(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2011
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`
`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
` Syllabus
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` ARIZONA ET AL. v. UNITED STATES
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 11–182. Argued April 25, 2012—Decided June 25, 2012
`
`
` An Arizona statute known as S. B. 1070 was enacted in 2010 to address
` pressing issues related to the large number of unlawful aliens in the
`
` State. The United States sought to enjoin the law as preempted. The
`
` District Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing four of its
`
`provisions from taking effect. Section 3 makes failure to comply with
`
`federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; §5(C)
`makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage
`
`
` in work in the State; §6 authorizes state and local officers to arrest
` without a warrant a person “the officer has probable cause to believe
`
`. . . has committed any public offense that makes the person remova-
`ble from the United States”; and §2(B) requires officers conducting a
`
`stop, detention, or arrest to make efforts, in some circumstances, to
`verify the person’s immigration status with the Federal Government.
`The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the United States had es-
`tablished a likelihood of success on its preemption claims.
`Held:
`
`1. The Federal Government’s broad, undoubted power over immi-
`gration and alien status rests, in part, on its constitutional power to
`
`“establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” Art. I, §8, cl. 4, and on
`its inherent sovereign power to control and conduct foreign relations,
`see Toll v. Moreno, 458 U. S. 1, 10. Federal governance is extensive
`and complex. Among other things, federal law specifies categories of
`aliens who are ineligible to be admitted to the United States, 8
`
`U. S. C. §1182; requires aliens to register with the Federal Govern-
`ment and to carry proof of status, §§1304(e), 1306(a); imposes sanc-
`
`tions on employers who hire unauthorized workers, §1324a; and spec-
`ifies which aliens may be removed and the procedures for doing so,
`
`see §1227. Removal is a civil matter, and one of its principal features
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`

`
`2
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`ARIZONA v. UNITED STATES
`
`
`Syllabus
`is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials, who must
`
`decide whether to pursue removal at all. Immigration and Customs
`Enforcement (ICE), an agency within the Department of Homeland
`Security, is responsible for identifying, apprehending, and removing
`illegal aliens. It also operates the Law Enforcement Support Center,
`which provides immigration status information to federal, state, and
`local officials around the clock. Pp. 2–7.
`
`
`2. The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt
`state law. A statute may contain an express preemption provision,
`
`see, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whit-
`ing, 563 U. S. ___, ___, but state law must also give way to federal
`law in at least two other circumstances. First, States are precluded
`
`from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined
`
`must be regulated by its exclusive governance. See Gade v. National
`Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 115. Intent can be in-
`ferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Con-
`gress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where a “federal
`interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
`preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Rice v. San-
`ta Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230. Second, state laws are
`preempted when they conflict with federal law, including when they
`stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
`purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
`52, 67. Pp. 7–8.
`3. Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 of S. B. 1070 are preempted by federal
`law. Pp. 8–19.
`
`
`(a) Section 3 intrudes on the field of alien registration, a field in
`which Congress has left no room for States to regulate. In Hines, a
`state alien-registration program was struck down on the ground that
`Congress intended its “complete” federal registration plan to be a
`“single integrated and all-embracing system.” 312 U. S., at 74. That
`scheme did not allow the States to “curtail or complement” federal
`law or “enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Id., at 66–67.
`The federal registration framework remains comprehensive. Because
`
`Congress has occupied the field, even complementary state regulation
`is impermissible. Pp. 8–11.
`
`
`(b) Section 5(C)’s criminal penalty stands as an obstacle to the
`
`federal regulatory system. The Immigration Reform and Control Act
`of 1986 (IRCA), a comprehensive framework for “combating the em-
`
`
`ployment of illegal aliens,” Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
`
`NLRB, 535 U. S. 137, 147, makes it illegal for employers to knowing-
`
`ly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ unauthorized workers, 8
`U. S. C. §§1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), and requires employers to verify pro-
`spective
`employees’
`employment
`authorization
`status,
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`

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`Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
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`
`Syllabus
`§§1324a(a)(1)(B), (b). It imposes criminal and civil penalties on em-
`ployers, §§1324a(e)(4), (f), but only civil penalties on aliens who seek,
`
`or engage in, unauthorized employment, e.g., §§1255(c)(2), (c)(8).
`IRCA’s express preemption provision, though silent about whether
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`additional penalties may be imposed against employees, “does not bar
`the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles” or impose a
`
`
`“special burden” making it more difficult to establish the preemption
`of laws falling outside the clause. Geier v. American Honda Motor
`Co., 529 U. S. 861, 869–872. The correct instruction to draw from the
`text, structure, and history of IRCA is that Congress decided it would
`be inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on unauthorized em-
`ployees. It follows that a state law to the contrary is an obstacle to
`the regulatory system Congress chose. Pp. 12–15.
`
`
`(c) By authorizing state and local officers to make warrantless
`arrests of certain aliens suspected of being removable, §6 too creates
`an obstacle to federal law. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a
`removable alien to remain in the United States. The federal scheme
`
`
`
`instructs when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal
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`process. The Attorney General in some circumstances will issue a
`warrant for trained federal immigration officers to execute. If no fed-
`eral warrant has been issued, these officers have more limited au-
`
`thority. They may arrest an alien for being “in the United States in
`violation of any [immigration] law or regulation,” for example, but on-
`ly where the alien “is likely to escape before a warrant can be ob-
`tained.” §1357(a)(2). Section 6 attempts to provide state officers with
`even greater arrest authority, which they could exercise with no in-
`
`struction from the Federal Government. This is not the system Con-
`gress created. Federal law specifies limited circumstances in which
`
`state officers may perform an immigration officer’s functions. This
`includes instances where the Attorney General has granted that au-
`
`thority in a formal agreement with a state or local government. See,
`e.g., §1357(g)(1). Although federal law permits state officers to “coop-
`erate with the Attorney General in the identification, apprehension,
`
`detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United
`States,” §1357(g)(10)(B), this does not encompass the unilateral deci-
`
`
`sion to detain authorized by §6. Pp. 15–19.
`
`4. It was improper to enjoin §2(B) before the state courts had an
`opportunity to construe it and without some showing that §2(B)’s en-
`forcement in fact conflicts with federal immigration law and its objec-
`
`tives. Pp. 19–24.
`(a) The state provision has three limitations: A detainee is pre-
`sumed not to be an illegal alien if he or she provides a valid Arizona
`driver’s license or similar identification; officers may not consider
`race, color, or national origin “except to the extent permitted by the
`
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`3
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`

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`ARIZONA v. UNITED STATES
`
`
`Syllabus
`United States [and] Arizona Constitution[s]”; and §2(B) must be “im-
`plemented in a manner consistent with federal law regulating immi-
`gration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the
`privileges and immunities of United States citizens.” P. 20.
`(b) This Court finds unpersuasive the argument that, even with
`
`
`those limits, §2(B) must be held preempted at this stage. Pp. 20–24.
`
`(1) The mandatory nature of the status checks does not inter-
`fere with the federal immigration scheme. Consultation between fed-
`eral and state officials is an important feature of the immigration
`system. In fact, Congress has encouraged the sharing of information
`about possible immigration violations. See §§1357(g)(10)(A), 1373(c).
`
`The federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy requiring state offi-
`cials to contact ICE as a routine matter. Cf. Whiting, 563 U. S., at
`
`___. Pp. 20–21.
`(2) It is not clear at this stage and on this record that §2(B), in
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`
`
`practice, will require state officers to delay the release of detainees
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`for no reason other than to verify their immigration status. This
`would raise constitutional concerns. And it would disrupt the federal
`framework to put state officers in the position of holding aliens in
`custody for possible unlawful presence without federal direction and
`supervision. But §2(B) could be read to avoid these concerns. If the
`law only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the
`
`course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been
`released, the provision would likely survive preemption—at least ab-
`sent some showing that it has other consequences that are adverse to
`federal law and its objectives. Without the benefit of a definitive in-
`
`terpretation from the state courts, it would be inappropriate to as-
`sume §2(B) will be construed in a way that conflicts with federal law.
`Cf. Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 277. This opinion does not
`foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law
`
`as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect. Pp. 22–24.
`
`641 F. 3d 339, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
`KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`
`
`C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J.,
`
`
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`
`
`THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed opinions concurring in part and dissent-
`
`
`ing in part. KAGAN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of
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`the case.
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`4
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`Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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`
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 11–182
`_________________
` ARIZONA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES
`
`
`
`
` ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`
`
` APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`[June 25, 2012]
`
`JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
`To address pressing issues related to the large number
`
`
`of aliens within its borders who do not have a lawful right
`to be in this country, the State of Arizona in 2010 enacted
`a statute called the Support Our Law Enforcement and
`Safe Neighborhoods Act. The law is often referred to as
`S. B. 1070, the version introduced in the state senate. See
`also H. 2162 (2010) (amending S. 1070). Its stated pur­
`pose is to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and
`presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlaw­
`fully present in the United States.” Note following Ariz.
`Rev. Stat. Ann. §11–1051 (West 2012). The law’s provi­
`sions establish an official state policy of “attrition through
`enforcement.”
`Ibid. The question before the Court is
`
`whether federal law preempts and renders invalid four
`separate provisions of the state law.
`I
`
`The United States filed this suit against Arizona, seek­
`ing to enjoin S. B. 1070 as preempted. Four provisions of
`the law are at issue here. Two create new state offenses.
`Section 3 makes failure to comply with federal alien­
`registration requirements a state misdemeanor. Ariz.
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`2
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`ARIZONA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
` Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–1509 (West Supp. 2011). Section 5, in
`
`relevant part, makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthor­
`ized alien to seek or engage in work in the State; this
`
`provision is referred to as §5(C). See §13–2928(C). Two
`other provisions give specific arrest authority and inves-
`tigative duties with respect to certain aliens to state and
`local law enforcement officers. Section 6 authorizes offic­
`ers to arrest without a warrant a person “the officer has
`probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public
`offense that makes the person removable from the United
`States.” §13–3883(A)(5). Section 2(B) provides that offic­
`ers who conduct a stop, detention, or arrest must in some
`circumstances make efforts to verify the person’s immi­
`
`gration status with the Federal Government. See §11–
`1051(B) (West 2012).
`
`The United States District Court for the District of
`
`Arizona issued a preliminary injunction preventing the
`four provisions at issue from taking effect. 703 F. Supp.
`2d 980, 1008 (2010). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
`Circuit affirmed. 641 F. 3d 339, 366 (2011). It agreed that
`
`the United States had established a likelihood of success
`on its preemption claims. The Court of Appeals was unan­
`imous in its conclusion that §§3 and 5(C) were likely
`preempted. Judge Bea dissented from the decision to
`uphold the preliminary injunction against §§2(B) and 6.
`
`This Court granted certiorari to resolve important ques­
`tions concerning the interaction of state and federal power
`with respect to the law of immigration and alien status.
`565 U. S. ___ (2011).
`
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`
`II
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`
`A
`
`The Government of the United States has broad, un­
`
`doubted power over the subject of immigration and the
`status of aliens. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U. S. 1, 10 (1982);
`see generally S. Legomsky & C. Rodríguez, Immigration
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`

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`3
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` Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` and Refugee Law and Policy 115–132 (5th ed. 2009). This
`
`authority rests, in part, on the National Government’s
`constitutional power to “establish an uniform Rule of Nat-
`uralization,” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 4, and its inher-
`ent power as sovereign to control and conduct relations
`with foreign nations, see Toll, supra, at 10 (citing United
`
`States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 318
`
`
`(1936)).
`The federal power to determine immigration policy is
`
`well settled. Immigration policy can affect trade, invest­
`ment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire
`Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of
`aliens in this country who seek the full protection of its
`
`laws. See, e.g., Brief for Argentina et al. as Amici Curiae;
`see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580,
`588–589 (1952). Perceived mistreatment of aliens in the
`United States may lead to harmful reciprocal treatment
`of American citizens abroad. See Brief for Madeleine K.
`
`Albright et al. as Amici Curiae 24–30.
`It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about
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`the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the
`
`United States must be able to confer and communicate on
`
`this subject with one national sovereign, not the 50 sepa­
`rate States. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 279–
`280 (1876); see also The Federalist No. 3, p. 39 (C. Rossiter
`ed. 2003) (J. Jay) (observing that federal power would be
`necessary in part because “bordering States . . . under the
`impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of appar­
`
`ent interest or injury” might take action that would un­
`
`dermine foreign relations). This Court has reaffirmed that
`“[o]ne of the most important and delicate of all interna­
`tional relationships . . . has to do with the protection of the
`just rights of a country’s own nationals when those na­
`tionals are in another country.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
`U. S. 52, 64 (1941).
`Federal governance of immigration and alien status is
`
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`

`
`ARIZONA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`extensive and complex. Congress has specified catego­
`ries of aliens who may not be admitted to the United
`States. See 8 U. S. C. §1182. Unlawful entry and unlawful
`reentry into the country are federal offenses. §§1325,
`1326. Once here, aliens are required to register with the
`Federal Government and to carry proof of status on their
`person. See §§1301–1306. Failure to do so is a federal
`misdemeanor. §§1304(e), 1306(a). Federal law also au­
`thorizes States to deny noncitizens a range of public bene­
`fits, §1622; and it imposes sanctions on employers who
`hire unauthorized workers, §1324a.
`
`Congress has specified which aliens may be removed
`
`
`from the United States and the procedures for doing so.
`Aliens may be removed if they were inadmissible at the
`time of entry, have been convicted of certain crimes, or
`meet other criteria set by federal law. See §1227. Re­
`moval is a civil, not criminal, matter. A principal feature of
`the removal system is the broad discretion exercised by
`immigration officials. See Brief for Former Commission­
`ers of the United States Immigration and Naturalization
`Service as Amici Curiae 8–13 (hereinafter Brief for For­
`mer INS Commissioners). Federal officials, as an initial
`matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue
`removal at all. If removal proceedings commence, aliens
`may seek asylum and other discretionary relief allowing
`them to remain in the country or at least to leave without
`
` formal removal. See §1229a(c)(4); see also, e.g., §§1158
`(asylum), 1229b (cancellation of removal), 1229c (volun­
`tary departure).
`
`Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law em­
`braces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized work­
`ers trying to support their families, for example, likely
`pose less danger than alien smugglers or aliens who com­
`mit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case
`may turn on many factors, including whether the alien
`has children born in the United States, long ties to the
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`4
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`5
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` Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`community, or a record of distinguished military service.
`Some discretionary decisions involve policy choices that
`bear on this Nation’s international relations. Returning
`an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate
`even where he has committed a removable offense or fails
`to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state may
`be mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or
`enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien
`or his family will be harmed upon return. The dynamic
`nature of relations with other countries requires the Exec­
`utive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are con­
`sistent with this Nation’s foreign policy with respect to
`these and other realities.
`Agencies in the Department of Homeland Security play
`
`
`a major role in enforcing the country’s immigration laws.
`
`United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is re-
`sponsible for determining the admissibility of aliens and
`securing the country’s borders. See Dept. of Homeland
`
` Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Immigration
` Enforcement Actions: 2010, p. 1 (2011). In 2010, CBP’s
`
`Border Patrol apprehended almost half a million people.
`Id., at 3. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a
`second agency, “conducts criminal investigations involving
`the enforcement of immigration-related statutes.” Id., at
`2. ICE also operates the Law Enforcement Support Cen­
`ter. LESC, as the Center is known, provides immigra-
`tion status information to federal, state, and local officials
`around the clock. See App. 91. ICE officers are respon­
`sible “for the identification, apprehension, and removal of
`illegal aliens from the United States.” Immigration En­
`forcement Actions, supra, at 2. Hundreds of thousands of
`
`
`aliens are removed by the Federal Government every year.
`See id., at 4 (reporting there were 387,242 removals, and
`476,405 returns without a removal order, in 2010).
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`

`
`ARIZONA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`B
`
`
`The pervasiveness of federal regulation does not di­
`minish the importance of immigration policy to the States.
`Arizona bears many of the consequences of unlawful im­
`
`migration. Hundreds of thousands of deportable aliens
`are apprehended in Arizona each year. Dept. of Homeland
`Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2010 Yearbook
`of Immigration Statistics 93 (2011) (Table 35). Unauthor­
`ized aliens who remain in the State comprise, by one es-
`timate, almost six percent of the population. See Passel
`& Cohn, Pew Hispanic Center, U. S. Unauthorized Im-
`
`migration Flows Are Down Sharply Since Mid-Decade 3
`(2010). And in the State’s most populous county, these
`aliens are reported to be responsible for a disproportionate
`share of serious crime. See, e.g., Camarota & Vaughan,
`Center for Immigration Studies, Immigration and Crime:
`Assessing a Conflicted Situation 16 (2009) (Table 3) (esti­
`
`mating that unauthorized aliens comprise 8.9% of the
`population and are responsible for 21.8% of the felonies in
`Maricopa County, which includes Phoenix).
`
`Statistics alone do not capture the full extent of Arizo­
`na’s concerns. Accounts in the record suggest there is an
`“epidemic of crime, safety risks, serious property damage,
`and environmental problems” associated with the influx
`of illegal migration across private land near the Mexican
`border. Brief for Petitioners 6. Phoenix is a major city of
`the United States, yet signs along an interstate highway
`30 miles to the south warn the public to stay away. One
`reads, “DANGER—PUBLIC WARNING—TRAVEL NOT
`RECOMMENDED / Active Drug and Human Smuggling
`Area / Visitors May Encounter Armed Criminals and
`
`Smuggling Vehicles Traveling at High Rates of Speed.”
`App. 170; see also Brief for Petitioners 5–6. The problems
`posed to the State by illegal immigration must not be
`underestimated.
`
`These concerns are the background for the formal legal
`
`
`
`6
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`

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` Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`analysis that follows. The issue is whether, under pre­
`emption principles, federal law permits Arizona to imple­
`ment the state-law provisions in dispute.
`
`III
`
`Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts
`the principle that both the National and State Govern­
`ments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to
`respect. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 457
`(1991); U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779,
`838 (1995) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). From the existence
`
`of two sovereigns follows the possibility that laws can be
`in conflict or at cross-purposes. The Supremacy Clause
`provides a clear rule that federal law “shall be the su­
`preme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
`shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
`Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
`Art. VI, cl. 2. Under this principle, Congress has the
`power to preempt state law. See Crosby v. National For-
`eign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 372 (2000); Gibbons
`v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210–211 (1824). There is no doubt
`that Congress may withdraw specified powers from the
`
`
`States by enacting a statute containing an express
`preemption provision. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of
`
`United States of America v. Whiting, 563 U. S. ___, ___
`(2011) (slip op., at 4).
`State law must also give way to federal law in at least
`
`
`two other circumstances. First, the States are precluded
`from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting
`within its proper authority, has determined must be regu­
`lated by its exclusive governance. See Gade v. National
`Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 115 (1992).
`The intent to displace state law altogether can be inferred
`from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that
`Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or
`where there is a “federal interest . . . so dominant that the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
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`

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`8
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`ARIZONA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
`state laws on the same subject.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
`Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947); see English v. General
`Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79 (1990).
`
`Second, state laws are preempted when they conflict
`with federal law. Crosby, supra, at 372. This includes
`cases where “compliance with both federal and state
`regulations is a physical impossibility,” Florida Lime &
`Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142–143
`(1963), and those instances where the challenged state law
`“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu­
`tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,”
`
`Hines, 312 U. S., at 67; see also Crosby, supra, at 373
`(“What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment, to
`be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole
`and identifying its purpose and intended effects”).
`In
`preemption analysis, courts should assume that “the
`historic police powers of the States” are not superseded
`“unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con­
`
`gress.” Rice, supra, at 230; see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S.
`555, 565 (2009).
`
`The four challenged provisions of the state law each
`must be examined under these preemption principles.
`IV
`A
`Section 3
`
`Section 3 of S. B. 1070 creates a new state misde-
`
`meanor. It forbids the “willful failure to complete or carry an
`alien registration document . . . in violation of 8 United
`
`States Code section 1304(e) or 1306(a).” Ariz. Rev. Stat.
`Ann. §11–1509(A) (West Supp. 2011). In effect, §3 adds a
`
`state-law penalty for conduct proscribed by federal law.
`The United States contends that this state enforcement
`mechanism intrudes on the field of alien registration, a
`field in which Congress has left no room for States to
`
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`Opinion of the Court
` regulate. See Brief for United States 27, 31.
`
`
`The Court discussed federal alien-registration require­
` ments in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52. In 1940, as
`
`international conflict spread, Congress added to federal
`immigration law a “complete system for alien registra­
`tion.” Id., at 70. The new federal law struck a careful
`balance. It punished an alien’s willful failure to register
`but did not require aliens to carry identification cards.
`
`There were also limits on the sharing of registration rec­
`ords and fingerprints. The Court found that Congress
`intended the federal plan for registration to be a “single
`integrated and all-embracing system.” Id., at 74. Because
`this “complete scheme . . . for the registration of aliens”
`touched on foreign relations, it did not allow the States to
`“curtail or complement” federal law or to “enforce addi­
`tional or auxiliary regulations.” Id., at 66–67. As a con­
`sequence, the Court ruled that Pennsylvania could not
`enforce its own alien-registration program. See id., at 59, 74.
`
`
`
`The present regime of federal regulation is not identi­
`cal to the statutory framework considered in Hines, but
`
` it remains comprehensive. Federal law now includes a
`requirement that aliens carry proof of registration. 8
`U. S. C. §1304(e). Other aspects, however, have stayed the
`same. Aliens who remain in the country for more than 30
`days must apply for registration and be fingerprinted.
`Compare §1302(a) with id., §452(a) (1940 ed.). Detailed
`information is required, and any change of address has
`to be reported to the Federal Government. Compare
`§§1304(a), 1305(a) (2006 ed.), with id., §§455(a), 456 (1940
`ed.). The statute continues to provide penalties for the
`willful failure to register. Compare §1306(a) (2006 ed.),
`with id., §457 (1940 ed.).
`
`The framework enacted by Congress leads to the conclu­
`sion here, as it did in Hines, that the Federal Government
`
`has occupied the field of alien registration. See American
`Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U. S. 396, 419, n. 11 (2003)
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`ARIZONA v. UNITED STATES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`(characterizing Hines as a field preemption case); Pennsyl-
`vania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497, 504 (1956) (same); see also
`Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L. J.
`2085, 2098–2099, 2107 (2000) (same). The federal statu­
`tory directives provide a full set of standards governing
`alien registration, including the punishment for noncom­
`pliance.
`It was designed as a “‘harmonious whole.’”
`
`Hines, supra, at 72. Where Congress occupies an entire
`field, as it has in the field of alien registration, even com­
`plementary state regulation is impermissible. Field pre­
`emption reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any
`state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to fed-
`
`eral standards. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
`U. S. 238, 249 (1984).
`
`Federal law makes a single sovereign responsible for
`maintaining a comprehensive and unified system to keep
`track of aliens within the Nation’s borders. If §3 of the
`Arizona statute were valid, every State could give itself
`independent authority to prosecute federal registration
`violations, “diminish[ing] the [Federal Government]’s control
`over enforcement” and “detract[ing] from the ‘integrated
`scheme of regulation’ created by Congress.” Wisconsin
`Dept. of Industry v. Gould Inc., 475 U. S. 282, 288–289
`(1986). Even if a State may make violation of federal
`law a crime in some instances, it cannot do so in a field
`(like the field of alien registration) that has been occupied
`
`by federal law. See California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725, 730–
`731, 733 (1949); see also In re Loney, 134 U. S. 372, 375–
`
`376 (1890) (States may not impose their own punishment
`
`for perjury in federal courts).
`
`Arizona contends that §3 can survive preemption be­
`cause the provision has the same aim as federal law and
`adopts its substantive standards. This argument not only
`ignores the basic premise of field preemption—that States
`may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal Gov­
`ernment has reserved for itself—but also is unpersuasive
`
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`Opinion of the Court
`on its own terms. Permitting the State to impose its own
`penalties for the federal offenses here would conflict with
`the careful framework Congress adopted. Cf. Buckman
`Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U. S. 341, 347–348
`(2001) (States may not impose their own punishment for
`fraud on the Food and Drug Administration); Wisconsin
`Dept., supra, at 288 (States may not impose their own
`punishment for repeat violations of the National Labor
`Relations Act). Were §3 to come into force, the State
`would have the power to bring criminal charges against
`individuals for violating a federal law even in circum­
`stances where federal officials in charge of the comprehen­
`sive scheme determine that prosecution would frustrate
`federal policies.
`There is a further intrusion upon the federal scheme.
`
`Even where federal authorities believe prosecution is ap-
`propriate, there is an inconsistency between §3 and fed-
`eral law with respect to penalties. Under federal law,
`the failure to carry registration papers is a misdemeanor
`that may be punished by a fine, imprisonment, or a term
`of probation. See 8 U. S. C. §1304(e) (2006 ed.); 18 U. S. C.
`§3561. State law, by contrast, rule