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` OCTOBER TERM, 2014
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
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` Syllabus
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`ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
` INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION ET AL.
`
`APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
`
`DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
` No. 13–1314. Argued March 2, 2015—Decided June 29, 2015
`
`Under Arizona’s Constitution, the electorate shares lawmaking author-
`ity on equal footing with the Arizona Legislature. The voters may
`adopt laws and constitutional amendments by ballot initiative, and
`they may approve or disapprove, by referendum, measures passed by
`the Legislature. Ariz. Const., Art. IV, pt. 1, §1. “Any law which may
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` be enacted by the Legislature . . . may be enacted by the people under
`the Initiative.” Art. XXII, §14.
`
`In 2000, Arizona voters adopted Proposition 106, an initiative
`aimed at the problem of gerrymandering. Proposition 106 amended
`Arizona’s Constitution, removing redistricting authority from the Ar-
`izona Legislature and vesting it in an independent commission, the
`Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC). After the
`2010 census, as after the 2000 census, the AIRC adopted redistricting
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` maps for congressional as well as state legislative districts. The Ari-
`zona Legislature challenged the map the Commission adopted in
`2012 for congressional districts, arguing that the AIRC and its map
`violated the “Elections Clause” of the U. S. Constitution, which pro-
`vides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Sena-
`tors and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the
`Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make
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`or alter such Regulations.” Because “Legislature” means the State’s
`representative assembly, the Arizona Legislature contended, the
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`Clause precludes resort to an independent commission, created by in-
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`itiative, to accomplish redistricting. A three-judge District Court
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`held that the Arizona Legislature had standing to sue, but rejected
`its complaint on the merits.
`Held:
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`ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
`
`INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N
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`
`Syllabus
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`1. The Arizona Legislature has standing to bring this suit. In
`claiming that Proposition 106 stripped it of its alleged constitutional
`prerogative to engage in redistricting and that its injury would be
`remedied by a court order enjoining the proposition’s enforcement,
`the Legislature has shown injury that is ‘concrete and particularized’
`and ‘actual or imminent,’ ” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
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`520 U. S. 43, 64, “fairly traceable to the challenged action,” and “re-
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`dressable by a favorable ruling,” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
`U. S. ___, ___. Specifically, Proposition 106, together with the Arizo-
`na Constitution’s ban on efforts by the Arizona Legislature to under-
`mine the purposes of an initiative, would “completely nullif[y]” any
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`vote by the Legislature, now or “in the future,” purporting to adopt a
`redistricting plan. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 823–824. Pp. 9–15.
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`2. The Elections Clause and 2 U. S. C. §2a(c) permit Arizona’s use
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`of a commission to adopt congressional districts. Pp. 15–35.
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`(a) Redistricting is a legislative function to be performed in ac-
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`cordance with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking, which may in-
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`clude the referendum, Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565,
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`
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`567, and the Governor’s veto, Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 369.
`While exercise of the initiative was not at issue in this Court’s prior
`decisions, there is no constitutional barrier to a State’s empowerment
`of its people by embracing that form of lawmaking. Pp. 15–19.
`
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`(b) Title 2 U. S. C. §2a(c)—which provides that, “[u]ntil a State is
`redistricted in the manner provided by the law thereof after any ap-
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`portionment,” it must follow federally prescribed redistricting proce-
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`dures—permits redistricting in accord with Arizona’s initiative.
`From 1862 through 1901, apportionment Acts required a State to fol-
`low federal procedures unless “the [state] legislature” drew district
`lines. In 1911, Congress, recognizing that States had supplemented
`the representative legislature mode of lawmaking with a direct law-
`making role for the people, replaced the reference to redistricting by
`the state “legislature” with a reference to redistricting of a State “in
`the manner provided by the laws thereof.” §4, 37 Stat. 14. The Act’s
`legislative history “leaves no . . . doubt,” Hildebrant, 241 U. S., at
`568, that the change was made to safeguard to “each state full au-
`thority to employ in the creation of congressional districts its own
`laws and regulations.” 47 Cong. Rec. 3437. “If they include the initi-
`ative, it is included.” Id., at 3508. Congress used virtually identical
`language in enacting §2a(c) in 1941. This provision also accords full
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`respect to the redistricting procedures adopted by the States. Thus,
`so long as a State has “redistricted in the manner provided by the law
`thereof”—as Arizona did by utilizing the independent commission
`procedure in its Constitution—the resulting redistricting plan be-
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`comes the presumptively governing map.
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`2
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`Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Syllabus
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`Though four of §2a(c)’s five default redistricting procedures—
`operative only when a State is not “redistricted in the manner pro-
`vided by [state] law”—have become obsolete as a result of this Court’s
`decisions embracing the one-person, one-vote principle, this infirmity
`does not bear on the question whether a State has been “redistricted
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`in the manner provided by [state] law.” Pp. 19–23.
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`(c) The Elections Clause permits the people of Arizona to provide
`for redistricting by independent commission. The history and pur-
`pose of the Clause weigh heavily against precluding the people of Ar-
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`izona from creating a commission operating independently of the
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`state legislature to establish congressional districts. Such preclusion
`would also run up against the Constitution’s animating principle that
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`the people themselves are the originating source of all the powers of
`government. Pp. 24–35.
`(1) The dominant purpose of the Elections Clause, the histori-
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`
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`cal record bears out, was to empower Congress to override state elec-
`tion rules, not to restrict the way States enact legislation. See Inter
`Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 U. S., at ___. Ratification arguments in
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`support of congressional oversight focused on potential abuses by
`state politicians, but the legislative processes by which the States
`could exercise their initiating role in regulating congressional elec-
`tions occasioned no debate. Pp. 25–27.
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`(2) There is no suggestion that the Election Clause, by specify-
`ing “the Legislature thereof,” required assignment of congressional
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`redistricting authority to the State’s representative body. It is char-
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`acteristic of the federal system that States retain autonomy to estab-
`lish their own governmental processes free from incursion by the
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`Federal Government. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 752.
`
`“Through the structure of its government, and the character of those
`who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sover-
`eign.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460. Arizona engaged in
`definition of that kind when its people placed both the initiative pow-
`er and the AIRC’s redistricting authority in the portion of the Arizo-
`na Constitution delineating the State’s legislative authority, Ariz.
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`Const., Art. IV. The Elections Clause should not be read to single out
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`federal elections as the one area in which States may not use citizen
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`initiatives as an alternative legislative process. And reading the
`Clause to permit the use of the initiative to control state and local
`elections but not federal elections would “deprive several States of
`the convenience of having the elections for their own governments
`and for the national government” held at the same times and places,
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`and in the same manner. The Federalist No. 61, p. 374 (Hamilton).
`Pp. 27–30.
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`(3) The Framers may not have imagined the modern initiative
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`3
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`4
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`ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
`INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N
`
`
`Syllabus
`
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`process in which the people’s legislative power is coextensive with the
`state legislature’s authority, but the invention of the initiative was in
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`full harmony with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the
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`
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`font of governmental power. It would thus be perverse to interpret
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`“Legislature” in the Elections Clause to exclude lawmaking by the
`people, particularly when such lawmaking is intended to advance the
`prospect that Members of Congress will in fact be “chosen . . . by the
`People of the several States,” Art. I, §2. Pp. 30–33.
`
`(4) Banning lawmaking by initiative to direct a State’s method
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`of apportioning congressional districts would not just stymie at-
`tempts to curb gerrymandering. It would also cast doubt on numer-
`ous other time, place, and manner regulations governing federal elec-
`tions that States have adopted by the initiative method. As well, it
`could endanger election provisions in state constitutions adopted by
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`conventions and ratified by voters at the ballot box, without involve-
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`ment or approval by “the Legislature.” Pp. 33–35.
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`997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, affirmed.
`GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
`BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a
`dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined.
`SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.
`THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined.
`
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`Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 13–1314
`_________________
` ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE, APPELLANT v.
`
`
`ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING
`
`COMMISSION ET AL.
`
`
`ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
`
`THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
`[June 29, 2015]
` JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
`This case concerns an endeavor by Arizona voters to
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`address the problem of partisan gerrymandering—the
`drawing of legislative district lines to subordinate adher
`ents of one political party and entrench a rival party in
`power.1 “[P]artisan gerrymanders,” this Court has recog
`nized, “[are incompatible] with democratic principles.”
`
`Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality
`opinion); id., at 316 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judg
`ment). Even so, the Court in Vieth did not grant relief on
`the plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymander claim. The plurality
`held the matter nonjusticiable. Id., at 281. JUSTICE
`KENNEDY found no standard workable in that case, but
`left open the possibility that a suitable standard might be
`identified in later litigation. Id., at 317.
`
`
`
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`
`
`——————
`1The term “gerrymander” is a portmanteau of the last name of El-
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`bridge Gerry, the eighth Governor of Massachusetts, and the shape of
`the electoral map he famously contorted for partisan gain, which
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`included one district shaped like a salamander. See E. Griffith, The
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`Rise and Development of the Gerrymander 16–19 (Arno ed. 1974).
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`2
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`ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
`INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`In 2000, Arizona voters adopted an initiative, Proposi
`
`tion 106, aimed at “ending the practice of gerrymandering
`and improving voter and candidate participation in elec
`tions.” App. 50. Proposition 106 amended Arizona’s Con
`stitution to remove redistricting authority from the Ari-
`
`zona Legislature and vest that authority in an independent
`
`
`commission, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Com
`mission (AIRC or Commission). After the 2010 census,
`as after the 2000 census, the AIRC adopted redistrict-
`ing maps for congressional as well as state legislative
`districts.
`
`The Arizona Legislature challenged the map the Com
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`mission adopted in January 2012 for congressional dis
`tricts. Recognizing that the voters could control redistrict
`ing for state legislators, Brief for Appellant 42, 47; Tr. of
`Oral Arg. 3–4, the Arizona Legislature sued the AIRC in
`federal court seeking a declaration that the Commission
`and its map for congressional districts violated the “Elec
`
`tions Clause” of the U. S. Constitution. That Clause,
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`critical to the resolution of this case, provides:
`“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
`for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed
`in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Con
`gress may at any time by Law make or alter such
`Regulations . . . .” Art. I, §4, cl. 1.
`
`The Arizona Legislature’s complaint alleged that “[t]he
`word ‘Legislature’ in the Elections Clause means [specifi
`cally and only] the representative body which makes the
`laws of the people,” App. 21, ¶37; so read, the Legislature
`urges, the Clause precludes resort to an independent
`commission, created by initiative, to accomplish redistrict
`ing. The AIRC responded that, for Elections Clause pur
`poses, “the Legislature” is not confined to the elected
`representatives; rather, the term encompasses all legisla
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`tive authority conferred by the State Constitution, includ
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` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` ing initiatives adopted by the people themselves.
`
`
`A three-judge District Court held, unanimously, that the
`Arizona Legislature had standing to sue; dividing two to
`one, the Court rejected the Legislature’s complaint on the
`merits. We postponed jurisdiction and instructed the
`parties to address two questions: (1) Does the Arizona
`Legislature have standing to bring this suit? (2) Do the
`Elections Clause of the United States Constitution and 2
`U. S. C. §2a(c) permit Arizona’s use of a commission to
`adopt congressional districts? 573 U. S. ___ (2014).
`We now affirm the District Court’s judgment. We hold,
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`first, that the Arizona Legislature, having lost authority to
`draw congressional districts, has standing to contest the
`constitutionality of Proposition 106. Next, we hold that
`lawmaking power in Arizona includes the initiative proc-
`ess, and that both §2a(c) and the Elections Clause permit
`use of the AIRC in congressional districting in the same
`way the Commission is used in districting for Arizona’s
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`own Legislature.
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`3
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`
`
`I
`
`A
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`Direct lawmaking by the people was “virtually unknown
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`when the Constitution of 1787 was drafted.” Donovan &
`Bowler, An Overview of Direct Democracy in the American
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`States, in Citizens as Legislators 1 (S. Bowler, T. Don-
`
`ovan, & C. Tolbert eds. 1998). There were obvious pre-
`cursors or analogues to the direct lawmaking operative
`today in several States, notably, New England’s town hall
`meetings and the submission of early state constitutions to
`the people for ratification. See Lowell, The Referendum in
`the United States, in The Initiative, Referendum and
`Recall 126, 127 (W. Munro ed. 1912) (hereinafter IRR); W.
`Dodd, The Revision and Amendment of State Constitu
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`4
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`ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
`
`INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N
`
`Opinion of the Court
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`tions 64–67 (1910).2 But it was not until the turn of the
`20th century, as part of the Progressive agenda of the era,
`that direct lawmaking by the electorate gained a foothold,
`largely in Western States. See generally Persily, The
`Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initia
`tive, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American
`West, 2 Mich L. & Pol’y Rev. 11 (1997).
`
`The two main “agencies of direct legislation” are the
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`initiative and the referendum. Munro, Introductory, in
`IRR 8. The initiative operates entirely outside the States’
`representative assemblies; it allows “voters [to] petition to
`propose statutes or constitutional amendments to be
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`
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`adopted or rejected by the voters at the polls.” D. Magleby,
`Direct Legislation 1 (1984). While the initiative allows
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`the electorate to adopt positive legislation, the referendum
`serves as a negative check. It allows “voters [to] petition
`to refer a legislative action to the voters [for approval or
`disapproval] at the polls.” Ibid. “The initiative [thus]
`corrects sins of omission” by representative bodies, while
`the “referendum corrects sins of commission.” Johnson,
`Direct Legislation as an Ally of Representative Govern
`ment, in IRR 139, 142.
`
`In 1898, South Dakota took the pathmarking step of
`affirming in its Constitution the people’s power “directly
`[to] control the making of all ordinary laws” by initiative
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`
`and referendum. Introductory, id., at 9. In 1902, Oregon
`became the first State to adopt the initiative as a means,
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`——————
`2The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 is illustrative of the under
`standing that the people’s authority could trump the state legislature’s.
`
`Framed by a separate convention, it was submitted to the people for
`ratification. That occurred after the legislature attempted to promul
`gate a Constitution it had written, an endeavor that drew opposition
`from many Massachusetts towns. See J. Rakove, Original Meanings:
`Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 96–101 (1996); G.
`Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787, pp. 339–341
`(1969).
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`Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` not only to enact ordinary laws, but also to amend the
`State’s Constitution. J. Dinan, The American State Con
`stitutional Tradition 62 (2006). By 1920, the people in 19
`States had reserved for themselves the power to initiate
`ordinary lawmaking, and, in 13 States, the power to initi
`ate amendments to the State’s Constitution. Id., at 62,
`and n. 132, 94, and n. 151. Those numbers increased to 21
`and 18, respectively, by the close of the 20th century.
`
`Ibid.3
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`
`
`5
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`
`
`B
`For the delegates to Arizona’s constitutional convention,
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`direct lawmaking was a “principal issu[e].” J. Leshy, The
`Arizona State Constitution 8–9 (2d ed. 2013) (hereinafter
`Leshy). By a margin of more than three to one, the people
`of Arizona ratified the State’s Constitution, which included,
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`among lawmaking means, initiative and referendum pro-
`visions. Id., at 14–16, 22. In the runup to Arizona’s ad
`mission to the Union in 1912, those provisions generated
`no controversy. Id., at 22.
`In particular, the Arizona Constitution “establishes the
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`electorate [of Arizona] as a coordinate source of legisla
`tion” on equal footing with the representative legislative
`body. Queen Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai Cty.
`Bd. of Supervisors, 108 Ariz. 449, 451, 501 P. 2d 391, 393
`(1972); Cave Creek Unified School Dist. v. Ducey, 233 Ariz.
`1, 4, 308 P. 3d 1152, 1155 (2013) (“The legislature and
`——————
`3The people’s sovereign right to incorporate themselves into a State’s
`lawmaking apparatus, by reserving for themselves the power to adopt
`
`
` laws and to veto measures passed by elected representatives, is one this
` Court has ranked a nonjusticiable political matter. Pacific States
`
`Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912) (rejecting
`challenge to referendum mounted under Article IV, §4’s undertaking by
`the United States to “guarantee to every State in th[e] Union a Repub
`
`
` lican Form of Government”). But see New York v. United States, 505
`U. S. 144, 185 (1992) (“[P]erhaps not all claims under the Guarantee
`
` Clause present nonjusticiable political questions.”).
`
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`6
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`ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
`
`INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`electorate share lawmaking power under Arizona’s system
`of government.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
`initiative, housed under the article of the Arizona Consti
`tution concerning the “Legislative Department” and the
`section defining the State’s “legislative authority,” re
`serves for the people “the power to propose laws and
`amendments to the constitution.” Art. IV, pt. 1, §1. The
`Arizona Constitution further states that “[a]ny law which
`may be enacted by the Legislature under this Constitution
`may be enacted by the people under the Initiative.”
`
`Art. XXII, §14. Accordingly, “[g]eneral references to the
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`power of the ‘legislature’” in the Arizona Constitution
`“include the people’s right (specified in Article IV, part 1)
`to bypass their elected representatives and make laws
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`directly through the initiative.” Leshy xxii.
`C
`
`Proposition 106, vesting redistricting authority in the
`AIRC, was adopted by citizen initiative in 2000 against a
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`“background of recurring redistricting turmoil” in Arizona.
`Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buf-
`fer? 121 Yale L. J. 1808, 1831 (2012). Redistricting plans
`adopted by the Arizona Legislature sparked controversy in
`every redistricting cycle since the 1970’s, and several of
`those plans were rejected by a federal court or refused
`preclearance by the Department of Justice under the
`
`Voting Rights Act of 1965. See id., at 1830–1832.4
`——————
` 4From Arizona’s admission to the Union in 1912 to 1940, no congres
`
`sional districting occurred because Arizona had only one Member of
`Congress. K. Martis, The Historical Atlas of United States Congres
`sional Districts, 1789–1983, p. 3 (1982) (Table 1). Court-ordered
`congressional districting plans were in place from 1966 to 1970, and
`from 1982 through 2000. See Klahr v. Williams, 313 F. Supp. 148
`
`(Ariz. 1970); Goddard v. Babbitt, 536 F. Supp. 538 (Ariz. 1982); Arizo-
`nans for Fair Representation v. Symington, 828 F. Supp. 684 (Ariz.
`1992); Norrander & Wendland, Redistricting in Arizona, in Reappor
`tionment and Redistricting in the West 177, 178–179 (G. Moncrief ed.
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`7
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`Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Aimed at “ending the practice of gerrymandering and
`
`improving voter and candidate participation in elections,”
`App. 50, Proposition 106 amended the Arizona Constitu
`tion to remove congressional redistricting authority from
`the state legislature, lodging that authority, instead, in a
`
`
`new entity, the AIRC. Ariz. Const., Art. IV, pt. 2, §1, ¶¶3–
`23. The AIRC convenes after each census, establishes
`final district boundaries, and certifies the new districts to
`the Arizona Secretary of State. ¶¶16–17. The legislature
`may submit nonbinding recommendations to the AIRC,
`¶16, and is required to make necessary appropriations for
`its operation, ¶18. The highest ranking officer and minor
`ity leader of each chamber of the legislature each select
`one member of the AIRC from a list compiled by Arizona’s
`Commission on Appellate Court Appointments. ¶¶4–7.
`
`The four appointed members of the AIRC then choose,
`from the same list, the fifth member, who chairs the
`Commission. ¶8. A Commission’s tenure is confined to
`one redistricting cycle; each member’s time in office “ex
`pire[s] upon the appointment of the first member of the
`next redistricting commission.” ¶23.
`
`Holders of, or candidates for, public office may not serve
`on the AIRC, except candidates for or members of a school
`board. ¶3. No more than two members of the Commission
`may be members of the same political party, ibid., and the
`presiding fifth member cannot be registered with any
`party already represented on the Commission, ¶8. Subject
`to the concurrence of two-thirds of the Arizona Senate,
`AIRC members may be removed by the Arizona Governor
`for gross misconduct, substantial neglect of duty, or inabil
`
`ity to discharge the duties of office. ¶10.5
`——————
`2011).
`5In the current climate of heightened partisanship, the AIRC has
`encountered interference with its operations. In particular, its depend
`ence on the Arizona Legislature for funding, and the removal provision
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`have proved problematic. In 2011, when the AIRC proposed boundaries
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`8
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`ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
`INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`Several other States, as a means to curtail partisan
`
`
`gerrymandering, have also provided for the participation
`of commissions in redistricting. Some States, in common
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`with Arizona, have given nonpartisan or bipartisan com
`missions binding authority over redistricting.6 The Cali
`fornia Redistricting Commission, established by popular
`initiative, develops redistricting plans which can be halted
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`by public referendum.7 Still other States have given com
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`missions an auxiliary role, advising the legislatures on
`redistricting,8 or serving as a “backup” in the event the
`State’s representative body fails to complete redistricting.9
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`Studies report that nonpartisan and bipartisan commis
`sions generally draw their maps in a timely fashion and
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`create districts both more competitive and more likely to
`survive legal challenge. See Miller & Grofman, Redistrict
`ing Commissions in the Western United States, 3 U. C.
`Irvine L. Rev. 637, 661, 663–664, 666 (2013).
`D
`On January 17, 2012, the AIRC approved final congres
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`sional and state legislative maps based on the 2010 cen
`sus. See Arizona Independent Redistricting, Final Maps,
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`——————
`the majority party did not like, the Governor of Arizona attempted to
`remove the Commission’s independent chair. Her attempt was stopped
`by the Arizona Supreme Court. See Cain, Redistricting Commissions:
`A Better Political Buffer? 121 Yale L. J. 1808, 1835–1836 (2012) (citing
`Mathis v. Brewer, No. CV–11–0313–SA (Ariz. 2011)); Arizona Inde-
`pendent Redistricting Comm’n v. Brewer, 229 Ariz. 347, 275 P. 3d 1267
`(2012).
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` 6See Haw. Const., Art. IV, §2, and Haw. Rev. Stat. §§25–1 to 25–9
`(2009 and 2013 Cum. Supp.); Idaho Const., Art. III, §2; Mont. Const.,
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` Art. V, §14; N. J. Const., Art. II, §2; Wash Const., Art. II, §43.
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`7See Cal. Const., Art. XXI, §2; Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §§8251–8253.6
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` (West Supp. 2015).
`8See Iowa Code §§42.1–42.6 (2013); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §103.51
`(Lexis 2014); Me. Const., Art. IV, pt. 3, §1–A.
`9See Conn. Const., Art. III, §6; Ind. Code §3–3–2–2 (2014).
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` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`http://azredistricting.org/Maps/Final-Maps/default.asp (all
`Internet materials as visited June 25, 2015, and included
`in Clerk of Court’s case file). Less than four months later,
`on June 6, 2012, the Arizona Legislature filed suit in the
`United States District Court for the District of Arizona,
`naming as defendants the AIRC, its five members, and the
`Arizona Secretary of State. The Legislature sought both a
`declaration that Proposition 106 and congressional maps
`adopted by the AIRC are unconstitutional, and, as affirm
`ative relief, an injunction against use of AIRC maps for
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` any congressional election after the 2012 general election.
`A three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28
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`U. S. C. §2284(a), unanimously denied a motion by the
`AIRC to dismiss the suit for lack of standing. The Arizona
`Legislature, the court determined, had “demonstrated that
`its loss of redistricting power constitute[d] a [sufficiently]
`concrete injury.” 997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1050 (2014). On
`the merits, dividing two to one, the District Court granted
`the AIRC’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
`state a claim. Decisions of this Court, the majority con
`cluded, “demonstrate that the word ‘Legislature’ in the
`Elections Clause refers to the legislative process used in
`[a] state, determined by that state’s own constitution and
`laws.” Id., at 1054. As the “lawmaking power” in Arizona
`“plainly includes the power to enact laws through initia
`tive,” the District Court held, the “Elections Clause per
`mits [Arizona’s] establishment and use” of the Commis
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`sion. Id., at 1056. Judge Rosenblatt dissented in part.
`Proposition 106, in his view, unconstitutionally denied
`“the Legislature” of Arizona the “ability to have any out
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`come-defining effect on the congressional redistricting
`process.” Id., at 1058.
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`We postponed jurisdiction, and now affirm.
`
`II
`We turn first to the threshold question: Does the Ari
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` 10
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`ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA
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` INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`zona Legislature have standing to bring this suit? Trained
`on “whether the plaintiff is [a] proper party to bring [a
`particular lawsuit,]” standing is “[o]ne element” of the
`Constitution’s case-or-controversy limitation on federal
`judicial authority, expressed in Article III of the Constitu
`tion. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997). “To qual
`ify as a party with standing to litigate,” the Arizona Legis
`lature “must show, first and foremost,” injury in the form
`of “‘invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘con
`crete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent.’” Ari-
`zonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 64
`(1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S.
`555, 560 (1992)). The Legislature’s injury also must be
`“fairly traceable to the challenged action” and “redressable
`by a favorable ruling.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
`U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 10) (internal quotation
`marks omitted).
`
`The Arizona Legislature maintains that the Elections
`Clause vests in it “primary responsibility” for redistricting.
`Brief for Appellant 51, 53. To exercise that responsibility,
`the Legislature urges, it must have at least the opportun-
`ity to engage (or decline to engage) in redistricting before
`the State may involve other actors in the redistricting
`process. See id., at 51–53. Proposition 106, which gives
`the AIRC binding authority over redistricting, regardless
`of the Legislature’s action or inaction, strips the Legisla
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`ture of its alleged prerogative to initiate redistricting.
`That asserted deprivation would be remedied by a court
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`order enjoining the enforcement of Proposition 106. Al-
`though we conclude that the Arizona Legislature does not
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`have the exclusive, constitutionally guarded role it asserts,
`see infra, at 24–35, one must not “confus[e] weakness on
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`the merits with absence of Article III standing.” Davis v.
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`United States, 564 U. S. ___, ___, n. 10 (2011) (slip op., at
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`19, n. 10); see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975)
`(standing “often turns on the nature and source of the
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` Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`claim asserted,” but it “in no way depends on the merits”
`of the claim).
`
`The AIRC argues that the Legislature’s alleged injury is
`insufficiently concrete to meet the standing requirement
`absent some “specific legislative act that would have taken
`effect but for Proposition 106.” Brief for Appellees 20. The
`United States, as amicus curiae, urges that even more is
`needed: the Legislature’s injury will remain speculative,
`the United States contends, unless and until the Arizona
`Secretary of State refuses to implement a competing redis
`tricting plan passed by the Legislature. Brief for United
`States 14–17. In our view, the Arizona Legislature’s suit
`is not premature, nor is its alleged injury too “conjectural”
`or “hypothetical” to establish standing. Defenders of Wild-
`life, 504 U. S., at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`Two prescriptions of Arizona’s Constitution would ren
`der the Legislature’s passage of a competing plan and
`submission of that plan to the Secretary of State unavail
`ing. Indeed, those actions would directly and immediately
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`conflict with the regime Arizona’s Constitution establishes