To establish anticipation, each and every element in a claim, arranged
`as recited in the claim, must be found in a single prior art reference. Net
`MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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`There is no requirement that the prior art must use the same words to
`describe a claim element in order to be deemed as teaching or disclosing that
`claim element. Identity of terminology is not required, for a claim element
`to be met directly by the prior art, without resort to obviousness. See In re
`Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831,
`832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Even in a non-obviousness setting, it is proper to take
`into account not only the literal and specific teachings of the reference, but
`also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be
`expected to draw therefrom. In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968).
`For anticipation, the dispositive question is whether one skilled in the art
`would reasonably understand or infer from a prior art reference that every
`claim element is disclosed in that reference. Eli Lilly v. Los Angeles
`Biomedical Res. Inst., 849 F.3d 1073, 1074–75 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
`A patent claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) if the
`differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that
`the subject matter, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time the
`invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
`subject matter pertains. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
`(2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying
`factual determinations including: (1) the scope and content of the prior art;
`(2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art;
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`(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) objective evidence of
`nonobviousness.6 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
`
`C. Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art
`In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, various factors
`may be considered, including the “type of problems encountered in the art;
`prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with which innovations are
`made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active
`workers in the field.” In re GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
`(citation omitted). Mr. Lipoff testifies that a person with ordinary skill in the
`art “would have had at least an undergraduate degree in electrical
`engineering, or equivalent education, and one to two years of work
`experience in the fields of: (i) network communication systems; (ii) systems
`for access control or automated door systems; or (iii) equivalent work
`experience or training.” Ex. 1008 ¶ 30. Patent Owner does not dispute Mr.
`Lipoff’s assessment regarding the level of ordinary skill in the art. See
`generally PO Resp. Based on the record before us, we agree with and apply
`Mr. Lipoff’s assessment regarding the general knowledge of a person with
`ordinary skill in the art. We further note that the prior art of record in the
`instant proceeding reflects the appropriate level of ordinary skill in the art.
`See Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the
`prior art itself reflects an appropriate level” of ordinary skill in the art).
`
`
`6 Neither party presents objective evidence of nonobviousness in this trial.
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`D. Anticipation by Menard
`Petitioner asserts that claims 1–4, 6−11, and 22−25 are unpatentable
`under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and (e) as anticipated by Menard. Pet. 2–3, 19–
`56. As support, Petitioner cites to Mr. Lipoff’s Declaration. Ex. 1008.
`Patent Owner counters that Menard does not describe certain claim
`limitations, citing Declaration of Dr. Davis for support. PO Resp. 3–26.
`For the reasons provided below, we determine that Petitioner has
`demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1–4, 6−11, and
`22−25 are anticipated by Menard. We begin our discussion with a brief
`summary of Menard, and then we address the relevant contentions advanced
`by the parties in turn.
`
`Menard
`Menard describes a wireless system for controlling and monitoring a
`power door. Ex. 1003 ¶ 1. Figure 1 of Menard illustrates a garage door
`opener, and is reproduced below.
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`Figure 1 of Menard shows garage door opener system 10 that includes
`power unit 15 that has an electric motor to open and close garage door 40.
`Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 4, 5. Power unit 15 can be operated by using switch 65 or
`remote control 85. Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
`Menard discloses a system and a method that allow remote control
`and management of a single door opener or multiple door openers using a
`wired or wireless communication device, including a cellular telephone, a
`pager, a personal digital assistant, a computer, or other device that
`communicates using a network. Id. ¶ 9. The door opener system includes a
`processor executing programming, a position sensor, and a wireless
`transceiver that communicates using both a long range communication
`protocol and a short range communication protocol, allowing a user to
`control and manage the door opener remotely. Id. ¶ 10. The door opener
`receives commands and transmits status information using either or both of
`the long range and short range protocols. Id. The communication link
`provides a channel for communicating information from the door opener to
`the device and for communicating instructions from the device to the door
`opener. Id. For example, the long distance network may include a two-way
`pager network, “enabling bidirectional communication” with a user
`controlled pager.” Id. ¶ 44.
`
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`IPR2017-01137
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`Figure 2 of Menard is reproduced below.
`
`
`Figure 2 of Menard “illustrates a block diagram of one embodiment of
`the present system.” Id. ¶ 13. As shown in Figure 2 of Menard, system 100
`is connected to garage door opener (“GDO”) 10. System 100 includes
`processor 120, programming 150, position sensor 155, and transceiver 130.
`Id. ¶¶ 21–26. Processor 120 may include a microprocessor and memory to
`perform the programmed functions and to retain settings and configuration
`information. Id. ¶ 23. Position sensor 155 is coupled to processor 120, and
`provides an electrical signal corresponding to the position of the door. Id.
`¶¶ 30, 69 (disclosing that “sensor 155 provides the position information to
`processor 120”).
`Transceiver 130 may be compatible with more than two
`communication protocols. Id. ¶ 47. For example, transceiver 130 may be
`compatible with three protocols, such as a cellular telephone communication
`protocol, a two-way pager communication protocol, and Bluetooth protocol.
`Id. In such a case, the garage door opener may be operable using a cellular
`telephone, a two-way pager, or a device compatible with Bluetooth. Id.
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`Figure 7 of Menard “illustrates one embodiment of programming in
`accordance with one embodiment of the present system” and is reproduced
`below. Id. ¶ 18.
`
`
`
`As shown in Figure 7 of Menard, programming 150 has various
`features: web server programming 240, auxiliary sensors programming 260,
`GDO programming 215, auxiliary actuator programming 285, and voice
`recognition programming 310. Id. ¶ 58. For example, web server
`programming 240 provides an interface to allow remote control of system
`100. Id. ¶ 59. The wireless application protocol (WAP) server of web
`server programming 240 is coupled to a communication network to allow a
`user to operate, program, and monitor system 100. Id. The WAP server
`generates data that can be accessed using an Internet browser. Id.
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`Auxiliary sensors programming 260 includes position sensor
`programming 265 that receives and interprets position information derived
`from door position sensor 165. Id. ¶ 60. GDO programming 215 includes
`position sensor programming 220 and actuator programming 225 that
`includes door open programming 230 and door close programming 235 for
`opening or closing garage door 40 in response to commands received by
`processor 120. Id. ¶ 61.
`
`Claims 1 and 22
`
`1. Network interface connecting a controller to a network and responding
`to a status request
`Claims 1 and 22 require a network interface connecting a controller to
`
`a network and responding to a status request. In particular, claim 1 recites
`an apparatus comprising “a movable barrier operator including a controller
`for controlling movement of a movable barrier,” and “a network interface
`electronically connected to the controller for connecting the controller to a
`network.” Ex. 1001, 5:5−9 (emphases added). Claim 22 recites an
`apparatus comprising (1) “a barrier status monitor coupled to a movable
`barrier,” (2) “a network interface electronically connecting the barrier status
`monitor to a network,” and (3) “a controller coupled to the network interface
`and the moveable barrier.” Id. at 6:27−32 (emphases added).
`Further, claim 1 recites “wherein the network interface responds to
`requests received on the network by sending a status of the movable barrier
`over the network.” Ex. 1001, 5:10−12 (emphases added). Claim 22 recites
`that “the network interface responds to network conveyed requests by
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`sending a status of the movable barrier over the network in response to a
`request for the status of the movable barrier.” Id. at 6:33−36 (emphases
`added).
`
`Petitioner’s contentions
`Petitioner explains in detail how Menard discloses each of these
`limitations, citing Mr. Lipoff’s Declaration for support. Pet. 22−28, 47−56.
`We are persuaded by Petitioner’s showing.
`In particular, to account for the claimed “moveable barrier operator”
`and “movable barrier” in claims 1 and 22, Petitioner first notes that Menard
`discloses a system “which allows remote control and management of single
`or multiple door openers using a wired or wireless communication device.”
`Id. at 22 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 9, Fig. 1). According to Menard, the
`communication “device may be a cellular telephone, a pager, a personal
`digital assistant, a computer or other device that communicates using a
`network.” Ex. 1003 ¶ 9. Figure 1 of Menard illustrates a garage door
`opener system 10 that includes power unit 15 for opening and closing the
`garage door. Id. ¶ 4. Having reviewed Petitioner’s explanation and
`supporting evidence, we find that Petitioner has established that Menard
`discloses a “movable barrier” (garage door) and “movable barrier operator,”
`as recited in claims 1 and 22.
`As to the claimed “barrier status monitor” in claim 22, Petitioner
`directs our attention to Figures 1 and 2 of Menard, which illustrate garage
`door 40 coupled to a networked garage door opening system that contains a
`position sensor (barrier status monitor). Pet. 48−50 (citing Ex. 1003, Figs.
`23
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`IPR2017-01137
`Patent 6,998,
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