(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2011
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`
`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
` Syllabus
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` ELGIN ET AL. v. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
`
`
`ET AL.
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FIRST CIRCUIT
` No. 11–45. Argued February 27, 2012—Decided June 11, 2012
`
`The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) “established a compre-
`hensive system for reviewing personnel action taken against federal
`
`employees,” United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 455, including
`
`
`removals, 5 U. S. C. §7512. A qualifying employee has the right to a
`hearing before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB),
`§§7513(d), 7701(a)(1)–(2), which is authorized to order reinstatement,
`backpay, and attorney’s fees, §§1204(a)(2), 7701(g). An employee who
`is dissatisfied with the MSPB’s decision is entitled to judicial review
`
`in the Federal Circuit. §§7703(a)(1), (b)(1).
`
`Petitioners were federal employees discharged pursuant to 5
`U. S. C. §3328, which bars from Executive agency employment any-
`one who has knowingly and willfully failed to register for the Selec-
`tive Service as required by the Military Selective Service Act, 50
`
`
`U. S. C. App. §453. Petitioner Elgin challenged his removal before
`the MSPB, claiming that §3328 is an unconstitutional bill of attain-
`der and unconstitutionally discriminates based on sex when com-
`bined with the Military Selective Service Act’s male-only registration
`
`
`requirement. The MSPB referred the case to an Administrative Law
`Judge (ALJ), who dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, con-
`cluding that an employee is not entitled to MSPB review of agency
`
`action that is based on an absolute statutory bar to employment. The
`ALJ also concluded that the MSPB lacked authority to determine the
`constitutionality of a federal statute. Rather than seeking further
`MSPB review or appealing to the Federal Circuit, Elgin joined other
`petitioners raising the same constitutional challenges to their remov-
`als in a suit in Federal District Court. The District Court found that
`it had jurisdiction and denied petitioners’ constitutional claims on the
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`

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`2
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`ELGIN v. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
`
`
`Syllabus
`merits. The First Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to
`dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The First Circuit held that petition-
`
`ers were employees entitled to MSPB review despite the statutory
`
`bar to their employment. The court further concluded that challeng-
`es to a removal are not exempt from the CSRA review scheme simply
`
`because an employee challenges the constitutionality of the statute
`authorizing the removal.
`
`
`Held: The CSRA precludes district court jurisdiction over petitioners’
`
`claims because it is fairly discernible that Congress intended the
`statute’s review scheme to provide the exclusive avenue to judicial
`review for covered employees who challenge covered adverse em-
`ployment actions, even when those employees argue that a federal
`
`statute is unconstitutional. Pp. 5–20.
`(a) Relying on Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 603, petitioners claim
`
`that 28 U. S. C. §1331’s general grant of federal-question jurisdiction
`
`
`to district courts remains undisturbed unless Congress explicitly di-
`
`rects otherwise. But Webster’s “heightened showing” applies only
`when a statute purports to “deny any judicial forum for a colorable
`constitutional claim,” 486 U. S., at 603, not when Congress channels
`judicial review of a constitutional claim to a particular court, see
`
`Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U. S. 200. Here, where the
`claims can be “meaningfully addressed in the” Federal Circuit, id., at
`215, the proper inquiry is whether Congress’ intent to preclude dis-
`trict court jurisdiction was “ ‘fairly discernible in the statutory
`
`scheme,’ ” id., at 207. Pp. 5–6.
`(b) It is “fairly discernible” from the CSRA’s text, structure, and
`purpose that Congress precluded district court jurisdiction over peti-
`tioners’ claims. Pp. 6–12.
`
`(1) Just as the CSRA’s “elaborate” framework demonstrated
`Congress’ intent to entirely foreclose judicial review to employees to
`whom the CSRA denies statutory review in Fausto, 484 U. S., at 443,
`
`
`the CSRA indicates that extrastatutory review is not available to
`those employees to whom the CSRA grants administrative and judi-
`cial review. It “prescribes in great detail the protections and reme-
`dies applicable to” adverse personnel actions against federal employ-
`ees, ibid., specifically enumerating the major adverse actions and
`employee classifications to which the CSRA’s procedural protections
`and review provisions apply, §§7511, 7512, setting out the procedures
`due an employee prior to final agency action, §7513, and exhaustively
`detailing the system of review before the MSPB and the Federal Cir-
`cuit, §§7701, 7703. Petitioners and the Government do not dispute
`that petitioners are removed employees to whom CSRA review is
`
`
`provided, but petitioners claim that there is an exception to the
`
`CSRA review scheme for employees who bring constitutional chal-
`
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`

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`Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`
`Syllabus
`lenges to federal statutes; this claim finds no support in the CSRA’s
`text and structure. The availability of administrative and judicial
`review under the CSRA generally turns on the type of civil service
`employee and adverse employment action at issue. Nothing in the
`CSRA’s text suggests that its exclusive review scheme is inapplicable
`
`simply because a covered employee raises a constitutional challenge.
`And §7703(b)(2)—which expressly exempts from Federal Circuit re-
`view challenges alleging that a covered action was based on discrimi-
`nation prohibited by enumerated
`federal employment
`laws—
`
`demonstrates that Congress knew how to provide alternative forums
`for judicial review based on the nature of an employee’s claim. Pp. 6–
`
`10.
`
`
`(2) The CSRA’s purpose also supports the conclusion that the
`statutory review scheme is exclusive, even for constitutional chal-
`lenges. The CSRA’s objective of creating an integrated review
`scheme to replace inconsistent decisionmaking and duplicative judi-
`
`cial review would be seriously undermined if a covered employee
`could challenge a covered employment action first in a district court,
`and then again in a court of appeals, simply by challenging the con-
`stitutionality of the statutory authorization for the action. Claim-
`splitting and preclusion doctrines would not necessarily eliminate the
`possibility of parallel proceedings before the MSPB and the district
`court, and petitioners point to nothing in the CSRA to support the no-
`tion that Congress intended to allow employees to pursue constitu-
`
`tional claims in district court at the expense of forgoing other, poten-
`
`tially meritorious claims before the MSPB. Pp. 10–12.
`
`(c) Petitioners invoke the “presum[ption] that Congress does not in-
`tend to limit [district court] jurisdiction if ‘a finding of preclusion
`could foreclose all meaningful judicial review’; if the suit is ‘wholly
`
`collateral to a statute’s review provisions’; and if the claims are ‘out-
`
`side the agency’s expertise.’ ” Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Com-
`pany Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. ___, ___. But none of those
`characteristics is present here. Pp. 12–20.
`
`
`(1) Petitioners’ constitutional claims can receive meaningful re-
`
`view within the CSRA scheme even if the MSPB, as it claims, is not
`authorized to decide a federal law’s constitutionality. Their claims
`
`
`can be “meaningfully addressed” in the Federal Circuit, which has
`held that it can determine the constitutionality of a statute upon
`which an employee’s removal was based, notwithstanding the
`MSPB’s professed lack of authority to decide the question. The CSRA
`review scheme also fully accommodates the potential need for a fac-
`tual record. Even without factfinding capabilities, the Federal Cir-
`
`cuit may take judicial notice of facts relevant to the constitutional
`question. If further development is necessary, the CSRA empowers
`
`
`
`
`
`3
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`

`
`4
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`ELGIN v. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
`
`
`Syllabus
` the MSPB to take evidence and find facts for Federal Circuit review.
`
`See 5 U. S. C. §§1204(b)(1)–(2). Petitioners err in arguing that the
`MSPB will invariably dismiss a case without ever reaching the fact-
`finding stage in an appeal such as theirs. The MSPB may determine
`that it lacks authority to decide the issue; but absent another infirmi-
`ty in the adverse action, it will affirm the employing agency’s deci-
`
`
` sion. The Federal Circuit can then review the decision, including any
` factual record developed by the MSPB. Petitioners’ argument is not
`
`illustrated by Elgin’s case, which was dismissed on the threshold
`ground that he was not an “employee” with a right to appeal because
`
` his employment was absolutely barred by statute. Pp. 12–18.
` (2) Petitioners’ claims are also not “wholly collateral” to the
`
`
`
`CSRA scheme. Their constitutional claims are the vehicle by which
`
` they seek to reverse the removal decisions, to return to federal em-
`ployment, and to receive lost compensation. A challenge to removal
`
`
` is precisely the type of personnel action regularly adjudicated by the
`MSPB and the Federal Circuit within the CSRA scheme, and rein-
`
` statement, backpay, and attorney’s fees are precisely the kinds of re-
`lief that the CSRA empowers the MSPB and the Federal Circuit to
`
`provide. Pp. 18–19.
`
`
`(3) Finally, in arguing that their constitutional claims are not the
`sort that Congress intended to channel through the MSPB because
`they are beyond the MSPB’s expertise, petitioners overlook the many
`
`threshold questions that may accompany a constitutional claim and
`to which the MSPB can apply its expertise, e.g., whether a resigna-
`tion, as in petitioner Tucker’s case, amounts to a constructive dis-
`charge. Pp. 19–20.
`641 F. 3d 6, affirmed.
`THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`
`
`C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
`
`
`
`ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and KAGAN, JJ.,
`
`
`joined.
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`

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` Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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`
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 11–45
`_________________
`
` MICHAEL B. ELGIN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. DEPART-
` MENT OF THE TREASURY ET AL.
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
`
`[June 11, 2012]
`
`JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
`Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5
`
`U. S. C. §1101 et seq., certain federal employees may
`obtain administrative and judicial review of specified ad-
`verse employment actions. The question before us is
`whether the CSRA provides the exclusive avenue to judi-
`cial review when a qualifying employee challenges an
`adverse employment action by arguing that a federal sta-
`tute is unconstitutional. We hold that it does.
`I
`The CSRA “established a comprehensive system for
`
`reviewing personnel action taken against federal employ-
`ees.” United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 455 (1988).
`
`As relevant here, Subchapter II of Chapter 75 governs
`review of major adverse actions taken against employees
`“for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the ser-
`vice.” 5 U. S. C. §§7503(a), 7513(a). Employees entitled to
`
`review are those in the “competitive service” and “excepted
`service” who meet certain requirements regarding proba-
`
`
`
`

`
`2
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`
`
`ELGIN v. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
`
`Opinion of the Court
`tionary periods and years of service.1 §7511(a)(1). The re-
`viewable agency actions are removal, suspension for more
`than 14 days, reduction in grade or pay, or furlough for 30
`days or less. §7512.
`
`When an employing agency proposes a covered action
`
`against a covered employee, the CSRA gives the employee
`
`the right to notice, representation by counsel, an oppor-
`tunity to respond, and a written, reasoned decision from
`the agency. §7513(b). If the agency takes final adverse
`action against the employee, the CSRA gives the employee
`the right to a hearing and to be represented by an attor-
`ney or other representative before the Merit Systems Pro-
`tection Board (MSPB).
` §§7513(d), 7701(a)(1)–(2). The
`MSPB is authorized to order relief to prevailing employ-
`ees, including reinstatement, backpay, and attorney’s fees.
`§§1204(a)(2), 7701(g).
`
`An employee who is dissatisfied with the MSPB’s deci-
`sion is entitled to judicial review in the United States
`
`Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. That court “shall
`review the record and hold unlawful and set aside any
`agency action, findings, or conclusions” that are “arbitrary,
`
`capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
`accordance with law,” “obtained without procedures re-
`——————
`1The CSRA divides civil service employees into three main catego-
`
`
`ries. Fausto, 484 U. S., at 441, n. 1. “Senior Executive Service” em-
`ployees occupy high-level positions in the Executive Branch but are not
`
`
`required to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
`5 U. S. C. §3131(2). “[C]ompetitive service” employees—the relevant
`category for purposes of this case—are all other Executive Branch
`employees whose nomination by the President and confirmation by the
`Senate are not required and who are not specifically excepted from the
`competitive service by statute. §2102(a)(1). The competitive service
`also includes employees in other branches of the Federal Govern-
`ment and in the District of Columbia government who are specifically
`included by statute. §§2102(a)(2)–(3). Finally, “excepted service”
`employees are employees who are not in the Senior Executive Service
`
`or in the competitive service. §2103.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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`Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed,”
`or “unsupported by substantial evidence.” §§7703(a)(1),
`(c). The Federal Circuit has “exclusive jurisdiction” over
`appeals from a final decision of the MSPB. 28 U. S. C.
`
`§1295(a)(9); see also 5 U. S. C. §7703(b)(1) (judicial review
`of an MSPB decision “shall be” in the Federal Circuit).
`
`II
`
`Petitioners are former federal competitive service em-
`
`ployees who failed to comply with the Military Selective
`
`Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. §453. That Act requires
`male citizens and permanent-resident aliens of the United
`States between the ages of 18 and 26 to register for the
`Selective Service. Another federal statute, 5 U. S. C.
`
`§3328 (hereinafter Section 3328), bars from employment
`by an Executive agency anyone who has knowingly and
`willfully failed to register. Pursuant to Section 3328, pe-
`titioners were discharged (or allegedly constructively
`discharged) by respondents, their employing agencies.
`Among petitioners, only Michael Elgin appealed his
`
`
`removal to the MSPB. Elgin argued that Section 3328 is
`an unconstitutional bill of attainder and unconstitution-
`ally discriminates on the basis of sex when combined with
`the registration requirement of the Military Selective
`
`Service Act. The MSPB referred Elgin’s appeal to an ad-
`
`ministrative law judge (ALJ) for an initial decision.2
`The ALJ dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
`concluding that an employee is not entitled to MSPB
`review of agency action that is based on an absolute statu-
`
`tory bar to employment. App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a–101a.
`The ALJ also held that Elgin’s constitutional claims could
`
`not “confer jurisdiction” on the MSPB because it “lacks
`authority to determine the constitutionality of a statute.”
`——————
`2See §7701(b)(1) (authorizing referral of MSPB appeals to an ALJ); 5
`
`CFR §§1201.111–1201.114 (2011) (detailing procedures for an initial
`
` decision by an ALJ and review by the MSPB).
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`4
`
`
`ELGIN v. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` Id., at 101a.
`
`
`
`Elgin neither petitioned for review by the full MSPB
`nor appealed to the Federal Circuit. Instead, he joined the
`other petitioners in filing suit in the United States District
`Court for the District of Massachusetts, raising the same
`constitutional challenges to Section 3328 and the Military
`Selective Service Act. App. 4, 26–28, 29. Petitioners
`sought equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judg-
`ment that the challenged statutes are unconstitutional, an
`injunction prohibiting enforcement of Section 3328, rein-
`statement to their former positions, backpay, benefits, and
`attorney’s fees. Id., at 29–30.
`The District Court rejected respondents’ argument that
`
`it lacked jurisdiction and denied petitioners’ constitutional
`
`claims on the merits. See Elgin v. United States, 697
`F. Supp. 2d 187 (Mass. 2010). The District Court held
`that the CSRA did not preclude it from hearing petition-
`ers’ claims, because the MSPB had no authority to deter-
`
`
`mine the constitutionality of a federal statute. Id., at 193.
`Hence, the District Court concluded that it retained juris-
`diction under the general grant of federal-question juris-
`diction in 28 U. S. C. §1331. 697 F. Supp. 2d, at 194.
`
`
`The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
`
`
`vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to
`
`dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See 641 F. 3d 6 (2011).
`
`The Court of Appeals held that challenges to a removal
`are not exempted from the CSRA review scheme simply
`because the employee argues that the statute authorizing
`the removal is unconstitutional. Id., at 11–12. According
`to the Court of Appeals, the CSRA provides a forum—the
`Federal Circuit—that may adjudicate the constitutionality
`of a federal statute, and petitioners “were obliged to use
`it.” Id., at 12–13.
`
`We granted certiorari to decide whether the CSRA pre-
`cludes district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims
`even though they are constitutional claims for equitable
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`5
`
`
`
` Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` relief. See 565 U. S. ___ (2011). We conclude that it does,
`and we therefore affirm.
`
`
`
`
`III
`
`We begin with the appropriate standard for determining
`whether a statutory scheme of administrative and judicial
`review provides the exclusive means of review for consti-
`tutional claims. Petitioners argue that even if they may
`obtain judicial review of their constitutional claims before
`the Federal Circuit, they are not precluded from pursuing
`their claims in federal district court. According to peti-
`tioners, the general grant of federal-question jurisdiction
`in 28 U. S. C. §1331, which gives district courts authority
`over constitutional claims, remains undisturbed unless
`Congress explicitly directs otherwise. In support of this
`argument, petitioners rely on Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S.
`592, 603 (1988), which held that “where Congress intends
`to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims[,] its
`intent to do so must be clear.” The Webster Court noted
`that this “heightened showing” was required “to avoid the
`‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if a fed-
`eral statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for
`a colorable constitutional claim.” Ibid. (quoting Bowen v.
`Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667,
`
`681, n. 12 (1986)). Petitioners contend that the CSRA
`does not meet this standard because it does not expressly
`
`bar suits in district court.
`
` Petitioners’ argument overlooks a necessary predicate to
`the application of Webster’s heightened standard: a statute
`
`
`
`that purports to “deny any judicial forum for a colorable
`
`constitutional claim.” 486 U. S., at 603. Webster’s stand-
`
`ard does not apply where Congress simply channels judi-
`
`cial review of a constitutional claim to a particular court.
`
`
`We held as much in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510
`U. S. 200 (1994). In that case, we considered whether a
`
`statutory scheme of administrative review followed by
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`6
`
`
`ELGIN v. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
`
`Opinion of the Court
`judicial review in a federal appellate court precluded
`district court jurisdiction over a plaintiff ’s statutory and
`
`constitutional claims.
`Id., at 206. We noted that the
`plaintiff ’s claims could be “meaningfully addressed in the
`Court of Appeals” and that the case therefore did “not
`present the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would
`arise if an agency statute were construed to preclude all
`judicial review of a constitutional claim.” Id., at 215, and
`n. 20 (quoting Bowen, supra, at 681, n. 12). Accordingly,
`
`we did not require Webster’s “heightened showing,” but
`
`instead asked only whether Congress’ intent to preclude
`district court jurisdiction was “ ‘fairly discernible in the
`statutory scheme.’” 510 U. S., at 207 (quoting Block v.
`Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 351 (1984)).
`
`Like the statute in Thunder Basin, the CSRA does not
`
`foreclose all judicial review of petitioners’ constitutional
`claims, but merely directs that judicial review shall occur
`in the Federal Circuit. Moreover, as we explain below, the
`Federal Circuit is fully capable of providing meaningful
`review of petitioners’ claims. See infra, at 12–17. Accord-
`ingly, the appropriate inquiry is whether it is “fairly dis-
`cernible” from the CSRA that Congress intended covered
`employees appealing covered agency actions to proceed
`exclusively through the statutory review scheme, even in
`cases in which the employees raise constitutional chal-
`
`lenges to federal statutes.
`
`
`
`
`
`IV
`
`To determine whether it is “fairly discernible” that
`Congress precluded district court jurisdiction over peti-
`tioners’ claims, we examine the CSRA’s text, structure,
`and purpose. See Thunder Basin, supra, at 207; Fausto,
`484 U. S., at 443.
`
`A
`
`This is not the first time we have addressed the impact
`
`
`
`

`
`
`Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`of the CSRA’s text and structure on the availability of
`judicial review of a federal employee’s challenge to an
`employment decision. In Fausto, we considered whether
`a so-called “nonpreference excepted service employe[e]”
`could challenge his suspension in the United States
`Claims Court, even though the CSRA did not then afford
`
`him a right to review in the MSPB or the Federal Circuit.3
`Id., at 440–441, 448. Citing “[t]he comprehensive nature
`of the CSRA, the attention that it gives throughout to the
`rights of nonpreference excepted service employees, and
`the fact that it does not include them in provisions for
`
`administrative and judicial review contained in Chapter
`75,” the Court concluded that “the absence of provision
`for these employees to obtain judicial review” was a “con-
`sidered congressional judgment.” Id., at 448. The Court
`thus found it “fairly discernible” that Congress intended to
`preclude all judicial review of Fausto’s statutory claims.4
`
`Id., at 452 (citing Block, supra, at 349).
`Just as the CSRA’s “elaborate” framework, 484 U. S.,
`
`at 443, demonstrates Congress’ intent to entirely foreclose
`judicial review to employees to whom the CSRA denies
`statutory review, it similarly indicates that extrastatutory
`review is not available to those employees to whom the
`CSRA grants administrative and judicial review. Indeed,
`
`in Fausto we expressly assumed that “competitive service
`employees, who are given review rights by Chapter 75,
`cannot expand these rights by resort to” judicial review
`
`outside of the CSRA scheme. See id., at 450, n. 3. As
`
`Fausto explained, the CSRA “prescribes in great detail the
`protections and remedies applicable to” adverse personnel
`——————
`3Certain veterans and their close relatives are considered “preference
`eligible” civil service employees. Fausto, 484 U. S., at 441, n. 1.
`4Although Fausto interpreted the CSRA to entirely foreclose judicial
`
`review, the Court had no need to apply a heightened standard like that
`
` applied in Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592 (1988), because Fausto did not
`press any constitutional claims.
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
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`
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`

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`
`
`8
`
`
`ELGIN v. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` actions against federal employees. Id., at 443. For exam-
`ple, Subchapter II of Chapter 75, the portion of the CSRA
`relevant to petitioners, specifically enumerates the major
`adverse actions and employee classifications to which the
`CSRA’s procedural protections and review provisions
`apply. 5 U. S. C. §§7511, 7512. The subchapter then sets
`out the procedures due an employee prior to final agency
`action. §7513. And, Chapter 77 of the CSRA exhaustively
`details the system of review before the MSPB and the
`Federal Circuit. §§7701, 7703; see also Fausto, supra, at
`
`449 (emphasizing that the CSRA’s structure evinces “the
`primacy” of review by the MSPB and the Federal Circuit).
`
`Given the painstaking detail with which the CSRA sets
`out the method for covered employees to obtain review of
`adverse employment actions, it is fairly discernible that
`Congress intended to deny such employees an additional
`avenue of review in district court.
`
`Petitioners do not dispute that they are employees who
`
`suffered adverse actions covered by the foregoing provi-
`sions of the CSRA. Nor do they contest that the CSRA’s
`text and structure support implied preclusion of district
`court jurisdiction, at least as a general matter. Petitioners
`even acknowledge that the MSPB routinely adjudicates
`some constitutional claims, such as claims that an agency
`took adverse employment action in violation of an em-
`
`ployee’s First or Fourth Amendment rights, and that these
`claims must be brought within the CSRA scheme. See
`Brief for Petitioners 33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7–11, 15, 21; see
`also, e.g., Smith v. Department of Transp., 106 MSPR 59,
`78–79 (2007) (applying Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Town-
`
`
`ship High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563 (1968),
`to an employee’s claim that he was suspended in retal-
`iation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights);
`
`Garrison v. Department of Justice, 67 MSPR 154 (1995)
`
`(considering whether an order directing an employee to
`submit to a drug test was reasonable under the Fourth
`
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`Opinion of the Court
`Amendment). Nevertheless, petitioners seek to carve out
`an exception to CSRA exclusivity for facial or as-applied
`constitutional challenges to federal statutes.
`The text and structure of the CSRA, however, provide
`
`no support for such an exception. The availability of ad-
`ministrative and judicial review under the CSRA gen-
`erally turns on the type of civil service employee and
`adverse employment action at issue. See, e.g., 5 U. S. C.
`§§7511(a)(1) (defining “employee”), 7512 (defining “[a]c-
`tions covered”), 7513(d) (providing that “[a]n employee
`against whom an action is taken under this section is
`entitled to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board”),
`7703(a)(1) (providing that “[a]ny employee . . . adversely
`affected or aggrieved by a final order or decision of the
`Merit Systems Protection Board may obtain judicial re-
`view of the order or decision” in the Federal Circuit).
`Nothing in the CSRA’s text suggests that its exclusive
`review scheme is inapplicable simply because a covered
`employee challenges a covered action on the ground that
`the statute authorizing that action is unconstitutional. As
`the Government correctly notes, “[t]he plain language of
`
`[the CSRA’s] provisions applies to an employee who chal-
`lenges his removal on the ground that the statute requir-
`ing it is unconstitutional no less than it applies to an
`employee who challenges his removal on any other
`ground.” Brief for Respondents 33–34.
`In only one situation does the CSRA expressly exempt a
`
`
`covered employee’s appeal of a covered action from Federal
`Circuit review based on the type of claim at issue. When a
`covered employee “alleges that a basis for the action was
`discrimination” prohibited by enumerated federal em-
`ployment laws, 5 U. S. C. §7702(a)(1)(B), the CSRA allows
`the employee to obtain judicial review of an unfavorable
`MSPB decision by filing a civil action as provided by the
`applicable employment law. See §7703(b)(2). Each of the
`cross-referenced employment laws authorizes an action
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`

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`10
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`
`ELGIN v. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
`
`Opinion of the Court
`in federal district court. See 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(f); 29
`U. S. C. §633a(c); §216(b). Title 5 U. S. C. §7703(b)(2)
`demonstrates that Congress knew how to provide alterna-
`tive forums for judicial review based on the nature of an
`employee’s claim. That Congress declined to include an
`exemption from Federal Circuit review for challenges to
`a statute’s constitutionality indicates that Congress in-
`tended no such exception.
`
`
`
`B
`
`The purpose of the CSRA also supports our conclusion
`that the statutory review scheme is exclusive, even for
`employees who bring constitutional challenges to federal
`statutes. As we have previously explained, the CSRA’s
`“integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review”
`
`
`for aggrieved federal employees was designed to replace
`an “‘outdated patchwork of statutes and rules’” that af-
`forded employees the right to challenge employing agency
`actions in district courts across the country. Fausto, 484
`U. S., at 444–445. Such widespread judicial review, which
`included appeals in all of the Federal Courts of Appeals
`
`produced “wide variations in the kinds of decisions . . .
`issued on the same or similar matters” and a double layer
`
`of judicial review that was “wasteful and irrational.” Id.,
`at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`The CSRA’s objective of creating an integrated scheme
`of review would be seriously undermined if, as petitioners
`would have it, a covered employee could challenge a cov-
`ered employment action first in a district court, and then
`again in one of the courts of appeals, simply by alleging
`that the statutory authorization for such action is uncon-
`stitutional. Such suits would reintroduce the very po-
`
`tential for inconsistent decisionmaking and duplicative
`
`judicial review that the CSRA was designed to avoid.
`Moreover, petitioners’ position would create the possibility
`
`of parallel litigation regarding the same agency action
`
`
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`Opinion of the Court
`before the MSPB and a district court. An employee could
`challenge the constitutionality of the statute authorizing
`an agency’s action in district court, but the MSPB would
`remain the exclusive forum for other types of challenges to
`the agency’s decision. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4–7, 9, 15–16.
`
`Petitioners counter that doctrines regarding claim split-
`
`ting and preclusion would bar parallel suits before the
`MSPB and the district court. But such doctrines would
`not invariably eliminate the possibility of simultaneous
`proceedings, for a tribunal generally has discretion to
`decide whether to dismiss a suit when a similar suit is
`pending elsewhere. See 18 C. Wright et al., Federal Prac-
`tice and Procedure §4406 (2d ed. 2002 and Supp. 2011). In
`any event, petitioners point to nothing in the CSRA to
`support the odd notion that Congress intended to allow
`employees to pursue constitutional claims in district court
`at the cost of forgoing other, potentially meritorious claims
`before the MSPB.
`
`Finally, we note that a jurisdictional rule based on the
`
`nature of an employee’s constitutional claim would deprive
`
`the aggrieved employee, the MSPB, and the district court
`of clear guidance about the proper forum for the employ-
`
`ee’s claims at the outset of the