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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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`Civil Action No. 14-1489
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`Judge Cathy Bissoon
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`MEMORANDUM ORDER
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`For the reasons stated below, Duquesne University of the Holy Spirit and Kenneth
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`SUSAN HASCALL,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY OF THE
`HOLY SPIRIT, et al.,
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`Defendants.
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`Gormely’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) will be GRANTED IN PART and
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`DENIED IN PART. Susan Hascall’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 37) will be
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`DENIED.
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`I. MEMORANDUM
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`Pending before the Court are a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 33) filed by
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`Duquesne University of the Holy Spirit and Kenneth Gormley (“Defendants”) and a cross-
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`motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 37) filed by Susan Hascall (“Plaintiff”). After a
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`thorough review of the record, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be denied as to
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`Plaintiff’s gender discrimination and retaliation claims and granted in all other respects.
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`Additionally, Plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment will be denied.
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`As a preliminary matter, and as Defendants point out in their Reply Brief (Doc. 50),
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`Plaintiff presents no arguments or evidence supporting her age discrimination (Counts I and VI),
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`Case 2:14-cv-01489-CB Document 52 Filed 06/28/16 Page 2 of 5
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`Equal Pay Act (Count VII), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII), and breach of
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`implied contract (Count IX) claims against Defendants. Indeed, in her Proposed Order, Plaintiff
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`implicitly concedes that summary judgment should be entered for Defendants on those claims, as
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`she omitted those claims and counts from her requested relief. (Doc. 47-1). Accordingly,
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`summary judgment will be entered for Defendants on those claims.
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`Defendants also move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of religious
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`discrimination (Counts III and VI). The Court agrees with Defendants’ position, that Plaintiff’s
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`attempts to rely on her scholarship of Islamic law as a sincerely held religious belief are
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`misplaced. See (Doc. 36) at 12-13. Scholarship in Islamic and Sharia law does not, on its own,
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`create a sincerely held religious belief. Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence that she herself
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`practices Islam as a religion. Indeed, Plaintiff states in her Amended Complaint that she has not
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`converted to Islam. (Doc. 10) at ¶ 394. Without a sincerely held belief in Islam, Plaintiff cannot
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`establish a claim for religious discrimination. United States v. Welsh, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970)
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`(citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)). Plaintiff may very well have been
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`subject to ridicule and derision from her colleagues due to the subject matter of her choice of
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`scholarship; however, such conduct is not prohibited by law. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion
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`will be granted as to Plaintiff’s claims of religious discrimination.
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`On the question of Plaintiff’s claims of gender discrimination and retaliation, the Court
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`finds that there exist sufficient disputes of material fact in the record that summary judgment is
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`inappropriate. Plaintiff has pointed to several disputed facts regarding the validity of
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`Defendants’ “legitimate non-discriminatory reason” for denying Plaintiff tenure. See generally
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`(Doc. 47). Examples of inconsistencies include: what standard tenure reviewers applied to
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`assess Plaintiff’s candidacy ((Doc. 34) at ¶ 10 and (Doc. 48) at ¶ 10); whether Defendant
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`Case 2:14-cv-01489-CB Document 52 Filed 06/28/16 Page 3 of 5
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`Gormely lobbied members of the Law School Rank and Tenure Committee to vote against
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`Plaintiff prior to the vote ((Doc. 34) at ¶ 17 and (Doc. 48) at ¶ 17); whether Laurie Serafino is an
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`adequate comparator ((Doc. 34) at ¶ 5 and (Doc. 48) at ¶ 5); and what basis Defendants used for
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`denying Plaintiff tenure, e.g., teaching or scholarship ((Doc. 34) at ¶ 9 and (Doc. 48) at ¶ 9).
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`These factual disputes, coupled with evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
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`Defendant Gormley has a history of creating a hostile work environment for females, (see (Doc.
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`47-17)), are sufficient for Plaintiff’s gender claims to survive summary judgment. Additionally,
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`there is a dispute of material fact as to when Defendant Gormley began drafting his letter
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`recommending that Plaintiff be denied tenure – whether it occurred before or after he received
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`notice of Plaintiff’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge and whether
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`that EEOC charge played any role in the Law School Rank and Tenure Committee’s decision to
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`deny tenure to Plaintiff. Compare (Doc. 34) at ¶ 20 with (Doc. 48) at ¶ 20. Therefore, her
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`retaliation claim likewise must survive the summary judgment stage.
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`Plaintiff bases her defamation claim on two statements contained in an article in the
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`Legal Intelligencer: (i) “Ms. Hascall is a disgruntled faculty member in Duquesne’s School of
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`Law who was recently denied tenure by the university[ ]”; and (ii) “Indeed, Plaintiff’s poor
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`teaching, flawed examinations and disrespect exhibited toward students in the classroom led to
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`ongoing student complaints yet Plaintiff makes the astounding assertion that Duquesne
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`University somehow ‘solicited the students . . . and choreographed thereby a slew of poor student
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`evaluations.’ Thus she continues to refuse to take responsibility for her poor teaching
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`evaluations.” (Doc. 10) at ¶¶ 588-590.
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`Defendants argue the first statement is, as a matter of law, not defamatory as it is “merely
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`an expression of Defendants’ opinion as to why Plaintiff filed her lawsuit.” (Doc. 36) at 21-22
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`3
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`Case 2:14-cv-01489-CB Document 52 Filed 06/28/16 Page 4 of 5
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`(citing Baker v. Lafayette Coll., 504 A.2d 247, 252 (Pa. Super. 1986), aff’d 532 A.2d 399 (Pa.
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`1987)).
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`As to the second statement, Defendants correctly indicate that it was taken from
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`Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiff’s initial Complaint, filed on the docket with the Court. (Doc. 5)
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`at ¶ 1. This statement, Defendants argue, is privileged and not capable of being defamatory, as it
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`was made in the course of this judicial proceeding. (Doc. 36) at 22 (citing Bochetto v. Gibson,
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`860 A.2d 67 (Pa. 2004).
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`Plaintiff’s response seems to focus on the second statement, specifically the phrase “poor
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`teaching.” (Doc. 47) at 24-25. She does not address whether Defendants’ “disgruntled”
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`statement is one of opinion. Id. Instead, she focuses on how the absolute privilege exception
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`that applies to statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding should not apply here. Id.
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`The Court finds neither of the statements at issue defamatory. The first statement is
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`properly categorized as opinion. A statement need not self-identify as an opinion in order to
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`qualify as one. In their statement, Defendants used the adjective “disgruntled” to describe why,
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`in Defendants’ estimation, Plaintiff filed her lawsuit. As to the second statement, Plaintiff failed
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`to put forth any evidence that Defendants did anything other than file the Answer on the public
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`docket. As it was made in the course of this judicial proceeding, the statement is “absolutely
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`privileged and, therefore, cannot form the basis for liability for defamation.” Pawlowski v.
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`Smorto, 588 A.2d 36, 41 (Pa. Super. 1991). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for defamation will
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`be dismissed.
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`4
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`Case 2:14-cv-01489-CB Document 52 Filed 06/28/16 Page 5 of 5
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`II. ORDER
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`Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s
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`gender discrimination and retaliation claims (Counts II, IV, V and VI) and GRANTED in all
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`other respects. Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 37) is DENIED.
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`s\Cathy Bissoon
`Cathy Bissoon
`United States District Judge
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`June 28, 2016
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`cc (via ECF email notification):
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`All Counsel of Record
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`5