(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2012
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
` FLORIDA v. JARDINES
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
` No. 11–564. Argued October 31, 2012—Decided March 26, 2013
`
`Police took a drug-sniffing dog to Jardines’ front porch, where the dog
`
`gave a positive alert for narcotics. Based on the alert, the officers ob-
`
`tained a warrant for a search, which revealed marijuana plants;
`Jardines was charged with trafficking in cannabis. The Supreme
`Court of Florida approved the trial court’s decision to suppress the
`evidence, holding that the officers had engaged in a Fourth Amend-
`
`ment search unsupported by probable cause.
`
`Held: The investigation of Jardines’ home was a “search” within the
`meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 3–10.
`
`(a) When “the Government obtains information by physically in-
`
`truding” on persons, houses, papers, or effects, “a ‘search’ within the
`original meaning of the Fourth Amendment” has “undoubtedly oc-
`curred.” United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. ___, ___, n. 3. Pp. 3–4.
`
`
`(b) At the Fourth Amendment’s “very core” stands “the right of a
`man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreason-
`
`able governmental intrusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S.
`505, 511. The area “immediately surrounding and associated with
`
`the home”—the curtilage—is “part of the home itself for Fourth
`
`
`Amendment purposes.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170, 180.
`
`The officers entered the curtilage here: The front porch is the classic
`exemplar of an area “to which the activity of home life extends.” Id.,
`at 182, n. 12. Pp. 4–5.
`
`(c) The officers’ entry was not explicitly or implicitly invited. Offi-
`cers need not “shield their eyes” when passing by a home “on public
`thoroughfares,” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 213, but “no man
`can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave,” Entick
`
`v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K. B. 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817. A police
`officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home in hopes of
`speaking to its occupants, because that is “no more than any private
`
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`

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`2
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`FLORIDA v. JARDINES
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`citizen might do.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___. But the scope
`of a license is limited not only to a particular area but also to a specif-
`ic purpose, and there is no customary invitation to enter the curtilage
`simply to conduct a search. Pp. 5–8.
`(d) It is unnecessary to decide whether the officers violated
`
`Jardines’ expectation of privacy under Katz v. United States, 389
`
`U. S. 347. Pp. 8–10.
`73 So. 3d 34, affirmed.
`SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS,
`
`
`GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., filed a con-
`
`
`
`
`curring opinion, in which GINSBURG and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ALITO,
`
`
` J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY
`
`
`
` and BREYER, JJ., joined.
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`

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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 11–564
`_________________
`FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. JOELIS JARDINES
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
`
`
`FLORIDA
`
`
`[March 26, 2013]
`
` JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
`We consider whether using a drug-sniffing dog on a
`
`homeowner’s porch to investigate the contents of the
`home is a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
`Amendment.
`
`
`
`I
`In 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade
`
`Police Department received an unverified tip that mari-
`juana was being grown in the home of respondent Joelis
`Jardines. One month later, the Department and the
`Drug Enforcement Administration sent a joint surveillance
`team to Jardines’ home. Detective Pedraja was part of
`that team. He watched the home for fifteen minutes and
`
`saw no vehicles in the driveway or activity around the
`home, and could not see inside because the blinds were
`
`drawn. Detective Pedraja then approached Jardines’
`
`home accompanied by Detective Douglas Bartelt, a trained
`
`canine handler who had just arrived at the scene with his
`drug-sniffing dog. The dog was trained to detect the scent
`of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and several other drugs,
`indicating the presence of any of these substances through
`particular behavioral changes recognizable by his handler.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

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` FLORIDA v. JARDINES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Detective Bartelt had the dog on a six-foot leash, owing
`
`
` in part to the dog’s “wild” nature, App. to Pet. for Cert. A–
`35, and tendency to dart around erratically while search-
`ing. As the dog approached Jardines’ front porch, he
`apparently sensed one of the odors he had been trained to
`detect, and began energetically exploring the area for the
`strongest point source of that odor. As Detective Bartelt
`explained, the dog “began tracking that airborne odor by
`. . . tracking back and forth,” engaging in what is called
`“bracketing,” “back and forth, back and forth.” Id., at A–
`33 to A–34. Detective Bartelt gave the dog “the full six
`feet of the leash plus whatever safe distance [he could]
`give him” to do this—he testified that he needed to give
`the dog “as much distance as I can.” Id., at A–35. And
`Detective Pedraja stood back while this was occurring, so
`that he would not “get knocked over” when the dog was
`“spinning around trying to find” the source. Id., at A–38.
`After sniffing the base of the front door, the dog sat,
`
`
`which is the trained behavior upon discovering the odor’s
`strongest point. Detective Bartelt then pulled the dog
`away from the door and returned to his vehicle. He left
`the scene after informing Detective Pedraja that there had
`
`been a positive alert for narcotics.
`On the basis of what he had learned at the home, De-
`
`
`tective Pedraja applied for and received a warrant to
`
` search the residence. When the warrant was executed later
`
`that day, Jardines attempted to flee and was arrested; the
`search revealed marijuana plants, and he was charged
`
`with trafficking in cannabis.
`
`At trial, Jardines moved to suppress the marijuana
`plants on the ground that the canine investigation was an
`unreasonable search. The trial court granted the motion,
`and the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed.
`On a petition for discretionary review, the Florida Su-
`preme Court quashed the decision of the Third District
`Court of Appeal and approved the trial court’s decision to
`
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`2
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`

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`3
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`suppress, holding (as relevant here) that the use of the
`
`trained narcotics dog to investigate Jardines’ home was
`a Fourth Amendment search unsupported by probable
`cause, rendering invalid the warrant based upon infor-
`mation gathered in that search. 73 So. 3d 34 (2011).
`We granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether
`
`the officers’ behavior was a search within the meaning of
`
`the Fourth Amendment. 565 U. S. ___ (2012).
`
`II
`
`The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that
`
`the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
`
`
`papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
`seizures, shall not be violated.” The Amendment estab-
`lishes a simple baseline, one that for much of our history
`formed the exclusive basis for its protections: When “the
`Government obtains information by physically intruding”
`on persons, houses, papers, or effects, “a ‘search’ within
`the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment” has “un-
`doubtedly occurred.” United States v. Jones, 565 U. S.
`
`
` ___, ___, n. 3 (2012) (slip op., at 6, n. 3). By reason of
`
`
`our decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347
`
`(1967), property rights “are not the sole measure of Fourth
`
`Amendment violations,” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S.
`
`56, 64 (1992)—but though Katz may add to the baseline, it
`does not subtract anything from the Amendment’s protec-
`tions “when the Government does engage in [a] physi-
`
` cal intrusion of a constitutionally protected area,” United
`States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
`concurring in the judgment).
`
`That principle renders this case a straightforward one.
`The officers were gathering information in an area belong-
`ing to Jardines and immediately surrounding his house—
`in the curtilage of the house, which we have held enjoys
`protection as part of the home itself. And they gathered
`that information by physically entering and occupying the
`
`
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`

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`
`4
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`
` FLORIDA v. JARDINES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`area to engage in conduct not explicitly or implicitly per-
`mitted by the homeowner.
`
`A
`
`The Fourth Amendment “indicates with some precision
`the places and things encompassed by its protections”:
`persons, houses, papers, and effects. Oliver v. United
`States, 466 U. S. 170, 176 (1984). The Fourth Amendment
`does not, therefore, prevent all investigations conducted
`on private property; for example, an officer may (subject to
`Katz) gather information in what we have called “open
`fields”—even if those fields are privately owned—because
`such fields are not enumerated in the Amendment’s text.
`Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (1924).
`
`But when it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home
`is first among equals. At the Amendment’s “very core”
`stands “the right of a man to retreat into his own home
`and there be free from unreasonable governmental in-
`
`trusion.” Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511
`(1961). This right would be of little practical value if the
`State’s agents could stand in a home’s porch or side gar-
`den and trawl for evidence with impunity; the right to
`retreat would be significantly diminished if the police
`could enter a man’s property to observe his repose from
`just outside the front window.
`
`
`We therefore regard the area “immediately surrounding
`and associated with the home”—what our cases call the
`curtilage—as “part of the home itself for Fourth Amend-
`ment purposes.” Oliver, supra, at 180. That principle has
`ancient and durable roots. Just as the distinction between
`
`the home and the open fields is “as old as the common
`law,” Hester, supra, at 59, so too is the identity of home
`and what Blackstone called the “curtilage or homestall,”
`for the “house protects and privileges all its branches and
`appurtenants.” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
`Laws of England 223, 225 (1769). This area around the
`
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`

`
`5
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`Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`home is “intimately linked to the home, both physically
`and psychologically,” and is where “privacy expectations
`
`are most heightened.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207,
`213 (1986).
`
`While the boundaries of the curtilage are generally
`“clearly marked,” the “conception defining the curtilage” is
`at any rate familiar enough that it is “easily understood
`from our daily experience.” Oliver, 466 U. S., at 182, n. 12.
`Here there is no doubt that the officers entered it: The
`front porch is the classic exemplar of an area adjacent to
`the home and “to which the activity of home life extends.”
`
`Ibid.
`
`
`
`B
`Since the officers’ investigation took place in a constitu-
`
`tionally protected area, we turn to the question of whether
`
`it was accomplished through an unlicensed physical in-
`trusion.1 While law enforcement officers need not “shield
`their eyes” when passing by the home “on public thorough-
`fares,” Ciraolo, 476 U. S., at 213, an officer’s leave to
`gather information is sharply circumscribed when he steps
`off those thoroughfares and enters the Fourth Amend-
`ment’s protected areas. In permitting, for example, visual
`
`observation of the home from “public navigable airspace,”
`we were careful to note that it was done “in a physically
`nonintrusive manner.” Ibid. Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils.
`
`K. B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K. B. 1765), a case “undoubt-
`edly familiar” to “every American statesman” at the time
`of the Founding, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626
`——————
`1At oral argument, the State and its amicus the Solicitor General
`
` argued that Jardines conceded in the lower courts that the officers had
`a right to be where they were. This misstates the record. Jardines
`conceded nothing more than the unsurprising proposition that the of-
`ficers could have lawfully approached his home to knock on the front
`door in hopes of speaking with him. Of course, that is not what they
`did.
`
`
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`
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`

`
`6
`
`
`FLORIDA v. JARDINES
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`(1886), states the general rule clearly: “[O]ur law holds the
`property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his
`foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave.” 2 Wils.
`K. B., at 291, 95 Eng. Rep., at 817. As it is undisputed
`that the detectives had all four of their feet and all four of
`their companion’s firmly planted on the constitutionally
`
`protected extension of Jardines’ home, the only question is
`
`whether he had given his leave (even implicitly) for them
`to do so. He had not.
`
`“A license may be implied from the habits of the coun-
`try,” notwithstanding the “strict rule of the English com-
`mon law as to entry upon a close.” McKee v. Gratz, 260
`U. S. 127, 136 (1922) (Holmes, J.). We have accordingly
`recognized that “the knocker on the front door is treated
`as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying
`ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers
`
`of all kinds.” Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 626
`(1951). This implicit license typically permits the visitor
`to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly,
`wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to
`linger longer) leave. Complying with the terms of that
`traditional invitation does not require fine-grained legal
`knowledge; it is generally managed without incident by
`the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.2 Thus, a
`police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a
`home and knock, precisely because that is “no more than
`any private citizen might do.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S.
`——————
` 2With this much, the dissent seems to agree—it would inquire into
`
`“ ‘the appearance of things,’ ” post, at 5 (opinion of ALITO, J.), what is
`
`
`
`
`“typica[l]” for a visitor, ibid., what might cause “alarm” to a “resident of
`
` the premises,” ibid., what is “expected” of “ordinary visitors,” ibid., and
`what would be expected from a “ ‘reasonably respectful citizen,’ ” post, at
`
`
`7. These are good questions. But their answers are incompatible with
`the dissent’s outcome, which is presumably why the dissent does not
`even try to argue that it would be customary, usual, reasonable, re-
`spectful, ordinary, typical, nonalarming, etc., for a stranger to explore
`the curtilage of the home with trained drug dogs.
`
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`
`
`

`
`
`Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 16).
`
`But introducing a trained police dog to explore the area
`around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating
`evidence is something else. There is no customary invita-
`tion to do that. An invitation to engage in canine forensic
`investigation assuredly does not inhere in the very act of
`
`hanging a knocker.3 To find a visitor knocking on the door
`is routine (even if sometimes unwelcome); to spot that
`same visitor exploring the front path with a metal detec-
`tor, or marching his bloodhound into the garden before
`saying hello and asking permission, would inspire most
`
`of us to—well, call the police. The scope of a license—
`express or implied—is limited not only to a particular area
`but also to a specific purpose. Consent at a traffic stop to
`an officer’s checking out an anonymous tip that there is a
`body in the trunk does not permit the officer to rummage
`through the trunk for narcotics. Here, the background
`social norms that invite a visitor to the front door do not
`invite him there to conduct a search.4
`
`——————
`
` 3The dissent insists that our argument must rest upon “the particu-
` lar instrument that Detective Bartelt used to detect the odor of mari-
`
` juana”—the dog. Post, at 8. It is not the dog that is the problem, but the
`
`
`
`
` behavior that here involved use of the dog. We think a typical person
`
`
`would find it “ ‘a cause for great alarm’ ” (the kind of reaction the dis-
`
`
`sent quite rightly relies upon to justify its no-night-visits rule, post,
`
`at 5) to find a stranger snooping about his front porch with or without
`
`a dog. The dissent would let the police do whatever they want by way
`of gathering evidence so long as they stay on the base-path, to use a
`baseball analogy—so long as they “stick to the path that is typically
`used to approach a front door, such as a paved walkway.” Ibid. From
`that vantage point they can presumably peer into the house through
`
`binoculars with impunity. That is not the law, as even the State con-
`
`cedes. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.
` 4The dissent argues, citing King, that “gathering evidence—even
`
`
`damning evidence—is a lawful activity that falls within the scope of the
`
`
`
` license to approach.” Post, at 7. That is a false generalization. What
` King establishes is that it is not a Fourth Amendment search to ap-
`
` proach the home in order to speak with the occupant, because all are
`
`
`
`
`7
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`

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`FLORIDA v. JARDINES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`The State points to our decisions holding that the sub-
`
`jective intent of the officer is irrelevant. See Ashcroft v.
`al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___ (2011); Whren v. United States, 517
`U. S. 806 (1996). But those cases merely hold that a stop
`or search that is objectively reasonable is not vitiated by
`the fact that the officer’s real reason for making the stop
`or search has nothing to do with the validating reason.
`Thus, the defendant will not be heard to complain that
`although he was speeding the officer’s real reason for the
`stop was racial harassment. See id., at 810, 813. Here,
`however, the question before the court is precisely whether
`the officer’s conduct was an objectively reasonable search.
`As we have described, that depends upon whether the
`officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in
`turn depends upon the purpose for which they entered.
`Here, their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to con-
`
`duct a search, which is not what anyone would think he
`had license to do.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`III
`
`The State argues that investigation by a forensic narcot-
`
`ics dog by definition cannot implicate any legitimate pri-
`vacy interest. The State cites for authority our decisions
`in United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983), United
`States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109 (1984), and Illinois v.
`Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005), which held, respectively,
`that canine inspection of luggage in an airport, chemical
`testing of a substance that had fallen from a parcel in
`transit, and canine inspection of an automobile during a
`lawful traffic stop, do not violate the “reasonable expecta-
`
`tion of privacy” described in Katz.
`
`——————
`
`invited to do that. The mere “purpose of discovering information,” post,
`
`
`
` at 8, in the course of engaging in that permitted conduct does not cause
` it to violate the Fourth Amendment. But no one is impliedly invited to
`
`
`enter the protected premises of the home in order to do nothing but
`
` conduct a search.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`

`
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Just last Term, we considered an argument much like
`
`this. Jones held that tracking an automobile’s where-
`abouts using a physically-mounted GPS receiver is a Fourth
`Amendment search. The Government argued that the
`Katz standard “show[ed] that no search occurred,” as the
`
`defendant had “no ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’” in
`his whereabouts on the public roads, Jones, 565 U. S., at
`
`___ (slip op., at 5)—a proposition with at least as much
`support in our case law as the one the State marshals
`
`here. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276, 278
`(1983). But because the GPS receiver had been physically
`mounted on the defendant’s automobile (thus intruding on
`his “effects”), we held that tracking the vehicle’s move-
`ments was a search: a person’s “Fourth Amendment rights
`do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.” Jones,
`supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5). The Katz reasonable-
`expectations test “has been added to, not substituted
`for,” the traditional property-based understanding of the
`Fourth Amendment, and so is unnecessary to consider
`when the government gains evidence by physically intrud-
`ing on constitutionally protected areas. Jones, supra, at
`___ (slip op., at 8).
`
`Thus, we need not decide whether the officers’ investiga-
`tion of Jardines’ home violated his expectation of privacy
`under Katz. One virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s
`property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.
`That the officers learned what they learned only by physi-
`cally intruding on Jardines’ property to gather evidence is
`
`enough to establish that a search occurred.
`
`For a related reason we find irrelevant the State’s ar-
`gument (echoed by the dissent) that forensic dogs have
`been commonly used by police for centuries. This argu-
`ment is apparently directed to our holding in Kyllo v.
`United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001), that surveillance of
`the home is a search where “the Government uses a device
`that is not in general public use” to “explore details of the
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`
`9
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`

`
`10
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` FLORIDA v. JARDINES
`
`Opinion of the Court
`home that would previously have been unknowable with-
`
`out physical intrusion.” Id., at 40 (emphasis added). But
`the implication of that statement (inclusio unius est exclu-
`sio alterius) is that when the government uses a physical
`
`intrusion to explore details of the home (including its
`curtilage), the antiquity of the tools that they bring along
`is irrelevant.
`
`
`
`*
`*
`*
`
`The government’s use of trained police dogs to inves-
`
`tigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a
`“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
`The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is therefore
`affirmed.
`
`
`
`
`It is so ordered.
`
`

`
`
`
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`
` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
` KAGAN, J., concurring
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`1
`
`_________________
`
` No. 11–564
`_________________
`FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. JOELIS JARDINES
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
`
`
`FLORIDA
`
`
`[March 26, 2013]
`
` JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and
`
`
`JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, concurring.
`
`For me, a simple analogy clinches this case—and does
`so on privacy as well as property grounds. A stranger
`comes to the front door of your home carrying super-high-
`powered binoculars. See ante, at 7, n. 3. He doesn’t knock
`or say hello. Instead, he stands on the porch and uses the
`binoculars to peer through your windows, into your home’s
`furthest corners. It doesn’t take long (the binoculars are
`really very fine): In just a couple of minutes, his uncom-
`mon behavior allows him to learn details of your life you
`disclose to no one. Has your “visitor” trespassed on your
`property, exceeding the license you have granted to mem-
`bers of the public to, say, drop off the mail or distribute
`campaign flyers? Yes, he has. And has he also invaded
`your “reasonable expectation of privacy,” by nosing into
`
`intimacies you sensibly thought protected from disclosure?
`
`Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan,
`J., concurring). Yes, of course, he has done that too.
`
`
`That case is this case in every way that matters. Here,
`police officers came to Joelis Jardines’ door with a super-
`
`sensitive instrument, which they deployed to detect things
`inside that they could not perceive unassisted. The equip-
`ment they used was animal, not mineral. But contra the
`dissent, see post, at 2 (opinion of ALITO, J.) (noting the
`
`
`ubiquity of dogs in American households), that is of no
`
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`
`

`
`2
`
`
`
`
`
`
` FLORIDA v. JARDINES
`
` KAGAN, J., concurring
`
`
`significance in determining whether a search occurred.
`
`Detective Bartelt’s dog was not your neighbor’s pet, come
`to your porch on a leisurely stroll. As this Court discussed
`earlier this Term, drug-detection dogs are highly trained
`tools of law enforcement, geared to respond in distinctive
`ways to specific scents so as to convey clear and reliable
`information to their human partners. See Florida v.
`Harris, 568 U. S. ___ (2013) (slip op. at 2–3, 7–8). They
`are to the poodle down the street as high-powered binocu-
`lars are to a piece of plain glass. Like the binoculars, a
`drug-detection dog is a specialized device for discovering
`objects not in plain view (or plain smell). And as in the
`hypothetical above, that device was aimed here at a
`home—the most private and inviolate (or so we expect) of
`all the places and things the Fourth Amendment protects.
`
`Was this activity a trespass? Yes, as the Court holds to-
`day. Was it also an invasion of privacy? Yes, that as well.
`
`
`
`The Court today treats this case under a property ru-
`
`
`bric; I write separately to note that I could just as happily
`have decided it by looking to Jardines’ privacy interests. A
`decision along those lines would have looked . . . well,
`
`much like this one. It would have talked about “ ‘the right
`of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
`from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” Ante, at 4
`
`(quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511
`(1961)). It would have insisted on maintaining the “prac-
`tical value” of that right by preventing police officers from
`standing in an adjacent space and “trawl[ing] for evidence
`with impunity.” Ante, at 4. It would have explained that
`“‘privacy expectations are most heightened’” in the home
`and the surrounding area. Ante, at 4–5 (quoting Califor-
`
`nia v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 213 (1986)). And it would
`have determined that police officers invade those shared
`expectations when they use trained canine assistants to
`reveal within the confines of a home what they could not
`otherwise have found there. See ante, at 6–7, and nn. 2–3.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`
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`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
` KAGAN, J., concurring
`
`
`It is not surprising that in a case involving a search of a
`
`
`home, property concepts and privacy concepts should so
`align. The law of property “naturally enough influence[s]”
`our “shared social expectations” of what places should be
`free from governmental incursions. Georgia v. Randolph,
`547 U. S. 103, 111 (2006); see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S.
`
`128, 143, n. 12 (1978). And so the sentiment “my home is
`my own,” while originating in property law, now also
`denotes a common understanding—extending even beyond
`that law’s formal protections—about an especially private
`sphere. Jardines’ home was his property; it was also his
`most intimate and familiar space. The analysis proceed-
`ing from each of those facts, as today’s decision reveals,
`runs mostly along the same path.
`I can think of only one divergence: If we had decided
`
`this case on privacy grounds, we would have realized that
`Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001), already re-
`
`solved it.1 The Kyllo Court held that police officers con-
`
`ducted a search when they used a thermal-imaging device
`to detect heat emanating from a private home, even
`though they committed no trespass. Highlighting our
`intention to draw both a “firm” and a “bright” line at “the
`entrance to the house,” id., at 40, we announced the fol-
`lowing rule:
`“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is
`
`not in general public use, to explore details of the
`home that would previously have been unknowable
`——————
`1The dissent claims, alternatively, that Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S.
`
`405, 409–410 (2005), controls this case (or nearly does). See post, at 9,
`
`11. But Caballes concerned a drug-detection dog’s sniff of an automo-
`
`bile during a traffic stop. See also Florida v. Harris, 568 U. S. ___
`(2013). And we have held, over and over again, that people’s expecta-
`tions of privacy are much lower in their cars than in their homes. See,
`
`e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332, 345 (2009); Wyoming v. Houghton,
`526 U. S. 295, 303 (1999); New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 115 (1986);
`
`
`Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583, 590–591 (1974) (plurality opinion).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`4
`
`
`
`FLORIDA v. JARDINES
`
` KAGAN, J., concurring
`
`
`without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a
`
`‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a
`
`warrant.” Ibid.
`That “firm” and “bright” rule governs this case: The police
`
`officers here conducted a search because they used a
`“device . . . not in general public use” (a trained drug-
`detection dog) to “explore details of the home” (the pres-
`ence of certain substances) that they would not otherwise
`have discovered without entering the premises.
`
`
`And again, the dissent’s argument that the device is just
`
`a dog cannot change the equation. As Kyllo made clear,
`the “sense-enhancing” tool at issue may be “crude” or
`“sophisticated,” may be old or new (drug-detection dogs
`actually go back not “12,000 years” or “centuries,” post, at
`2, 8, 12, but only a few decades), may be either smaller or
`
`bigger than a breadbox; still, “at least where (as here)” the
`device is not “in general public use,” training it on a home
`violates our “minimal expectation of privacy”—an expecta-
`tion “that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasona-
`ble.” 533 U. S., at 34, 36.2 That does not mean the device
`——————
` 2The dissent’s other principal reason for concluding that no violation
`
`
`
` of privacy occurred in this case—that police officers themselves might
` detect an aroma wafting from a house—works no better. If officers can
`
`
` smell drugs coming from a house, they can use that information; a
`human sniff is not a search, we can all agree. But it does not follow
`that a person loses his expectation of privacy in the many scents within
`
` his home that (his own nose capably tells him) are not usually detecti-
` ble by humans standing outside. And indeed, Kyllo already decided as
`
`much. In response to an identical argument from the dissent in that
`case, see 533 U. S., at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that humans
`can sometimes detect “heat emanating from a building”), the Kyllo
`Court stated: “The dissent’s comparison of the thermal imaging to
`various circumstances in which outside observers might be able to
`perceive, without technology, the heat of the home . . . is quite irrele-
`vant. The fact that equivalent information could sometimes be ob-
`tained by other means does not make lawful the use of means that
`
`violate the Fourth Amendment. . . . In any event, [at the time in
`question,] no outside observer could have discerned the relative heat of
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
` KAGAN, J., concurring
`
`
`is off-limits, as the dissent implies, see post, at 11–12; it
`just means police officers cannot use it to examine a home
`without a warrant or exigent circumstance. See Brigham
`
`City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403–404 (2006) (describing
`exigencies allowing the warrantless search of a home).
`
`With these further thoughts, suggesting that a focus on
`Jardines’ privacy interests would make an “easy cas[e]
`easy” twice over, ante, at 9, I join the Court’s opinion in
`
`full.
`
`5
`
`
`
`——————
`
`Kyllo’s home without thermal imaging.” Id., at 35, n. 2.
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
` ALITO, J., dissenting
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`1
`
`_________________
`
` No. 11–564
`_________________
`FLORIDA, PETITIONER v. JO