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` OCTOBER TERM, 2012
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`SEBELIUS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
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`SERVICES v. AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL
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`CENTER ET AL.
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`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
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`THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
` No. 11–1231. Argued December 4, 2012—Decided January 22, 2013
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`The reimbursement amount health care providers receive for inpatient
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`services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries is adjusted upward for
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`hospitals that serve a disproportionate share of low-income patients.
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`The adjustment amount is determined in part by the percentage of a
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`hospital’s patients who are eligible for Supplemental Security Income
`(SSI), called the SSI fraction. Each year, the Centers for Medicare &
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`Medicaid Services (CMS) calculates the SSI fraction for an eligible
`hospital and submits that number to the hospital’s “fiscal intermedi-
`ary,” a Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) contractor.
`The intermediary computes the reimbursement amount due and then
`sends the hospital a Notice of Program Reimbursement (NPR). A
`provider dissatisfied with the determination has a right to appeal to
`the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB or Board) within
`180 days of receiving the NPR. 42 U. S. C. §1395oo(a)(3). By regula-
`tion, the Secretary of HHS authorized the PRRB to extend the 180-
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`day limit, for good cause, up to three years. See 42 CFR 405.1841(b)
`(2007).
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` The Baystate Medical Center—not a party here—timely appealed
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`its SSI fraction calculation for each year from 1993 through 1996.
`The PRRB found that errors in CMS’s methodology resulted in a sys-
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`tematic undercalculation of the disproportionate share adjustment
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`and corresponding underpayments to providers. In March 2006, the
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`Board’s Baystate decision was made public. Within 180 days, re-
`spondent hospitals filed a complaint with the Board, challenging
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`their adjustments for 1987 through 1994. Acknowledging that their
`challenges were more than a decade out of time, they urged that eq-
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`SEBELIUS v. AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
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`Syllabus
`uitable tolling of the limitations period was in order due to CMS’s
`failure to tell them about the computation error. The PRRB held that
`it lacked jurisdiction, reasoning that it had no equitable powers save
`those legislation or regulation might confer. On judicial review, the
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`District Court dismissed the hospitals’ claims. The D. C. Circuit re-
`versed. The presumption that statutory limitations periods are gen-
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`erally subject to equitable tolling, the court concluded, applied to the
`180-day time limit because nothing in §1395oo(a)(3) indicated that
`Congress intended to disallow such tolling.
`Held:
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`1. The 180-day limitation in §1395oo(a)(3) is not “jurisdictional.”
`Pp. 6–9.
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`(a) Unless Congress has “clearly state[d]” that a statutory limita-
`tion is jurisdictional, the restriction should be treated “as nonjuris-
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`dictional.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515–516.
`“[C]ontext, including this Court’s interpretations of similar provisions
`in many years past,” is probative of whether Congress intended a
`particular provision to rank as jurisdictional. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
`Muchnick, 559 U. S. ___, ___. If §1395oo(a)(3) were jurisdictional, the
`180-day time limit could not be enlarged by agency or court.
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` Section 1395oo(a)(3) hardly reveals a design to preclude any regu-
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`latory extension. The provision instructs that a provider “may obtain
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`a hearing” by filing “a request . . . within 180 days after notice of the
`intermediary’s final determination.” It “does not speak in jurisdic-
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`tional terms.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394.
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`This Court has repeatedly held that filing deadlines ordinarily are
`not jurisdictional; indeed, they have been described as “quintessen-
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`tial claim-processing rules.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. ___,
`___. Pp. 6–8.
`(b) Court-appointed amicus urges that §1395oo(a)(3) should be
`classified as a jurisdictional requirement based on its proximity to
`§§1395oo(a)(1) and (a)(2), both jurisdictional requirements, amicus
`asserts. But a requirement that would otherwise be nonjurisdictional
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`does not become jurisdictional simply because it is in a section of a
`statute that also contains jurisdictional provisions. Gonzalez v. Tha-
`ler, 565 U. S. ___, ___. Amicus also urges that the Medicare Act’s ex-
`press grant of authority for the Secretary to extend the time for bene-
`ficiary appeals implies the absence of such leeway for §1395oo(a)(3)’s
`provider appeals. In support, amicus relies on the general rule that
`Congress’s use of “certain language in one part of the statute and dif-
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`ferent language in another” can indicate that “different meanings
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`were intended,” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 711, n. 9.
`But that interpretive guide, like other canons of construction, is “no
`more than [a] rul[e] of thumb” that can tip the scales when a statute
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`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Syllabus
`could be read in multiple ways. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain,
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`503 U. S. 249, 253. Here, §1395oo(a)’s limitation is most sensibly
`characterized as nonjurisdictional. Pp. 8–9.
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`2. The Secretary’s regulation is a permissible interpretation of
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`§1395oo(a)(3). Pp. 10–14.
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`(a) Congress vested in the Secretary large rulemaking authority
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`to administer Medicare. A court lacks authority to undermine the
`Secretary’s regime unless her regulation is “arbitrary, capricious, or
`manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural
`Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 844. Here, the regula-
`tion survives inspection under that deferential standard. The Secre-
`tary brought to bear practical experience in superintending the huge
`program generally, and the PRRB in particular, in maintaining a
`three-year outer limit for intermediary determination challenges. A
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`court must uphold her judgment as long as it is a permissible con-
`struction of the statute, even if the court would have interpreted the
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`statute differently absent agency regulation. Pp. 10–11.
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`(b) A presumption of equitable tolling generally applies to suits
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`against the United States, Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
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`498 U.S. 89, 95–96, but application of this presumption is not in or-
`der for §1395oo(a)(3). This Court has never applied Irwin’s presump-
`tion to an agency’s internal appeal deadline. The presumption was
`adopted in part on the premise that “[s]uch a principle is likely to be
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`a realistic assessment of legislative intent.” Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95.
`That premise is inapt in the context of providers’ administrative ap-
`peals under the Medicare Act. For nearly 40 years the Secretary has
`prohibited the Board from extending the 180-day deadline, except as
`provided by regulation. In the six times §1395oo has been amended
`since 1974, Congress has left untouched the 180-day provision and
`the Secretary’s rulemaking authority. Furthermore, the statutory
`scheme, which applies to sophisticated institutional providers, is not
`designed to be “ ‘unusually protective’ of claimants.” Bowen v. City of
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`New York, 476 U. S. 467, 480. Nor is the scheme one “in which lay-
`men, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.” Zipes, 455
`U. S., at 397.
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`The hospitals ultimately argue that the Secretary’s regulations fail
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`to adhere to “fundamentals of fair play.” FCC v. Pottsville Broadcast-
`ing Co., 309 U. S. 134, 143. They point to 42 CFR §405.1885(b)(3),
`which permits reopening of an intermediary’s reimbursement deter-
`mination “at any time” if the determination was procured by fraud or
`fault of the provider. But this Court has explained that giving inter-
`mediaries more time to discover overpayments than providers have to
`discover underpayments may be justified by the “administrative real-
`ities” of the system: a few dozen fiscal intermediaries are charged
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` SEBELIUS v. AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
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`Syllabus
`with issuing tens of thousands of NPRs, while each provider can con-
`centrate on a single NPR, its own. Your Home Visiting Nurse Ser-
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` vices, Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U. S. 449, 455, 456. Pp. 11–14.
`642 F. 3d 1145, reversed and remanded.
`GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SO-
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`TOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion.
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`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 11–1231
`_________________
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` KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH
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` AND HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER v. AU-
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`BURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER ET AL.
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
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`[January 22, 2013]
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` JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
`This case concerns the time within which health care
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`providers may file an administrative appeal from the
`initial determination of the reimbursement due them for
`inpatient services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries.
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`Government contractors, called
`fiscal
`intermediaries,
`receive cost reports annually from care providers and
`notify them of the reimbursement amount for which they
`qualify. A provider dissatisfied with the fiscal intermedi-
`ary’s determination may appeal to an administrative body
`named the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB
`or Board). The governing statute, §602(h)(l)(D), 97 Stat.
`165, 42 U. S. C. §1395oo(a)(3), sets a 180-day limit for
`filing appeals from the fiscal intermediary to the PRRB.
`By a regulation promulgated in 1974, the Secretary of the
`Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) author-
`ized the Board to extend the 180-day limitation, for good
`cause, up to three years.1
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`——————
`1The agency was called the Department of Health, Education, and
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`Welfare until 1979, but for simplicity’s sake we refer to it as HHS
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` SEBELIUS v. AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
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`Opinion of the Court
`The providers in this case are hospitals who appealed to
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`the PRRB more than ten years after expiration of the 180-
`day statutory deadline. They assert that the Secretary’s
`failure to disclose information that made the fiscal inter-
`mediary’s reimbursement calculation incorrect prevented
`them from earlier appealing to the Board. Three positions
`have been briefed and argued regarding the time for pro-
`viders’ appeals to the PRRB. First, a Court-appointed
`amicus curiae has urged that the 180-day limitation is
`“jurisdictional,” and therefore cannot be enlarged at all by
`agency or court. Second, the Government maintains that
`the Secretary has the prerogative to set an outer limit of
`three years for appeals to the Board. And third, the hos-
`pitals argue that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies,
`stopping the 180-day clock during the time the Secretary
`concealed the information that made the fiscal interme-
`diary’s reimbursement determinations incorrect.
`We hold that the statutory 180-day limitation is not
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`“jurisdictional,” and that the Secretary reasonably con-
`strued the statute to permit a regulation extending the
`time for a provider’s appeal to the PRRB to three years.
`We further hold that the presumption in favor of equitable
`tolling does not apply to administrative appeals of the
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`kind here at issue.
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`I
`The Medicare program covers certain inpatient services
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`that hospitals provide to Medicare beneficiaries. Provid-
`ers are reimbursed at a fixed amount per patient, regard-
`less of the actual operating costs they incur in rendering
`these services. But the total reimbursement amount is
`adjusted upward for hospitals that serve a disproportion-
`ate share of low-income patients. This adjustment is
`made because hospitals with an unusually high percent-
`——————
`throughout this opinion.
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`Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`age of low-income patients generally have higher per-
`patient costs; such hospitals, Congress therefore found,
`should receive higher reimbursement rates. See H. R.
`Rep. No. 99–241, pt. 1, p. 16 (1985). The amount of the
`disproportionate share adjustment is determined in part
`by the percentage of the patients served by the hospital
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`who are eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
`payments, a percentage commonly called the SSI fraction.
`42 U. S. C. §1395ww(d) (2006 ed. and Supp. V).
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`At the end of each year, providers participating in Medi-
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`care submit cost reports to contractors acting on behalf of
`HHS known as fiscal intermediaries. Also at year end,
`the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) cal-
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`culates the SSI fraction for each eligible hospital and
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`submits that number to the intermediary for that hospital.
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`Using these numbers to determine the total payment due,
`the intermediary issues a Notice of Program Reimburse-
`ment (NPR) informing the provider how much it will be
`paid for the year.
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`If a provider is dissatisfied with the intermediary’s re-
`imbursement determination, the statute gives it the right
`to file a request for a hearing before the PRRB within
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`180 days of receiving the NPR. §1395oo(a)(3) (2006 ed.)
`In 1974, the Secretary promulgated a regulation, after
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`notice and comment rulemaking, permitting the Board to
`extend the 180-day time limit upon a showing of good
`cause; the regulation further provides that “no such exten-
`sion shall be granted by the Board if such request is filed
`more than 3 years after the date the notice of the interme-
`diary’s determination is mailed to the provider.” 39 Fed.
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`Reg. 34517 (1974) (codified in 42 CFR §405.1841(b)
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`(2007)).2
`——————
` 2In 2008, after this case commenced, the Secretary replaced the 1974
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`regulation with a new prescription limiting “good cause” to “extraordi-
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` nary circumstances beyond [the provider’s] control (such as a natural or
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`SEBELIUS v. AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
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`Opinion of the Court
`For many years, CMS released only the results of its
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` SSI fraction calculations and not the underlying data.3
`The Baystate Medical Center—a hospital not party to this
`case—timely appealed the calculation of its SSI fraction
`for each year from 1993 through 1996. Eventually, the
`PRRB determined that CMS had omitted several catego-
`ries of SSI data from its calculations and was using a
`flawed process to determine the number of low-income
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`beneficiaries treated by hospitals. These errors caused a
`systematic undercalculation of the disproportionate share
`adjustment, resulting in underpayments to the providers.
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`Baystate Medical Center v. Leavitt, 545 F. Supp. 2d 20,
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`26–30 (DC 2008); see id., at 57–58 (concluding that CMS
`failed to use “the best available data”).
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`The methodological errors revealed by the Board’s Bay-
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`state decision would have yielded similarly reduced pay-
`ments to all providers for which CMS had calculated
`an SSI fraction. In March 2006, the Board’s decision in
`the Baystate case was made public. Within 180 days, the
`hospitals in this case filed a complaint with the Board
`seeking to challenge their disproportionate share adjust-
`ments for the years 1987 through 1994. The hospitals
`acknowledged that their challenges, unlike Baystate’s
`timely contest, were more than a decade out of time. But
`equitable tolling of the limitations period was in order,
`they urged, due to CMS’s failure to inform the hospitals
`——————
`other catastrophe, fire, or strike).” 73 Fed. Reg. 30250 (2008) (codified
`in 42 CFR §405.1836(b) (2012)). The new regulation retains the strict
`three-year cutoff for all claims. §405.1836(c)(2). The parties agree that
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`this case is governed by the 1974 regulation, and our opinion today
`addresses only that regulation.
`3In §951 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Mod-
`ernization Act of 2003, 117 Stat. 2427, Congress required the Secretary
`to furnish hospitals with the data necessary to compute their own
`disproportionate share adjustment. Pursuant to this congressional
`mandate, the Secretary has adopted procedures for turning over the
`SSI data to hospitals upon request. 70 Fed. Reg. 47438 (2005).
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`that their SSI fractions had been based on faulty data.
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`The PRRB held that it lacked jurisdiction over the
`hospitals’ complaint, reasoning that it had no equitable
`powers save those legislation or regulation might confer,
`and that the Secretary’s regulation permitted it to excuse
`late appeals only for good cause, with three years as the
`outer limit. On judicial review, the District Court dis-
`missed the hospitals’ claims for relief, holding that noth-
`ing in the statute suggests that “Congress intended to
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`authorize equitable tolling.” 686 F. Supp. 2d 55, 70 (DC
`2010).
`The Court of Appeals reversed. 642 F. 3d 1145 (CADC
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`2011). It relied on the presumption that statutory limita-
`tions periods are generally subject to equitable tolling and
`reasoned that “‘the same rebuttable presumption of equi-
`table tolling applicable to suits against private defendants
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`should also apply to suits against the United States.’” Id.,
`at 1148 (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
`498 U. S. 89, 95–96 (1990)). The presumption applies
`to the 180-day time limit for provider appeals from re-
`imbursement determinations, the Court of Appeals held,
`finding nothing in the statutory provision for PRRB re-
`view indicating that Congress intended to disallow equi-
`table tolling. 642 F. 3d, at 1149–1151.
`
`We granted the Secretary’s petition for certiorari, 567
`U. S. ___ (2012), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of
`Appeals over whether the 180-day time limit in 42 U. S. C.
`§1395oo(a)(3) constricts the Board’s jurisdiction. Compare
`642 F. 3d 1145 (case below); Western Medical Enterprises,
`Inc. v. Heckler, 783 F. 2d 1376, 1379–1380 (CA9
`1986) (180-day limit is not jurisdictional and the Secretary
`may extend it for good cause), with Alacare Home Health
`Servs., Inc. v. Sullivan, 891 F. 2d 850, 855–856 (CA11
`1990) (statute of limitations is jurisdictional and the Sec-
`retary lacked authority to promulgate good-cause excep-
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`tion); St. Joseph’s Hospital of Kansas City v. Heckler, 786
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`SEBELIUS v. AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
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`Opinion of the Court
`F. 2d 848, 852–853 (CA8 1986) (same). Beyond the juris-
`dictional inquiry,4 the Secretary asked us to determine
`whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
`equitable tolling applies to providers’ Medicare reim-
`bursement appeals to the PRRB, notwithstanding the
`Secretary’s regulation barring such appeals after three
`years.
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`6
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`II
`
`A
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`Characterizing a rule as jurisdictional renders it unique
`in our adversarial system. Objections to a tribunal’s ju-
`risdiction can be raised at any time, even by a party that
`once conceded the tribunal’s subject-matter jurisdiction
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`over the controversy. Tardy jurisdictional objections can
`therefore result in a waste of adjudicatory resources and
`can disturbingly disarm litigants. See Henderson v.
`Shinseki, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 5); Arbaugh
`v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006). With these
`untoward consequences in mind, “we have tried in recent
`cases to bring some discipline to the use” of the term
`“jurisdiction.” Henderson, 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5);
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`see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523
`U. S. 83, 90 (1998) (jurisdiction has been a “word of many,
`too many, meanings” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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`To ward off profligate use of the term “jurisdiction,”
`we have adopted a “readily administrable bright line” for
`determining whether to classify a statutory limitation as
`jurisdictional. Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 516. We inquire
`whether Congress has “clearly state[d]” that the rule is
`jurisdictional; absent such a clear statement, we have
`——————
`4Because no party takes the view that the statutory 180-day time
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`limit is jurisdictional, we appointed John F. Manning to brief and argue
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` this position as amicus curiae. 567 U. S. ___ (2012). Amicus Manning
`has ably discharged his assigned responsibilities and the Court thanks
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` him for his well-stated arguments.
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`cautioned, “courts should treat the restriction as nonjuris-
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`dictional in character.” Id., at 515–516; see also Gonzalez
`v. Thaler, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 6); Hender-
`son, 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). This is not to say that
`Congress must incant magic words in order to speak
`clearly. We consider “context, including this Court’s inter-
`pretations of similar provisions in many years past,” as
`probative of whether Congress intended a particular
`provision to rank as jurisdictional. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
`Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 168 (2010); see also John R.
`Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 133–
`134 (2008).
`
`
`We reiterate what it would mean were we to type the gov-
`erning statute, 42 U. S. C. §1395oo(a)(3), “jurisdictional.”
`Under no circumstance could providers engage PRRB re-
`view more than 180 days after notice of the fiscal inter-
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`mediary’s final determination. Not only could there be no
`equitable tolling. The Secretary’s regulation providing for
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`a good-cause extension, see supra, at 3, would fall as well.
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`The language Congress used hardly reveals a design to
`preclude any regulatory extension. Section 1395oo(a)(3)
`instructs that a provider of services “may obtain a hear-
`ing” by the Board regarding its reimbursement amount if
`“such provider files a request for a hearing within 180
`days after notice of the intermediary’s final determina-
`tion.” This provision “does not speak in jurisdictional
`terms.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385,
`394 (1982). Indeed, it is less “jurisdictional” in tone than
`the provision we held to be nonjurisdictional in Henderson.
`There, the statute provided that a veteran seeking Veter-
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`ans Court review of the Department of Veterans Affairs’
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`determination of disability benefits “shall file a notice of
`appeal . . . within 120 days.” 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
`9) (quoting 38 U. S. C. §7266(a) (emphasis added)). Sec-
`tion 1395oo(a)(3), by contrast, contains neither the manda-
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`tory word “shall” nor the appellation “notice of appeal,”
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` SEBELIUS v. AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
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`Opinion of the Court
`words with jurisdictional import in the context of 28
`U. S. C. §2107’s limitations on the time for appeal from a
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` district court to a court of appeals. See Bowles v. Russell,
`551 U. S. 205, 214 (2007).
`Key to our decision, we have repeatedly held that filing
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`deadlines ordinarily are not jurisdictional; indeed, we have
`described them as “quintessential claim-processing rules.”
`Henderson, 562 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6); see also Scar-
`borough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 414 (2004) (filing dead-
`line for fee applications under Equal Access to Justice
`Act); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454 (2004) (filing
`deadlines for objecting to debtor’s discharge in bank-
`ruptcy); Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 498 (1967) (filing
`deadline for claims under the Trading with the Enemy
`Act). This case is scarcely the exceptional one in which a “cen-
`tury’s worth of precedent and practice in American courts”
`rank a time limit as jurisdictional. Bowles, 551 U. S., at
`209, n. 2; cf. Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454 (a time limitation
`may be emphatic, yet not jurisdictional).
`B
`
`Amicus urges that the three requirements in §1395oo(a)
`are specifications that together define the limits of the
`PRRB’s jurisdiction. Subsection (a)(1) specifies the claims
`providers may bring to the Board, and subsection (a)(2)
`sets forth an amount-in-controversy requirement. These
`are jurisdictional requirements, amicus asserts, so we
`should read the third specification, subsection (a)(3)’s
`
`
`
`180-day limitation, as also setting a jurisdictional
`requirement.
`
`Last Term, we rejected a similar proximity-based argu-
`
`ment. A requirement we would otherwise classify as
`nonjurisdictional, we held, does not become jurisdictional
`simply because it is placed in a section of a statute that
`
`also contains jurisdictional provisions. Gonzalez, 565
`U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11); see Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
`
`8
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`U. S. 749, 763–764 (1975) (statutory provision at issue
`
`contained three requirements for judicial review, only one
`of which was jurisdictional).
`
`Amicus also argues that the 180-day time limit for pro-
`vider appeals to the PRRB should be viewed as jurisdic-
`tional because Congress could have expressly made the
`provision nonjurisdictional, and indeed did so for other
`
`time limits in the Medicare Act. Amicus notes particularly
`that when Medicare beneficiaries request the Secretary
`to reconsider a benefits determination, the statute gives
`
`them a time limit of 180 days or “such additional time as
`
`the Secretary may allow.” 42 U. S. C. §1395ff(b)(1)(D)(i);
`see also §1395ff(b)(1)(D)(ii) (permitting Medicare benefi-
`
`ciary to request a hearing by the Secretary within “time
`limits” the Secretary “shall establish in regulations”). We
`have recognized, as a general rule, that Congress’s use of
`“certain language in one part of the statute and different
`
`language in another” can indicate that “different meanings
`were intended.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692,
`711, n. 9 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ami-
`cus notes this general rule in urging that an express grant
`of authority for the Secretary to extend the time for bene-
`ficiary appeals implies the absence of such leeway for
`
`provider appeals.
`
`But the interpretive guide just identified, like other
`canons of construction, is “no more than [a] rul[e] of
`thumb” that can tip the scales when a statute could be
`read in multiple ways. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain,
`503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992). For the reasons earlier stated,
`see supra, at 6–8, we are persuaded that the time limi-
`tation in §1395oo(a) is most sensibly characterized as a
`nonjurisdictional prescription. The limitation therefore
`does not bar the modest extension contained in the Secre-
`tary’s regulation.
`
`
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`
`
`9
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`10
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` SEBELIUS v. AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` III
`We turn now to the question whether §1395oo(a)(3)’s
`
`
`
` 180-day time limit for a provider to appeal to the PRRB is
`subject to equitable tolling.
`
`A
`Congress vested in the Secretary large rulemaking
`
`authority to administer the Medicare program. The PRRB
`may adopt rules and procedures only if “not inconsistent”
`with the Medicare Act or “regulations of the Secretary.”
`
`42 U. S. C. §1395oo(e). Concerning the 180-day period
`
`for an appeal to the Board from an intermediary’s reim-
`bursement determination, the Secretary’s regulation im-
`plementing §1395oo, adopted after notice and comment,
`
`speaks in no uncertain terms:
`“A request for a Board hearing filed after [the 180-day
`time limit] shall be dismissed by the Board, except
`that for good cause shown, the time limit may be ex-
`tended. However, no such extension shall be granted
`
`by the Board if such request is filed more than 3 years
`after the date the notice of the intermediary’s deter-
`mination
`is mailed to the provider.” 42 CFR
`§405.1841(b) (2007).
`The Secretary allowed only a distinctly limited exten-
`
`sion of time to appeal to the PRRB, cognizant that “the
`Board is burdened by an immense caseload,” and that
`“procedural rules requiring timely filings are indispens-
`able devices for keeping the machinery of the reimburse-
`ment appeals process running smoothly.” High Country
`Home Health, Inc. v. Thompson, 359 F. 3d 1307, 1310
`(CA10 2004). Imposing equitable tolling to permit appeals
`barred by the Secretary’s regulation would essentially gut
`the Secretary’s requirement that an appeal to the Board
`“shall be dismissed” if filed more than 180 days after the
`NPR, unless the provider shows “good cause” and requests
`
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` 11
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` Cite as: 568 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`an extension no later than three years after the NPR. A
`court lacks authority to undermine the regime established
`by the Secretary unless her regulation is “arbitrary, capri-
`cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron
`U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
`467 U. S. 837, 844 (1984).
`
`The Secretary’s regulation, we are satisfied, survives
`inspection under that deferential standard. As HHS has
`explained, “[i]t is in the interest of providers and the pro-
`gram that, at some point, intermediary determinations
`and the resulting amount of program payment due the
`provider or the program become no longer open to correc-
`tion.” CMS, Medicare: Provider Reimbursement Manual,
`pt. 1, ch. 29, §2930, p. 29–73 (rev. no. 372, 2011); cf. Taylor
`v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U. S. 638, 644 (1992) (“Deadlines
`may lead to unwelcome results, but they prompt parties
`to act and produce finality.”). The Secretary brought to
`bear practical experience in superintending the huge pro-
`gram generally, and the PRRB in particular, in maintaining
`three years as the outer limit. A court must uphold the
`
`Secretary’s judgment as long as it is a permissible con-
`struction of the statute, even if it differs from how the
`court would have interpreted the statute in the absence of
`an agency regulation. National Cable & Telecommunica-
`tions Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 980
`
`(2005); see also Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 11.
`B
`
`
`Rejecting the Secretary’s position, the Court of Appeals
`relied principally on this Court’s decision in Irwin, 498
`U. S., at 95–96. Irwin concerned the then 30-day time
`period for filing suit against a federal agency under Title
`VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–
`16(c) (1988 ed.). We held in Irwin that “the same rebut-
`table presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits
`against private defendants should also apply to suits
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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` SEBELIUS v. AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
`
`Opinion of the Court
`against the United States.” 498 U. S., at 95–96. Irwin
`itself, and equitable-tolling cases we have considered both
`pre- and post-Irwin, have generally involved time limits
`for filing suit in federal court. See, e.g., Holland v. Flor-
`ida, 560 U. S. ___ (2010) (one-year limitation for filing
`application for writ of habeas corpus); Rotella v. Wood, 528
`U. S. 549 (2000) (four-year period for filing civil RICO
`
`suit); United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38 (1998) (12-
`year period to bring suit under Quiet Title Act); Lampf,
`Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U. S.
`350 (1991) (one- and three-year periods for commencing
`civil action under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
`1934); Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484 (1967) (60-day period
`for filing suit under Trading with the Enemy Act); Kendall
`v. United States, 107 U. S. 123 (1883) (six-year period for
`filing suit in Court of Claims). Courts in those cases ren-
`dered in the first instance the decision whether equity
`required tolling.
`
`This case is of a different order. We have never applied
`
`the Irwin presumption to an agency’s internal appeal dead-
`
`line, here the time a provider has to appeal an inter-
`mediary’s reimbursement determination to the PRRB. Cf