(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2012
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
` Syllabus
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` MCQUIGGIN, WARDEN v. PERKINS
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
` No. 12–126. Argued February 25, 2013—Decided May 28, 2013
`
`
`Rodney Henderson was found stabbed to death after leaving a party in
`Flint, Michigan, with respondent Floyd Perkins and Damarr Jones.
`Perkins was charged with murder. Jones, the key prosecution wit-
`
` ness, testified that Perkins alone committed the murder while Jones
`looked on. Perkins, however, testified that Jones and Henderson left
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` him during the evening, and that he later saw Jones with blood on
` his clothing. Perkins was convicted of first-degree murder and sen-
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`tenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. His convic-
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` tion became final in 1997.
`The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
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`(AEDPA) gives a state prisoner one year to file a federal habeas peti-
`tion, starting from “the date on which the judgment became final.”
`28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1)(A). But if the petition alleges newly discov-
`
`ered evidence, the filing deadline is one year from “the date on which
`the factual predicate of the claim . . . could have been discovered
`
`
` through . . . due diligence.” §2244(d)(1)(D).
` More than 11 years after his conviction became final, Perkins filed
`
`
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` his federal habeas petition, alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance
`of trial counsel. To overcome AEDPA’s time limitations, he asserted
`
` newly discovered evidence of actual innocence, relying on three affi-
`davits, the most recent dated July 16, 2002, each pointing to Jones as
`the murderer. The District Court found that, even if the affidavits
`could be characterized as evidence newly discovered, Perkins had
`failed to show diligence entitling him to equitable tolling of AEDPA’s
`limitations period. Alternatively, the court found, Perkins had not
`shown that, taking account of all the evidence, no reasonable juror
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`would have convicted him. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Acknowledg-
`
`ing that Perkins’ petition was untimely and that he had not diligently
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`MCQUIGGIN v. PERKINS
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`Syllabus
`pursued his rights, the court held that Perkins’ actual-innocence
`claim allowed him to present his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
`
` claim as if it had been filed on time. In so ruling, the court apparent-
`ly considered Perkins’ delay irrelevant to appraisal of his actual-
`innocence claim.
`
`Held:
`1. Actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a
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`
`petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar, as
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`it was in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, and House v. Bell, 547 U. S.
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`518, or expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations, as in this
`case. Pp. 7–14.
`(a) Perkins, who waited nearly six years from the date of the
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`
`2002 affidavit to file his petition, maintains that an actual-innocence
`plea can overcome AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. This Court’s
`decisions support his view. The Court has not resolved whether a
`
`prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding ac-
`tual-innocence claim, Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 404–405, but
`it has recognized that a prisoner “otherwise subject to defenses of
`abusive or successive use of the writ may have his federal constitu-
`tional claim considered on the merits if he makes a proper showing of
`
`
`actual innocence,” id., at 404.
`
`The Court has applied this “fundamental miscarriage of justice ex-
`
`ception” to overcome various procedural defaults, including, as most
`
`relevant here, failure to observe state procedural rules, such as filing
`deadlines. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 750. The excep-
`tion, the Court’s decisions bear out, survived AEDPA’s passage. See,
`e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 558; House, 547 U. S., at
`537–538. These decisions “see[k] to balance the societal interests in
`finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources with the
`
`individual interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case.”
`Schlup, 513 U. S., at 324. Sensitivity to the injustice of incarcerating
`an innocent individual should not abate when the impediment is
`AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Pp. 7–9.
`
`
`(b) The State urges that recognition of a miscarriage of justice
`exception would render §2244(d)(1)(D) superfluous. That is not so,
`for AEDPA’s time limitations apply to the typical case in which
`no actual-innocence claim is made, while the exception applies to
`a severely confined category: cases in which new evidence shows
`
`“it is more likely than not that ‘no reasonable juror’ would have con-
`victed [the petitioner],” Schlup, 513 U. S., at 329. Many petitions
`that could not pass through the actual-innocence gateway will be
`timely or not measured by §2244(d)(1)(D)’s triggering provision. Nor
`does Congress’ inclusion of a miscarriage of justice exception in
`§§2244(b)(2)(B) and 2254(e)(2) indicate an intent to preclude courts
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Syllabus
`from applying the exception in §2244(d)(1)(D) cases. Congress did
`not simply incorporate the miscarriage of justice exception into
`§§2244(b)(2)(B) and 2254(e)(2). Rather, Congress constrained the ex-
`ception’s application with respect to second-or-successive petitions
`and the holding of evidentiary hearings in federal court. The more
`rational inference to draw from the incorporation of a modified ver-
`sion of the exception into other provisions of AEDPA is that, in a case
`not governed by those provisions, the exception survived AEDPA’s
`passage intact and unrestricted. Pp. 9–14.
`
`
` 2. A federal habeas court, faced with an actual-innocence gateway
`claim, should count unjustifiable delay on a habeas petitioner’s part,
`
` not as an absolute barrier to relief, but as a factor in determining
`whether actual innocence has been reliably shown. A petitioner in-
`voking the miscarriage of justice exception “must show that it is more
`likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in
`the light of the new evidence.” Schlup, 513 U. S., at 327. Unex-
`plained delay in presenting new evidence bears on the determination
`
` whether the petitioner has made the requisite showing. Taking ac-
`count of the delay in the context of the merits of a petitioner’s actual-
`innocence claim, rather than treating timeliness as a threshold in-
`quiry, is tuned to the exception’s underlying rationale of ensuring
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`“that federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of
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`innocent persons.” Herrera, 506 U. S., at 404. Pp. 14–16.
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`3. Here, the District Court’s appraisal of Perkins’ petition as insuf-
`ficient to meet Schlup’s actual-innocence standard should be disposi-
`tive, absent cause, which this Court does not currently see, for the
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`Sixth Circuit to upset that evaluation. Under Schlup’s demanding
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`standard, the gateway should open only when a petition presents “ev-
`idence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in
`the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial
`was free of nonharmless constitutional error.” 513 U. S., at 316.
`Pp. 16–17.
`670 F. 3d 665, vacated and remanded.
`GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
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`BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissent-
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` ing opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined, and in
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`which ALITO, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III.
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`Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 12–126
`_________________
`GREG MCQUIGGIN, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. FLOYD
`PERKINS
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`
` APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`
`[May 28, 2013]
`
`JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`
`
`This case concerns the “actual innocence” gateway to
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`federal habeas review applied in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S.
`298 (1995), and further explained in House v. Bell, 547
`
`U. S. 518 (2006). In those cases, a convincing showing of
`actual innocence enabled habeas petitioners to overcome
`a procedural bar to consideration of the merits of their
`constitutional claims. Here, the question arises in the
`context of 28 U. S. C. §2244(d)(1), the statute of limitations
`on federal habeas petitions prescribed in the Antiterrorism
`
`and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Specifically,
`if the petitioner does not file her federal habeas peti-
`tion, at the latest, within one year of “the date on which
`the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented
`could have been discovered through the exercise of due
`diligence,” §2244(d)(1)(D), can the time bar be overcome by
`a convincing showing that she committed no crime?
`
`
`We hold that actual innocence, if proved, serves as a
`gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the
`impediment is a procedural bar, as it was in Schlup and
`House, or, as in this case, expiration of the statute of
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`MCQUIGGIN v. PERKINS
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`Opinion of the Court
`limitations. We caution, however, that tenable actual-
`innocence gateway pleas are rare: “[A] petitioner does not
`meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the
`district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror,
`acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty
`beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U. S., at 329; see
`House, 547 U. S., at 538 (emphasizing that the Schlup
`standard is “demanding” and seldom met). And in making
`an assessment of the kind Schlup envisioned, “the timing
`of the [petition]” is a factor bearing on the “reliability of
`th[e] evidence” purporting to show actual innocence.
`Schlup, 513 U. S., at 332.
`
`
`In the instant case, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that
`habeas petitioner Perkins (respondent here) had filed his
`petition after the statute of limitations ran out, and had
`“failed to diligently pursue his rights.” Order in No. 09–
`1875, (CA6, Feb. 24, 2010), p. 2 (Certificate of Appealabil-
`ity). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the
`decision of the District Court denying Perkins’ petition,
`and held that Perkins’ actual-innocence claim allowed him
`to pursue his habeas petition as if it had been filed on
`time. 670 F. 3d 665, 670 (2012). The appeals court ap-
`parently considered a petitioner’s delay irrelevant to ap-
`
`praisal of an actual-innocence claim. See ibid.
`
`We vacate the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand
`the case. Our opinion clarifies that a federal habeas
`court, faced with an actual-innocence gateway claim, should
`count unjustifiable delay on a habeas petitioner’s part,
`not as an absolute barrier to relief, but as a factor in
`determining whether actual innocence has been re-
`liably shown. See Brief for Respondent 45 (habeas court
`“could . . . hold the unjustified delay against the petitioner
`
`when making credibility findings as to whether the [actual-
`innocence] exception has been met”).
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`I
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`
`
`
`A
`
`On March 4, 1993, respondent Floyd Perkins attended
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`a party in Flint, Michigan, in the company of his friend,
`Rodney Henderson, and an acquaintance, Damarr Jones.
`The three men left the party together. Henderson was
`later discovered on a wooded trail, murdered by stab
`wounds to his head.
`
`Perkins was charged with the murder of Henderson. At
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`trial, Jones was the key witness for the prosecution. He
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`testified that Perkins alone committed the murder while
`Jones looked on. App. 55.
`Chauncey Vaughn, a friend of Perkins and Henderson,
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`testified that, prior to the murder, Perkins had told him
`he would kill Henderson, id., at 39, and that Perkins later
`called Vaughn, confessing to his commission of the crime.
`Id., at 36–38. A third witness, Torriano Player, also a
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`friend of both Perkins and Henderson, testified that Per-
`kins told him, had he known how Player felt about Hen-
`derson, he would not have killed Henderson. Id., at 74.
`
`Perkins, testifying in his own defense, offered a different
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`account of the episode. He testified that he left Hender-
`son and Jones to purchase cigarettes at a convenience store.
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`When he exited the store, Perkins related, Jones and
`Henderson were gone. Id., at 84. Perkins said that he
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`then visited his girlfriend. Id., at 87. About an hour later,
`Perkins recalled, he saw Jones standing under a street-
`light with blood on his pants, shoes, and plaid coat. Id.,
`
`at 90.
`
`The jury convicted Perkins of first-degree murder. He
`
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`was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
`parole on October 27, 1993. The Michigan Court of Ap-
`peals affirmed Perkins’ conviction and sentence, and the
`Michigan Supreme Court denied Perkins leave to appeal
`on January 31, 1997. Perkins’ conviction became final on
`May 5, 1997.
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`
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`

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`MCQUIGGIN v. PERKINS
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`Opinion of the Court
`B
`
`Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
`Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, a state prisoner
`ordinarily has one year to file a federal petition for habeas
`corpus, starting from “the date on which the judgment
`became final by the conclusion of direct review or the ex-
`piration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U. S. C.
`§2244(d)(1)(A). If the petition alleges newly discovered
`evidence, however, the filing deadline is one year from
`“the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
`claims presented could have been discovered through the
`exercise of due diligence.” §2244(d)(1)(D).
`
`Perkins filed his federal habeas corpus petition on June
`13, 2008, more than 11 years after his conviction became
`final. He alleged, inter alia, ineffective assistance on the
`part of his trial attorney, depriving him of his Sixth
`Amendment right to competent counsel. To overcome
`AEDPA’s time limitations, Perkins asserted newly discov-
`
`ered evidence of actual innocence. He relied on three
`affidavits, each pointing to Jones, not Perkins, as Hender-
`son’s murderer.
`
`The first affidavit, dated January 30, 1997, was submit-
`ted by Perkins’ sister, Ronda Hudson. Hudson stated that
`she had heard from a third party, Louis Ford, that Jones
`bragged about stabbing Henderson and had taken his
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`clothes to the cleaners after the murder. App. to Pet. for
`Cert. 54a–55a. The second affidavit, dated March 16,
`1999, was subscribed to by Demond Louis, Chauncey
`
`Vaughn’s younger brother. Louis stated that, on the night
`of the murder, Jones confessed to him that he had just
`
`killed Henderson. Louis also described the clothes Jones
`wore that night, bloodstained orange shoes and orange
`pants, and a colorful shirt. Id., at 50a–53a. The next day,
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`Louis added, he accompanied Jones, first to a dumpster
`where Jones disposed of the bloodstained shoes, and then
`to the cleaners. Finally, Perkins presented the July 16,
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
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`Opinion of the Court
`2002 affidavit of Linda Fleming, an employee at Pro-Clean
`Cleaners in 1993. She stated that, on or about March 4,
`1993, a man matching Jones’s description entered the
`shop and asked her whether bloodstains could be removed
`from the pants and a shirt he brought in. The pants were
`orange, she recalled, and heavily stained with blood, as
`was the multicolored shirt left for cleaning along with the
`pants. Id., at 48a–49a.
`The District Court found the affidavits insufficient to
`
`entitle Perkins to habeas relief. Characterizing the affi-
`davits as newly discovered evidence was “dubious,” the
`District Court observed, in light of what Perkins knew
`about the underlying facts at the time of trial. Id., at 29a.
`But even assuming qualification of the affidavits as evi-
`dence newly discovered, the District Court next explained,
`“[Perkins’] petition [was] untimely under §2244(d)(1)(D).”
`Ibid. “[If] the statute of limitations began to run as of
`the date of the latest of th[e] affidavits, July 16, 2002,” the
`District Court noted, then “absent tolling, [Perkins] had
`until July 16, 2003 in which to file his habeas petition.”
`Ibid. Perkins, however, did not file until nearly five years
`
`later, on June 13, 2008.
`
`Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the District Court stated,
`
`“a habeas petitioner who demonstrates a credible claim
`of actual innocence based on new evidence may, in ex-
`ceptional circumstances, be entitled to equitable tolling
`of habeas limitations.” Id., at 30a. But Perkins had not
`established exceptional circumstances, the District Court
`determined. In any event, the District Court observed,
`equitable tolling requires diligence and Perkins “ha[d]
`failed utterly to demonstrate the necessary diligence in
`exercising his rights.” Id., at 31a. Alternatively, the Dis-
`
`trict Court found that Perkins had failed to meet the strict
`
`standard by which pleas of actual innocence are mea-
`sured: He had not shown that, taking account of all
`the evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable
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`

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`MCQUIGGIN v. PERKINS
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`Opinion of the Court
`juror would have convicted him,” or even that the evidence
`was new. Id., at 30a–31a.
`
`Perkins appealed the District Court’s judgment. Al-
`
`though recognizing that AEDPA’s statute of limitations
`had expired and that Perkins had not diligently pursued
`
`his rights, the Sixth Circuit granted a certificate of ap-
`pealability limited to a single question: Is reasonable
`diligence a precondition to relying on actual innocence as a
`gateway to adjudication of a federal habeas petition on the
`
`merits? Certificate of Appealability 2–3.
`
`On consideration of the certified question, the Court of
`Appeals reversed the District Court’s judgment. Adhering
`to Circuit precedent, Souter v. Jones, 395 F. 3d 577, 597–
`602 (2005), the Sixth Circuit held that Perkins’ gateway
`actual-innocence allegations allowed him to present his
`ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim as if it were filed
`on time. On remand, the Court of Appeals instructed, “the
`[D]istrict [C]ourt [should] fully consider whether Perkins
`
`assert[ed] a credible claim of actual innocence.” 670 F. 3d,
`at 676.
`
`We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict on
`whether AEDPA’s statute of limitations can be overcome
`by a showing of actual innocence. 568 U. S. ___ (2012).
`Compare, e.g., San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F. 3d 1257,
`1267–1268 (CA11 2011) (“A court . . . may consider an
`untimely §2254 petition if, by refusing to consider the
`petition for untimeliness, the court thereby would endorse
`a ‘fundamental miscarriage of justice’ because it would
`require that an individual who is actually innocent remain
`imprisoned.”), with, e.g., Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426
`F. 3d 868, 871–872 (CA7 2005) (“Prisoners claiming to be
`innocent, like those contending that other events spoil the
`conviction, must meet the statutory requirement of timely
`
`action.”). See also Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F. 3d 514, 548
`
`(CA2 2012) (collecting cases).
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`7
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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
`
` II
`
`A
`
` In Holland v. Florida, 560 U. S. ___ (2010), this Court
`
`addressed the circumstances in which a federal habeas
`petitioner could invoke the doctrine of “equitable tolling.”
`Holland held that “a [habeas] petitioner is entitled to
`equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been
`pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraor-
`dinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
`filing.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 16–17) (internal quotation
`marks omitted). As the courts below comprehended,
`Perkins does not qualify for equitable tolling. In posses-
`sion of all three affidavits by July 2002, he waited nearly
`
` six years to seek federal postconviction relief. “Such a
`delay falls far short of demonstrating the . . . diligence”
`required to entitle a petitioner to equitable tolling. App. to
`Pet. for Cert. 31a (District Court opinion). See also Certif-
`icate of Appealability 2.
`
`
`Perkins, however, asserts not an excuse for filing after
`the statute of limitations has run. Instead, he maintains
`that a plea of actual innocence can overcome AEDPA’s
`one-year statute of limitations. He thus seeks an equi-
`table exception to §2244(d)(1), not an extension of the time
`
`statutorily prescribed. See Rivas, 687 F. 3d, at 547, n. 42
`(distinguishing from “equitable tolling” a plea to override
`the statute of limitations when actual innocence is shown).
`
`Decisions of this Court support Perkins’ view of the
`significance of a convincing actual-innocence claim. We
`have not resolved whether a prisoner may be entitled to
`habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual
`innocence. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 404–405
`(1993). We have recognized, however, that a prisoner
`“otherwise subject to defenses of abusive or successive use
`of the writ [of habeas corpus] may have his federal consti-
`tutional claim considered on the merits if he makes a
`proper showing of actual innocence.” Id., at 404 (citing
`
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`

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`8
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`MCQUIGGIN v. PERKINS
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`Opinion of the Court
`
`
` Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333 (1992)). See also Murray
`v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 496 (1986) (“[W]e think that in
`an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has
`probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
`innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even
`in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural
`default.”). In other words, a credible showing of actual
`innocence may allow a prisoner to pursue his constitu-
`tional claims (here, ineffective assistance of counsel) on the
`
`merits notwithstanding the existence of a procedural bar
`to relief. “This rule, or fundamental miscarriage of justice
`exception, is grounded in the ‘equitable discretion’ of
`habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors do
`not result in the incarceration of innocent persons.” Her-
`rera, 506 U. S., at 404.
`
`We have applied the miscarriage of justice exception to
`
`overcome various procedural defaults. These include
`“successive” petitions asserting previously rejected claims,
`see Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U. S. 436, 454 (1986) (plural-
`ity opinion), “abusive” petitions asserting in a second
`petition claims that could have been raised in a first peti-
`tion, see McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 494–495
`(1991), failure to develop facts in state court, see Keeney v.
`Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1, 11–12 (1992), and failure to
`
`observe state procedural rules, including filing deadlines,
`see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 750 (1991);
`Carrier, 477 U. S., at 495–496.
`The miscarriage of justice exception, our decisions bear
`
`out, survived AEDPA’s passage. In Calderon v. Thomp-
`son, 523 U. S. 538 (1998), we applied the exception to hold
`that a federal court may, consistent with AEDPA, recall
`its mandate in order to revisit the merits of a decision.
`Id., at 558 (“The miscarriage of justice standard is alto-
`gether consistent . . . with AEDPA’s central concern that
`
`the merits of concluded criminal proceedings not be revis-
`ited in the absence of a strong showing of actual inno-
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`

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` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` cence.”). In Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 622
`
`(1998), we held, in the context of §2255, that actual in-
`nocence may overcome a prisoner’s failure to raise a con-
`stitutional objection on direct review. Most recently, in
`House, we reiterated that a prisoner’s proof of actual
`innocence may provide a gateway for federal habeas re-
`view of a procedurally defaulted claim of constitutional
`error. 547 U. S., at 537–538.
`These decisions “see[k] to balance the societal interests
`
`in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial re-
`sources with the individual interest in justice that arises
`in the extraordinary case.” Schlup, 513 U. S., at 324.
`
`Sensitivity to the injustice of incarcerating an innocent
`individual should not abate when the impediment is
`AEDPA’s statute of limitations.
`As just noted, see supra, at 8, we have held that the
`
`
`miscarriage of justice exception applies to state procedural
`rules, including filing deadlines. Coleman, 501 U. S., at
`
`750. A federal court may invoke the miscarriage of justice
`exception to justify consideration of claims defaulted in
`
`state court under state timeliness rules. See ibid. The
`
`State’s reading of AEDPA’s time prescription would thus
`accord greater force to a federal deadline than to a simi-
`larly designed state deadline. It would be passing strange
`to interpret a statute seeking to promote federalism and
`comity as requiring stricter enforcement of federal proce-
`dural rules than procedural rules established and enforced
`by the States.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`B
`The State ties to §2244(d)’s text its insistence that
`
`AEDPA’s statute of limitations precludes courts from
`considering late-filed actual-innocence gateway claims.
`
`“Section 2244(d)(1)(D),” the State contends, “forecloses any
`argument that a habeas petitioner has unlimited time to
`present new evidence in support of a constitutional claim.”
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`10
`
`
`MCQUIGGIN v. PERKINS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Brief for Petitioner 17. That is so, the State maintains,
`because AEDPA prescribes a comprehensive system for
`determining when its one-year limitations period begins to
`run. “Included within that system,” the State observes, “is
`a specific trigger for the precise circumstance presented
`here: a constitutional claim based on new evidence.” Ibid.
`Section 2244(d)(1)(D) runs the clock from “the date on
`which the factual predicate of the claim . . . could have
`been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” In
`light of that provision, the State urges, “there is no need
`for the courts to act in equity to provide additional time for
`persons who allege actual innocence as a gateway to their
`claims of constitutional error.” Ibid. Perkins’ request for
`an equitable exception to the statute of limitations, the
`State charges, would “rende[r] superfluous this carefully
`scripted scheme.” Id., at 18.
`
`
`The State’s argument in this regard bears blinders.
`AEDPA’s time limitations apply to the typical case in
`which no allegation of actual innocence is made. The
`
`miscarriage of justice exception, we underscore, applies to
`a severely confined category: cases in which new evidence
`shows “it is more likely than not that no reasonable ju-
`ror would have convicted [the petitioner].” Schlup, 513
`U. S., at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section
`2244(d)(1)(D) is both modestly more stringent (because it
`requires diligence) and dramatically less stringent (be-
`cause it requires no showing of innocence). Many petitions
`that could not pass through the actual-innocence gateway
`will be timely or not measured by §2244(d)(1)(D)’s trigger-
`ing provision. That provision, in short, will hardly be
`
`rendered superfluous by recognition of the miscarriage of
`justice exception.
`
`The State further relies on provisions of AEDPA other
`than §2244(d)(1)(D), namely, §§2244(b)(2)(B) and 2254(e)
`(2), to urge that Congress knew how to incorporate the
`
`miscarriage of justice exception when it was so minded.
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` 11
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 569 U. S. ____ (2013)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Section 2244(b)(2)(B), the State observes, provides that
`a petitioner whose first federal habeas petition has al-
`ready been adjudicated when new evidence comes to light
`may file a second-or-successive petition when, and only
`when, the facts underlying the new claim would “es-
`tablish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
`constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
`found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.”
`
`§2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). And §2254(e)(2), which generally bars
`evidentiary hearings in federal habeas proceedings ini-
`tiated by state prisoners, includes an exception for pris-
`oners who present new evidence of their innocence. See
`§§2254(e)(2)(A)(ii), (B) (permitting evidentiary hearings in
`federal court if “the facts underlying the claim would be
`sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence
`that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder
`would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
`offense”).
`
`
`But Congress did not simply incorporate the miscarriage
`
`of justice exception into §§2244(b)(2)(B) and 2254(e)(2).
`
`Rather, Congress constrained the application of the excep-
`tion. Prior to AEDPA’s enactment, a court could grant
`relief on a second-or-successive petition, then known as
`an “abusive” petition, if the petitioner could show that “a
`fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a
`failure to entertain the claim.” McCleskey, 499 U. S., at
`
`495. Section 2244(b)(2)(B) limits the exception to cases in
`which “the factual predicate for the claim could not have
`been discovered previously through the exercise of due
`diligence,” and the petitioner can establish that no rea-
`sonable factfinder “would have found [her] guilty of the
`underlying offense” by “clear and convincing evidence.”
`
`Congress thus required second-or-successive habeas peti-
`
`tioners attempting to benefit from the miscarriage of
`justice exception to meet a higher level of proof (“clear and
`convincing evidence”) and to satisfy a diligence require-
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`12
`
`
`MCQUIGGIN v. PERKINS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`ment that did not exist prior to AEDPA’s passage.
`
`Likewise, petitioners asserting actual innocence pre-
`
`AEDPA could obtain evidentiary hearings in federal court
`even if they failed to develop facts in state court. See
`Keeney, 504 U. S., at 12 (“A habeas petitioner’s failure to
`develop a claim in state-court proceedings will be excused
`and a hearing mandated if he can show that a fundamen-
`tal miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold
`a federal evidentiary hearing.”). Under AEDPA, a peti-
`
`tioner seeking an evidentiary hearing must show diligence
`and, in addition, establish her actual innocence by clear
`and convincing evidence. §§2254(e)(2)(A)(ii), (B).
`Sections 2244(b)(2)(B) and 2254(e)(2) thus reflect Con-
`
`gress’ will to modify the miscarriage of justice exception
`with respect to second-or-successive petitions and the hold-
`ing of evidentiary hearings in federal court. These pro-
`visions do not demonstrate Congress’ intent to preclude
`courts from applying the exception, unmodified, to “the
`type of petition at issue here”—an untimely first federal
`habeas petition alleging a gateway actual-innocence claim.
`House, 547 U. S., at 539.1 The more rational inference to
`draw from Congress’ incorporation of a modified version of
`the miscarriage of justice exception in §§2244(b)(2)(B) and
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`1In House, we rejected the analogous argument that AEDPA re-
`placed the standard for actual-innocence gateway claims prescribed in
`Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 327 (1995) (petitioner “must show that it
`is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted
`
`him in the light of the new evidence”), with a “clear and convincing”
`evidence requirement. 547 U. S., at 539 (internal quotation marks
`
`omitted). As here, the State relied on §§2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) and 2254(e)(2)
`to support its argument. But “[n]either provision address[ed] the type
`of petition at issue . . . [,] a first federal habeas petition seeking consid-
`
`eration of defaulted claims based on a showing of actual innocence.”
`
`Ibid. Consequently, we held inapplicable to first petitions the s