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` OCTOBER TERM, 2013
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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`WALDEN v. FIORE ET AL.
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 12–574. Argued November 4, 2013—Decided February 25, 2014
`
`Petitioner Walden, a Georgia police officer working as a deputized Drug
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`Enforcement Administration agent at a Georgia airport, searched re-
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`spondents and seized a large amount of cash. Respondents allege
`that after they returned to their Nevada residence, petitioner helped
`draft a false probable cause affidavit in support of the funds’ forfei-
`ture and forwarded it to a United States Attorney’s Office in Georgia.
`In the end, no forfeiture complaint was filed, and respondents’ funds
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`were returned. Respondents filed a tort suit against petitioner in
`Federal District Court in Nevada. The District Court dismissed the
`suit, finding that the Georgia search and seizure did not establish a
`basis to exercise personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The Ninth Circuit
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`reversed, holding that the District Court could properly exercise ju-
`risdiction because petitioner had submitted the false probable cause
`affidavit with the knowledge that it would affect persons with signifi-
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`cant Nevada connections.
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`Held: The District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over petitioner.
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`Pp. 5–14.
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`(a) The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause constrains a
`State’s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its
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`courts, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291,
`and requires that the nonresident have “certain minimum contacts”
`with the forum State, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
`U. S. 310, 316. The inquiry into the “minimum contacts” necessary to
`create specific jurisdiction focuses “on the relationship among the de-
`fendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
`Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 775. For a State to exercise jurisdiction con-
`sistent with due process, that relationship must arise out of contacts
`that the “defendant himself” creates with the forum, Burger King
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`2
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`WALDEN v. FIORE
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`Syllabus
`Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 475, and must be analyzed with
`regard to the defendant’s contacts with the forum itself, not with per-
`sons residing there, see, e.g., International Shoe, supra, at 319. The
`plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the fo-
`rum. These same principles apply when intentional torts are in-
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` volved. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783, 788–789. Pp. 5–10.
`(b) Petitioner lacks the “minimal contacts” with Nevada that are a
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`prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over him. No part of peti-
`tioner’s course of conduct occurred in Nevada, and he formed no ju-
`risdictionally relevant contacts with that forum. The Ninth Circuit
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` reached its contrary conclusion by improperly shifting the analytical
`focus from petitioner’s contacts with the forum to his contacts with
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` respondents, obscuring the reality that none of petitioner’s chal-
`lenged conduct had anything to do with Nevada itself. Respondents
`emphasize that they suffered the “injury” caused by the delayed re-
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` turn of their funds while residing in Nevada, but Calder made clear
` that mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to
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`the forum. The proper question is whether the defendant’s conduct
`connects him to the forum in a meaningful way: Here, respondents’
`claimed injury does not evince such a connection. The injury oc-
`curred in Nevada simply because that is where respondents chose to
`be when they desired to use the seized funds. Other possible contacts
`noted by the Ninth Circuit—that respondents’ Nevada attorney con-
`tacted petitioner in Georgia, that cash seized in Georgia originated in
`Nevada, and that funds were returned to respondents in Nevada—
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`are ultimately unavailing. Pp. 11–14.
`688 F. 3d 558, reversed.
`THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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` Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 12–574
`_________________
`ANTHONY WALDEN, PETITIONER v. GINA FIORE
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` ET AL.
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`
`[February 25, 2014]
`
` JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
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`This case asks us to decide whether a court in Nevada
`may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant on the
`basis that he knew his allegedly tortious conduct in Geor-
`gia would delay the return of funds to plaintiffs with
`connections to Nevada. Because the defendant had no
`other contacts with Nevada, and because a plaintiff ’s con-
`tacts with the forum State cannot be “decisive in deter-
`mining whether the defendant’s due process rights are
`violated,” Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U. S. 320, 332 (1980), we
`hold that the court in Nevada may not exercise personal
`jurisdiction under these circumstances.
`I
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`Petitioner Anthony Walden serves as a police officer for
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`the city of Covington, Georgia. In August 2006, petitioner
`was working at the Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson Airport as
`a deputized agent of the Drug Enforcement Administra-
`tion (DEA). As part of a task force, petitioner conducted
`investigative stops and other law enforcement functions in
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`support of the DEA’s airport drug interdiction program.
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`On August 8, 2006, Transportation Security Admin-
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`2
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`WALDEN v. FIORE
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`Opinion of the Court
`istration agents searched respondents Gina Fiore and
`Keith Gipson and their carry-on bags at the San Juan
`airport in Puerto Rico. They found almost $97,000 in
`cash. Fiore explained to DEA agents in San Juan that she
`and Gipson had been gambling at a casino known as the
`El San Juan, and that they had residences in both Cali-
`fornia and Nevada (though they provided only California
`identification). After respondents were cleared for depar-
`ture, a law enforcement official at the San Juan airport
`notified petitioner’s task force in Atlanta that respondents
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`had boarded a plane for Atlanta, where they planned to
`catch a connecting flight to Las Vegas, Nevada.
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`When respondents arrived in Atlanta, petitioner and
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`another DEA agent approached them at the departure
`gate for their flight to Las Vegas. In response to petition-
`er’s questioning, Fiore explained that she and Gipson were
`professional gamblers. Respondents maintained that the
`cash they were carrying was their gambling “‘bank’” and
`winnings. App. 15, 24. After using a drug-sniffing dog to
`perform a sniff test, petitioner seized the cash.1 Petitioner
`advised respondents that their funds would be returned if
`they later proved a legitimate source for the cash. Re-
`spondents then boarded their plane.
`After respondents departed, petitioner moved the cash
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`to a secure location and the matter was forwarded to DEA
`headquarters. The next day, petitioner received a phone
`call from respondents’ attorney in Nevada seeking return
`of the funds. On two occasions over the next month, peti-
`tioner also received documentation from the attorney
`regarding the legitimacy of the funds.
`At some point after petitioner seized the cash, he helped
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`draft an affidavit to show probable cause for forfeiture of
`——————
` 1Respondents allege that the sniff test was “at best, inconclusive,”
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`and there is no indication in the pleadings that drugs or drug residue
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` were ever found on or with the cash. App. 21.
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`Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
`the funds and forwarded that affidavit to a United States
`Attorney’s Office in Georgia.2 According to respondents,
`the affidavit was false and misleading because petitioner
`misrepresented the encounter at the airport and omitted
`exculpatory information regarding the lack of drug evi-
`dence and the legitimate source of the funds. In the end,
`no forfeiture complaint was filed, and the DEA returned
`the funds to respondents in March 2007.
`Respondents filed suit against petitioner in the United
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`States District Court for the District of Nevada, seeking
`money damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Nar-
`cotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). Respondents alleged
`that petitioner violated their Fourth Amendment rights by
`(1) seizing the cash without probable cause; (2) keeping
`the money after concluding it did not come from drug-
`related activity; (3) drafting and forwarding a probable
`cause affidavit to support a forfeiture action while know-
`ing the affidavit contained false statements; (4) willfully
`seeking forfeiture while withholding exculpatory informa-
`tion; and (5) withholding that exculpatory information
`from the United States Attorney’s Office.
`The District Court granted petitioner’s motion to dis-
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`miss. Relying on this Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones,
`465 U. S. 783 (1984), the court determined that petition-
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`er’s search of respondents and his seizure of the cash in
`Georgia did not establish a basis to exercise personal
`jurisdiction in Nevada. The court concluded that even if
`petitioner caused harm to respondents in Nevada while
`knowing they lived in Nevada, that fact alone did not
`confer jurisdiction. Because the court dismissed the com-
`plaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, it did not determine
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`——————
` 2The alleged affidavit is not in the record. Because this case comes to
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`us at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we take respondents’ factual allega-
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` tions as true, including their allegations regarding the existence and
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` content of the affidavit.
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`3
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`4
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`WALDEN v. FIORE
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`Opinion of the Court
`whether venue was proper.
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`On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of
`Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court of
`Appeals assumed the District Court had correctly deter-
`mined that petitioner’s search and seizure in Georgia
`could not support exercise of jurisdiction in Nevada. The
`court held, however, that the District Court could properly
`exercise jurisdiction over “the false probable cause affida-
`vit aspect of the case.” 688 F. 3d 558, 577 (2011). Accord-
`ing to the Court of Appeals, petitioner “expressly aimed”
`his submission of the allegedly false affidavit at Nevada by
`submitting the affidavit with knowledge that it would
`affect persons with a “significant connection” to Nevada.3
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`Id., at 581. After determining that the delay in returning
`the funds to respondents caused them “foreseeable harm”
`in Nevada and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
`over petitioner was otherwise reasonable, the court found
`the District Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction to be
`proper.4 Id., at 582, 585. The Ninth Circuit denied re-
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`hearing en banc, with eight judges, in two separate opin-
`ions, dissenting. Id., at 562, 568.
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`We granted certiorari to decide whether due process
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`permits a Nevada court to exercise jurisdiction over peti-
`tioner. 568 U. S. ___ (2013). We hold that it does not and
`——————
`3The allegations in the complaint suggested to the Court of Appeals
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` that petitioner “definitely knew, at some point after the seizure but
`before providing the alleged false probable cause affidavit, that [re-
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`spondents] had a significant connection to Nevada.” 688 F. 3d, at 578.
`4Judge Ikuta dissented. In her view, the “false affidavit/forfeiture
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`proceeding aspect” over which the majority found jurisdiction proper
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` was not raised as a separate claim in the complaint, and she found it
`“doubtful that such a constitutional tort even exists.” Id., at 593. After
`the court denied rehearing en banc, the majority explained in a post-
`script that it viewed the filing of the false affidavit, which effected a
`“continued seizure” of the funds, as a separate Fourth Amendment
`violation. Id., at 588–589. Petitioner does not dispute that reading
`here.
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`Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`5
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` therefore reverse.5
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`
`II
`
`A
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`“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determin-
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`ing the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler
`AG v. Bauman, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 6).
`
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`This is because a federal district court’s authority to assert
`personal jurisdiction in most cases is linked to service of
`process on a defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction
`of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the
`district court is located.” Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 4(k)(1)(A).
`
`Here, Nevada has authorized its courts to exercise juris-
`diction over persons “on any basis not inconsistent with
`. . . the Constitution of the United States.” Nev. Rev. Stat.
`§14.065 (2011). Thus, in order to determine whether
`the Federal District Court in this case was authorized to
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`exercise jurisdiction over petitioner, we ask whether the
`exercise of jurisdiction “comports with the limits imposed
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`by federal due process” on the State of Nevada. Daimler,
`supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6).
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`
`
`B
`1
`The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
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`constrains a State’s authority to bind a nonresident
`defendant to a judgment of its courts. World-Wide
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`Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291 (1980).
`Although a nonresident’s physical presence within the
`territorial jurisdiction of the court is not required, the
`nonresident generally must have “certain minimum con-
`tacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not
`——————
`5We also granted certiorari on the question whether Nevada is a
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` proper venue for the suit under 28 U. S. C. §1391(b)(2). Because we
`resolve the case on jurisdictional grounds, we do not decide whether
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` venue was proper in Nevada.
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`WALDEN v. FIORE
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`Opinion of the Court
`offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
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`justice.’” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S.
`310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457,
`463 (1940)).
`
`This case addresses the “minimum contacts” necessary
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`to create specific jurisdiction.6 The inquiry whether a
`forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonres-
`ident defendant “focuses on ‘the relationship among the
`defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” Keeton v. Hus-
`tler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. 770, 775 (1984) (quoting
`Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 204 (1977)). For a State
`to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the
`defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial
`connection with the forum State. Two related aspects of
`this necessary relationship are relevant in this case.
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`First, the relationship must arise out of contacts that
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`the “defendant himself ” creates with the forum State.
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`Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 475 (1985).
`Due process limits on the State’s adjudicative authority
`principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defend-
`ant—not the convenience of plaintiffs or third parties. See
`World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., supra, at 291–292. We have
`consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the defendant-
`focused “minimum contacts” inquiry by demonstrating
`contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the
`forum State. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
`S. A. v. Hall, 466 U. S. 408, 417 (1984) (“[The] unilateral
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`6
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`——————
`6“Specific” or “case-linked” jurisdiction “depends on an ‘affiliatio[n]
`between the forum and the underlying controversy’ ” (i.e., an “activity or
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`an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore
`subject to the State’s regulation”). Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
`S. A. v. Brown, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 2). This is in
`
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`contrast to “general” or “all purpose” jurisdiction, which permits a court
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`to assert jurisdiction over a defendant based on a forum connection
`unrelated to the underlying suit (e.g., domicile). Respondents rely on
`specific jurisdiction only.
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` Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
`activity of another party or a third person is not an appro-
`priate consideration when determining whether a defend-
`ant has sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify an
`assertion of jurisdiction”). We have thus rejected a plain-
`tiff ’s argument that a Florida court could exercise per-
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`sonal jurisdiction over a trustee in Delaware based solely on
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`the contacts of the trust’s settlor, who was domiciled in
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`Florida and had executed powers of appointment there.
`Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 253–254 (1958). We
`have likewise held that Oklahoma courts could not exer-
`cise personal jurisdiction over an automobile distributor
`that supplies New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut
`dealers based only on an automobile purchaser’s act of
`driving it on Oklahoma highways. World-Wide Volks-
`wagen Corp., supra, at 298. Put simply, however sig-
`
`nificant the plaintiff ’s contacts with the forum may be,
`those contacts cannot be “decisive in determining whether
`the defendant’s due process rights are violated.” Rush,
`444 U. S., at 332.
`
`Second, our “minimum contacts” analysis looks to the
`defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the
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`defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there. See,
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`e.g., International Shoe, supra, at 319 (Due process “does
`not contemplate that a state may make binding a judg-
`ment in personam against an individual . . . with which
`the state has no contacts, ties, or relations”); Hanson,
`supra, at 251 (“However minimal the burden of defending
`in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon
`to do so unless he has had the ‘minimal contacts’ with that
`State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over
`him”). Accordingly, we have upheld the assertion of juris-
`diction over defendants who have purposefully “reach[ed]
`out beyond” their State and into another by, for example,
`entering a contractual relationship that “envisioned con-
`tinuing and wide-reaching contacts” in the forum State,
`Burger King, supra, at 479–480, or by circulating maga-
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`7
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`8
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`WALDEN v. FIORE
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`Opinion of the Court
`zines to “deliberately exploi[t]” a market in the forum
`State, Keeton, supra, at 781. And although physical pres-
`ence in the forum is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction,
`Burger King, supra, at 476, physical entry into the State—
`either by the defendant in person or through an agent,
`goods, mail, or some other means—is certainly a relevant
`
`contact. See, e.g., Keeton, supra, at 773–774.
`
`But the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the
`defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s
`conduct that must form the necessary connection with the
`forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction over him.
`See Burger King, supra, at 478 (“If the question is whether
`an individual’s contract with an out-of-state party alone
`can automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts
`in the other party’s home forum, we believe the answer
`clearly is that it cannot”); Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal.,
`City and County of San Francisco, 436 U. S. 84, 93 (1978)
`(declining to “find personal jurisdiction in a State . . .
`merely because [the plaintiff in a child support action] was
`residing there”). To be sure, a defendant’s contacts with
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`the forum State may be intertwined with his transactions
`or interactions with the plaintiff or other parties. But a
`defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party,
`
`
`standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.
`See Rush, supra, at 332 (“Naturally, the parties’ relation-
`ships with each other may be significant in evaluating
`their ties to the forum. The requirements of International
`
`
`Shoe, however, must be met as to each defendant over
`whom a state court exercises jurisdiction”). Due process
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`requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum
`State based on his own affiliation with the State, not
`based on the “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts
`he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with
`the State. Burger King, 471 U. S., at 475 (internal quota-
`tion marks omitted).
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`9
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` Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
`2
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`These same principles apply when intentional torts are
`involved. In that context, it is likewise insufficient to rely
`on a defendant’s “random, fortuitous, or attenuated con-
`tacts” or on the “unilateral activity” of a plaintiff. Ibid.
`(same). A forum State’s exercise of jurisdiction over an
`out-of-state intentional tortfeasor must be based on inten-
`tional conduct by the defendant that creates the necessary
`contacts with the forum.
`Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783, illustrates the applica-
`tion of these principles. In Calder, a California actress
`brought a libel suit in California state court against a
`reporter and an editor, both of whom worked for the Na-
`tional Enquirer at its headquarters in Florida. The plain-
`
`tiff ’s libel claims were based on an article written and
`edited by the defendants in Florida for publication in the
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`National Enquirer, a national weekly newspaper with a
`California circulation of roughly 600,000.
`
`We held that California’s assertion of jurisdiction over
`the defendants was consistent with due process. Although
`we recognized that the defendants’ activities “focus[ed]” on
`the plaintiff, our jurisdictional inquiry “focuse[d] on ‘the
`relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
`
`litigation.’” Id., at 788 (quoting Shaffer, 433 U. S., at 204).
`Specifically, we examined the various contacts the defend-
`ants had created with California (and not just with the
`
`plaintiff) by writing the allegedly libelous story.
`
`We found those forum contacts to be ample: The defend-
`ants relied on phone calls to “California sources” for the
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`information in their article; they wrote the story about the
`plaintiff ’s activities in California; they caused reputa-
`tional injury in California by writing an allegedly libelous
`article that was widely circulated in the State; and the
`“brunt” of that injury was suffered by the plaintiff in that
`State. 465 U. S., at 788–789. “In sum, California [wa]s
`the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered.”
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`WALDEN v. FIORE
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`Opinion of the Court
`Id., at 789. Jurisdiction over the defendants was “there-
`fore proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their
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`Florida conduct in California.” Ibid.
`
`The crux of Calder was that the reputation-based “ef-
`fects” of the alleged libel connected the defendants to
`California, not just to the plaintiff. The strength of that
`connection was largely a function of the nature of the libel
`tort. However scandalous a newspaper article might be, it
`can lead to a loss of reputation only if communicated to
`(and read and understood by) third persons. See Restate-
`ment (Second) of Torts §577, Comment b (1976); see also
`ibid. (“[R]eputation is the estimation in which one’s char-
`acter is held by his neighbors or associates”). Accordingly,
`the reputational injury caused by the defendants’ story
`would not have occurred but for the fact that the defend-
`
`
`ants wrote an article for publication in California that was
`read by a large number of California citizens. Indeed,
`because publication to third persons is a necessary ele-
`ment of libel, see id., §558, the defendants’ intentional tort
`
`actually occurred in California. Keeton, 465 U. S., at 777
`(“The tort of libel is generally held to occur wherever the
`offending material is circulated”). In this way, the “ef-
`fects” caused by the defendants’ article—i.e., the injury to
`the plaintiff ’s reputation in the estimation of the Califor-
`nia public—connected the defendants’ conduct to Califor-
`nia, not just to a plaintiff who lived there. That connec-
`tion, combined with the various facts that gave the article
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`a California focus, sufficed to authorize the California
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`court’s exercise of jurisdiction.7
`——————
` 7The defendants in Calder argued that no contacts they had with
`
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`California were sufficiently purposeful because their employer was
`responsible for circulation of the article. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S.
`783, 789 (1984). We rejected that argument. Even though the defend-
`
`ants did not circulate the article themselves, they “expressly aimed”
`“their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions” at California be-
`cause they knew the National Enquirer “ha[d] its largest circulation” in
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`11
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`Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014)
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`Opinion of the Court
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` III
`
`Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that
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`petitioner lacks the “minimal contacts” with Nevada that
`are a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over him.
`Hanson, 357 U. S., at 251. It is undisputed that no part of
`
`petitioner’s course of conduct occurred in Nevada. Peti-
`tioner approached, questioned, and searched respondents,
`and seized the cash at issue, in the Atlanta airport. It is
`alleged that petitioner later helped draft a “false probable
`cause affidavit” in Georgia and forwarded that affidavit to
`a United States Attorney’s Office in Georgia to support a
`potential action for forfeiture of the seized funds.
` 688
`
`F. 3d, at 563. Petitioner never traveled to, conducted
`activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or
`anyone to Nevada. In short, when viewed through the
`proper lens—whether the defendant’s actions connect him
`to the forum—petitioner formed no jurisdictionally rele-
`vant contacts with Nevada.
`
`The Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion by
`shifting the analytical focus from petitioner’s contacts with
`the forum to his contacts with respondents. See Rush, 444
`U. S., at 332. Rather than assessing petitioner’s own
`contacts with Nevada, the Court of Appeals looked to
`petitioner’s knowledge of respondents’ “strong forum
`connections.” 688 F. 3d, at 577–579, 581. In the court’s
`view, that knowledge, combined with its conclusion that
`respondents suffered foreseeable harm in Nevada, satis-
`
`fied the “minimum contacts” inquiry.8 Id., at 582.
`
`
`This approach to the “minimum contacts” analysis
`——————
`California, and that the article would “have a potentially devastating
`
`
`impact” there. Id., at 789–790.
`8Respondents propose a substantially similar analysis. They suggest
`
`that “a defendant creates sufficient minimum contacts with a forum
`when he (1) intentionally targets (2) a known resident of the forum (3)
`for imposition of an injury (4) to be suffered by the plaintiff while she is
`
`residing in the forum state.” Brief for Respondents 26–27.
`
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`12
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`
`WALDEN v. FIORE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`impermissibly allows a plaintiff ’s contacts with the de-
`fendant and forum to drive the jurisdictional analysis.
`Petitioner’s actions in Georgia did not create sufficient
`contacts with Nevada simply because he allegedly directed
`his conduct at plaintiffs whom he knew had Nevada con-
`nections. Such reasoning improperly attributes a plain-
`tiff ’s forum connections to the defendant and makes those
`connections “decisive” in the jurisdictional analysis. See
`Rush, supra, at 332. It also obscures the reality that none
`of petitioner’s challenged conduct had anything to do with
`Nevada itself.
`Relying on Calder, respondents emphasize that they
`suffered the “injury” caused by petitioner’s allegedly tor-
`tious conduct (i.e., the delayed return of their gambling
`funds) while they were residing in the forum. Brief for
`
`Respondents 14. This emphasis is likewise misplaced. As
`previously noted, Calder made clear that mere injury to a
`forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum.
`Regardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an injury is
`jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the
`defendant has formed a contact with the forum State. The
`proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a
`particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s
`
`conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.
`
`Respondents’ claimed injury does not evince a connec-
`tion between petitioner and Nevada. Even if we consider
`the continuation of the seizure in Georgia to be a distinct
`
`injury, it is not the sort of effect that is tethered to Nevada
`in any meaningful way. Respondents (and only respond-
`ents) lacked access to their funds in Nevada not because
`anything independently occurred there, but because Ne-
`
`vada is where respondents chose to be at a time when they
`desired to use the funds seized by petitioner. Respondents
`would have experienced this same lack of access in Cali-
`fornia, Mississippi, or wherever else they might have
`traveled and found themselves wanting more money than
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`13
`
`
`Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`they had. Unlike the broad publication of the forum-
`focused story in Calder, the effects of petitioner’s con-
`duct on respondents are not connected to the forum State
`in a way that makes those effects a proper basis for
`
`jurisdiction.9
`
`The Court of Appeals pointed to other possible contacts
`with Nevada, each ultimately unavailing. Respondents’
`Nevada attorney contacted petitioner in Georgia, but that
`is precisely the sort of “unilateral activity” of a third party
`that “cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the
`
`forum State.” Hanson, 357 U. S., at 253. Respondents
`allege that some of the cash seized in Georgia “originated”
`in Nevada, but that attenuated connection was not created
`by petitioner, and the cash was in Georgia, not Nevada,
`when petitioner seized it. Finally, the funds were eventu-
`ally returned to respondents in Nevada, but petitioner had
`nothing to do with that return (indeed, it seems likely that
`it was respondents’ unilateral decision to have their funds
`sent to Nevada).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`*
`*
`*
`Well-established principles of personal jurisdiction are
`
`sufficient to decide this case. The proper focus of the
`——————
`9Respondents warn that if we decide petitioner lacks minimum con-
`tacts in this case, it will bring about unfairness in cases where inten-
`tional torts are committed via the Internet or other electronic means
`(e.g., fraudulent access of financial accounts or “phishing” schemes). As
`an initial matter, we reiterate that the “minimum contacts” inquiry
`principally protects the liberty of the nonresident defendant, not the
`interests of the plaintiff. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
`444 U. S., 286, 291–292 (1980). In any event, this case does not present
`the very different questions whether and how a defendant’s virtual
`“presence” and conduct translate into “contacts” with a particular
`State. To the contrary, there is no question where the conduct giving
`rise to this litigation took place: Petitioner seized physical cash from
`respondents in the Atlanta airport, and he later drafted and forwarded
`an affidavit in Georgia. We leave questions about virtual contacts for
`another day.
`
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`14
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`
`WALDEN v. FIORE
`
`Opinion of the Court
`“minimum contacts” inquiry in intentional-tort cases is
`
`“‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
`the litigation.’” Calder, 465 U. S., at 788. And it is the
`defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who must
`
`create contacts with the forum State. In this case, the
`application of those principles is clear: Petitioner’s rele-
`vant conduct occurred entirely in Georgia, and the mere
`fact that his conduct affected plaintiffs with connections
`to the forum State does not suffice to authorize jurisdic-
`tion. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of
`Appeals.
`
`
`