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` OCTOBER TERM, 2012
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
` Syllabus
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`HILLMAN v. MARETTA
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
` No. 11–1221. Argued April 22, 2013—Decided June 3, 2013
`
`The Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954 (FEGLIA)
`establishes an insurance program for federal employees. FEGLIA
`permits an employee to name a beneficiary of life insurance proceeds,
`and specifies an “order of precedence” providing that an employee’s
`death benefits accrue first to that beneficiary ahead of other potential
`recipients. 5 U. S. C. §8705(a). A Virginia statute revokes a benefi-
`
`ciary designation in any contract that provides a death benefit to a
`former spouse where there has been a change in the decedent’s mari-
`
`
`tal status. Va. Code Ann. §20–111.1(A) (Section A). In the event that
`this provision is pre-empted by federal law, a separate provision of
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`Virginia law, Section D, provides a cause of action rendering the for-
`mer spouse liable for the principal amount of the proceeds to the par-
`ty who would have received them were Section A not pre-empted.
`§20–111.1(D).
`
`Warren Hillman named then-spouse, respondent Judy Maretta, as
`the beneficiary of his Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance
`(FEGLI) policy. After their divorce, he married petitioner Jacqueline
`Hillman but never changed his named FEGLI beneficiary. After
`Warren’s death, Maretta, still the named beneficiary, filed a claim for
`the FEGLI proceeds and collected them. Hillman sued in Virginia
`court, seeking recovery of the proceeds under Section D. Maretta ar-
`gued in response that Section D is pre-empted by federal law. The
`parties agreed that Section A is pre-empted. The Virginia Circuit
`
`Court found Maretta liable to Hillman under Section D for the
`FEGLI policy proceeds. The State Supreme Court reversed, conclud-
`ing that Section D is pre-empted by FEGLIA because it conflicts with
`the purposes and objectives of Congress.
`Held: Section D of the Virginia statute is pre-empted by FEGLIA.
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`Pp. 6–15.
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`HILLMAN v. MARETTA
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`Syllabus
`
`(a) State law is pre-empted “to the extent of any conflict with a
`federal statute.” Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U. S.
`363, 372. This case raises the question whether Virginia law “stands
`
`as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
`
`
`poses and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52,
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`67. Pp. 6–13.
`
`
`
`(1) To determine whether a state law conflicts with Congress’
`
`purposes and objectives, the nature of the federal interest must first
`be ascertained. Crosby, 530 U. S., at 372–373. Two previous cases
`govern the analysis of the relationship between Section D and
`FEGLIA here. In Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655, a California
`court granted a decedent’s widow, who was not the named beneficiary
`of a policy under the federal National Service Life Insurance Act of
`1940 (NSLIA), an interest in the insurance proceeds as community
`property under state law. This Court reversed. Because NSLIA pro-
`vided that the insured had a right to designate a beneficiary and
`
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`could change that designation at any time, the Court reasoned that
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`Congress had “spoken with force and clarity in directing that the pro-
`ceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.” Id., at 658. The
`Court addressed a similar question regarding the federal Service-
`
`men’s Group Life Insurance Act of 1965 (SGLIA) in Ridgway v.
`Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46. There, a Maine court imposed a constructive
`trust on insurance proceeds paid to a servicemember’s widow, the
`named beneficiary, and ordered that they be paid to the decedent’s
`
`first wife as required by a divorce decree. Holding the constructive
`trust pre-empted, the Ridgway Court explained that Wissner con-
`
`trolled and that SGLIA made clear that “the insured service member
`possesses the right freely to designate the beneficiary and to alter
`
`that choice at any time by communicating the decision in writing to
`the proper office.” Id., at 56. Pp. 7–9.
`(2) The reasoning in Wissner and Ridgway applies with equal
`force here. NSLIA and SGLIA are strikingly similar to FEGLIA,
`which creates a scheme that gives highest priority to an insured’s
`designated beneficiary, §8705(a), and which underscores that the
`
`employee’s “right” of designation “cannot be waived or restricted,” 5
`CFR §843.205(e). Section D interferes with this scheme, because it
`directs that the proceeds actually belong to someone other than the
`named beneficiary by creating a cause of action for their recovery by
`a third party. FEGLIA establishes a clear and predictable procedure
`for an employee to indicate who the intended beneficiary shall be and
`evinces Congress’ decision to accord federal employees an unfettered
`freedom of choice in selecting a beneficiary and to ensure the pro-
`ceeds actually belong to that beneficiary. This conclusion is con-
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`firmed by another provision of FEGLIA, §8705(e), which creates a
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`2
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Syllabus
`limited exception to the order of precedence by allowing proceeds to
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`be paid to someone other than the named beneficiary, if, and only if,
`the requisite documentation is filed with the Government before the
`employee’s death, so that any departure from the beneficiary desig-
`nation is managed within, not outside, the federal system. If States
`could make alternative distributions outside the clear procedure
`Congress established, §8705(e)’s narrow exception would be trans-
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`formed into a general license for state law to override FEGLIA.
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`Pp. 9–13.
`(b) Hillman’s additional arguments in support of a different result
`are unpersuasive. Pp. 13–15.
`283 Va. 34, 722 S. E. 2d 32, affirmed.
`SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
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` C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in
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`which SCALIA, J., joined as to all but footnote 4. THOMAS, J., and ALITO,
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`J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment.
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`3
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
`
` No. 11–1221
`_________________
` JACQUELINE HILLMAN, PETITIONER v. JUDY A.
`
`
` MARETTA
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
`
`
`VIRGINIA
`
`[June 3, 2013]
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`
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` JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.*
`
`The Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of
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`1954 (FEGLIA), 5 U. S. C. §8701 et seq., establishes a life
`insurance program for federal employees. FEGLIA pro-
`vides that an employee may designate a beneficiary to
`receive the proceeds of his life insurance at the time of his
`death. §8705(a). Separately, a Virginia statute addresses
`the situation in which an employee’s marital status has
`changed, but he did not update his beneficiary designation
`before his death. Section 20–111.1(D) of the Virginia Code
`renders a former spouse liable for insurance proceeds to
`whoever would have received them under applicable law,
`usually a widow or widower, but for the beneficiary desig-
`nation. Va. Code Ann. §20–111.1(D) (Lexis Supp. 2012).
`This case presents the question whether the remedy cre-
`ated by §20–111.1(D) is pre-empted by FEGLIA and its
`implementing regulations. We hold that it is.
`
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`——————
`* JUSTICE SCALIA joins all but footnote 4 of this opinion.
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` HILLMAN v. MARETTA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`I
`
`A
`
`In 1954, Congress enacted FEGLIA to “provide low-cost
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`group life insurance to Federal employees.” H. R. Rep. No.
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`2579, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1954). The program is ad-
`ministered by the federal Office of Personnel Management
`(OPM). 5 U. S. C. §8716. Pursuant to the authority
`granted to it by FEGLIA, OPM entered into a life insur-
`ance contract with the Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
`pany. See §8709; 5 CFR §870.102 (2013). Individual
`employees enrolled in the Federal Employees’ Group Life
`
`Insurance (FEGLI) Program receive coverage through this
`contract. The program is of substantial size. In 2010, the
`total amount of FEGLI insurance coverage in force was
`$824 billion. GAO, Federal Employees’ Group Life Insur-
`ance: Retirement Benefit and Retained Asset Account
`
`Disclosures Could Be Improved 1 (GAO–12–94, 2011).
`FEGLIA provides that, upon an employee’s death, life
`
`insurance benefits are paid in accordance with a specified
`“order of precedence.” 5 U. S. C. §8705(a). The proceeds
`accrue “[f]irst, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries desig-
`nated by the employee in a signed and witnessed writing
`received before death.” Ibid. “[I]f there is no designated
`
`
`beneficiary,” the benefits are paid “to the widow or widower
`
`of the employee.” Ibid. Absent a widow or widower, the
`benefits accrue to “the child or children of the employee
`and descendants of [the] deceased children”; “the parents
`of the employee” or their survivors; the “executor or ad-
`ministrator of the estate of the employee”; and last, to
`“other next of kin.” Ibid.
`
`To be effective, the beneficiary designation and any
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`accompanying revisions to it must be in writing and duly
`filed with the Government. See ibid. (“[A] designation,
`change, or cancellation of beneficiary in a will or other
`document not so executed and filed has no force or effect”).
`
`An OPM regulation provides that an employee may
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`2
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`“change [a] beneficiary at any time without the knowledge
`or consent of the previous beneficiary,” and makes clear
`that “[t]his right cannot be waived or restricted.” 5 CFR
`§870.802(f). Employees are informed of these require-
`ments through materials that OPM disseminates in
`connection with the program. See, e.g., OPM, FEGLI Pro-
`gram Booklet 21–22 (rev. Aug. 2004) (setting forth the
`order of precedence and stating that OPM “will pay bene-
`fits” “[f]irst, to the beneficiary [the employee] desig-
`nate[s]”). The order of precedence is also described on the
`form that employees use to designate a beneficiary. See
`Designation of Beneficiary, FEGLI Program, SF 2823 (rev.
`
`Mar. 2011) (Back of Part 2). And the enrollment form
`advises employees to update their designations if their
`“[i]ntentions [c]hange” as a result of, for example, “mar-
`
`riage [or] divorce.” Ibid.
`
`In 1998, Congress amended FEGLIA to create a limited
`exception to an employee’s right of designation. The stat-
`ute now provides that “[a]ny amount which would other-
`wise be paid to a person determined under the order of
`precedence . . . shall be paid (in whole or in part) by [OPM]
`to another person if and to the extent expressly provided
`for in the terms of any court decree of divorce, annulment,
`or legal separation” or related settlement, but only in the
`event the “decree, order, or agreement” is received by
`OPM or the employing agency before the employee’s
`death. 5 U. S. C. §§8705(e)(1)–(2).
`
`
`FEGLIA also includes an express pre-emption provision.
`That provision states in relevant part that “[t]he provi-
`sions of any contract under [FEGLIA] which relate to the
`nature or extent of coverage or benefits (including pay-
`ments with respect to benefits) shall supersede and
`preempt any law of any State . . . , which relates to group
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`life insurance to the extent that the law or regulation is
`inconsistent with the contractual provisions.” §8709(d)(1).
`
`This case turns on the interaction between these provi-
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`3
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`4
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` HILLMAN v. MARETTA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`sions of FEGLIA and a Virginia statute. Section 20–
`
`111.1(A) (Section A) of the Virginia Code provides that a
`divorce or annulment “revoke[s]” a “beneficiary designa-
`tion contained in a then existing written contract owned
`by one party that provides for the payment of any death
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`benefit to the other party.” A “death benefit” includes
`“payments under a life insurance contract.” §20.111.1(B).
`
`In the event that Section A is pre-empted by federal law,
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`§20–111.1(D) (Section D) of the Virginia Code applies.
`
`Section D provides as follows:
`
`“If [Va. Code Ann. §20–111.1] is preempted by fed-
`eral law with respect to the payment of any death
`benefit, a former spouse who, not for value, receives
`the payment of any death benefit that the former
`spouse is not entitled to under [§20–111.1] is person-
`ally liable for the amount of the payment to the per-
`
`son who would have been entitled to it were
`[§20.111.1] not preempted.”
`In other words, where Section A is pre-empted, Section D
`creates a cause of action rendering a former spouse liable
`for the principal amount of the insurance proceeds to the
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`person who would have received them had Section A
`continued in effect.
`
`B
`
`Warren Hillman (Warren) and respondent Judy Maretta
`
`were married. In 1996, Warren named Maretta as the
`beneficiary of his FEGLI policy. Warren and Maretta
`divorced in 1998 and, four years later, he married peti-
`tioner Jacqueline Hillman. Warren died unexpectedly in
`2008. Because Warren had never changed the named
`beneficiary under his FEGLI policy, it continued to iden-
`
`tify Maretta as the beneficiary at the time of his death
`despite his divorce and subsequent remarriage to Hillman.
`
`Hillman filed a claim for the proceeds of Warren’s life
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`insurance, but the FEGLI administrator informed her that
`the proceeds would accrue to Maretta, because she had
`been named as the beneficiary. Maretta filed a claim for
`the benefits with OPM and collected the FEGLI proceeds
`in the amount of $124,558.03. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a.
`
`Hillman then filed a lawsuit in Virginia Circuit Court,
`
`arguing that Maretta was liable to her under Section D for
`the proceeds of her deceased husband’s FEGLI policy. The
`parties agreed that Section A, which directly reallo-
`cates the benefits, is pre-empted by FEGLIA. Id., at 36a.
`
`Maretta contended that Section D is also pre-empted by
`federal law and that she should keep the insurance pro-
`ceeds. The Circuit Court rejected Maretta’s argument and
`granted summary judgment to Hillman, finding Maretta
`liable to Hillman under Section D for the proceeds of
`Warren’s policy. Id., at 58a.
`
`The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and entered
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`judgment for Maretta. 283 Va. 34, 46, 722 S. E. 2d 32, 38
`
`
`(2012). The court found that FEGLIA clearly instructed
`that the insurance proceeds should be paid to a named
`beneficiary. Id., at 44–46, 722 S. E. 2d, at 36–38. The
`court reasoned that “Congress did not intend merely for
`the named beneficiary in a FEGLI policy to receive the
`proceeds, only then to have them subject to recovery by a
`third party under state law.” Id., at 44, 722 S. E. 2d, at
`37. It therefore concluded that Section D is pre-empted by
`FEGLIA, because it “stand[s] as an obstacle to the accom-
`plishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
`tives of Congress.” Id., at 45, 722 S. E. 2d, at 37 (internal
`quotation marks omitted).
`
`We granted certiorari, 568 U. S. ___ (2013), to resolve a
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`conflict among the state and federal courts over whether
`FEGLIA pre-empts a rule of state law that automatically
`assigns an interest in the proceeds of a FEGLI policy to a
`person other than the named beneficiary or grants that
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`5
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`HILLMAN v. MARETTA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`person a right to recover such proceeds.1 We now affirm.
`II
`
`Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress has the power
`
`to pre-empt state law expressly. See Brown v. Hotel
`Employees, 468 U. S. 491, 500–501 (1984). Although
`FEGLIA contains an express pre-emption provision, see
`§8709(d)(1), the court below considered only whether
`Section D is pre-empted under conflict pre-emption princi-
`ples. We limit our analysis here to that holding. State
`law is pre-empted “to the extent of any conflict with a
`federal statute.” Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Coun-
`cil, 530 U. S. 363, 372 (2000) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz,
`
`312 U. S. 52, 66–67 (1941)). Such a conflict occurs when
`compliance with both federal and state regulations is
`impossible, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
`373 U. S. 132, 142–143 (1963), or when the state law
`“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
`tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,”
`Hines, 312 U. S., at 67. This case raises a question of
`purposes and objectives pre-emption.
`The regulation of domestic relations is traditionally the
`
`
`domain of state law. See In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 593–
`594 (1890). There is therefore a “presumption against pre-
`emption” of state laws governing domestic relations,
`Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U. S. 141, 151 (2001), and “family
`and family-property law must do ‘major damage’ to ‘clear
`
`and substantial’ federal interests before the Supremacy
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
` 1Compare, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Zaldivar, 413 F. 3d 119
`
`(CA1 2005) (FEGLIA pre-empted state-law rule); Metropolitan Life Ins.
` Co. v. Sullivan, 96 F. 3d 18 (CA2 1996) (per curiam) (same); Metropoli-
`
`
`
` tan Life Ins. Co. v. McMorris, 786 F. 2d 379 (CA10 1986) (same); O’Neal
`
` v. Gonzalez, 839 F. 2d 1437 (CA11 1988), with Hardy v. Hardy, 963
`
`N. E. 2d 470 (Ind. 2012) (not pre-empted); McCord v. Spradling, 830
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` So. 2d 1188 (Miss. 2002) (same); Kidd v. Pritzel, 821 S. W. 2d 566 (Mo.
`App. 1991) (same).
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`Clause will demand that state law will be overridden,”
`Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U. S. 572, 581 (1979). But
`family law is not entirely insulated from conflict pre-
`emption principles, and so we have recognized that state
`laws “governing the economic aspects of domestic relations
`. . . must give way to clearly conflicting federal enact-
`ments.” Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U. S. 46, 55 (1981).
`A
`
`To determine whether a state law conflicts with Con-
`
`gress’ purposes and objectives, we must first ascertain
`the nature of the federal interest. Crosby, 530 U. S., at
`372–373.
`
`Hillman contends that Congress’ purpose in enacting
`FEGLIA was to advance administrative convenience by
`
`establishing a clear rule to dictate where the Government
`should direct insurance proceeds. See Brief for Petitioner
`25. There is some force to Hillman’s argument that a
`significant legislative interest in a large federal program
`like FEGLIA is to enable its efficient administration. If
`Hillman is correct that administrative convenience was
`Congress’ only purpose, then there might be no conflict
`between Section D and FEGLIA: Section D’s cause of
`action takes effect only after benefits have been paid, and
`so would not necessarily impact the Government’s distri-
`bution of insurance proceeds. Cf. Hardy v. Hardy, 963
`
`N. E. 2d 470, 477–478 (Ind. 2012).
`
`
`For her part, Maretta insists that Congress had a more
`
`substantial purpose in enacting FEGLIA: to ensure that a
`duly named beneficiary will receive the insurance pro-
`ceeds and be able to make use of them. Brief for Respond-
`ent 21–22. If Maretta is correct, then Section D would
`directly conflict with that objective, because its cause of
`action would take the insurance proceeds away from the
`
`named beneficiary and reallocate them to someone else.
`We must therefore determine which understanding of
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`7
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` HILLMAN v. MARETTA
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`FEGLIA’s purpose is correct.
`We do not write on a clean slate. In two previous cases,
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`we considered federal insurance statutes requiring that
`insurance proceeds be paid to a named beneficiary and
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`held they pre-empted state laws that mandated a different
`distribution of benefits. The statutes we addressed in
`these cases are similar to FEGLIA. And the impediments
`to the federal interests in these prior cases are analogous
`to the one created by Section D of the Virginia statute.
`These precedents accordingly govern our analysis of the
`
`relationship between Section D and FEGLIA in this case.
`In Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U. S. 655 (1950), we consid-
`ered whether the National Service Life Insurance Act of
`1940 (NSLIA), 54 Stat. 1008, pre-empted a rule of state
`marital property law. Congress had enacted NSLIA to
`
`“affor[d] a uniform and comprehensive system of life in-
`surance for members and veterans of the armed forces of
`the United States.” Wissner, 338 U. S., at 658. A Califor-
`nia court granted the decedent’s widow, who was not the
`
`named beneficiary, an interest in the insurance proceeds
`as community property under state law. Id., at 657.
`
`We reversed, holding that NSLIA pre-empted the wid-
`ow’s state-law action to recover the proceeds. Id., at 658.
`
`In pertinent part, NSLIA provided that the insured “‘shall
`have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries
`of the insurance [within a designated class], . . . and shall
`. . . at all times have the right to change the beneficiary or
`beneficiaries.’” Ibid. (quoting 38 U. S. C. §802(g) (1946
`ed.)). We reasoned that “Congress has spoken with force
`and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the
`named beneficiary and no other.” 338 U. S., at 658. The
`
`California court’s decision could not stand, we found,
`because it “substitute[d] the widow for the mother, who
`was the beneficiary Congress directed shall receive the
`insurance money.” Id., at 659.
`In Ridgway, we considered a similar question regarding
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`the federal Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance Act of 1965
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`(SGLIA), Pub. L. 89–214, 79 Stat. 880, another insurance
`scheme for members of the armed services. 454 U. S., at
`50–53. A Maine court imposed a constructive trust on
`insurance proceeds paid to a servicemember’s widow, who
`was the named beneficiary, and ordered they be paid to
`
`the decedent’s first wife as required by the terms of a
`divorce decree. Id., at 49–50.
`In holding the constructive trust pre-empted, we ex-
`
`plained that the issue was “controlled by Wissner.” Id., at
`55. As in Wissner, the applicable provisions of SGLIA
`
`made clear that “the insured service member possesses the
`right freely to designate the beneficiary and to alter that
`choice at any time by communicating the decision in writ-
`
`ing to the proper office.” 454 U. S., at 56 (citing Wissner,
`338 U. S., at 658). We also noted that SGLIA estab-
`lished an “‘order of precedence,’” which provided that the
`benefits would be first paid to “such ‘beneficiary or bene-
`
`ficiaries as the member . . . may have designated by [an
`appropriately filed] writing received prior to death.’” 454
`U. S., at 52 (quoting 38 U. S. C. §770(a) (1976 ed.)). Not-
`withstanding “some small differences” between SGLIA
`and NSLIA, we concluded that SGLIA’s “unqualified direc-
`tive to pay the proceeds to the properly designated bene-
`ficiary clearly suggest[ed] that no different result was
`intended by Congress.” 454 U. S., at 57.
`
`B
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`Our reasoning in Wissner and Ridgway applies with
`equal force here. The statutes we considered in these
`earlier cases are strikingly similar to FEGLIA. Like
`NSLIA and SGLIA, FEGLIA creates a scheme that gives
`highest priority to an insured’s designated beneficiary. 5
`U. S. C. §8705(a). Indeed, FEGLIA includes an “order of
`precedence” that is nearly identical to the one in SGLIA:
`Both require that the insurance proceeds be paid first to
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`HILLMAN v. MARETTA
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`Opinion of the Court
`the named beneficiary ahead of any other potential recipi-
`ent. Compare ibid. with 38 U. S. C. §770(a) (1976 ed.)
`(now §1970(a) (2006 ed.)). FEGLIA’s implementing regu-
`lations further underscore that the employee’s “right” of
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`designation “cannot be waived or restricted.” 5 CFR
`§843.205(e). In FEGLIA, as in these other statutes, Con-
`
`gress “‘spok[e] with force and clarity in directing that the
`proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other.’”
`
`Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 55 (quoting Wissner, 338 U. S., at
`
`658; emphasis added). 2
`Section D interferes with Congress’ scheme, because it
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`directs that the proceeds actually “belong” to someone
`other than the named beneficiary by creating a cause of
`action for their recovery by a third party. Ridgway, 454
`U. S., at 55; see Va. Code Ann. §20–111.1(D). It makes no
`
`difference whether state law requires the transfer of the
`proceeds, as Section A does, or creates a cause of action,
`like Section D, that enables another person to receive the
`proceeds upon filing an action in state court. In either
`case, state law displaces the beneficiary selected by the
`insured in accordance with FEGLIA and places someone
`else in her stead. As in Wissner, applicable state law
`
`“substitutes the widow” for the “beneficiary Congress
`
`directed shall receive the insurance money,” 338 U. S., at
`659, and thereby “frustrates the deliberate purpose of
`
`
`Congress” to ensure that a federal employee’s named
`beneficiary receives the proceeds. Ibid.
`
`One can imagine plausible reasons to favor a different
`
`——————
`2Hillman points to some textual differences among NSLIA, SGLIA,
`
`and FEGLIA. She suggests, for example, that the provision of NSLIA
`
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`enabling the appointment of a beneficiary does not use precisely the
`“ ‘same language’ ” as FEGLIA’s order of precedence. Reply Brief 21.
`
`
`Even if there are “some small differences” in the statutory language,
`
`however, they do not diminish the critical similarity shared by the
`
`three statutes: Each reflects Congress’ “unqualified directive” that the
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`proceeds accrue to a named beneficiary. Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 57.
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`11
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`Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`policy. Many employees perhaps neglect to update their
`beneficiary designations after a change in marital status.
`
`As a result, a legislature could have thought that a default
`rule providing that insurance proceeds accrue to a widow
`or widower, and not a named beneficiary, would be more
`likely to align with most people’s intentions. Or, similarly,
`a legislature might have reasonably believed that an
`employee’s will is more reliable evidence of his intent than
`a beneficiary designation form executed years earlier.
`
`But that is not the judgment Congress made.3 Rather
`
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`than draw an inference about an employee’s probable
`intent from a range of sources, Congress established a
`clear and predictable procedure for an employee to indi-
`cate who the intended beneficiary of his life insurance
`shall be. Like the statutes at issue in Ridgway and
`
`
`
`Wissner, FEGLIA evinces Congress’ decision to accord
`federal employees an unfettered “freedom of choice” in
`selecting the beneficiary of the insurance proceeds and to
`ensure the proceeds would actually “belong” to that bene-
`ficiary. Ridgway, 454 U. S., at 56. An employee’s ability
`to name a beneficiary acts as a “guarantee of the complete
`and full performance of the contract to the exclusion of
`conflicting claims.” Wissner, 338 U. S., at 660. With that
`promise comes the expectation that the insurance pro-
`ceeds will be paid to the named beneficiary and that the
`beneficiary can use them.
`There is further confirmation that Congress intended
`
`——————
`3In his concurrence, JUSTICE ALITO argues that one of FEGLIA’s pur-
`
`poses is to “effectuat[e] . . . the insured’s expressed intent” and that
`evidence beyond an employee’s named beneficiary could therefore be
`relevant in some circumstances to determining that intent. Post, at 2–3
`
`(opinion concurring in judgment) (emphasis in original). For the
`reasons explained, however, that statement of Congress’ purpose is
`incomplete. See supra, at 9–10. Congress sought to ensure that an
`employee’s intent would be given effect only through the designation of
`a beneficiary or through the narrow exceptions specifically provided in
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`the statute, see infra, at 12–13.
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`HILLMAN v. MARETTA
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`Opinion of the Court
`the insurance proceeds be paid in accordance with
`
`FEGLIA’s procedures. Section 8705(e)(1) of FEGLIA
`provides that “[a]ny amount which would otherwise be
`paid . . . under the order of precedence” shall be paid to
`another person “if and to the extent expressly provided for
`in the terms of any court decree of divorce, annulment, or
`legal separation.” This exception, however, only applies if
`
`the “decree, order, or agreement . . . is received, before the
`date of the covered employee’s death, by the employing
`agency.” §8705(e)(2). This provision allows the proceeds
`to be paid to someone other than the named beneficiary,
`
`but if and only if the requisite documentation is filed with
`the Government, so that any departure from the benefi-
`ciary designation is managed within, not outside, the
`
`federal system.4
`
`We have explained that “[w]here Congress explicitly
`enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition,
`additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence
`of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” Andrus v.
`Glover Constr. Co., 446 U. S. 608, 616–617 (1980). Section
`8705(e) creates a limited exception to the order of prece-
`dence.
`If States could make alternative distributions
`outside the clear procedure Congress established, that
`——————
`4Congress enacted 5 U. S. C. §8705(e) following federal-court deci-
`
`sions that found FEGLIA to pre-empt state-court constructive trust
`actions predicated upon divorce decrees. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 839 F. 2d,
`at 1439–1440. Reflecting this backdrop, the House Report noted that
`“Under current law, . . . divorce decrees . . . do not affect the payment of
`life insurance proceeds.
`Instead, when the policyholder dies, the
`proceeds are paid to the beneficiary designated by the policyholder, if
`any, or to other individuals as specified by statute.” H. R. Rep. No.
`105–134, p. 2 (1997). To address the issue raised by these lower court
`
`cases, Congress could have amended FEGLIA to allow state law to take
`precedence over the named beneficiary when there is any conflict with
`a divorce decree or annulment. But Congress did not do so, and instead
`described the precise conditions under which a divorce decree could
`displace an employee’s named beneficiary.
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`Opinion of the Court
`would transform this narrow exception into a general
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`license for state law to override FEGLIA. See TRW Inc. v.
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`Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 28–29 (2001).5
`In short, where a beneficiary has been duly named, the
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`insurance proceeds she is owed under FEGLIA cannot be
`allocated to another person by operation of state law.
`Section D does exactly that. We therefore agree with the
`Virginia Supreme Court that it is pre-empted.
`
`III
`We are not persuaded by Hillman’s additional argu-
`ments in support of a different result.
`
`Hillman contends that Ridgway and Wissner can be
`distinguished because, unlike the statutes we considered
`in those cases, FEGLIA does not include an “anti-
`attachment provision.” Brief for Petitioner 38–41. The
`anti-attachment provisions in NSLIA and SGLIA were
`
`identical, and each broadly prohibited the “attachment,
`levy, or seizure” of insurance proceeds by any legal pro-
`cess. 38 U. S. C. §454a (1946 ed.) (incorporated by refer-
`
`ence in §816); §770(g) (1976 ed.). In Wissner and Ridgway,
`we found that the relevant state laws violated these provi-
`sions and that this further conflict supported our conclu-
`sion that the state laws were pre-empted.
`
`These discussions of the anti-attachment provisions,
`however, were alternative grounds to