(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2015
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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`
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
` Syllabus
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` FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF CALIFORNIA v. HYATT
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA
` No. 14–1175. Argued December 7, 2015—Decided April 19, 2016
`
`Respondent Hyatt claims that he moved from California to Nevada in
`1991, but petitioner Franchise Tax Board of California, a state agen-
`cy, claims that he actually moved in 1992 and thus owes California
`millions in taxes, penalties, and interest. Hyatt filed suit in Nevada
`state court, which had jurisdiction over California under Nevada v.
`Hall, 440 U. S. 410, seeking damages for California’s alleged abusive
`audit and investigation practices. After this Court affirmed the Ne-
`
` vada Supreme Court’s ruling that Nevada courts, as a matter of com-
`ity, would immunize California to the same extent that Nevada law
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`would immunize its own agencies and officials, see Franchise Tax Bd.
`
` of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U. S. 488, 499, the case went to trial, where Hy-
`att was awarded almost $500 million in damages and fees. On ap-
`peal, California argued that the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit
`Clause, Art. IV, §1, required Nevada to limit damages to $50,000, the
`maximum that Nevada law would permit in a similar suit against its
`own officials. The Nevada Supreme Court, however, affirmed $1 mil-
`lion of the award and ordered a retrial on another damages issue,
`stating that the $50,000 maximum would not apply on remand.
`Held:
`1. The Court is equally divided on the question whether Nevada v.
`Hall should be overruled and thus affirms the Nevada courts’ exer-
`cise of jurisdiction over California’s state agency. P. 4.
`2. The Constitution does not permit Nevada to apply a rule of Ne-
`vada law that awards damages against California that are greater
`than it could award against Nevada in similar circumstances. This
`conclusion is consistent with this Court’s precedents. A statute is a
`“public Act” within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
`While a State is not required “to substitute for its own statute . . . the
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`statute of another State reflecting a conflicting and opposed policy,”
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`FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT
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`
`Syllabus
` Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S. 408, 412, a State’s decision to decline to
`
`
`apply another State’s statute on this ground must not embody a “pol-
`icy of hostility to the public Acts” of that other State, id., at 413. Us-
`ing this approach, the Court found no violation of the Clause in Car-
`roll v. Lanza or in Franchise Tax Bd. the first time this litigation was
`considered. By contrast, the rule of unlimited damages applied here
`is not only “opposed” to California’s law of complete immunity; it is
`also inconsistent with the general principles of Nevada immunity
`law, which limit damages awards to $50,000. Nevada explained its
`departure from those general principles by describing California’s
`own system of controlling its agencies as an inadequate remedy for
`Nevada’s citizens. A State that disregards its own ordinary legal
`principles on this ground employs a constitutionally impermissible
`
`“ ‘policy of hostility to the public Acts’ of a sister State.” 538 U. S., at
`499. The Nevada Supreme Court’s decision thereby lacks the
`
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`“healthy regard for California’s sovereign status” that was the hall-
`
`mark of its earlier decision. Ibid. This holding does not indicate a
`return to a complex “balancing-of-interests approach to conflicts of
`law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.” Id., at 496. Rather,
`Nevada’s hostility toward California is clearly evident in its decision
`to devise a special, discriminatory damages rule that applies only to a
`sister State. Pp. 4–9.
`130 Nev. ___, 335 P. 3d 125, vacated and remanded.
`BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
`GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., concurred in
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` the judgment. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
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`THOMAS, J., joined.
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` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 14–1175
`_________________
`FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF CALIFORNIA,
`
`PETITIONER v. GILBERT P. HYATT
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
`
`
`NEVADA
`
`[April 19, 2016]
`
`JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
`In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410 (1979), this Court held
`that one State (here, Nevada) can open the doors of its
`courts to a private citizen’s lawsuit against another State
`(here, California) without the other State’s consent. In
`this case, a private citizen, a resident of Nevada, has
`brought a suit in Nevada’s courts against the Franchise
`Tax Board of California, an agency of the State of Califor-
`nia. The board has asked us to overrule Hall and hold
`that the Nevada courts lack jurisdiction to hear this law-
`suit. The Court is equally divided on this question, and
`we consequently affirm the Nevada courts’ exercise of
`jurisdiction over California. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co.
`
`
`v. Baker, 554 U. S. 471, 484 (2008) (citing Durant v. Essex
`Co., 7 Wall. 107, 112 (1869)).
`California also asks us to reverse the Nevada court’s
`
`decision insofar as it awards the private citizen greater
`damages than Nevada law would permit a private citizen
`to obtain in a similar suit against Nevada’s own agencies.
`We agree that Nevada’s application of its damages law in
`this case reflects a special, and constitutionally forbidden,
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`FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT
`
`Opinion of the Court
`“‘policy of hostility to the public Acts’ of a sister State,”
`namely, California. U. S. Const., Art. IV, §1 (Full Faith
`and Credit Clause); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,
`538 U. S. 488, 499 (2003) (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, 349
`
`U. S. 408, 413 (1955)). We set aside the Nevada Supreme
`Court’s decision accordingly.
`
`I
`Gilbert P. Hyatt, the respondent here, moved from
`
`California to Nevada in the early 1990’s. He says that he
`moved to Nevada in September 1991. California’s Fran-
`chise Tax Board, however, after an investigation and tax
`audit, claimed that Hyatt moved to Nevada later, in April
`1992, and that he consequently owed California more than
`$10 million in taxes, associated penalties, and interest.
`Hyatt filed this lawsuit in Nevada state court against
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`California’s Franchise Tax Board, a California state agency.
`
`Hyatt sought damages for what he considered the board’s
`abusive audit and investigation practices, including rifling
`through his private mail, combing through his garbage,
`
`and examining private activities at his place of worship.
`
`See App. 213–245, 267–268.
`California recognized that, under Hall, the Constitution
`
`
`permits Nevada’s courts to assert jurisdiction over Cali-
`fornia despite California’s lack of consent. California
`nonetheless asked the Nevada courts to dismiss the case
`on other constitutional grounds. California law, it pointed
`out, provided state agencies with immunity from lawsuits
`based upon actions taken during the course of collecting
`taxes. Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §860.2 (West 1995); see also
`§860.2 (West 2012). It argued that the Constitution’s Full
`Faith and Credit Clause required Nevada to apply Cali-
`fornia’s sovereign immunity law to Hyatt’s case. Nevada’s
`Supreme Court, however, rejected California’s claim. It
`held that Nevada’s courts, as a matter of comity, would
`immunize California where Nevada law would similarly
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` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
`immunize its own agencies and officials (e.g., for actions
`taken in the performance of a “discretionary” function),
`but they would not immunize California where Nevada
`law permitted actions against Nevada agencies, say, for
`acts taken in bad faith or for intentional torts. App. to
`Pet. for Cert. in Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, O. T.
`2002, No. 42, p. 12. We reviewed that decision, and we
`affirmed. Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499.
`On remand, the case went to trial. A jury found in
`
`Hyatt’s favor and awarded him close to $500 million in
`damages (both compensatory and punitive) and fees (in-
`cluding attorney’s fees). California appealed. It argued
`that the trial court had not properly followed the Nevada
`Supreme Court’s earlier decision. California explained
`that in a similar suit against similar Nevada officials,
`Nevada statutory law would limit damages to $50,000,
`and it argued that the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit
`Clause required Nevada to limit damages similarly here.
`
`The Nevada Supreme Court accepted the premise that
`Nevada statutes would impose a $50,000 limit in a similar
`suit against its own officials. See 130 Nev. ___, ___, 335
`
`P. 3d 125, 145–146 (2014); see also Nev. Rev. Stat.
`§41.035(1) (1995). But the court rejected California’s
`conclusion. Instead, while setting aside much of the dam-
`ages award, it nonetheless affirmed $1 million of the
`award (earmarked as compensation for fraud), and it
`
`remanded for a retrial on the question of damages for
`
`intentional infliction of emotional distress. In doing so, it
`stated that “damages awarded on remand . . . are not
`subject to any statutory cap.” 130 Nev., at ___, 335 P. 3d,
`at 153. The Nevada Supreme Court explained its holding
`by stating that California’s efforts to control the actions of
`its own agencies were inadequate as applied to Nevada’s
`own citizens. Hence, Nevada’s “policy interest in provid-
`ing adequate redress to Nevada’s citizens [wa]s paramount
`
`to providing [California] a statutory cap on damages under
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`3
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`FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT
`
`Opinion of the Court
`comity.” Id., at ___, 335 P. 3d, at 147.
`
`California petitioned for certiorari. We agreed to decide
`two questions. First, whether to overrule Hall. And,
`second, if we did not do so, whether the Constitution per-
`mits Nevada to award Hyatt damages against a California
`state agency that are greater than those that Nevada
`would award in a similar suit against its own state
`agencies.
`
`
`
`4
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`
`
`II
`
`In light of our 4-to-4 affirmance of Nevada’s exercise of
`jurisdiction over California’s state agency, we must con-
`sider the second question: Whether the Constitution per-
`mits Nevada to award damages against California agen-
`cies under Nevada law that are greater than it could
`
`award against Nevada agencies in similar circumstances.
`We conclude that it does not. The Nevada Supreme Court
`has ignored both Nevada’s typical rules of immunity and
`California’s immunity-related statutes (insofar as Califor-
`nia’s statutes would prohibit a monetary recovery that is
`greater in amount than the maximum recovery that Ne-
`vada law would permit in similar circumstances). Instead,
`it has applied a special rule of law that evinces a “ ‘policy
`
`of hostility’” toward California. Franchise Tax Bd., supra,
`at 499 (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 413). Doing so
`violates the Constitution’s requirement that “Full Faith
`and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
`
`Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”
`Art. IV, §1.
`
`The Court’s precedents strongly support this conclusion.
`A statute is a “public Act” within the meaning of the Full
`
`
`Faith and Credit Clause. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza,
`supra, at 411; see also 28 U. S. C. §1738 (referring to “[t]he
`Acts of the legislature” in the full faith and credit context).
`We have said that the Clause “does not require a State to
`substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and
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`Opinion of the Court
` events within it, the statute of another State reflecting a
`
`
`
` conflicting and opposed policy.” Carroll v. Lanza, 349
`U. S., at 412. But when affirming a State’s decision to
`decline to apply another State’s statute on this ground, we
`have consistently emphasized that the State had “not
`adopt[ed] any policy of hostility to the public Acts” of that
`other State. Id., at 413.
`
`
` In Carroll v. Lanza, the Court considered a negligence
`action brought by a Missouri worker in Arkansas’ courts.
`We held that the Arkansas courts need not apply a time
`
`limitation contained in Missouri’s (but not in Arkansas’)
`workman’s compensation law. Id., at 413–414. In doing
`so, we emphasized both that (1) Missouri law (compared
`with Arkansas law) embodied “a conflicting and opposed
`
`policy,” and (2) Arkansas law did not embody “any policy of
`hostility to the public Acts of Missouri.” Id., at 412–413.
`
`This second requirement was well established in earlier
`law. See, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629, 642–643
`(1935) (New Jersey may not enforce a jurisdictional stat-
`ute that would permit enforcement of certain claims under
`New Jersey law but “deny the enforcement” of similar,
`valid claims under New York law); Hughes v. Fetter, 341
`U. S. 609, 611–612 (1951) (invalidating a Wisconsin stat-
`ute that “close[d] the doors of its courts” to an Illinois
`cause of action while permitting adjudication of similar
`
`Wisconsin claims).
`
`We followed this same approach when we considered the
`litigation now before us for the first time. See Franchise
`Tax Bd., 538 U. S., at 498–499. Nevada had permitted
`Hyatt to sue California in Nevada courts. See id., at 497
`(citing Hall, 440 U. S., at 414–421). Nevada’s courts
`recognized that California’s law of complete immunity
`would prevent any recovery in this case. The Nevada
`
`Supreme Court consequently did not apply California law.
`It applied Nevada law instead. We upheld that decision as
`consistent with the Full Faith and Credit Clause. But in
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`

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`FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT
`
`Opinion of the Court
`doing so, we emphasized both that (1) the Clause does not
`require one State to apply another State’s law that vio-
`lates its “own legitimate public policy,” Franchise Tax Bd.,
`supra, at 497–498 (citing Hall, supra, at 424), and (2)
`Nevada’s choice of law did not “exhibi[t] a ‘policy of hostility
`to the public Acts’ of a sister State.” Franchise Tax Bd.,
`
`
`supra, at 499 (quoting Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 413).
`Rather, Nevada had evinced “a healthy regard for Califor-
`nia’s sovereign status,” we said, by “relying on the con-
`tours of Nevada’s own sovereign immunity from suit as a
`benchmark for its analysis.” Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at
`499.
`
`The Nevada decision before us embodies a critical de-
`parture from its earlier approach. Nevada has not applied
`the principles of Nevada law ordinarily applicable to suits
`against Nevada’s own agencies. Rather, it has applied a
`special rule of law applicable only in lawsuits against its
`
`sister States, such as California. With respect to damages
`awards greater than $50,000, the ordinary principles of
`Nevada law do not “conflic[t]” with California law, for both
`laws would grant immunity. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S.,
`at 412. Similarly, in respect to such amounts, the
`“polic[ies]” underlying California law and Nevada’s usual
`approach are not “opposed”; they are consistent. Id., at
`412–413.
`
`But that is not so in respect to Nevada’s special rule.
`That rule, allowing damages awards greater than $50,000,
`
`is not only “opposed” to California law, ibid.; it is also
`inconsistent with the general principles of Nevada immun-
`ity law, see Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499. The Nevada
`Supreme Court explained its departure from those general
`principles by describing California’s system of controlling
`its own agencies as failing to provide “adequate” recourse
`to Nevada’s citizens. 130 Nev., at ___, 335 P. 3d, at 147.
`
`It expressed concerns about the fact that California’s
`agencies “‘operat[e] outside’” the systems of “‘legislative
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`7
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` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`Opinion of the Court
`control, administrative oversight, and public accountabil-
`
`ity’” that Nevada applies to its own agencies. Ibid. (quot-
`ing Faulkner v. University of Tenn., 627 So. 2d 362 (Ala.
`1992)). Such an explanation, which amounts to little more
`than a conclusory statement disparaging California’s own
`legislative, judicial, and administrative controls, cannot
`
`justify the application of a special and discriminatory rule.
`Rather, viewed through a full faith and credit lens, a State
`that disregards its own ordinary legal principles on this
`ground is hostile to another State. A constitutional rule
`that would permit this kind of discriminatory hostility is
`likely to cause chaotic interference by some States into the
`internal, legislative affairs of others. Imagine, for exam-
`ple, that many or all States enacted such discriminatory,
`special laws, and justified them on the sole basis that (in
`their view) a sister State’s law provided inadequate pro-
`tection to their citizens. Would each affected sister State
`have to change its own laws? Entirely? Piece-by-piece, in
`order to respond to the new special laws enacted by every
`other State? It is difficult to reconcile such a system of
`special and discriminatory rules with the Constitution’s
`vision of 50 individual and equally dignified States. In
`light of the “constitutional equality” among the States,
`Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559, 580 (1911), Nevada has not
`offered “sufficient policy considerations” to justify the
`application of a special rule of Nevada law that discrimi-
`nates against its sister States, Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at
`413. In our view, Nevada’s rule lacks the “healthy regard
`for California’s sovereign status” that was the hallmark of
`its earlier decision, and it reflects a constitutionally im-
`permissible “‘policy of hostility to the public Acts’ of a
`
`sister State.” Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499 (quoting
`
`Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 413).
`
`
`In so holding we need not, and do not, intend to return
`to a complex “balancing-of-interests approach to conflicts
`of law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.” Franchise
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`8
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`FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Tax Bd., 538 U. S., at 496. Long ago this Court’s efforts to
`apply that kind of analysis led to results that seemed to
`differ depending, for example, upon whether the case
`involved commercial law, a shareholders’ action, insurance
`claims, or workman’s compensation statutes. See, e.g.,
`
`Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 157–
`159 (1932); Carroll v. Lanza, supra, at 414–420 (Frankfur-
`
`ter, J., dissenting) (listing, and trying to classify, nearly 50
`cases). We have since abandoned that approach, and we
`
`continue to recognize that a State need not “‘substitute
`the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing
`
`
`with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to
`legislate.’” Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 496 (quoting
`Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n,
`306 U. S. 493, 501 (1939)). But here, we can safely con-
`clude that, in devising a special—and hostile—rule for
`
`California, Nevada has not “sensitively applied principles
`of comity with a healthy regard for California’s sovereign
`status.” Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 499; see Thomas v.
`Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U. S. 261, 272 (1980)
`(plurality opinion) (Clause seeks to prevent “parochial
`entrenchment on the interests of other States”); Allstate
`
`Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U. S. 302, 323, and n. 10 (1981)
`(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (Clause is properly
`brought to bear when a State’s choice of law “threatens the
`federal interest in national unity by unjustifiably infring-
`
`ing upon the legitimate interests of another State”); cf.
`
`Supreme Court of N. H. v. Piper, 470 U. S. 274, 288 (1985)
`(Privileges and Immunities Clause prevents the New
`Hampshire Supreme Court from promulgating a rule that
`limits bar admission to state residents, discriminating
`
`against out-of-state lawyers); Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
`Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U. S. 888, 894 (1988)
`(Commerce Clause invalidates a statute of limitations that
`“imposes a greater burden on out-of-state companies than
`it does on [in-state] companies”).
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`9
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` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`For these reasons, insofar as the Nevada Supreme Court
`
`has declined to apply California law in favor of a special
`rule of Nevada law that is hostile to its sister States, we
`find its decision unconstitutional. We vacate its judgment
`and remand the case for further proceedings not incon-
`sistent with this opinion.
`
`
`
`It is so ordered.
`
`
`
` JUSTICE ALITO concurs in the judgment.
`
`

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` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
` ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`1
`
`_________________
`
` No. 14–1175
`_________________
`FRANCHISE TAX BOARD OF CALIFORNIA,
`
`PETITIONER v. GILBERT P. HYATT
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
`
`
`NEVADA
`
`[April 19, 2016]
`
`CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS
`
`joins, dissenting.
`Petitioner Franchise Tax Board is the California agency
`
`that collects California’s state income tax. Respondent
`Gilbert Hyatt, a resident of Nevada, filed suit in Nevada
`state court against the Board, alleging that it had commit-
`
`ted numerous torts in the course of auditing his California
`tax returns. The Board is immune from such a suit in
`California courts. The last time this case was before us,
`we held that the Nevada Supreme Court could apply
`Nevada law to resolve the Board’s claim that it was im-
`mune from suit in Nevada as well. Following our decision,
`the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a $1 million jury
`award against the Board after concluding that the Board
`did not enjoy immunity under Nevada law.
`Today the Court shifts course. It now holds that the
`
`Full Faith and Credit Clause requires the Nevada Su-
`preme Court to afford the Board immunity to the extent
`Nevada agencies are entitled to immunity under Nevada
`law. Because damages in a similar suit against Nevada
`agencies are capped at $50,000 by Nevada law, the Court
`concludes that damages against the Board must be capped
`at that level as well.
`
`That seems fair. But, for better or worse, the word “fair”
`
`
`does not appear in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The
`
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`

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`2
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`FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT
`
` ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
`
`
`
`Court’s decision is contrary to our precedent holding that
`the Clause does not block a State from applying its own
`law to redress an injury within its own borders. The
`opinion also departs from the text of the Clause, which—
`when it applies—requires a State to give full faith and
`credit to another State’s laws. The Court instead permits
`partial credit: To comply with the Full Faith and Credit
`Clause, the Nevada Supreme Court need only afford the
`Board the same limited immunity that Nevada agencies
`enjoy.
`I respectfully dissent.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`I
`In 1991 Gilbert Hyatt sold his house in California and
`rented an apartment, registered to vote, and opened a
`bank account in Nevada. When he filed his 1991 and 1992
`
`tax returns, he claimed Nevada as his place of residence.
`
`
`Unlike California, Nevada has no state income tax, and
`the move saved Hyatt millions of dollars in California
`taxes. California’s Franchise Tax Board was suspicious,
`and it initiated an audit.
`In the course of the audit, employees of the Board trav-
`
`eled to Nevada and allegedly peered through Hyatt’s
`windows, rummaged around in his garbage, contacted his
`estranged family members, and shared his personal in-
`formation not only with newspapers but also with his
`business contacts and even his place of worship. Hyatt
`claims that one employee in particular had it in for him,
`referring to him in antisemitic terms and taking “trophy-
`like pictures” in front of his home after the audit. Brief for
`Respondent 3. As a result of the audit, the Board deter-
`mined that Hyatt was a resident of California for 1991 and
`part of 1992, and that he accordingly owed over $10 mil-
`lion in unpaid state income taxes, penalties, and interest.
`Hyatt protested the audit before the Board, which up-
`
`held the audit following an 11-year administrative pro-
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`
`
` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
` ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
`
`
`
`ceeding. Hyatt is still challenging the audit in California
`court. In 1998, Hyatt also filed suit against the Board in
`Nevada state court. In that suit, which is the subject of
`this case, Hyatt claimed that the Board committed a
`variety of torts, including fraud, intentional infliction of
`emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. The Board is
`immune from suit under California law, and it argued that
`Nevada was required under the Full Faith and Credit
`
`Clause to enforce California’s immunity law.
`
`When the case reached the Nevada Supreme Court, that
`court held, applying general principles of comity under
`Nevada law, that the Board was entitled to immunity for
`its negligent but not intentional torts—the same immu-
`nity afforded Nevada state agencies. Not satisfied, the
`Board pursued its claim of complete immunity to this
`Court, but we affirmed. We ruled that the Full Faith and
`Credit Clause did not prohibit Nevada from applying its
`own immunity law to the dispute. Franchise Tax Bd. of
`Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U. S. 488, 498–499 (2003).
`
`
`On remand, the trial court conducted a four-month jury
`trial. The jury found for Hyatt, awarding him $1 million
`for fraud, $52 million for invasion of privacy, $85 million
`for emotional distress, and $250 million in punitive dam-
`ages. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court significantly
`reduced the award, concluding that the invasion of privacy
`claims failed as a matter of law. Applying principles of
`comity, the Nevada Supreme Court also held that because
`Nevada state agencies are not subject to punitive dam-
`ages, the Board was not liable for the $250 million punitive
`damages award. The court did hold the Board responsible
`for the $1 million fraud judgment, however, and it re-
`manded for a new trial on damages for the emotional
`distress claim. Although tort liability for Nevada state
`agencies was capped at $50,000 under Nevada law, the
`court held that it was against Nevada’s public policy to
`apply that cap to the Board’s liability for the fraud and
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`4
`
`
`FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT
`
` ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
`
`
`
`emotional distress claims. The Board sought review by
`this Court, and we again granted certiorari. 576 U. S. ___
`(2015).
`
`
`II
`
`A
`
`
`The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that “Full
`Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
`Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
`State.” U. S. Const., Art. IV, §1. The purpose of the
`Clause “was to alter the status of the several states as
`independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore
`obligations created under the laws or by the judicial pro-
`ceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of
`a single nation.” Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.,
`296 U. S. 268, 276–277 (1935).
`
`The Full Faith and Credit Clause applies in a straight-
`forward fashion to state court judgments: “A judgment
`entered in one State must be respected in another pro-
`vided that the first State had jurisdiction over the parties
`
`
`
`
`
`and the subject matter.” Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 421
`(1979). The Clause is more difficult to apply to “public
`
`Acts,” which include the laws of other States. See Carroll
`v. Lanza, 349 U. S. 408, 411 (1955). State courts must
`give full faith and credit to those laws. But what does that
`
`mean in practice?
`
`It is clear that state courts are not always required to
`apply the laws of other States. State laws frequently
`
`conflict, and a “rigid and literal enforcement of the full
`faith and credit clause, without regard to the statute of the
`forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the
`conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced
`in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.” Alaska
`Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n of Cal.,
`294 U. S. 532, 547 (1935). Accordingly, this Court has
`treated the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a “conflicts of
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
`
` ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
`
`
`
`law” provision that dictates when a State must apply the
`laws of another State rather than its own. Franchise Tax
`
`Bd., 538 U. S., at 496; see also Hall, 440 U. S., at 424
`(California court is not required to apply Nevada law).
`
`
`Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, “it is frequently
`the case” that “a court can lawfully apply either the law of
`one State or the contrary law of another.” Franchise Tax
`
`Bd., 538 U. S., at 496 (internal quotation marks omitted).
`As we have explained,
`“the very nature of the federal union of states, to
`which are reserved some of the attributes of sover-
`eignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit
`clause as the means for compelling a state to substi-
`tute the statutes of other states for its own statutes
`dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is
`competent to legislate.” Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
`Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U. S. 493, 501
`
`(1939).
`This Court has generally held that when a State chooses
`“to apply its own rule of law to give affirmative relief for
`an action arising within its borders,” the Full Faith and
`Credit Clause is satisfied. Carroll, 349 U. S., at 413; see
`Hall, 440 U. S., at 424 (California court may apply Cali-
`fornia law consistent with the State’s interest in “provid-
`ing full protection to those who are injured on its high-
`ways” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
`A State may not apply its own law, however, if doing so
`
`reflects a “policy of hostility to the public Acts” of another
`
`State. Carroll, 349 U. S., at 413. A State is considered to
`have adopted such a policy if it has “no sufficient policy
`considerations to warrant” its refusal to apply the other
`State’s laws. Ibid. For example, when a State “seeks to
`exclude from its courts actions arising under a foreign
`statute” but permits similar actions under its own laws,
`the State has adopted a policy of hostility to the “public
`
`
`
`
`
`

`
`6
`
`
`FRANCHISE TAX BD. OF CAL. v. HYATT
`
` ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
`
`
`
`
` Acts” of another State. Ibid.; see Hughes v. Fetter, 341
`U. S. 609, 611–613 (1951). In such cases, this Court has
`held that the forum State must open its doors and permit
`the plaintiff to seek relief under another State’s laws. See,
`e.g., id., at 611 (“Wisconsin cannot escape [its] con-
`stitutional obligation to enforce the rights and duties
`validly created under the laws of other states by the simple
`device of removing jurisdiction from courts otherwise
`competent”).
`
`
`
`B
`According to the Court, the Nevada Supreme Court
`
`violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause by applying “a
`special rule of law that evinces a policy of hostility toward
`California.” Ante, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`As long as Nevada provides immunity to its state agencies
`for awards above $50,000, the majority reasons, the State
`has no legitimate policy rationale for refusing to give
`similar immunity to the agencies of other States. The
`Court concludes that the Nevada Supreme Court is accord-
`ingly required to rewrite Nevada law to afford the Board
`
`the same immunity to which Nevada agencies are entitled.
`
`In the majority’s view, that result is “strongly” supported
`
`by this Court’s precedents. Ibid. I disagree.
`Carroll explains that the Full Faith and Credit Cl