throbber
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
`
`
`
`
`BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
`
`
`
`
`LG ELECTRONICS, INC., LG ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.,
`LG ELECTRONICS MOBILECOMM U.S.A., INC.,
`Petitioner
`
`v.
`
`WI-LAN INC., WI-LAN USA, INC., WI-LAN LABS, INC.,
`Patent Owner
`
`
`
`
`
`Case IPR2018-00710
`U.S. Patent 8,867,351
`
`
`
`
`
`PATENT OWNER PRELIMINARY RESPONSE
`
`
`
`Mail Stop “PATENT BOARD”
`Patent Trial and Appeal Board
`U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
`P.O. Box 1450
`Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I. 
`
`II. 
`
`Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 
`
`Overview of the ’351 Patent ............................................................................ 2 
`
`III.  Claim Construction .......................................................................................... 6 
`
`IV.  Discussion of Applicable Law ......................................................................... 7 
`
`V. 
`
`The Burden of Persuasion Is on Petitioner to Show the ’351 Claims Are
`Unsupported by the Priority Application ...................................................... 10 
`
`VI.  The ’351 Patent Is Entitled to Its Priority Date ............................................. 13 
`
`A. 
`
`B. 
`
`Petitioner Concedes that the Priority Application Discloses Use of
`Priority in Selecting Logical Channel Queues .................................... 14 
`
`The Priority Application Discloses Traffic Shaping Using an
`Associated Rate as a Limit on a Per Logical Channel Basis .............. 14 
`
`1.  The Specification Discloses the Claimed Use of Traffic Shaping
`and Priority in Selecting Logical Channels for Transmission ....... 16 
`
`2.  Petitioner Failed to Show a Reasonable Likelihood of Carrying Its
`Burden ............................................................................................ 26 
`
`VII.  Petitioner Cannot Show a Reasonable Likelihood of Prevailing on any
`Challenged Claim .......................................................................................... 30 
`
`VIII.  Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 31 
`
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`i
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`IPR2018-00710
`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
`
`Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.
`
`CASES 
`
` 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ...................................................................... 7, 28
`
`Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp.
`
` 913 F.2d 923 (Fed.Cir.1990) ................................................................................. 8
`
`Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc.
`
` 800 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ........................................................ 10, 11, 12, 13
`
`Freebit AS v. Bose Corp.,
`
`2017 WL 5202106 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 8, 2017) .................................... 10, 11, 12, 30
`
`In re Gosteli
`
` 872 F.2d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ............................................................................. 7
`
`In re Hayes Microprocessor Litigation
`
` 982 F.2d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ............................................................................. 8
`
`In re Skvorecz
`
` 580 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................ 8, 9, 27, 29
`
`LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc.
`
` 424 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................. 8
`
`Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc.
`
` 579 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ............................................................................. 8
`ii
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`
`
`Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc.
`
`
`
`
`IPR2018-00710
`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
`
` 696 F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2012) .................................................................... 10, 27
`
`S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp.
`
` 259 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ........................................................................... 28
`
`ScriptPro, LLC v. Innovation Assocs.
`
` 762 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................. 9
`
`Space Systems/Loral, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
`
` 405 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ............................................................................... 9
`
`STATUTES 
`
`35 U.S.C. § 112 ........................................................................................................ 12
`
`35 U.S.C. § 311 ........................................................................................................ 12
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314 .......................................................................................................... 1
`
`35 U.S.C. § 316(e) ................................................................................................... 11
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`
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`
`
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`
`iii
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`

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`IPR2018-00710
`
`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`PATENT OWNER’S LIST OF EXHIBITS
`
`Exhibit No.
`2001
`2002
`
`2003
`
`2004
`2005
`2006
`2007
`
`2008
`
`2009
`2010
`2011
`2012
`2013
`2014
`2015
`2016
`
`Description
`Declaration of Douglas Wilson
`Markup of the Canadian Patent Application No. CA2393373 to
`obtain U.S. Patent No. 8,867,351 Specification
`Canadian Patent Application No. CA2393373 (“Priority
`Application”)
`Lomp Declaration
`Excerpts of COMPUTER NETWORKS (4th ed. 2003)
`LG’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
`Wi-LAN’s Opposition to LG’s Motion for Partial Summary
`Judgment
`LG’s Reply in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
`Judgment
`U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 10/521,581
`U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 12/028,365
`U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 13/468,925
`U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 14/102,120
`Wi-LAN Opening Claim Construction Brief
`LG Opening Claim Construction Brief
`Wi-LAN Response Claim Construction Brief
`LG Response Claim Construction Brief
`
`
`
`iv
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`

`

`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Patent Owner Wi-LAN Inc., Wi-LAN USA, Inc. and Wi-LAN Labs, Inc.,
`
`respectfully submit this Preliminary Response to the Petition seeking inter partes
`
`review (“IPR”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,867,351 (“the ’351 Patent”) (LGE-1001).
`
`Under 35 U.S.C. § 314, Patent Owner requests that the Board refuse to
`
`institute IPR because Petitioner has not shown a reasonable likelihood of proving
`
`that any of claims 1, 3-7, and 9-12 of the ’351 Patent (“Challenged Claims”) would
`
`have been obvious in view of Petitioner’s five different combinations: (1) U.S.
`
`Patent Application Publication No. 2009/0168793 to Fox et al. (“Fox”) (claim 1);
`
`(2) Fox in view of U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2009/0046605 to Gao
`
`et al. (“Gao”) (claims 4, 6); (3) Fox in view of Gao and U.S. Patent No. 7,263,064
`
`to Yoshimura et al. (“Yoshimura”) (claims 7, 10, 12); (4) Fox in view of Gao,
`
`Yoshimura, and U.S. Patent No. 7,675,926 to Olsen et al. (“Olsen”) (claims 3, 9);
`
`and (5) Fox in view of Gao, Yoshimura, and U.S. Patent No. 6,804,251 to Limb et
`
`al. (“Limb”) (claims 5, 11).
`
`Petitioner acknowledges that “the instant IPR relies upon evidence and the
`
`contention that the ’351 Patent is not entitled to the earliest claimed priority date.”
`
`Petition at 13. The sole issue raised by Petitioner with respect to priority is whether
`
`Canadian Patent Application CA2393373, which has a priority date of July 15,
`
`2002 (“Priority Application”), supports the ’351 Patent’s claims. Petitioner
`
`
`
`1
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`

`

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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
`
`
`challenges written description support for just one specific concept from the ’351
`
`claims—the “traffic shaping rate.” Petitioner is wrong because the Priority
`
`Application (which is substantively identical to the ’351 Patent’s written
`
`description) supports the “traffic shaping rate” limitations.
`
`Each reference cited by Petitioner is dated after the ’351 Patent’s foreign
`
`priority date of July 15, 2002. Without depriving Patent Owner of its rightful
`
`priority date, Petitioner concedes that it cannot prevail in showing a reasonable
`
`likelihood of prevailing on its assertion of invalidity of any Challenged Claim.
`
`II. OVERVIEW OF THE ’351 PATENT
`
`The ’351 Patent “relates to an apparatus, system and method for transmitting
`
`data flows that have different quality of service (QoS) attributes over a network
`
`link.” ’351 Patent at 1:30-47. The ’351 Patent teaches “packet data networks” that
`
`simultaneously transfer diverse data, e.g., voice, video, and email data packets. Id.
`
`at 1:30-47. Because of this diversity, such networks can become overloaded with
`
`data packets at times but be relatively idle at other times. Id. at 1:49-64. To
`
`overcome these peaks and valleys in network traffic, “traffic shaping” filters the
`
`outgoing data packets to reduce burstiness and smooth out the traffic flow, while
`
`maintaining bandwidth requirements for the different data services.
`
`Claims 1 and 7 are independent, and claim 1 recites a method while claim 7
`
`recites a mobile device. Both claims 1 and 7 recite a similar process for handling
`
`
`
`2
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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`data flows as part of the method and mobile device, respectively. That process is
`
`described below in method terms for ease of discussing the limitations of the two
`
`claims together, but Patent Owner is not treating claim 7 as a method claim.
`
`The ’351 claims recite a mobile device with multiple “logical channel
`
`queues for transmitting data,” each of which may be “associated with a priority and
`
`a traffic shaping rate.” Id. at 13:55-58, 14:31-37. Thus, one “logical channel
`
`queue” may be for transmitting high priority voice data, while another “logical
`
`channel queue” may be for transmitting lower priority email data. Rather than
`
`transmitting the data in the logical channel queues haphazardly, the claims require
`
`the mobile device to first “select … a highest priority logical channel queue” (e.g.,
`
`the queue with voice data) and then “allocate a portion of the data transmission
`
`capacity to the selected logical channel queue.” ’351 Patent at 13:59-65, 14:38-43.
`
`The claims require limiting the allocated portion by three things: (1) “the traffic
`
`shaping rate associated with the selected logical channel queue,” (2) “the data
`
`available for transmission in the selected logical channel queue,” and (3) “the data
`
`transmission capacity.” Id. at 13:65-14:3, 14:43-47.
`
`Once a particular logical channel queue is permitted to use some portion of
`
`the data transmission capacity, the claims next recite repeatedly considering a next
`
`highest priority logical channel queue until “the data transmission capacity is
`
`exhausted” or “each of the logical channel queues is exhausted.” Id. at 14:4-9,
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`
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`3
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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`14:48-52. Thus, the ’351 claims envision using the data transmission capacity to
`
`send data from each of the logical channel queues unless the data transmission
`
`capacity is first exhausted. Finally, the claims recite allocating any remaining
`
`portion of the data transmission capacity to one or more of the logical channel
`
`queues having data for transmission, selected in priority order. Id. at 14:10-13,
`
`14:53-56.
`
`Exhibit 20021 is a copy of the ’351 Patent showing all substantive changes to
`
`the Priority Application to arrive at the ’351 written description (i.e., punctuation
`
`and formatting changes and non-substantive changes (e.g., “Figure” to “FIG.” and
`
`“LC1” to “LC.sub.1”) are omitted). Exhibit 2003 is a copy of the Priority
`
`Application itself. As Exhibit 2002 demonstrates, the ’351 specification and the
`
`Priority Application are substantively identical, except for the claims, which Patent
`
`Owner addresses infra. The figures of the Priority Application are identical to the
`
`’351 figures.
`
`Claim 1 of the ’351 Patent is reproduced below for ease of reference. The
`
`traffic shaping rate limitations challenged by Petitioner are included in bold:
`
`A method of operating a mobile device, comprising:
`
`
`
`
`1 All Exhibits referenced in this Patent Owner Preliminary Response are
`
`exhibits to the Declaration of Douglas Wilson (Ex. 2001) unless otherwise noted.
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`
`
`4
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`

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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`operating a plurality of logical channel queues, each of the logical
`channel queues associated with a priority and a traffic shaping
`rate;
`selecting, from the plurality of logical channel queues, a highest
`priority logical channel queue having data for transmission and
`whose traffic shaping rate is not reached;
`allocating a portion of a data transmission capacity available to the
`mobile device, to the selected logical channel queue, wherein the
`allocated portion is limited by:
`the traffic shaping rate associated with the selected logical
`channel queue,
`the data available for transmission in the selected logical channel
`queue, and
`the data transmission capacity;
`repeatedly considering a next highest priority logical channel queue
`for selecting and allocating, until at least one of:
`the data transmission capacity is exhausted, and
`each of the plurality of logical channel queues is considered for
`selecting; and thereafter
`allocating a remaining portion, if any, of the data transmission
`capacity to one or more of the logical channel queues having data
`for transmission, selected in priority order.
`
`’351 Patent at 13:55-14:14.
`
`
`
`5
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`

`

`
`
`
`III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
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`
`
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`IPR2018-00710
`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), and solely for the purposes of this
`
`review, Patent Owner believes that no term requires construction at this time. If
`
`trial is instituted, or if Petitioner later presents any new theories or interpretations
`
`of the references, Patent Owner expressly reserves the right to further argue
`
`specific claim constructions.
`
`For the sake of completeness, Patent Owner includes as exhibits the claim
`
`construction briefing in the pending litigation between Patent Owner and
`
`Petitioner. Ex. 2013 (Wi-LAN Op. Br.); Ex. 2014 (LG Op. Br.); Ex. 2015 (Wi-
`
`LAN Resp. Br.); Ex. 2016 (LG Resp. Br.). In that litigation, Petitioner requested
`
`constructions for these terms from the ’351 Patent:
`
`Claim Term
`“associated with a
`priority and a traffic
`shaping rate”
`[claims 1, 7]
`“priority”
`[claims 1, 7]
`
`“traffic shaping rate”
`[claims 1, 7]
`
`“whose traffic shaping
`rate is not reached”
`[claims 1, 7]
`
`
`
`LG’s Construction
`“having the [priority] and
`[traffic shaping rate] quality
`of service attributes of the
`held packets”
`“the priority of a packet
`placed into a logical channel
`queue compared to the
`priority of packets placed into
`other logical channel queues”
`Invalid under 35 U.S.C. §
`112, ¶¶ 1, 2, as indefinite,
`lacking written description
`support, and/or nonenabled.
`Invalid under 35 U.S.C. §
`112, ¶¶ 1, 2, as indefinite,
`lacking written description
`support, and/or nonenabled.
`6
`
`Wi-LAN’s Construction
`No construction
`necessary; plain &
`ordinary meaning applies.
`
`No construction
`necessary; plain &
`ordinary meaning applies.
`
`Not invalid.
`
`Not invalid.
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`

`

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`IPR2018-00710
`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`Ex. 2014 (LG Op. Br.) at 17-20. But in this IPR, Petitioner alleges that “no claim
`
`term requires express construction.” Petition at 11.
`
`Petitioner also filed a motion for summary
`
`judgment for alleged
`
`indefiniteness of the ’351 claims, which may also be relevant. Ex. 2006 (LG
`
`MSJ); Ex. 2007 (Wi-LAN Response to MSJ); Ex. 2008 (LG Reply to MSJ).
`
`IV. DISCUSSION OF APPLICABLE LAW
`
`“Under section 119, the claims set forth in a United States application are
`
`entitled to the benefit of a foreign priority date if the corresponding foreign
`
`application supports the claims in the manner required by section 112, ¶ 1.” In re
`
`Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The test for adequacy of written
`
`description is whether a patent’s disclosure reasonably conveys to a person of
`
`ordinary skill “that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of
`
`the filing date.” Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed.
`
`Cir. 2010) (en banc). Compliance with the written description requirement is a
`
`question of fact. Id. Because Petitioner has not asserted that the ’351 Patent itself
`
`or the Priority Application lacks enablement with respect to the Challenged Claims
`
`or presented any evidence to that effect, Patent Owner will not address enablement
`
`at this time.
`
`There are no specific disclosure requirements to satisfy the written
`
`description requirement. Id. at 1352. In fact, the level of detail required in a
`7
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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`disclosure “varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on the
`
`complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Id. at 1351. In a
`
`predictable field, less disclosure may be necessary to satisfy the written description
`
`requirement. See In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also
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`Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 926 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“Of
`
`necessity, the disclosure required by section 112 is directed to those skilled in the
`
`art.”).
`
`There is “certainly no length requirement” for a disclosure because “an
`
`inventor is not required to describe every detail of his invention.” In re Hayes
`
`Microprocessor Litigation, 982 F.2d 1527, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1992). There is also no
`
`requirement that a specification disclose every embodiment covered by the claims.
`
`See LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
`
`2005) (“A claim will not be invalidated on section 112 grounds simply because the
`
`embodiments of the specification do not contain examples explicitly covering the
`
`full scope of the claim language.”). A patent can satisfy the written description
`
`requirement even if the claims are “broader than the specific examples disclosed.”
`
`Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
`
`(reversing JMOL of lack of written description even though the specification did
`
`not contain “working examples” of the claimed features). Nor does a specification
`
`have to include “information that is already known and available to the
`
`
`
`8
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`

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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`experienced public.” Space Systems/Loral, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 405
`
`F.3d 985, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
`
`All that is required is for the patent to convey to a person of ordinary skill in
`
`the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter. See
`
`ScriptPro, LLC v. Innovation Assocs., 762 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
`
`(reversing summary judgment of invalidity for lack of written description and
`
`noting that “the specification’s description of embodiments having [a certain
`
`feature] does not necessarily mean that the only described invention [has that
`
`feature]”). In Skvorecz, the Federal Circuit reversed a PTO rejection for lack of
`
`written description because “a person skilled in the mechanical arts would
`
`understand the specification” included support for a claim limitation the PTO
`
`argued was not explicitly disclosed. 580 F.3d at 1270; see also Space
`
`Systems/Loral, 405 F.3d at 987 (reversing judgment of invalidity for lack of
`
`written description based on testimony from the patentee’s expert). Written
`
`description demands no particular form of disclosure. In TurboCare v. General
`
`Electric Co., the Federal Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment on
`
`invalidity for lack of written description even though the disclosure was “not a
`
`model of clarity.” TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v.
`
`Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
`
`
`
`9
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`

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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`Even in the limited circumstances where the sufficiency of written
`
`description is properly raised in an IPR proceeding, it remains axiomatic that a
`
`disclosure “does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed” term.
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`Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 696 F.3d 1151, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
`
`V. THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION IS ON PETITIONER TO SHOW THE ’351
`CLAIMS ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE PRIORITY APPLICATION
`
`In an inter partes review proceeding, the burden of persuasion is (and
`
`remains) on the Petitioner to prove unpatentability. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). Dynamic
`
`Drinkware, LLC v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“In
`
`this case, Dynamic, as the petitioner, had the burden of persuasion to prove
`
`unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence, and this burden never
`
`shifted.”); see also Freebit AS v. Bose Corp., IPR2017-01308, 2017 WL 5202106,
`
`at *5 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 8, 2017) (“On the issue of entitlement of a patent claim to an
`
`earlier effective filing date, the recent decision in Dynamic Drinkware LLC v.
`
`National Graphics, Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2015), is instructive
`
`regarding the parties’ respective burdens of persuasion and production.”).
`
`Challenges made under 35 U.S.C. § 112, like written description, are not
`
`permitted in inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (limiting challenges in inter
`
`partes review to “a ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only
`
`on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed publications”). Even so,
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`10
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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`petitioners sometimes try to circumvent this rule by raising the written description
`
`issue in the context of an invalidity challenge based on an intervening reference.
`
`Petitioner argues that a patent is not presumed to be entitled to the filing date
`
`of its priority application, citing Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics,
`
`Inc., 800 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Petition at 5. But Dynamic Drinkware
`
`held that a petitioner in inter partes review bears the burden of persuasion to prove
`
`unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence, and that burden never shifts.
`
`800 F.3d at 1379; Freebit AS, 2017 WL 5202106, at *6 (holding that “the burden
`
`of persuasion to prove unpatentability always rests with the petitioner”). In fact,
`
`Dynamic Drinkware held that the burden of persuasion on the petitioner extends
`
`even to showing an asserted prior art patent is entitled to the filing date of a
`
`provisional when that provisional date was needed for the asserted prior art patent
`
`to be prior art. 800 F.3d at 1380 (“As the Board found, however, Dynamic [the
`
`petitioner] failed to carry its burden of proving that Raymond’s [the asserted prior
`
`art patent] effective date was earlier than the date that the invention claimed in the
`
`’196 patent was reduced to practice.”).
`
`Dynamic Drinkware also explained the burdens of production in inter partes
`
`review:
`
`In this case, Dynamic, as the petitioner, had the burden of
`persuasion to prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the
`evidence, and this burden never shifted. Dynamic also had the initial
`11
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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`burden of production, and it satisfied that burden by arguing that
`Raymond anticipated the asserted claims of the ’196 patent under
`§ 102(e)(2).
`
`The burden of production then shifted to National Graphics
`[patent owner] to argue or produce evidence that either Raymond does
`not actually anticipate, or, as was argued in this case, that Raymond is
`not prior art because the asserted claims in the ’196 patent are entitled
`to the benefit of a filing date (constructive or otherwise) prior to the
`filing date of Raymond. National Graphics produced evidence that the
`invention claimed in the ’196 patent was reduced to practice prior to
`the filing date of Raymond, and thus contended that the asserted
`claims were entitled to a date of invention prior to that of the
`Raymond patent.
`
`As a result, the burden of production returned to Dynamic to
`prove that either the invention was not actually reduced to practice as
`argued, or that the Raymond prior art was entitled to the benefit of a
`filing date prior to the date of National Graphics’ reduction to
`practice. As the Board found, however, Dynamic failed to carry its
`burden of proving that Raymond’s effective date was earlier than the
`date that the invention claimed in the ’196 patent was reduced to
`practice. The burden of production was on Dynamic to prove that,
`under § 119(e)(1), Raymond was entitled to the benefit of the filing
`date of its provisional application, and it failed to do that.
`
`800 F.3d at 1379-80; see also Freebit AS, 2017 WL 5202106, at *5-*6 (reciting the
`
`shifting burden of production). Dynamic Drinkware did not hold, as Petitioner
`
`
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`12
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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`suggests, that a patent with a written description that is substantively identical to its
`
`parent is not presumptively entitled to the filing date of that parent. Regardless, as
`
`the Federal Circuit noted, the petitioner bore the burden of persuasion even for the
`
`patentee’s earlier reduction to practice. The patent owner bore only a burden of
`
`production on this issue, which it satisfied by producing evidence of an earlier
`
`reduction to practice. The burden of persuasion always remained on the petitioner
`
`even for the challenged claims’ entitlement to an earlier priority date. Thus,
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`Dynamic Drinkware holds that Petitioner bears the burden of persuasion as to
`
`whether the ’351 claims are entitled to the filing date of the Priority Application
`
`once Patent Owner comes forward with evidence to show they are so entitled,
`
`which it does infra.
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`VI. THE ’351 PATENT IS ENTITLED TO ITS PRIORITY DATE
`
`The ’351 specification, just like the Priority Application, discloses both the
`
`use of priority in selecting logical channel queues for use of available data
`
`transmission capacity, and the optional addition of traffic shaping to that selection
`
`process. That is precisely what the ’351 claims recite. Persons of ordinary skill in
`
`the art in 2002 understood these concepts, and detailed descriptions of
`
`implementation details in the Priority Application were unnecessary. Petitioner is
`
`unlikely to prevail in showing that the Priority Application did not disclose the use
`
`of these concepts to effectuate the selection of logical channel queues for use of
`
`
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`13
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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`available data transmission capacity. And Petitioner is even more unlikely to
`
`prevail in showing that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have
`
`understood that the Priority Application shows that the inventors had possession of
`
`the subject matter recited in the ’351 claims as of July 15, 2002.
`
`A.
`
`Petitioner Concedes that the Priority Application Discloses
`Use of Priority in Selecting Logical Channel Queues
`
`Petitioner concedes that the ’351 Patent (and thus the Priority Application)
`
`discloses the use of priority in selecting logical channel queues for data
`
`transmission. Petitioner asserts that “the ’351 Patent at Fig. 5 discloses a priority-
`
`based algorithm [for] selecting a logical channel queue in order of priority for
`
`transmitting queued data on an output link. LGE-1001, Fig. 5, 7:16-37, 10:20-48;
`
`LGE-1003, ¶31.” Petition at 4. Thus, there is no dispute that the ’351 Patent, and
`
`its Priority Application, disclose this subject matter.
`
`B.
`
`The Priority Application Discloses Traffic Shaping Using an
`Associated Rate as a Limit on a Per Logical Channel Basis
`
`Petitioner goes even further and contends that the ’351 Patent discloses only
`
`priority-based allocation. Petition at 4, 8. Petitioner focuses its argument on the
`
`alleged lack of discussion about “traffic shaping” in the specification and
`
`specifically in the process recited in the claims. Id. at 7-8. Petitioner’s arguments
`
`contradict the disclosures of the ’351 specification and Priority Application. The
`
`’351 specification and the Priority Application disclose the use of traffic shaping in
`
`
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`14
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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`applying a data rate limit on the particular logical channel queue selected for
`
`transmission—precisely what is claimed. A person of ordinary skill in the art
`
`would recognize that the inventors of the ’351 Patent possessed the subject matter
`
`recited in the Challenged Claims as of July 15, 2002 as shown by the Priority
`
`Application.
`
`Petitioner has not challenged the continuity of disclosure from the Priority
`
`Application to the ’351 Patent. Nevertheless, Patent Owner demonstrates that
`
`continuity here to avoid any question. The ’351 Patent claims priority to the
`
`Priority Application through a series of intervening applications: U.S. Patent
`
`Application Serial Nos. 10/521,581 (Ex. 2009), 12/028,365 (Ex. 2010), 13/468,925
`
`(Ex. 2011), and 14/102,120 (Ex. 2012). As shown in those exhibits, each of the
`
`applications after 10/521,581 incorporates all of the previous applications in the
`
`chain by reference in their entireties. Ex. 2010 at 1; Ex. 2011 at 1; Ex. 2012 at 1.
`
`Moreover, the ’351 Patent written description (excluding title, abstract, and claims)
`
`is identical to the written description portion of U.S. Patent Application Serial No.
`
`10/521,581. Compare ’351 Patent (LGE-1001) to Ex. 2009. Patent Owner has
`
`compared the electronic versions of these written descriptions from the U.S. Patent
`
`and Trademark Office and found them identical. Thus, continuity of disclosure is
`
`demonstrated from the Priority Application to the ’351 Patent for all common
`
`subject matter as reflected in Exhibit 2002.
`
`
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`15
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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`1. The Specification Discloses the Claimed Use of Traffic
`Shaping and Priority in Selecting Logical Channels for
`Transmission
`
`Contrary to Petitioner’s assertion, the ’351 specification does not restrict the
`
`QoS mechanism to only using a “priority.”2 The ’351 Patent discloses a “QoS
`
`processor” containing a “radio link controller” (“RLC”) that performs the
`
`“prioritization, segmentation and, if desired, traffic shaping of data packets for
`
`transmission over the available radio resources.” ’351 Patent at 9:11-13.
`
`To enable the “prioritization, segmentation and, if desired, traffic shaping of
`
`data packets,” the ’351 specification explains that “[l]ogical channel queues
`
`LC.sub.i make their enqueued data available to a Radio Link Controller (RLC)
`
`140.” ’351 Patent at 8:12-13; Ex. 2003 (Priority Application) at 10:5-6. The ’351
`
`Patent references Figure 3 as part of this description, reproduced below:
`
`
`2 Because the ’351 Patent specification and the Priority Application are
`
`substantively identical, reference throughout this section to the ’351 Patent is,
`
`unless otherwise noted, intended to refer to the Priority Application as well. Still,
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`Patent Owner provides citations for both.
`
`
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`16
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`IPR2018-00710
`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`The ‘351 specification continues, noting “RLC 140 includes a segmentation
`
`cache 160 for each logical channel queue LC.sub.i in each PQE 108.sub.x.” ’351
`
`Patent at 9:13-15; Ex. 2003 (Priority Application) at 11:18-19. The ’351
`
`specification also states, “Pools 144 and 152 report the available capacity of each
`
`of their respective channels assigned to a PQE 108.sub.x to RLC 140 which will
`
`
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`17
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`IPR2018-00710
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`U.S. Pat. 8,867,351
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`then select the contents of a segmentation cache 160.sub.x,1 for the next
`
`transmission on a channel (DDCH or BDCH) assigned to that PQE 108.sub.x
`
`channel.” ’351 Patent at 9:30-35; Ex. 2003 (Priority Application) at 11:28-31. The
`
`’351 disclosure thus describes a Radio Link Controller (RLC) that obtains
`
`information regarding the available data transmission capacity of radio links. Ex.
`
`2004 (Lomp Dec.) at ¶ 38.
`
`The RLC then performs the prioritization, segmentation, and optional traffic
`
`shaping of the data taken from the segmentation caches associated with the logical
`
`queues to fill that available data transmission capacity. Ex. 2004 (Lomp Dec.) at
`
`¶ 38. In fact, the ’351 specification provides examples of this scenario at column
`
`9, line 37 through column 10, line 3. ’351 Patent at 9:37-10:3; Ex. 2003 (Priority
`
`Application) at 11:32-12:20.
`
`In expounding on traffic shaping specifically, the ’351 Patent further
`
`describes the use of traffic shaping in the context of the ’351 algorithm:
`
`Further, traffic shapers can be implemented and configured on a per
`logical channel basis. This allows, for example, voice tele

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