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` ALITO, J., dissenting
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`1
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`_________________
`No. 11A501
`_________________
` JOHN DOE #1, ET AL. v. SAM REED, WASHINGTON
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`SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL.
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`
`
`ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTION
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` [November 21, 2011]
`The application for an injunction presented to JUSTICE
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`KENNEDY and by him referred to the Court is denied.
`JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or deci-
`sion of this application.
`JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting from denial of injunction.
`In Doe v. Reed, 561 U. S. ___ (2010), the Court rejected
`petitioners’ facial challenge to the Washington law author-
`izing the disclosure of referendum petitions but assured
`petitioners that the disclosure could be blocked if a proper
`party could show that compelled disclosure would result in
`“threats, harassment, or reprisals.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at
`12). Today’s order reveals that this assurance was empty.
`
`On remand, the District Court rejected petitioners’ as-
`
`applied challenge, relying primarily on a highly question-
`able interpretation of our precedents. The District Court
`reasoned that only a select few organizations—what
`the court termed “minor” political parties and “fringe”
`groups—may challenge the disclosure of the names of
`persons who sign a referendum petition. Case No. C09–
`5456 (WD Wash., Oct. 17, 2011), pp. 13–15. If a referen-
`dum succeeds or nearly succeeds (or if the referendum
`supports a position that has not been historically vilified),
`then, according to the District Court, disclosure of the
`names of the citizens who signed the petition cannot be
`shielded no matter how strong the evidence of threatened
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`DOE v. REED
`
` ALITO, J., dissenting
`
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`retaliation or how severe the nature of the threats. Id., at
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`15. Whether this is a correct interpretation of our cases
`presents an important question that merits serious appel-
`late review.
`
`The alternative basis for the District Court’s holding—
`that petitioners did not present sufficient evidence of
`threatened harm—also presents an important legal issue,
`namely, the type and quantity of proof that persons object-
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`ing to disclosure must adduce. As Judge N. R. Smith
`observed below, petitioners adduced evidence that some
`supporters of the referendum “received death threats,”
`“had their children threatened,” and suffered various
`indignities, No. 11–35854 (CA9, Nov. 16, 2011), p. 8 (dis-
`senting opinion), but according to the District Court, this
`was not enough. Whether the standard of proof applied by
`the District Court provides any real protection for persons
`who are threatened with retaliation for asserting their
`First Amendment rights is an important issue that merits
`considered appellate review.
`
`There has been no such review in this case. When
`petitioners took an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the panel
`denied the stay application over Judge Smith’s protest
`that the majority had “race[d] to decide the case at [a]
`preliminary stage based on incomplete information and
`without even reviewing the record.” Id., at 3.
`
`This Court now takes a similar approach. Particularly
`since the referendum at issue went down to defeat more
`than two years ago, the Court’s haste is hard to under-
`stand. I would grant a stay at least until the Court has
`had an opportunity to review the record and to consider
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`the parties’ arguments.
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`2