(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2014
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS ET AL. v.
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` ALABAMA ET AL.
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`APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
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`MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
`No. 13–895. Argued November 12, 2014—Decided March 25, 2015*
`In 2012 Alabama redrew the boundaries of the State’s 105 House dis-
`tricts and 35 Senate districts. In doing so, while Alabama sought to
`achieve numerous traditional districting objectives—e.g., compact-
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`ness, not splitting counties or precincts, minimizing change, and pro-
`tecting incumbents—it placed yet greater importance on two goals:
`(1) minimizing a district’s deviation from precisely equal population,
`by keeping any deviation less than 1% of the theoretical ideal; and (2)
`seeking to avoid retrogression with respect to racial minorities’ “abil-
`ity to elect their preferred candidates of choice” under §5 of the Vot-
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`ing Rights Act of 1965, 52 U. S. C. §10304(b), by maintaining roughly
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`the same black population percentage in existing majority-minority
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`districts.
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`Appellants—Alabama Legislative Black Caucus (Caucus), Alabama
`Democratic Conference (Conference), and others—claim that Ala-
`bama’s new district boundaries create a “racial gerrymander” in vio-
`lation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Af-
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`ter a bench trial, the three-judge District Court ruled (2 to 1) for the
`State. It recognized that electoral districting violates the Equal Pro-
`tection Clause when race is the “predominant” consideration in decid-
`ing “to place a significant number of voters within or without a par-
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`ticular district,” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 913, 916, and the
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`use of race is not “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
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`est,” Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899, 902 (Shaw II).
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`In ruling against appellants, it made four critical determinations:
`——————
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`*Together with No. 13–1138, Alabama Democratic Conference et al. v.
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`Alabama et al., also on appeal from the same court.
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`2
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`ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS v. ALABAMA
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`Syllabus
`(1) that both appellants had argued “that the Acts as a whole consti-
`tute racial gerrymanders,” and that the Conference had also argued
`that the State had racially gerrymandered Senate Districts 7, 11, 22,
`and 26; (2) that the Conference lacked standing to make its racial
`gerrymandering claims; (3) that, in any event, appellants’ claims
`must fail because race “was not the predominant motivating factor”
`in making the redistricting decisions; and (4) that, even were it
`wrong about standing and predominance, these claims must fail be-
`cause any predominant use of race was “narrowly tailored” to serve a
`“compelling state interest” in avoiding retrogression under §5.
`Held:
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`1. The District Court’s analysis of the racial gerrymandering claim
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`as referring to the State “as a whole,” rather than district-by-district,
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`was legally erroneous. Pp. 5–12.
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`(a) This Court has consistently described a claim of racial gerry-
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`mandering as a claim that race was improperly used in the drawing
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`of the boundaries of one or more specific electoral districts, see, e.g.,
`Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 649 (Shaw I), and has described the
`plaintiff ’s evidentiary burden similarly, see Miller, supra, at 916.
`The Court’s district-specific language makes sense in light of the per-
`sonal nature of the harms that underlie a racial gerrymandering
`claim, see Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 957; Shaw I, supra, at 648.
`Pp. 5–6.
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`(b) The District Court found the fact that racial criteria had not
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`predominated in the drawing of some Alabama districts sufficient to
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`defeat a claim of racial gerrymandering with respect to the State as
`an undifferentiated whole. But a showing that race-based criteria did
`not significantly affect the drawing of some Alabama districts would
`have done little to defeat a claim that race-based criteria predomi-
`nantly affected the drawing of other Alabama districts. Thus, the
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`District Court’s undifferentiated statewide analysis is insufficient,
`and the District Court must on remand consider racial gerrymander-
`ing with respect to the individual districts challenged by appellants.
`Pp. 7–8.
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`(c) The Caucus and the Conference did not waive the right to fur-
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`ther consideration of a district-by-district analysis. The record indi-
`cates that plaintiffs’ evidence and arguments embody the claim that
`individual majority-minority districts were racially gerrymandered,
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`and those are the districts that the District Court must reconsider.
`Although plaintiffs relied heavily upon statewide evidence to prove
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`that race predominated in the drawing of individual district lines,
`neither the use of statewide evidence nor the effort to show wide-
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`spread effect can transform a racial gerrymandering claim about a
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`set of individual districts into a separate, general claim that the leg-
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`Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Syllabus
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`islature racially gerrymandered the State “as” an undifferentiated
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`“whole.” Pp. 8–12.
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`2. The District Court also erred in deciding, sua sponte, that the
`Conference lacked standing. It believed that the “record” did “not
`clearly identify the districts in which the individual members of the
`[Conference] reside.” But the Conference’s post-trial brief and the
`testimony of a Conference representative support an inference that
`the organization has members in all of the majority-minority dis-
`tricts, which is sufficient to meet the Conference’s burden of estab-
`lishing standing. At the very least, the Conference reasonably be-
`lieved that, in the absence of a state challenge or a court request for
`more detailed information, it need not provide additional information
`such as a specific membership list. While the District Court had an
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`independent obligation to confirm its jurisdiction, in these circum-
`stances elementary principles of procedural fairness required the
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`District Court, rather than acting sua sponte, to give the Conference
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`an opportunity to provide evidence of member residence. On remand,
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`the District Court should permit the Conference to file its member-
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`ship list and the State to respond, as appropriate. Pp. 12–15.
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`3. The District Court also did not properly calculate “predomi-
`nance” in its alternative holding that “[r]ace was not the predominant
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`motivating factor” in the creation of any of the challenged districts.
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`It reached its conclusion in part because it placed in the balance,
`among other nonracial factors, legislative efforts to create districts of
`approximately equal population. An equal population goal, however,
`is not one of the “traditional” factors to be weighed against the use of
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`race to determine whether race “predominates,” see Miller, supra, at
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`916. Rather, it is part of the redistricting background, taken as a
`given, when determining whether race, or other factors, predominate
`in a legislator’s determination as to how equal population objectives
`will be met. Had the District Court not taken a contrary view of the
`law, its “predominance” conclusions, including those concerning the
`four districts that the Conference specifically challenged, might well
`have been different. For example, there is strong, perhaps over-
`whelming, evidence that race did predominate as a factor when the
`legislature drew the boundaries of Senate District 26. Pp. 15–19.
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`4. The District Court’s final alternative holding—that “the [chal-
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`lenged] Districts would satisfy strict scrutiny”—rests upon a misper-
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`ception of the law. Section 5 does not require a covered jurisdiction to
`maintain a particular numerical minority percentage. It requires the
`jurisdiction to maintain a minority’s ability to elect a preferred can-
`didate of choice. Pp. 19–23.
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`(a) The statute’s language, 52 U. S. C. §§10304(b), (d), and De-
`partment of Justice Guidelines make clear that §5 is satisfied if mi-
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`3
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`4
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`ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS v. ALABAMA
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`Syllabus
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`nority voters retain the ability to elect their preferred candidates.
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`The history of §5 further supports this view, as Congress adopted the
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`language in §5 to reject this Court’s decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft,
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`539 U. S. 461, and to accept the views of Justice Souter’s dissent—
`that, in a §5 retrogression case, courts should ask whether a new vot-
`ing provision would likely deprive minority voters of their ability to
`elect a candidate of their choice, and that courts should not mechani-
`cally rely upon numerical percentages but should take account of all
`significant circumstances, id., at 493, 498, 505, 509. Here, both the
`District Court and the legislature relied heavily upon a mechanically
`numerical view as to what counts as forbidden retrogression. Pp. 19–
`22.
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`(b) In saying this, this Court does not insist that a state legisla-
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`ture, when redistricting, determine precisely what percent minority
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`population §5 demands. A court’s analysis of the narrow tailoring re-
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`quirement insists only that the legislature have a “strong basis in ev-
`idence” in support of the (race-based) choice that it has made. Brief
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`for United States as Amicus Curiae 29. Here, however, the District
`Court and the legislature both asked the wrong question with respect
`to narrow tailoring. They asked how to maintain the present minori-
`ty percentages in majority-minority districts, instead of asking the
`extent to which they must preserve existing minority percentages in
`order to maintain the minority’s present ability to elect the candidate
`of its choice. Because asking the wrong question may well have led to
`the wrong answer, the Court cannot accept the District Court’s con-
`clusion. Pp. 22–23.
`989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, vacated and remanded.
`BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
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`GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dis-
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`senting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and ALITO, JJ.,
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`joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
` Nos. 13–895 and 13–1138
`_________________
` ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, ET AL.,
`APPELLANTS
`
`v.
` ALABAMA ET AL.
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`
`13–895
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`13–1138
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`ALABAMA DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE, ET AL.,
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`APPELLANTS
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`v.
`ALABAMA ET AL.
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`ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
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`THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
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`[March 25, 2015]
` JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The Alabama Legislative Black Caucus and the Ala-
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`bama Democratic Conference appeal a three-judge Federal
`District Court decision rejecting their challenges to the
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`lawfulness of Alabama’s 2012 redistricting of its State
`House of Representatives and State Senate. The appeals
`focus upon the appellants’ claims that new district bound-
`aries create “racial gerrymanders” in violation of the
`Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. See,
`e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899, 907–908 (1996) (Shaw
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`II) (Fourteenth Amendment forbids use of race as “‘pre-
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`dominant’” district boundary-drawing “‘factor’” unless
`boundaries are “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “‘compel-
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`ling state interest’” (citations omitted)). We find that the
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`2
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`ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS v. ALABAMA
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`Opinion of the Court
`District Court applied incorrect legal standards in evaluat-
`ing the claims. We consequently vacate its decision and
`remand the cases for further proceedings.
`I
`
`The Alabama Constitution requires the legislature to
`reapportion its State House and Senate electoral districts
`following each decennial census. Ala. Const., Art. IX,
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`§§199–200. In 2012 Alabama redrew the boundaries of
`the State’s 105 House districts and 35 Senate districts.
`2012 Ala. Acts no. 602 (House plan); id., at no. 603 (Senate
`plan) (Acts).
`In doing so, Alabama sought to achieve
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`numerous traditional districting objectives, such as com-
`pactness, not splitting counties or precincts, minimizing
`change, and protecting incumbents. But it placed yet
`greater importance on achieving two other goals. See
`Alabama Legislature Reapportionment Committee Guide-
`lines in No. 12–cv–691, Doc. 30–4, pp. 3–5 (Committee
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`Guidelines).
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`First, it sought to minimize the extent to which a dis-
`trict might deviate from the theoretical ideal of precisely
`equal population. In particular, it set as a goal creating a
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`set of districts in which no district would deviate from the
`theoretical, precisely equal ideal by more than 1%—i.e., a
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`more rigorous deviation standard than our precedents
`have found necessary under the Constitution. See Brown
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`v. Thomson, 462 U. S. 835, 842 (1983) (5% deviation from
`ideal generally permissible). No one here doubts the
`desirability of a State’s efforts generally to come close to a
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`one-person, one-vote ideal.
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`Second, it sought to ensure compliance with federal law,
`and, in particular, the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 79 Stat.
`439, as amended, 52 U. S. C. §10301 et seq. At the time of
`the redistricting Alabama was a covered jurisdiction under
`that Act. Accordingly §5 of the Act required Alabama to
`demonstrate that an electoral change, such as redistrict-
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`3
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`ing, would not bring about retrogression in respect to
`racial minorities’ “ability . . . to elect their preferred can-
`didates of choice.” 52 U. S. C. §10304(b). Specifically,
`Alabama believed that, to avoid retrogression under §5, it
`was required to maintain roughly the same black popula-
`tion percentage in existing majority-minority districts.
`See Appendix B, infra.
`
`Compliance with these two goals posed particular diffi-
`culties with respect to many of the State’s 35 majority-
`minority districts (8 in the Senate, 27 in the House). That
`is because many of these districts were (compared with the
`average district) underpopulated. In order for Senate
`District 26, for example, to meet the State’s no-more-than-
`1% population-deviation objective, the State would have to
`add about 16,000 individuals to the district. And, prior to
`redistricting, 72.75% of District 26’s population was black.
`Accordingly, Alabama’s plan added 15,785 new individ-
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`uals, and only 36 of those newly added individuals were
`white.
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`This suit, as it appears before us, focuses in large part
`upon Alabama’s efforts to achieve these two goals. The
`Caucus and the Conference basically claim that the State,
`in adding so many new minority voters to majority-
`minority districts (and to others), went too far. They
`allege the State created a constitutionally forbidden “ra-
`cial gerrymander”—a gerrymander that (e.g., when the
`State adds more minority voters than needed for a minor-
`ity group to elect a candidate of its choice) might, among
`other things, harm the very minority voters that Acts such
`as the Voting Rights Act sought to help.
`
`After a bench trial, the Federal District Court held in
`favor of the State, i.e., against the Caucus and the Confer-
`ence, with respect to their racial gerrymandering claims
`as well as with respect to several other legal claims that
`the Caucus and the Conference had made. With respect to
`racial gerrymandering, the District Court recognized that
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`4
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`ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS v. ALABAMA
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`Opinion of the Court
`electoral districting violates the Equal Protection Clause
`when (1) race is the “dominant and controlling” or “pre-
`dominant” consideration in deciding “to place a significant
`number of voters within or without a particular district,”
`Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 913, 916 (1995), and (2)
`the use of race is not “narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
`ling state interest,” Shaw II, 517 U. S., at 902; see also
`Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 649 (1993) (Shaw I) (Consti-
`
`tution forbids “separat[ion of] voters into different districts
`on the basis of race” when the separation “lacks sufficient
`justification”); Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 958–959, 976
`(1996) (principal opinion of O’Connor, J.) (same). But,
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`after trial the District Court held (2 to 1) that the Caucus
`and the Conference had failed to prove their racial gerry-
`mandering claims. The Caucus along with the Conference
`(and several other plaintiffs) appealed. We noted probable
`jurisdiction with respect to the racial gerrymandering
`claims. 572 U. S. ___ (2014).
`
`We shall focus upon four critical District Court determi-
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`nations underlying its ultimate “no violation” conclusion.
`They concern:
`1. The Geographical Nature of the Racial Gerryman-
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`dering Claims. The District Court characterized
`the appellants’ claims as falling into two categories.
`In the District Court’s view, both appellants had ar-
`gued “that the Acts as a whole constitute racial ger-
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`rymanders,” 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1287 (MD Ala.
`2013) (emphasis added), and one of the appellants
`(the Conference) had also argued that the State had
`racially gerrymandered four specific electoral dis-
`tricts, Senate Districts 7, 11, 22, and 26, id., at
`1288.
`2. Standing. The District Court held that the Caucus
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`had standing to argue its racial gerrymandering
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`claim with respect to the State “as a whole.” But
`the Conference lacked standing to make any of its
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`5
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`racial gerrymandering claims—the claim requiring
`consideration of the State “as a whole,” and the
`claims requiring consideration of four individual
`Senate districts. Id., at 1292.
`3. Racial Predominance. The District Court held that,
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`in any event, the appellants’ claims must fail be-
`cause race “was not the predominant motivating
`factor” either (a) “for the Acts as a whole” or (b) with
`respect to “Senate Districts 7, 11, 22, or 26.” Id., at
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`1293.
`4. Narrow Tailoring/Compelling State Interest. The
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`District Court also held that, even were it wrong
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`about standing and predominance, the appellants’
`racial gerrymandering claims must fail. That is be-
`cause any predominant use of race in the drawing of
`electoral boundaries was “narrowly tailored” to
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`serve a “compelling state interest,” id., at 1306–
`1307, namely the interest in avoiding retrogression
`with respect to racial minorities’ “ability to elect
`their preferred candidates of choice.” §10304(b).
`
`In our view, each of these determinations reflects an
`error about relevant law. And each error likely affected
`the District Court’s conclusions—to the point where we
`must vacate the lower court’s judgment and remand the
`cases to allow appellants to reargue their racial gerry-
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`mandering claims.
`In light of our opinion, all parties
`remain free to introduce such further evidence as the
`District Court shall reasonably find appropriate.
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`II
`
`We begin by considering the geographical nature of the
`racial gerrymandering claims. The District Court repeat-
`edly referred to the racial gerrymandering claims as
`claims that race improperly motivated the drawing of
`boundary lines of the State considered as a whole. See,
`
`e.g., 989 F. Supp. 2d, at 1293 (“Race was not the predomi-
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`6
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`ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS v. ALABAMA
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`Opinion of the Court
`nant motivating factor for the Acts as a whole”); id., at
`1287 (construing plaintiffs’ challenge as arguing that the
`“Acts as a whole constitute racial gerrymanders”); id., at
`1292 (describing the plaintiffs’ challenge as a “claim of
`racial gerrymandering to the Acts as a whole”); cf. supra,
`at 4–5 (noting four exceptions).
`A racial gerrymandering claim, however, applies to the
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`boundaries of individual districts. It applies district-by-
`district. It does not apply to a State considered as an
`undifferentiated “whole.” We have consistently described
`a claim of racial gerrymandering as a claim that race was
`improperly used in the drawing of the boundaries of one or
`more specific electoral districts. See, e.g., Shaw I, 509
`
`
`U. S., at 649 (violation consists of “separat[ing] voters into
`different districts on the basis of race” (emphasis added));
`
`Vera, 517 U. S., at 965 (principal opinion) (“[Courts] must
`scrutinize each challenged district . . .” (emphasis added)).
`
`We have described the plaintiff ’s evidentiary burden
`similarly. See Miller, supra, at 916 (plaintiff must show
`that “race was the predominant factor motivating the
`legislature’s decision to place a significant number of
`voters within or without a particular district” (emphasis
`added)).
`Our district-specific language makes sense in light of
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`the nature of the harms that underlie a racial gerryman-
`dering claim. Those harms are personal. They include
`being “personally . . . subjected to [a] racial classification,”
`Vera, supra, at 957 (principal opinion), as well as being
`represented by a legislator who believes his “primary
`obligation is to represent only the members” of a particu-
`lar racial group, Shaw I, supra, at 648. They directly
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`threaten a voter who lives in the district attacked. But
`they do not so keenly threaten a voter who lives elsewhere
`in the State. Indeed, the latter voter normally lacks
`standing to pursue a racial gerrymandering claim. United
`States v. Hays, 515 U. S. 737, 744–745 (1995).
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`Voters, of course, can present statewide evidence in
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`order to prove racial gerrymandering in a particular dis-
`trict. See Miller, supra, at 916. And voters might make
`the claim that every individual district in a State suffers
`from racial gerrymandering. But this latter claim is not
`the claim that the District Court, when using the phrase
`“as a whole,” considered here. Rather, the concept as used
`here suggests the existence of a legal unicorn, an animal
`that exists only in the legal imagination.
`This is not a technical, linguistic point. Nor does it
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`criticize what might seem, in effect, a slip of the pen.
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`Rather, here the District Court’s terminology mattered.
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`That is because the District Court found that racial crite-
`ria had not predominated in the drawing of some Alabama
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`districts. And it found that fact (the fact that race did not
`predominate in the drawing of some, or many districts)
`sufficient to defeat what it saw as the basic claim before it,
`namely a claim of racial gerrymandering with respect to
`the State as an undifferentiated whole. See, e.g., 989
`F. Supp. 2d, at 1294 (rejecting plaintiffs’ challenge because
`“[the legislature] followed no bright-line rule” with respect
`to every majority-minority district); id., at 1298–1299,
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`1301 (citing examples of majority-minority districts in
`which black population percentages were reduced and
`examples of majority-white districts in which precincts
`were split).
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`A showing that race-based criteria did not significantly
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` affect the drawing of some Alabama districts, however,
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`
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`would have done little to defeat a claim that race-based
`criteria predominantly affected the drawing of other Ala-
`bama districts, such as Alabama’s majority-minority
`districts primarily at issue here. See id., at 1329 (Thomp-
`son, J., dissenting) (“[T]he drafters[’] fail[ure] to achieve
`their sought-after percentage in one district does not
`detract one iota from the fact that they did achieve it in
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` another”). Thus, the District Court’s undifferentiated
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`8
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`ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS v. ALABAMA
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`Opinion of the Court
`statewide analysis is insufficient. And we must remand
`for consideration of racial gerrymandering with respect to
`the individual districts subject to the appellants’ racial
`gerrymandering challenges.
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`The State and principal dissent argue that (but for four
`specifically mentioned districts) there were in effect no
`such districts. The Caucus and the Conference, the State
`and principal dissent say, did not seek a district-by-
`district analysis. And, the State and principal dissent
`conclude that the Caucus and the Conference have conse-
`quently waived the right to any further consideration.
`Brief for Appellees 14, 31; post, at 5–12 (opinion of
`SCALIA, J.).
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`We do not agree. We concede that the District Court’s
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`opinion suggests that it was the Caucus and the Confer-
`ence that led the Court to consider racial gerrymandering
`of the State “as a whole.” 989 F. Supp. 2d, at 1287. At
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`least the District Court interpreted their filings to allege
`only that kind of claim. Ibid. But our review of the record
`indicates that the plaintiffs did not claim only that the
`legislature had racially gerrymandered the State “as” an
`undifferentiated “whole.” Rather, their evidence and their
`arguments embody the claim that individual majority-
`minority districts were racially gerrymandered. And those
`are the districts that we believe the District Court must
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`reconsider.
`There are 35 majority-minority districts, 27 in the
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`House and 8 in the Senate. The District Court’s opinion
`itself refers to evidence that the legislature’s redistricting
`committee, in order to satisfy what it believed the Voting
`Rights Act required, deliberately chose additional black
`voters to move into underpopulated majority-minority
`districts, i.e., a specific set of individual districts. See, e.g.,
`989 F. Supp. 2d, at 1274 (referring to Senator Dial’s testi-
`mony that the Committee “could have used,” but did not
`use, “white population within Jefferson County to repopu-
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`late the majority-black districts” because “doing so would
`have resulted in the retrogression of the majority-black
`districts and potentially created a problem for [Justice
`Department] preclearance”); id., at 1276 (stating that
`Representative Jim McClendon, also committee cochair,
`“testified consistently with Senator Dial”); id., at 1277
`(noting that the committee’s expert, Randolph Hinaman,
`testified that “he needed to add population” to majority-
`black districts “without significantly lowering the percent-
`age of the population in each district that was majority-
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`black”).
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`The Caucus and the Conference presented much evidence
`at trial to show that that the legislature had deliberately
`moved black voters into these majority-minority dis-
`tricts—again, a specific set of districts—in order to pre-
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`vent the percentage of minority voters in each district
`from declining. See, e.g., Committee Guidelines 3–5; 1 Tr.
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`28–29, 36–37, 55, 63, 67–68, 77, 81, 96, 115, 124, 136, 138
`(testimony of Senator Dial); Deposition of Gerald Dial in
`No. 12–cv–691 (May 21, 2013), Doc. 123–5, pp. 17, 39–41,
`62, 100 (Dial Deposition); 3 Tr. 222 (testimony of Repre-
`sentative McClendon); id., at 118–119, 145–146, 164, 182–
`183, 186–187 (testimony of Hinaman); Deposition of Ran-
`dolph Hinaman in No. 12–cv–691 (June 25, 2013), Doc.
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`134–4, pp. 23–24, 101 (Hinaman Deposition).
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`In their post-trial Proposed Findings of Fact and Con-
`clusions of Law, the plaintiffs stated that the evidence
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`showed a racial gerrymander with respect to the majority
`of the majority-minority districts; they referred to the
`specific splitting of precinct and county lines in the draw-
`ing of many majority-minority districts; and they pointed
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`to much district-specific evidence. E.g., Alabama Legisla-
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`tive Black Caucus Plaintiffs’ Notice of Filing Proposed
`Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in No. 12–cv–
`691, Doc. 194, pp. 9–10, 13–14, 30–35, 40 (Caucus Post-
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`Trial Brief); Newton Plaintiffs’ Notice of Filing Proposed
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` 10 ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS v. ALABAMA
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in No. 12–cv–
`
`691, Doc. 195, pp. 33–35, 56–61, 64–67, 69–74, 82–85, 108,
`121–122 (Conference Post-Trial Brief); see also Appendix
`A, infra (organizing these citations by district).
`
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`We recognize that the plaintiffs relied heavily upon
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`statewide evidence to prove that race predominated in the
`drawing of individual district lines. See generally Caucus
`
`Post-Trial Brief 1, 3–7, 48–50; Conference Post-Trial Brief
`2, 44–45, 105–106. And they also sought to prove that the
`use of race to draw the boundaries of the majority-
`minority districts affected the boundaries of other districts
`as well. See, e.g., 1 Tr. 36–37, 48, 55, 70–71, 93, 111, 124
`
`(testimony of Dial); 3 Tr. 142, 162 (testimony of Hinaman);
`see generally Caucus Post-Trial Brief 8–16. Such evidence
`is perfectly relevant. We have said that the plaintiff ’s
`burden in a racial gerrymandering case is “to show, either
`through circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and
`demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative
`purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating
`the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of
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`voters within or without a particular district.” Miller, 515
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`U. S., at 916. Cf. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U. S. 234, 258
`(2001) (explaining the plaintiff ’s burden in cases, unlike
`these, in which the State argues that politics, not race,
`was its predominant motive). That Alabama expressly
`adopted and applied a policy of prioritizing mechanical
`racial targets above all other districting criteria (save one-
`person, one-vote) provides evidence that race motivated
`the drawing of particular lines in multiple districts in the
`State. And neither the use of statewide evidence nor the
`effort to show widespread effect can transform a racial
`gerrymandering claim about a set of individual districts
`into a separate, general claim that the legislature racially
`gerrymandered the State “as” an undifferentiated “whole.”
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`We, like the principal dissent, recognize that the plain-
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`tiffs could have presented their district-specific claims
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` Cite as: 575 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Opinion of the Court
`more clearly, post, at 6–8, 10–12 (opinion of SCALIA, J.),
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`but the dissent properly concedes that its objection would
`weaken had the Conference “developed such a claim in the
`course of discovery and trial.” Post, at 6. And that is just
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`what happened.
`In the past few pages and in Appendix A, we set forth
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`the many record references that establish this fact. The
`Caucus helps to explain the complaint omissions when it
`tells us that the plaintiffs unearthed the factual basis for
`their racial gerrymandering claims when they deposed the
`committee’s redistricting expert. See Brief for Appellants
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`in No. 13–895, pp. 12–13. The State neither disputes this
`procedural history nor objects that plaintiffs’ pleadings
`failed to conform with the proof. Indeed, throughout, the
`plaintiffs litigated these claims not as if they were wholly
`separate entities but as if they were a team. See, e.g.,
`Caucus Post-Trial Brief 1 (“[We] support the additional
`claims made by the [Conference] plaintiffs”); but cf. post,
`at 3–12 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (treating separately Con-
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`ference claims from Caucus claims). Thus we, like the
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`dissenting judge below (who also lived with these cases
`through trial), conclude that the record as a whole shows
`that the plaintiffs brought, and their argument rested
`significantly upon, district-specific claims.
`See 989
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`F. Supp. 2d, at 1313 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (constru-
`ing plaintiffs as also challenging “each majority-Black
`House and Senate District”).
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`The principal dissent adds that the Conference waived
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`its district-specif