throbber
(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2014
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
` WILLIAMS-YULEE v. FLORIDA BAR
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
` No. 13–1499. Argued January 20, 2015—Decided April 29, 2015
`
`Florida is one of 39 States where voters elect judges at the polls. To
`promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, the Florida
`Supreme Court adopted Canon 7C(1) of its Code of Judicial Conduct,
`which provides that judicial candidates “shall not personally solicit
`campaign funds . . . but may establish committees of responsible per-
`sons” to raise money for election campaigns.
` Petitioner Lanell Williams-Yulee (Yulee) mailed and posted online
`a letter soliciting financial contributions to her campaign for judicial
`office. The Florida Bar disciplined her for violating a Florida Bar
`Rule requiring candidates to comply with Canon 7C(1), but Yulee
`contended that the First Amendment protects a judicial candidate’s
`right to personally solicit campaign funds in an election. The Florida
`Supreme Court upheld the disciplinary sanctions, concluding that
`Canon 7C(1) is narrowly tailored to serve the State’s compelling in-
`terest.
`Held: The judgment is affirmed.
`138 So. 3d 379, affirmed.
`CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court, except
`as to Part II, concluding that the First Amendment permits Canon
`7C(1)’s ban on the personal solicitation of campaign funds by judicial
`candidates. Pp. 8–22.
`
`(a) Florida’s interest in preserving public confidence in the integri-
`
`ty of its judiciary is compelling. The State may conclude that judges,
`charged with exercising strict neutrality and independence, cannot
`
`
`supplicate campaign donors without diminishing public confidence in
`judicial integrity. Simply put, the public may lack confidence in a
`judge’s ability to administer justice without fear or favor if he comes
`to office by asking for favors. This Court’s precedents have recog-
`
`nized the “vital state interest” in safeguarding “ ‘public confidence in
`
`
`
`
`
`
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`

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`
`WILLIAMS-YULEE v. FLORIDA BAR
`
`
`Syllabus
`the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges,’ ” Caperton v.
`
`A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. 868, 889. Unlike the legislature or
`the executive, the judiciary “has no influence over either the sword or
`the purse,” Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (A. Hamilton), so its authority
`depends in large measure on the public’s willingness to respect and
`follow its decisions. Public perception of judicial integrity is accord-
`
`ingly “‘a state interest of the highest order.’” 556 U. S., at 889.
`
`
`
`A State’s interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of
`its judiciary extends beyond its interest in preventing the appearance
`of corruption in legislative and executive elections, because a judge’s
`role differs from that of a politician. Republican Party of Minn. v.
`
`White, 536 U. S. 765, 783. Unlike a politician, who is expected to be
`appropriately responsive to the preferences of supporters, a judge in
`deciding cases may not follow the preferences of his supporters or
`provide any special consideration to his campaign donors. As in
`White, therefore, precedents applying the First Amendment to politi-
`cal elections have little bearing on the issues here.
`
`The vast majority of elected judges in States allowing personal so-
`licitation serve with fairness and honor, but in the eyes of the public,
`a judicial candidate’s personal solicitation could result (even unknow-
`
`ingly) in “a possible temptation . . . which might lead him not to hold
`
`
`the balance nice, clear and true.” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 532.
`That risk is especially pronounced where most donors are lawyers
`
`and litigants who may appear before the judge they are supporting.
`
`In short, it is the regrettable but unavoidable appearance that judges
`who personally ask for money may diminish their integrity that
`prompted the Supreme Court of Florida and most other States to sev-
`
`er the direct link between judicial candidates and campaign contribu-
`tors. Pp. 9–12.
`
`(b) Canon 7C(1) raises no fatal underinclusivity concerns. The so-
`licitation ban aims squarely at the conduct most likely to undermine
`public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary: personal requests
`for money by judges and judicial candidates. The Canon applies ev-
`enhandedly to all judges and judicial candidates, regardless of view-
`point or means of solicitation. And unlike some laws that have been
`found impermissibly underinclusive, Canon 7C(1) is not riddled with
`exceptions.
`
`Yulee relies heavily on the provision of Canon 7C(1) that allows so-
`licitation by a candidate’s campaign committee. But Florida, along
`with most other States, has reasonably concluded that solicitation by
`the candidate personally creates a categorically different and more
`
`
`
`severe risk of undermining public confidence than does solicitation by
`a campaign committee. When the judicial candidate himself asks for
`money, the stakes are higher for all involved. A judicial candidate
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`2
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`

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`
`Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`
`Syllabus
`asking for money places his name and reputation behind the request,
`and the solicited individual knows that the same person who signed
`the fundraising letter might one day sign the judgment. This dynam-
`ic inevitably creates pressure for the recipient to comply, in a way
`
`that solicitation by a third party does not. Just as inevitably, the
`personal involvement of the candidate in the solicitation creates the
`public appearance that the candidate will remember who says yes,
`and who says no. However similar the two solicitations may be in
`substance, a State may conclude that they present markedly different
`
`appearances to the public.
`
`Permitting a judicial candidate to write thank you notes to cam-
`
`paign donors likewise does not detract from the State’s interest in
`preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The
`State’s compelling interest is implicated most directly by the candi-
`date’s personal solicitation itself. A failure to ban thank you notes for
`contributions not solicited by the candidate does not undercut the
`Bar’s rationale.
`
`In addition, the State has a good reason for allowing candidates to
`
`write thank you notes and raise money through committees. These
`accommodations reflect Florida’s effort to respect the First Amend-
`ment interests of candidates and their contributors—to resolve the
`“fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial of-
`fice and the real world of electoral politics.” Chisom v. Roemer, 501
`U. S. 380, 400. The State should not be punished for leaving open
`
`more, rather than fewer, avenues of expression, especially when
`there is no indication of a pretextual motive for the selective re-
`
`striction of speech. Pp. 12–16.
`
`(c) Canon 7C(1) is also not overinclusive. By any measure, it re-
`
`
`stricts a narrow slice of speech. It leaves judicial candidates free to
`discuss any issue with any person at any time; to write letters, give
`speeches, and put up billboards; to contact potential supporters in
`person, on the phone, or online; and to promote their campaigns
`
`through the media. Though they cannot ask for money, they can di-
`
`
`rect their campaign committees to do so.
`
`Yulee concedes that Canon 7C(1) is valid in numerous applications,
`
`but she contends that the Canon cannot constitutionally be applied to
`her chosen form of solicitation: a letter posted online and distributed
`via mass mailing. This argument misperceives the breadth of the
`compelling interest underlying Canon 7C(1). Florida has reasonably
`determined that personal appeals for money by a judicial candidate
`inherently create an appearance of impropriety that may cause the
`public to lose confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. That inter-
`est may be implicated to varying degrees in particular contexts, but
`the interest remains whenever the public perceives the judge person-
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` WILLIAMS-YULEE v. FLORIDA BAR
`
`
`Syllabus
` ally asking for money. Canon 7C(1) must be narrowly tailored, not
`
` “perfectly tailored.” Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191, 209. The
`
`First Amendment does not confine a State to addressing evils in their
`
`most acute form. Here, Florida has concluded that all personal solici-
`tations by judicial candidates create a public appearance that un-
`dermines confidence in the integrity of the judiciary; banning all per-
`sonal solicitations by judicial candidates is narrowly tailored to
`
`address that concern.
`
`Yulee errs in contending that Florida can accomplish its compelling
`
`interest through recusal rules and campaign contribution limits. A
`rule requiring recusal in every case in which a lawyer or litigant
`made a campaign contribution would disable many jurisdictions, and
`a flood of postelection recusal motions could exacerbate the very ap-
`pearance problem the State is trying to solve. As for contribution
`
`limits, Florida already applies them to judicial elections, and this
`Court has never held that adopting such limits precludes a State
`from pursuing its compelling interests through additional means.
`The desirability of judicial elections is a question that has sparked
`
`disagreement for more than 200 years, but it is not the Court’s place
`to resolve that enduring debate. The Court’s limited task is to apply
`the Constitution to the question presented in this case. Judicial can-
`didates have a First Amendment right to speak in support of their
`campaigns. States have a compelling interest in preserving public
`confidence in their judiciaries. When the State adopts a narrowly tai-
`
`lored restriction like the one at issue here, those principles do not
`conflict. A State’s decision to elect judges does not compel it to com-
`promise public confidence in their integrity. Pp. 16–22.
`
`
` ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part
`
`
` II. BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and
`
`
` GINSBURG, J., joined except as to Part II. BREYER, J., filed a concurring
`
`
`
`
`opinion. GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concur-
`
`ring in the judgment, in which BREYER, J., joined as to Part II. SCALIA,
`
`
` J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. KENNEDY, J.,
`
`
`
`
`and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions.
`
`
`4
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`
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`

`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
`_________________
`
` No. 13–1499
`_________________
` LANELL WILLIAMS-YULEE, PETITIONER v.
`
`THE FLORIDA BAR
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
`
`
`FLORIDA
`
`[April 29, 2015]
`
`CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
`Court, except as to Part II.
`Our Founders vested authority to appoint federal judges
`
`in the President, with the advice and consent of the Sen-
`ate, and entrusted those judges to hold their offices during
`good behavior. The Constitution permits States to make a
`different choice, and most of them have done so. In 39
`States, voters elect trial or appellate judges at the polls.
`In an effort to preserve public confidence in the integrity
`of their judiciaries, many of those States prohibit judges
`and judicial candidates from personally soliciting funds for
`their campaigns. We must decide whether the First
`Amendment permits such restrictions on speech.
`We hold that it does. Judges are not politicians, even
`
`when they come to the bench by way of the ballot. And a
`State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it to
`treat judicial candidates like campaigners for political
`office. A State may assure its people that judges will
`apply the law without fear or favor—and without having
`personally asked anyone for money. We affirm the judg-
`ment of the Florida Supreme Court.
`
`
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`

`
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`
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`
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`
`2
`
`
`
`
` WILLIAMS-YULEE v. FLORIDA BAR
`
`Opinion of the Court
`I
`
`A
`
`When Florida entered the Union in 1845, its Constitu-
`
`tion provided for trial and appellate judges to be elected by
`the General Assembly. Florida soon followed more than a
`dozen of its sister States in transferring authority to elect
`judges to the voting public. See J. Shugerman, The Peo-
`ple’s Courts: Pursuing Judicial Independence in America
`103–122 (2012). The experiment did not last long in the
`Sunshine State. The war came, and Florida’s 1868 Consti-
`tution returned judicial selection to the political branches.
`Over time, however, the people reclaimed the power to
`elect the state bench: Supreme Court justices in 1885 and
`trial court judges in 1942. See Little, An Overview of the
`Historical Development of the Judicial Article of the Flor-
`
`ida Constitution, 19 Stetson L. Rev. 1, 40 (1989).
`In the early 1970s, four Florida Supreme Court justices
`
`resigned from office following corruption scandals. Florida
`voters responded by amending their Constitution again.
`
`Under the system now in place, appellate judges are ap-
`pointed by the Governor from a list of candidates proposed
`by a nominating committee—a process known as “merit
`selection.” Then, every six years, voters decide whether to
`retain incumbent appellate judges for another term. Trial
`judges are still elected by popular vote, unless the local
`jurisdiction opts instead for merit selection. Fla. Const.,
`Art. V, §10; Hawkins, Perspective on Judicial Merit Reten-
`tion in Florida, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1421, 1423–1428 (2012).
`Amid the corruption scandals of the 1970s, the Florida
`
`Supreme Court adopted a new Code of Judicial Conduct.
`281 So. 2d 21 (1973). In its present form, the first sen-
`tence of Canon 1 reads, “An independent and honorable
`
`judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.” Code of
`
`
`
`Judicial Conduct for the State of Florida 6 (2014). Canon 1
`
`
`instructs judges to observe “high standards of conduct” so
`that “the integrity and independence of the judiciary may
`
`
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`
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`
`

`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` be preserved.” Ibid. Canon 2 directs that a judge “shall
`act at all times in a manner that promotes public confi-
`dence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”
`
`Id., at 7. Other provisions prohibit judges from lending
`the prestige of their offices to private interests, engaging
`in certain business transactions, and personally partici-
`pating in soliciting funds for nonprofit organizations.
`Canons 2B, 5C(3)(b)(i), 5D; id., at 7, 23, 24.
`
`Canon 7C(1) governs fundraising in judicial elections.
`
`The Canon, which is based on a provision in the Ameri-
`can Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
`
`provides:
`“A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a ju-
`
`dicial office that is filled by public election between
`competing candidates shall not personally solicit cam-
`paign funds, or solicit attorneys for publicly stated
`
`support, but may establish committees of responsible
`persons to secure and manage the expenditure of
`funds for the candidate’s campaign and to obtain pub-
`
`lic statements of support for his or her candidacy.
`Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting
`campaign contributions and public support from any
`person or corporation authorized by law.” Id., at 38.
`Florida statutes impose additional restrictions on cam-
`
`paign fundraising in judicial elections. Contributors may
`not donate more than $1,000 per election to a trial court
`candidate or more than $3,000 per retention election to a
`
`Supreme Court justice. Fla. Stat. §106.08(1)(a) (2014).
`
`Campaign committee treasurers must file periodic reports
`
`disclosing the names of contributors and the amount of
`each contribution. §106.07.
`
`Judicial candidates can seek guidance about campaign
`ethics rules from the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory
`Committee. The Committee has interpreted Canon 7 to
`allow a judicial candidate to serve as treasurer of his own
`
`
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`

`
`4
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`
`
` WILLIAMS-YULEE v. FLORIDA BAR
`
`Opinion of the Court
`campaign committee, learn the identity of campaign con-
`
`tributors, and send thank you notes to donors. An Aid to
`Understanding Canon 7, pp. 51–58 (2014).
`
`Like Florida, most other States prohibit judicial candi-
`dates from soliciting campaign funds personally, but allow
`them to raise money through committees. According to
`the American Bar Association, 30 of the 39 States that
`elect trial or appellate judges have adopted restrictions
`similar to Canon 7C(1). Brief for American Bar Associa-
`tion as Amicus Curiae 4.
`
`
`
`B
`
`Lanell Williams-Yulee, who refers to herself as Yulee,
`has practiced law in Florida since 1991. In September
`2009, she decided to run for a seat on the county court for
`Hillsborough County, a jurisdiction of about 1.3 million
`people that includes the city of Tampa. Shortly after filing
`paperwork to enter the race, Yulee drafted a letter an-
`nouncing her candidacy. The letter described her experi-
`ence and desire to “bring fresh ideas and positive solutions
`to the Judicial bench.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a. The
`letter then stated:
`“An early contribution of $25, $50, $100, $250, or
`$500, made payable to ‘Lanell Williams-Yulee Cam-
`paign for County Judge’, will help raise the initial
`funds needed to launch the campaign and get our
`message out to the public. I ask for your support [i]n
`
`meeting the primary election fund raiser goals.
`Thank you in advance for your support.” Id., at 32a.
`Yulee signed the letter and mailed it to local voters. She
`also posted the letter on her campaign Web site.
`
`Yulee’s bid for the bench did not unfold as she had
`
`hoped. She lost the primary to the incumbent judge.
`
`Then the Florida Bar filed a complaint against her. As
`relevant here, the Bar charged her with violating Rule 4–
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`5
`
`
`Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`8.2(b) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. That Rule
`requires judicial candidates to comply with applicable
`provisions of Florida’s Code of Judicial Conduct, including
`the ban on personal solicitation of campaign funds in
`Canon 7C(1).
`Yulee admitted that she had signed and sent the fund-
`
`raising letter. But she argued that the Bar could not
`discipline her for that conduct because the First Amend-
`ment protects a judicial candidate’s right to solicit cam-
`paign funds in an election.* The Florida Supreme Court
`appointed a referee, who held a hearing and recommended
`a finding of guilt. As a sanction, the referee recommended
`that Yulee be publicly reprimanded and ordered to pay the
`costs of the proceeding ($1,860). App. to Pet. for Cert.
`19a–25a.
`The Florida Supreme Court adopted the referee’s rec-
`
`ommendations. 138 So. 3d 379 (2014). The court ex-
`plained that Canon 7C(1) “clearly restricts a judicial can-
`didate’s speech” and therefore must be “narrowly tailored
`
`to serve a compelling state interest.” Id., at 384. The
`court held that the Canon satisfies that demanding in-
`quiry. First, the court reasoned, prohibiting judicial can-
`didates from personally soliciting funds furthers Florida’s
`compelling interest in “preserving the integrity of [its]
`judiciary and maintaining the public’s confidence in an
`impartial judiciary.”
`Ibid. (internal quotation marks
`
`omitted; alteration in original). In the court’s view, “per-
`sonal solicitation of campaign funds, even by mass mail-
`ing, raises an appearance of impropriety and calls into
`question, in the public’s mind, the judge’s impartiality.”
`
`Id., at 385. Second, the court concluded that Canon 7C(1)
`——————
`*Yulee also contended that she had not violated Canon 7C(1), which
`applies to “a judicial office that is filled by public election between
`competing candidates,” because the incumbent judge had not declared
`his campaign for reelection at the time she sent her solicitation letter.
`She has since abandoned that argument.
`
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`

`
`6
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`
`
`
`WILLIAMS-YULEE v. FLORIDA BAR
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
`is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest
`because it “‘insulate[s] judicial candidates from the solici-
`tation and receipt of funds while leaving open, ample
`alternative means for candidates to raise the resources
`necessary to run their campaigns.’” Id., at 387 (quoting
`Simes v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability
`Comm’n, 368 Ark. 577, 588, 247 S. W. 3d 876, 883 (2007)).
`
`
`The Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that some
`Federal Courts of Appeals—“whose judges have lifetime
`appointments and thus do not have to engage in fundrais-
`ing”—had invalidated restrictions similar to Canon 7C(1).
`138 So. 3d, at 386, n. 3. But the court found it persuasive
`that every State Supreme Court that had considered
`similar fundraising provisions—along with several Fed-
`eral Courts of Appeals—had upheld the laws against First
`Amendment challenges. Id., at 386. Florida’s chief justice
`and one associate justice dissented. Id., at 389. We
`granted certiorari. 573 U. S. ___ (2014).
`
`II
`
`The First Amendment provides that Congress “shall
`make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” The
`Fourteenth Amendment makes that prohibition applicable
`to the States. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368
`(1931). The parties agree that Canon 7C(1) restricts
`Yulee’s speech on the basis of its content by prohibiting
`
`her from soliciting contributions to her election campaign.
`
`The parties disagree, however, about the level of scrutiny
`that should govern our review.
`
`
`We have applied exacting scrutiny to laws restricting
`the solicitation of contributions to charity, upholding the
`speech limitations only if they are narrowly tailored to
`serve a compelling interest. See Riley v. National Federa­
`
`
`tion of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 798 (1988); id.,
`at 810 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting). As we have ex-
`plained, noncommercial solicitation “is characteristically
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
`intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive
`speech.”
`Id., at 796 (majority opinion) (quoting Schaum­
`burg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632
`(1980)). Applying a lesser standard of scrutiny to such
`speech would threaten “the exercise of rights so vital to
`the maintenance of democratic institutions.” Schneider v.
`State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 161 (1939).
`
`The principles underlying these charitable solicitation
`
`cases apply with even greater force here. Before asking
`for money in her fundraising letter, Yulee explained her
`fitness for the bench and expressed her vision for the
`judiciary. Her stated purpose for the solicitation was to
`get her “message out to the public.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
`32a. As we have long recognized, speech about public
`issues and the qualifications of candidates for elected
`office commands the highest level of First Amendment
`protection. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic
`Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 223 (1989). Indeed, in our
`only prior case concerning speech restrictions on a candi-
`date for judicial office, this Court and both parties as-
`sumed that strict scrutiny applied. Republican Party of
`Minn. v. White, 536 U. S. 765, 774 (2002).
`
`Although the Florida Supreme Court upheld Canon
`7C(1) under strict scrutiny, the Florida Bar and several
`amici contend that we should subject the Canon to a more
`permissive standard: that it be “closely drawn” to match a
`
`“sufficiently important interest.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424
`U. S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam). The “closely drawn”
`standard is a poor fit for this case. The Court adopted
`that test in Buckley to address a claim that campaign
`contribution limits violated a contributor’s “freedom of
`political association.” Id., at 24–25. Here, Yulee does not
`claim that Canon 7C(1) violates her right to free associa-
`
`tion; she argues that it violates her right to free speech.
`
`And the Florida Bar can hardly dispute that the Canon
`infringes Yulee’s freedom to discuss candidates and public
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`7
`
`

`
`8
`
`
`
`
` WILLIAMS-YULEE v. FLORIDA BAR
`
`Opinion of the Court
`issues—namely, herself and her qualifications to be a
`judge. The Bar’s call to import the “closely drawn” test
`from the contribution limit context into a case about solici-
`tation therefore has little avail.
`
`As several of the Bar’s amici note, we applied the “closely
`
`
`
`drawn” test to solicitation restrictions in McConnell v.
`Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 136 (2003), over-
`ruled in part by Citizens United v. Federal Election
`
`
`Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310 (2010). But the Court in that case
`determined that the solicitation restrictions operated
`primarily to prevent circumvention of the contribution
`limits, which were the subject of the “closely drawn” test
`
`in the first place. 540 U. S., at 138–139. McConnell offers
`no help to the Bar here, because Florida did not adopt
`Canon 7C(1) as an anticircumvention measure.
`In sum, we hold today what we assumed in White: A
`
`State may restrict the speech of a judicial candidate only if
`the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
`interest.
`
`
`
`III
`
`The Florida Bar faces a demanding task in defending
`
`Canon 7C(1) against Yulee’s First Amendment challenge.
`
`We have emphasized that “it is the rare case” in which a
`
`State demonstrates that a speech restriction is narrowly
`tailored to serve a compelling interest. Burson v. Free­
`man, 504 U. S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion). But
`those cases do arise. See ibid.; Holder v. Humanitarian
`Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 25–39 (2010); McConnell, 540
`U. S., at 314 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.); cf. Adarand Con­
`structors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 237 (1995) (“we wish
`to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory,
`but fatal in fact’”). Here, Canon 7C(1) advances the
`State’s compelling interest in preserving public confidence
`in the integrity of the judiciary, and it does so through
`means narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessarily abridging
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`9
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`speech. This is therefore one of the rare cases in which a
`
`speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny.
`A
`
`The Florida Supreme Court adopted Canon 7C(1) to
`promote the State’s interests in “protecting the integrity of
`the judiciary” and “maintaining the public’s confidence in
`an impartial judiciary.” 138 So. 3d, at 385. The way the
`Canon advances those interests is intuitive: Judges,
`charged with exercising strict neutrality and independ-
`ence, cannot supplicate campaign donors without dimin-
`ishing public confidence in judicial integrity. This princi-
`ple dates back at least eight centuries to Magna Carta,
`
`which proclaimed, “To no one will we sell, to no one will
`we refuse or delay, right or justice.” Cl. 40 (1215), in W.
`McKechnie, Magna Carta, A Commentary on the Great
`Charter of King John 395 (2d ed. 1914). The same concept
`underlies the common law judicial oath, which binds a
`
`judge to “do right to all manner of people . . . without fear
`or favour, affection or ill-will,” 10 Encyclopaedia of the
`Laws of England 105 (2d ed. 1908), and the oath that each
`of us took to “administer justice without respect to per-
`sons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich,” 28
`U. S. C. §453. Simply put, Florida and most other States
`have concluded that the public may lack confidence in a
`judge’s ability to administer justice without fear or favor if
`he comes to office by asking for favors.
`
`The interest served by Canon 7C(1) has firm support in
`our precedents. We have recognized the “vital state inter-
`est” in safeguarding “public confidence in the fairness and
`integrity of the nation’s elected judges.” Caperton v. A. T.
`Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. 868, 889 (2009) (internal quo-
`
`tation marks omitted). The importance of public confi-
`dence in the integrity of judges stems from the place of
`
`the judiciary in the government. Unlike the executive or the
`legislature, the judiciary “has no influence over either the
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`
` WILLIAMS-YULEE v. FLORIDA BAR
`
`Opinion of the Court
`sword or the purse; . . . neither force nor will but merely
`judgment.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed.
`1961) (A. Hamilton) (capitalization altered). The judici-
`ary’s authority therefore depends in large measure on the
`public’s willingness to respect and follow its decisions. As
`Justice Frankfurter once put it for the Court, “justice must
`satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States,
`348 U. S. 11, 14 (1954). It follows that public perception of
`
`judicial integrity is “a state interest of the highest order.”
`Caperton, 556 U. S., at 889 (quoting White, 536 U. S., at
`
`793 (KENNEDY, J., concurring)).
`
`The principal dissent observes that bans on judicial
`
`candidate solicitation lack a lengthy historical pedigree.
`Post, at 1–2 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). We do not dispute that
`
`fact, but it has no relevance here. As the precedent cited
`by the principal dissent demonstrates, a history and tradi-
`tion of regulation are important factors in determining
`whether to recognize “new categories of unprotected
`
`speech.” Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 564
`U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 3); see post, at 1. But
`nobody argues that solicitation of campaign funds by
`judicial candidates is a category of unprotected speech. As
`
`explained above, the First Amendment fully applies to
`Yulee’s speech. The question is instead whether that
`Amendment permits the particular regulation of speech at
`
`issue here.
`
`The parties devote considerable attention to our cases
`analyzing campaign finance restrictions in political elec-
`tions. But a State’s interest in preserving public confi-
`dence in the integrity of its judiciary extends beyond its
`interest in preventing the appearance of corruption in
`legislative and executive elections. As we explained in
`White, States may regulate judicial elections differently
`than they regulate political elections, because the role of
`judges differs from the role of politicians. 536 U. S., at
`783; id., at 805 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). Politicians are
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
`
`
` 11
`
`
`
` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`expected to be appropriately responsive to the preferences
`of their supporters. Indeed, such “responsiveness is key to
`the very concept of self-governance through elected offi-
`cials.” McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S.
`
`___, ___ (2014) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 39). The
`same is not true of judges. In deciding cases, a judge is
`not to follow the preferences of his supporters, or provide
`any special consideration to his campaign donors. A judge
`instead must “observe the utmost fairness,” striving to be
`“perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to
`influence or controul him but God and his conscience.”
`Address of John Marshall, in Proceedings and Debates of
`
`the Virginia State Convention of 1829–1830, p. 616 (1830).
`As in White, therefore, our precedents applying the First
`Amendment to political elections have little bearing on the
`
`issues here.
`
`The vast majority of elected judges in States that allow
`personal solicitation serve with fairness and honor. But
`“[e]ven if judges were able to refrain from favoring donors,
`the mere possibility that judges’ decisions may be moti-
`vated by the desire to repay campaign contributions is
`
`
`
`likely to undermine the public’s confidence in the judiciary.”
`White, 536 U. S., at 790 (O’Connor, J., concurrin

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