throbber
Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 1 of 62
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
`
`
`
`FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION et al.,
`Plaintiffs,
`
`
` CIVIL ACTION
` NO. 20-01113
`
`v.
`
`THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY et
`al.,
`
`
`
`Defendants.
`
`
`PAPPERT, J.
`
`
`MEMORANDUM
`
`December 8, 2020
`
`
`
`The Federal Trade Commission and Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General,
`
`collectively the Government, seek to preliminarily enjoin a proposed merger between
`
`Thomas Jefferson University and the Albert Einstein Healthcare Network pending an
`
`administrative determination of whether the combination violates Section 7 of the
`
`Clayton Act.
`
`
`
`The parties conducted extensive discovery and the Court held six days of
`
`evidentiary hearings which included the testimony of twenty witnesses and the
`
`presentation of voluminous documentary evidence. The Court also received from the
`
`parties and reviewed additional documents, declarations, deposition transcripts and
`
`other materials. Following the hearings, the parties submitted proposed findings of
`
`fact and conclusions of law and the Court allowed the parties several hours of oral
`
`argument.
`
`
`
`To obtain the relief it seeks, the Government must define a relevant geographic
`
`market—that area where potential buyers look for the goods or services they want—
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 2 of 62
`
`within which the likely competitive effects of the merger can be evaluated. That
`
`market’s definition is dependent on the special characteristics of the industry involved
`
`and the Court is required to take a pragmatic and factual approach in determining
`
`whether the Government has done it correctly. Of greatest importance to this case, the
`
`market’s geographic scope must “correspond to the commercial realities of the industry
`
`at issue.” The healthcare industry’s market is represented by a “two-stage model of
`
`competition.” In the first stage, hospitals compete to be included in an insurer’s
`
`hospital network. In the second, hospitals compete to attract individual members of the
`
`insurers’ plans.
`
`
`
`This means that insurers, not patients seeking and receiving medical care, are
`
`the payors—those who will most directly feel the impact of the increased price of care.
`
`This is what the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has called the “commercial reality” of
`
`the uniquely structured healthcare industry. Patients are not irrelevant to a hospital
`
`system merger analysis; their choices and behavior can affect the bargaining leverage
`
`that hospitals and insurers possess when they negotiate hospitals’ inclusion in insurers’
`
`networks and the reimbursement rates insurers agree to pay hospitals. But as the
`
`entities bearing the immediate impact of the cost of medical care, the insurers’
`
`perspective is extremely important in deciding whether a merger will substantially
`
`lessen the competition for healthcare in a proposed geographic market.
`
`
`
`The propriety of a relevant geographic market in this industry must therefore be
`
`assessed “through the lens of the insurers.” To establish its prima facie case, the
`
`Government must put forth enough evidence to prove that the insurers would not avoid
`
`a price increase in any one of the Government’s proposed markets by looking to
`
`
`
`2
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 3 of 62
`
`hospitals outside those markets.
`
`
`
`The Government has not met this burden. It contends that a combination of its
`
`expert’s econometric algorithm and testimony primarily from two (of the region’s four)
`
`major commercial insurers shows that its geographic markets correspond to the
`
`commercial realities of southeastern Pennsylvania’s competitive healthcare industry.
`
`But the expert’s calculations alone do not do so, and the insurers’ testimony is neither
`
`unanimous, unequivocal nor supported by the record as a whole. Their conclusory
`
`assertions that they would have to succumb to a price increase for services in the
`
`Government’s proposed markets instead of looking to healthcare providers outside
`
`those markets are not credible.
`
`
`
`
`
`The Court denies the Government’s request for a preliminary injunction.
`
`I
`
`A
`
`On September 14, 2018, Jefferson and Einstein signed a System Integration
`
`Agreement, (JX0078), pursuant to which Jefferson will become Einstein’s sole member
`
`and ultimate parent. (Pls.’ Proposed Findings of Fact (“FF”) ¶ 3); (Defs.’ FF ¶ 5.) On
`
`February 27, 2020, the FTC initiated an administrative proceeding seeking to
`
`permanently enjoin the proposed merger. A merits trial in that action is presently
`
`scheduled to begin on March 8, 2021. See Order Granting Continuance, In re Thomas
`
`Jefferson University et al., File No. 181 0128, Dkt. No. 9392 (FTC Nov. 6, 2020).
`
`Seeking to pause the merger and preserve the status quo pending the administrative
`
`proceeding’s outcome, the Government filed this lawsuit requesting a preliminary
`
`injunction under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), and Section 16 of the
`
`
`
`3
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 4 of 62
`
`Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. (Compl. at 1–2, ECF No. 7.) The System Integration
`
`Agreement expires on the later of December 31, 2021 or, in the event of an appeal from
`
`this decision, sixty days after a final decision by the Court of Appeals. (Pls.’ FF ¶ 3);
`
`(JX0078-045.)
`
`B
`
`
`
`Jefferson and Einstein operate in a densely populated, major metropolitan
`
`region. There are abundant healthcare options in southeastern Pennsylvania,
`
`including fifty-one hospitals dedicated to general acute care (“GAC”), children’s
`
`specialty care, orthopedics and cancer care. (Capps Rpt. App’x G.1 ¶ 544.)
`
`Philadelphia’s healthcare market is less consolidated than others around the country.
`
`See (Sept. 14, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (Markowitz (Reg’l Director Operations and Mktg., Cigna))
`
`65:7–24, ECF. No. 250). In 2018, Jefferson and Einstein were just two of thirteen
`
`health systems providing inpatient GAC services in the region.1 (Capps Rpt. App’x G
`
`Fig. 41.)
`
`i
`
`
`
`Jefferson includes a nonprofit health system operating fourteen hospitals with
`
`2,885 licensed beds in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. (Capps Rpt. ¶ 105.) Jefferson
`
`hospitals providing inpatient GAC services include its flagship, Thomas Jefferson
`
`University Hospital (“TJUH”) in Philadelphia and Abington Hospital and Abington-
`
`Lansdale Hospital in Montgomery County.2 (Defs.’ FF ¶ 1.) Jefferson provides
`
`
`In 2019, American Academic Health System stopped operating after closing Hahnemann
`1
`University Hospital and selling St. Christopher’s Hospital for Children to Drexel University and
`Tower Health. (Capps Rpt. App’x G Fig. 41.)
`
`Jefferson’s system also includes Bucks Hospital, Cherry Hill Hospital (NJ), Frankford
`
`Hospital, Jefferson Hospital for Neuroscience, Methodist Hospital, Stratford Hospital (NJ),
`
` 2
`
`
`
`4
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 5 of 62
`
`inpatient rehabilitation services in a twenty-three-bed unit at Abington Hospital and at
`
`the ninety-six-bed freestanding inpatient rehabilitation facility (“IRF”) Magee
`
`Rehabilitation Hospital, which is in Philadelphia. See (Pls.’ FF ¶ 1); (Defs.’ FF ¶ 1);
`
`(Ramanarayanan Rpt. ¶ 64, Ex. 3). Jefferson also operates urgent care centers,
`
`outpatient centers, testing and imaging centers and a cancer center.3 (Capps Rpt.
`
`¶ 105.)
`
`ii
`
`
`
`Einstein is a non-profit health system which includes three GAC hospitals: its
`
`548-bed Einstein Medical Center Philadelphia (“EMCP”) in North Philadelphia, the
`
`sixty-seven-bed Einstein Medical Center Elkins Park (“EMCEP”) in southeastern
`
`Montgomery County and its 191-bed Einstein Medical Center Montgomery (“EMCM”)
`
`in East Norriton, Montgomery County. See (Capps Rpt. ¶¶ 114–128); (Pls.’ FF ¶ 2);
`
`(Defs.’ Answer to Compl. ¶ 35, ECF No. 51).
`
`
`
`EMCP accounts for seventy percent of Einstein’s revenues. See (Sept. 16, 2020
`
`Hr’g Tr. (Freedman (CEO, Einstein)) 106:21–23, ECF No. 252). However, Einstein’s
`
`
`Torresdale Hospital and Washington Township Hospital (NJ). See Jefferson Health, We Are
`Jefferson, at 3 (Jan. 2020), https://hospitals.jefferson.edu/content/dam/health/PDFs/general/aboutus/
`We-Are-Jefferson-1-08-20.pdf. (last visited Dec. 7, 2020).
`
`Outpatient services are used by health systems to “feed inpatient services in the total
`
`continuum of care.” (JX0034, Buongiorno (EVP and CFO, Main Line Health) Dep. Tr. 159:11–12);
`see also (Sept. 29, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (Meyer (President Jefferson Health, Senior EVP Thomas Jefferson
`University (“TJU”)) 69:5–13 (explaining hospitals attract inpatients at outpatient locations “through
`the affiliation purchase or recruitment and employment of primary care doc[tor]s that they place into
`specific communities”)); (Capps Rpt. ¶ 63 (“[H]ospitals located outside of, but not overly far from, a
`given geography can attract patients from that area [through] local affiliated or owned medical
`groups . . . within the geography. These medical groups can act as ‘front doors’ that steer patients to
`the associated system’s hospital . . .”)); (Sep. 29, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (Klasko) 55:24–25 (“[M]ore, and more,
`and more, and more things are going to be moving to [an] outpatient environment.”)); (Id. at 22:15–
`25 (“[T]he whole definition of what a hospital is . . . is changing rapidly.”)).
`
`
` 3
`
`
`
`5
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 6 of 62
`
`commercially insured population is declining and many of EMCP’s commercially
`
`insured patients arrive through the hospital’s Emergency Department. (Defs.’ FF ¶ 30.)
`
`EMCP is viewed as a “safety net hospital” because it has one of the highest percentages
`
`of government-insured inpatients—eighty seven percent or more—among large
`
`hospitals in the United States. (Defs.’ FF ¶ 30.) Among the more than 800 large GAC
`
`hospitals in the United States, only sixteen recently had a comparable percentage of
`
`government-insured patients and six of those were government-operated. (Capps Rpt.
`
`¶ 87.) Medicare and medical assistance coverage “do not cover the cost” of patient care
`
`because government reimbursement rates do not keep up with Einstein’s inflationary
`
`costs. (Sept. 16, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (Freedman) 185:6–11.) Einstein concluded that it should
`
`seek a strategic partner in order to create scale to allow for savings that could improve
`
`its financial situation driven by its payor mix. See (id. at 115:17–116:6).
`
`
`
`Einstein also provides inpatient rehabilitation services through MossRehab at
`
`its EMCP and EMCEP locations. (Pls.’ FF ¶ 2); (Defs.’ FF ¶ 2.) MossRehab at Elkins
`
`Park is a 130-bed freestanding IRF. See (Smith Rpt. ¶ 69); (Ramanarayanan Rpt. ¶ 64,
`
`Ex. 3.) MossRehab also has inpatient beds at Jefferson’s Frankford and Bucks
`
`Hospitals and at Doylestown Hospital. (Pls.’ FF ¶ 2); (Smith Rpt. ¶ 69);
`
`(Ramanarayanan Rpt. ¶ 64, Ex. 3.)
`
`iii
`
`
`
`Other area health systems include the University of Pennsylvania Health
`
`System–also known as Penn Medicine. In southeastern Pennsylvania, Penn Medicine
`
`includes six acute care hospitals and hundreds of outpatient facilities. (Capps Rpt.
`
`¶ 130.) It also operates facilities in Lancaster County and New Jersey. (Id.) The 821-
`
`
`
`6
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 7 of 62
`
`bed Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (“HUP”) in Philadelphia’s University
`
`City is Penn Medicine’s largest hospital offering GAC services. (Id. at ¶ 131.) Penn
`
`Presbyterian Medical Center, with 331 staffed beds, also in University City, provides
`
`GAC services as well. (Id. at ¶ 133.) Pennsylvania Hospital, with 567 beds located in
`
`Center City, is Penn Medicine’s second-largest Philadelphia hospital providing GAC
`
`services. (Id. at ¶ 134.)
`
`
`
`Penn Medicine is in the process of opening “The Pavilion,” an additional facility
`
`with more GAC beds, across the street from HUP. (Id. at ¶ 132.) The new facility is
`
`expected to give Penn Medicine a 250-bed net inpatient gain. (Id.) The health system
`
`also provides GAC services at Chester County Hospital, a 275-bed suburban community
`
`hospital, and recently replaced an existing outpatient location in Delaware County at
`
`Penn Medicine Radnor with a new facility from which outpatients requiring inpatient
`
`care are anticipated to turn to Penn Medicine’s Philadelphia hospitals. (Id. at ¶¶ 136–
`
`37); (JX0065, Gustave (SVP Bus. Dev., Penn Medicine) Dep. Tr. 73:18–74:5.) In
`
`addition, Good Shepherd Penn Partners manages a fifty-eight-bed inpatient
`
`rehabilitation unit, the Penn Institute for Rehabilitation Medicine, which is licensed
`
`through HUP in Philadelphia. (Ramanarayanan Rpt. ¶ 64, Ex. 3.)
`
`
`
`Main Line Health is a nonprofit health system with four hospitals offering GAC
`
`services: 370-bed Lankenau Medical Center in Wynnewood, Montgomery County, its
`
`largest; 287-bed Bryn Mawr Hospital, also in Montgomery County; 231-bed Paoli
`
`Hospital, in eastern Chester County; and 204-bed Riddle Hospital, to Philadelphia’s
`
`southwest in Delaware County. (Capps Rpt. ¶¶ 138–142); (Smith Rpt. ¶ 60.) Main
`
`Line Health also operates a 148-bed freestanding IRF at Bryn Mawr Rehabilitation
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 8 of 62
`
`Hospital (“Bryn Mawr Rehab”) in Chester County. See (Ramanarayanan Rpt. ¶ 64, Ex.
`
`3).
`
`
`
`Tower Health operates six GAC hospitals in southeastern Pennsylvania: 148-bed
`
`Chestnut Hill Hospital in Philadelphia County; 232-bed Pottstown Hospital in western
`
`Montgomery County; 139-bed Phoenixville Hospital in northern Chester County, just
`
`across the Montgomery County border; 714-bed Reading Hospital in Berks County; and
`
`171-bed Brandywine Hospital and sixty-three-bed Jennersville Hospital in western
`
`Chester County. (Capps Rpt. ¶¶ 145–151); (Smith Rpt. ¶ 60.) Phoenixville Hospital
`
`also has fourteen inpatient rehabilitation beds. See (Ramanarayanan Rpt. ¶ 64, Ex. 3).
`
`Tower also operates twenty-two urgent care locations, including two in Montgomery
`
`County in Plymouth Meeting and Conshohocken. (JX0027, Ahern (EVP Business
`
`Development & Strategy, Tower Health) Dep. Tr. 16:4–5, 140:4–7.) Tower owns St.
`
`Christopher’s Hospital for Children, a 188-bed hospital in North Philadelphia that
`
`provides GAC services to children. (Smith Rpt. ¶ 60.)
`
`
`
`Temple Health, a subsidiary of Temple University, is a nonprofit health system.
`
`(Capps Rpt. ¶ 165.) Its hospitals include Temple University Hospital, Temple
`
`University Hospital – Jeanes Campus (“Jeanes”), Fox Chase Cancer Center, Temple
`
`University Hospital – Episcopal Campus and Temple University Hospital –
`
`Northeastern Campus. (Id.) Temple University Hospital, the system’s largest with 732
`
`beds, is in North Philadelphia. (Id. at ¶ 166); (Smith Rpt. ¶ 60.) Jeanes is a 146-bed
`
`hospital in northeast Philadelphia. (Capps Rpt. ¶ 167); (Smith Rpt. ¶ 60.) The
`
`Episcopal Campus, in Philadelphia’s Kensington neighborhood, is largely a behavioral
`
`health facility, but has an emergency room and offers other medical services. (Id. at
`
`
`
`8
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 9 of 62
`
`¶ 168.) Temple’s Northeastern Campus was formerly an impatient hospital, but now
`
`serves as an outpatient facility. (Id.)
`
`
`
`Trinity Health Mid-Atlantic also runs several GAC hospitals in the region. St.
`
`Mary Medical Center in Langhorne, Bucks County, with 373 beds, is its largest area
`
`hospital. (Id. at ¶ 157.) Nazareth Hospital, with 231 beds, is in northeast Philadelphia.
`
`(Id. at ¶ 156.) It has twenty inpatient rehabilitation beds. (Ramanarayanan Rpt. ¶ 64,
`
`Ex. 3.) Mercy Fitzgerald, with 183 beds, is in Delaware County. (Capps Rpt. ¶ 155.) It
`
`has ten inpatient rehabilitation beds. See (Ramanarayanan Rpt. ¶ 64, Ex. 3). Trinity
`
`has also operated 157-bed Mercy Philadelphia Hospital in southwest Philadelphia,
`
`although it is slated to stop offering services there, with some services shifting to other
`
`area providers and others moving to Mercy Fitzgerald. (Capps Rpt. ¶ 154.) In 2018,
`
`the Mercy Health System and St. Mary formed a clinical affiliation with Penn
`
`Medicine, facilitating access to Penn Medicine services when required by their patients.
`
`(Id. at ¶ 159); (JX0065, Gustave Dep. Tr. 53:18–54:16.) Trinity also operates a fifty-bed
`
`IRF at St. Mary Rehabilitation Hospital (“St. Mary Rehab”) in Bucks County.
`
`(Ramanarayanan Rpt. ¶ 64, Ex. 3.)
`
`
`
`Grand View Health operates Grand View Hospital, a 169-bed GAC hospital in
`
`Bucks County. (Capps Rpt. ¶ 173.) Grand View has fourteen inpatient rehabilitation
`
`beds. See (Ramanarayanan Rpt. ¶ 64, Ex. 3). In 2019, Grand View announced a $210
`
`million, 170,000 square foot expansion to include a new emergency department,
`
`intensive care unit beds and private inpatient rooms. (Capps Rpt. ¶ 174.) Grand View,
`
`like St. Mary and Mercy Health, has also entered into a joint clinical partnership with
`
`Penn Medicine, part of Penn’s effort to “attract tertiary volume to come down to the
`
`
`
`9
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 10 of 62
`
`Penn hospitals.” (JX0065, Gustave Dep. Tr. 53:14–21, 54:13–16.)
`
`
`
`The Prime Healthcare Foundation runs the nonprofit Suburban Community
`
`Hospital, a 126-bed hospital in Montgomery County. (Capps Rpt. ¶ 175.) Prime
`
`Healthcare also operates two for-profit hospitals in the area, Roxborough Memorial
`
`Hospital in Philadelphia and Lower Bucks Hospital in Bucks County. (Id.)
`
`
`
`Holy Redeemer Health System, a nonprofit health system, operates one GAC
`
`hospital, Holy Redeemer, with 242 beds in Montgomery County along with ambulatory
`
`care sites in Bucks County, eastern Montgomery County and northeast Philadelphia.
`
`(Id. at ¶ 160.)
`
`
`
`Doylestown Hospital, with 232 beds in Bucks County, is the sole hospital in
`
`Doylestown Health’s nonprofit system. (Id. at ¶ 162.) It recently underwent a $100
`
`million expansion, adding beds and other services. (Id. at ¶ 164.) Its oncology
`
`programs are part of a clinical partnership with Penn Medicine. (Id.)
`
`
`
`Cancer Treatment Centers of America, Philadelphia operates a twenty-two-bed
`
`cancer hospital in North Philadelphia. (Smith Rpt. ¶ 60.)
`
`
`
`In addition to the hospital-affiliated IRFs identified above, the Kessler Institute
`
`for Rehabilitation (“Kessler Marlton”) operates a sixty-one-bed freestanding IRF in New
`
`Jersey. See (Ramanarayanan Rpt. ¶ 64, Ex. 3). Rehabilitation services are also offered
`
`in the area at a number of skilled nursing facilities (“SNFs”) that are not directly tied to
`
`the region’s health systems. Area SNF operators include Genesis Healthcare. See (id.
`
`at ¶ 103). Genesis operates thirty-eight SNFs in Pennsylvania, four of which are
`
`PowerBack Rehabilitation facilities, “designed to provide short-stay skilled
`
`nursing . . . to deliver a comprehensive rehabilitation regimen in accommodations
`
`
`
`10
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 11 of 62
`
`specifically designed to serve high-acuity patients.” See (id.). The Pennsylvania
`
`PowerBack facilities are in Center City Philadelphia (PowerBack-Lombard, 150 beds),
`
`Montgomery County (PowerBack-Hatboro, 109 beds) and Chester County (PowerBack-
`
`Phoenixville, twenty-two beds and PowerBack-Exton, 120 beds). (See id. at ¶ 103
`
`n.240). Rehab at Shannondell operates a 120-bed SNF on the campus of a senior
`
`assisted living community in Montgomery County. See (id. at ¶ 103). Also, Abramson
`
`Senior Care offers senior short-term rehabilitation services at the Abramson Residence
`
`and the Birnhak Transitional Care center at Lankenau, both in Montgomery County.
`
`See (id.).
`
`C
`
`
`
`The region’s commercial health insurance market is far more consolidated than
`
`the provider market. Jefferson’s Chief Executive Officer Dr. Stephen Klasko
`
`characterized the area as having “the worst externalities of any city in the country” for
`
`healthcare systems because there is “pretty much a monopolistic type insurance
`
`situation with a few insurers.” See (Sept. 29, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (Klasko (CEO, Jefferson))
`
`19:21–20:2, ECF No. 261). The region has only four major commercial health insurance
`
`providers: Independence Blue Cross (“IBC”), Aetna, Cigna and United Healthcare
`
`(“United”). See (Capps Rpt. ¶¶ 177–191). Because healthcare provider competition in
`
`the area is extensive, Klasko explained that commercial insurers “especially the big
`
`ones, United, Aetna, IBC, of course, and Cigna, they could just say fine, we won’t [keep
`
`a provider in-network]” and not suffer negative repercussions. (Sept. 29, 2020 Hr’g Tr.
`
`(Klasko) 27:3–7.)
`
`
`
`
`
`IBC is the area’s dominant commercial insurer, with more than fifty percent
`
`11
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 12 of 62
`
`market share covering approximately 1.3 million lives and coverage agreements with
`
`every area health system. (Defs.’ FF ¶ 74); see also (Sept. 14, 2020 Hr’g Tr.
`
`(Staudenmeier (VP Provider Contracting, IBC)) 62:14–21); (id. (Markowitz) at 61:11–
`
`13); (PX5008, Staudenmeier Decl. ¶ 3); (JX0064, Winings (VP Network Management,
`
`United) Dep. Tr. 281:12–15); (JX0062, Morris (VP Provider Networks, Aetna) Dep. Tr.
`
`115:16–116:19, 124:10–17); (DX0127-002); (DX0405-003); (DX0317-10). At the
`
`evidentiary hearing, IBC could not identify a single health system that has been out of
`
`its coverage network for longer than six months. See (Sept. 14, 2020 Hr’g Tr.
`
`(Staudenmeier) 110:25–111:2). IBC has “a very strong market position” because there
`
`are significantly more other hospital options than other insurance options. (Sept. 14,
`
`2020 Hr’g Tr. (DeAngelis (CFO, Jefferson)) 307:10–25.) All other major commercial
`
`insurers in southeastern Pennsylvania recognize IBC as the prevailing player in the
`
`commercial insurance market. See (Sept. 14, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (Markowitz) 61:14–18);
`
`(JX0062, Morris Dep. Tr. 124:15–17); (JX0064, Winings Dep. Tr. 142:7–12).
`
`According to Aetna and United, healthcare providers fear IBC will retaliate
`
`against them if they partner with other payors by reducing benefits or terminating its
`
`relationships with them. See (JX0062, Morris Dep. Tr. 113:5–22 (explaining Jefferson
`
`and Penn had expressed concerns “about IBC retaliating” if they made certain coverage
`
`arrangements “with Aetna or any other carrier”)); (DX0442-003 (“IBC dominant player
`
`and all health systems have a ‘fear’ of Blue retribution if they were to align themselves
`
`in any way with another pay[o]r based on history.”)); (JX0064, Winings Dep. Tr. 283:4–
`
`16 (explaining health systems had concerns about partnering with United out of fear
`
`that “IBC would either terminate them from the network” or make “meaningful and
`
`
`
`12
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 13 of 62
`
`impactful” rate reductions)).
`
`
`
`Multiple witnesses testified that neither Jefferson nor Einstein can afford being
`
`out of IBC’s network. (Defs.’ FF ¶ 94.) At Jefferson, payments from IBC comprise
`
`approximately fifty-eight percent of commercial GAC revenues,4 roughly fifty percent of
`
`its total commercial insurance reimbursements and approximately twenty percent of its
`
`total revenue. See (Capps Rpt. Fig. 2); (Sept. 14, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (DeAngelis) 289:6–14).
`
`An IBC short-term financial analysis showed that if Jefferson were not included in
`
`IBC’s network, the resulting harm to Jefferson could amount to tens of millions of
`
`dollars. See (Sept. 14, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (Staudenmeier) 111:16–112:6). It determined that
`
`cutting Jefferson out of its network would not impact its network adequacy from a
`
`regulatory standpoint. (Id. at 108:24–109:3.)
`
`
`
`IBC accounts for approximately fifty-seven percent of Einstein’s commercial
`
`GAC revenues and approximately nineteen percent of the system’s hospital revenues.
`
`See (Capps Rpt. Fig. 2); (Sept. 30, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (McTiernan (SVP Clinical and Provider
`
`Management, Health Partners Plans, formerly at Einstein and IBC)) 60:22–23, ECF
`
`No. 262). An IBC analysis contemplating Einstein’s termination from its network
`
`showed that Einstein would lose tens of millions of dollars from termination and IBC
`
`would have sufficient network access and adequacy from a regulatory standpoint
`
`without Einstein. See (DX0329-008, -010).
`
`
`
`Aetna covers approximately 550,000 to 650,000 lives in the Philadelphia area.
`
`
`Percent estimates of IBC’s contribution to Jefferson and Einstein commercial GAC revenues
`4
`includes “the pay[o]r designation for plans associated with the Blue Cross and Blue Shield
`Association that are not classified as IBC.” (Capps Rpt. ¶ 177 n.206.) According to Dr. Capps, IBC
`itself accounts for forty percent of Jefferson’s commercial GAC revenue and forty-four percent of
`Einstein’s commercial GAC revenue. See (id. at Fig. 2).
`
`
`
`
`13
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 14 of 62
`
`See (Capps Rpt. ¶ 184). It is the second largest commercial payor for both Jefferson and
`
`Einstein. See (id.). Aetna accounts for approximately twenty-five percent and twenty-
`
`nine percent of Jefferson and Einstein’s commercial GAC revenues, respectively. See
`
`(id. at Fig. 2). Its reimbursement payments constitute eight to ten percent of
`
`Jefferson’s total revenue and approximately seven percent of Einstein’s hospital
`
`revenues. See (Sept. 14, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (DeAngelis) 289:15-22); (Sept. 30, 2020 Hr’g Tr.
`
`(McTiernan) 60:18–19).
`
`
`
`United is even smaller, covering approximately 300,000 lives in Philadelphia and
`
`Montgomery counties. See (PX5007, Winings Decl. ¶ 2). It accounts for roughly six
`
`percent of both Jefferson and Einstein’s commercial GAC revenues, three to four
`
`percent of Jefferson’s total revenue and one to two percent of Einstein’s hospital
`
`revenue. See (Capps Rpt. Fig. 2); (Sept. 14, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (DeAngelis) 289:23-290:1);
`
`(Sept. 30, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (McTiernan) 60:19–20). United excludes Jefferson from some of
`
`its commercial products and has been able to successfully market them. (Defs.’ FF
`
`¶ 86.) It considered terminating its contracts with Einstein in early 2020 and
`
`determined that, for most of its plans, it could do so without creating patient access
`
`issues. (Id. at ¶ 87.)
`
`
`
`Of the four primary commercial insurers in southeastern Pennsylvania, Cigna is
`
`the smallest, covering approximately 200,000 lives and six percent of the commercial
`
`healthcare market in the five-county Philadelphia area. See (PX5006, Markowitz Decl.
`
`¶ 2). Cigna accounts for approximately five percent of both Jefferson and Einstein’s
`
`commercial GAC revenues, one and a half to two percent of Jefferson’s total revenue
`
`and less than one percent of Einstein’s hospital revenue. See (Capps Rpt. Fig. 2); (Sept.
`
`
`
`14
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 15 of 62
`
`14, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (DeAngelis) 289:23-290:1); (Sept. 30, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (McTiernan)
`
`58:12–15).
`
`D
`
`
`
`The Government proposes three relevant markets in which to assess the
`
`proposed merger’s competitive effects. Two of the proposed markets are for inpatient
`
`GAC services sold to commercial insurers and their members and the third is for
`
`inpatient acute rehabilitation services sold to commercial insurers and their members.
`
`(Pls.’ FF ¶ 14.) Each proposed product market has different geographic boundaries.
`
`i
`
`
`
`GAC services include a broad cluster of medical, surgical, and diagnostic services
`
`that require an overnight hospital stay. (Pls.’ FF ¶ 15.) The parties agree that GAC
`
`services is a relevant product market. See (id. at ¶ 16); (Oct. 26, 2020 Oral Arg. Tr.
`
`257:9–10, ECF No. 273). Insurers include local GAC hospitals in their networks
`
`because patients prefer to receive GAC services near their homes.5 (Pls.’ FF ¶ 21.)
`
`The FTC does something in this case that it has never attempted in an effort to
`
`block a merger in the healthcare industry—allege multiple geographic markets for the
`
`same product, here GAC services. See (Oct. 26, 2020 Oral Arg. Tr. at 180–81). The
`
`Government includes three of the same hospitals in overlapping markets, magnifying
`
`their competitive significance. See (Smith Rpt. Figs. 3 and 4); (Capps Rpt. ¶¶ 35–36);
`
`
`While insurers agreed that patients prefer to seek care “close to home,” when asked to define
`5
`the boundaries of “close to home” care, insurers could not do so. See (JX0064, Winings Dep. Tr.
`72:14–75:16 (“close to home” depends on access standards required by the Department of Health or
`other entities and how far patients are willing to travel, but United has not studied how far patients
`are willing to travel for GAC services)); (JX0070, Staudenmeier Dep. Tr. 175:5–9 (no objective
`standard in mind for statement that patients “generally prefer to receive care close to home for most
`routine inpatient and outpatient services”)).
`
`
`
`
`15
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 16 of 62
`
`(id. at App’x G.1 ¶ 544 (noting Abington, Chestnut Hill and Roxborough Memorial are
`
`included in both alleged GAC markets)).
`
`a
`
`
`
`The Government first attempts to define what it terms the “Northern
`
`Philadelphia Area” market, in which it includes eleven hospitals: Einstein’s EMCP and
`
`EMCEP; Jefferson’s Abington and Frankford Hospitals; Prime’s Roxborough Memorial
`
`Hospital; Temple University Hospital; Jeanes; Tower Health’s Chestnut Hill Hospital;
`
`Fox Chase Cancer Center; Cancer Treatment Centers of America, Philadelphia; and St.
`
`Christopher’s Hospital for Children. (Pls.’ FF ¶ 23.) Notably, Abington sits on the edge
`
`of the market at its far northern end. (Capps Rpt. ¶ 35.) This market does not include,
`
`among others, Penn Medicine’s three Philadelphia hospitals, notwithstanding that the
`
`area from which the hospitals draw seventy-five percent of their patients—the Patient
`
`Service Area (“PSA”)—for all three of Penn Medicine’s hospitals includes EMCP. (Defs.’
`
`FF ¶ 27); see also (Capps Rpt. ¶ 37 (defining “patient service areas”)). It also excludes
`
`Holy Redeemer Hospital, (Defs.’ FF ¶¶ 26, 28), even though its PSA encompasses North
`
`Philadelphia. (Defs.’ FF ¶ 28.)
`
`b
`
`
`
`The Government’s proposed “Montgomery Area” market for GAC services also
`
`includes Jefferson’s Abington Hospital, Prime’s Roxborough Memorial Hospital and
`
`Tower Health’s Chestnut Hill Hospital along with seven other hospitals: Jefferson’s
`
`Abington Lansdale Hospital; Einstein’s EMCM; Main Line Health’s Bryn Mawr and
`
`Paoli Hospitals; Prime’s Suburban Community Hospital; Tower Health’s Phoenixville
`
`Hospital; and Physician’s Care Surgical Hospital. (Pls.’ FF ¶ 26.) Abington sits on the
`
`
`
`16
`
`

`

`Case 2:20-cv-01113-GJP Document 277 Filed 12/08/20 Page 17 of 62
`
`edge of this market as well, this time at its far eastern end. (Capps Rpt. ¶ 35.) The
`
`market does not include, among others, Lankenau Hospital, Pottstown Hospital, Grand
`
`View, Doylestown Hospital, Jeanes or any Penn Medicine facility. (Defs.’ FF ¶¶ 14, 23–
`
`24); (Capps Rpt. Fig. 42.)
`
`c
`
`While Einstein aspires to compete with Jefferson, (PX2146-011), Jefferson
`
`identifies its primary competition as Penn Medicine, Main Line Health, Temple
`
`University and Tower Health. See (Sept. 29, 2020 Hr’g Tr. (Meyer) 63:7–11). It does
`
`not consider Einstein to be “a primary competitor for commercial patients because their
`
`commercial pay[o]r mix is so small. And their commercial payer mix comes almost
`
`entirely from their emergency room . . . . we don’t compete with them for elective cases
`
`because less than 1 percent of their volume is actually that kind of elective commercial
`
`case.” (Id. at 63:17–64:5.) EMCM is not a primary competitor for Jefferson’s Abington
`
`Hospital because I-476 acts as a dividing line for where patients seek care—Abington is
`
`east of I-476 and EMCM is west of I-476. See (id. at 65:13–66:6); see also (Sept. 30,
`
`2020 Hr’g Tr. (Merlis (EVP Strategic Partnerships, Strategic Ventures and Innovation,
`
`Jefferson) 119:9–15); (Capps Rpt. ¶¶ 37–38, 41–42). Jefferson sees Abington’s primary
`
`competitors as Grand View Hospital and Doylestown Hospital, Holy Redeemer
`
`Hospital, “maybe to a much smaller extent Chestnut Hi

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket