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`Per Curiam
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`JEREMY CARROLL v. ANDREW CARMAN, ET UX.
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
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`STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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`No. 14–212. Decided November 10, 2014
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` PER CURIAM.
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`On July 3, 2009, the Pennsylvania State Police Depart-
`ment received a report that a man named Michael Zita
`had stolen a car and two loaded handguns. The report
`also said that Zita might have fled to the home of Andrew
`and Karen Carman. The department sent Officers Jeremy
`Carroll and Brian Roberts to the Carmans’ home to inves-
`tigate. Neither officer had been to the home before. 749
`F. 3d 192, 195 (CA3 2014).
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`The officers arrived in separate patrol cars around 2:30
`p.m. The Carmans’ house sat on a corner lot—the front of
`the house faced a main street while the left (as viewed
`from the front) faced a side street. The officers initially
`drove to the front of the house, but after discovering that
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`parking was not available there, turned right onto the side
`street. As they did so, they saw several cars parked side-
`by-side in a gravel parking area on the left side of the
`Carmans’ property. The officers parked in the “first avail-
`able spot,” at “the far rear of the property.” Ibid. (quoting
`Tr. 70 (Apr. 8, 2013)).
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`The officers exited their patrol cars. As they looked
`toward the house, the officers saw a small structure (ei-
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`ther a carport or a shed) with its door open and a light on.
`Id., at 71. Thinking someone might be inside, Officer
`Carroll walked over, “poked [his] head” in, and said
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`“Pennsylvania State Police.” 749 F. 3d, at 195 (quoting Tr.
`71 (Apr. 8, 2013); alteration in original). No one was
`there, however, so the officers continued walking toward
`the house. As they approached, they saw a sliding glass
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` CARROLL v. CARMAN
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`Per Curiam
`door that opened onto a ground-level deck. Carroll
`thought the sliding glass door “looked like a customary
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`entryway,” so he and Officer Roberts decided to knock on
`it. 749 F. 3d, at 195 (quoting Tr. 83 (Apr. 8, 2013)).
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`As the officers stepped onto the deck, a man came out
`of the house and “belligerent[ly] and aggressively ap-
`proached” them. 749 F. 3d, at 195. The officers identified
`themselves, explained they were looking for Michael Zita,
`and asked the man for his name. The man refused to
`answer. Instead, he turned away from the officers and
`appeared to reach for his waist. Id., at 195–196. Carroll
`grabbed the man’s right arm to make sure he was not
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`reaching for a weapon. The man twisted away from Car-
`roll, lost his balance, and fell into the yard. Id., at 196.
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`At that point, a woman came out of the house and asked
`what was happening. The officers again explained that
`they were looking for Zita. The woman then identified
`herself as Karen Carman, identified the man as her hus-
`band, Andrew Carman, and told the officers that Zita was
`not there. In response, the officers asked for permission to
`search the house for Zita. Karen Carman consented, and
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`everyone went inside. Ibid.
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`The officers searched the house, but did not find Zita.
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`They then left. The Carmans were not charged with any
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`crimes. Ibid.
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`The Carmans later sued Officer Carroll in Federal
`District Court under 42 U. S. C. §1983. Among other
`things, they alleged that Carroll unlawfully entered their
`property in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he
`went into their backyard and onto their deck without a
`warrant. 749 F. 3d, at 196.
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`At trial, Carroll argued that his entry was lawful under
`the “knock and talk” exception to the warrant require-
`ment. That exception, he contended, allows officers to
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`knock on someone’s door, so long as they stay “on those
`portions of [the] property that the general public is al-
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`Per Curiam
`lowed to go on.” Tr. 7 (Apr. 8, 2013). The Carmans re-
`sponded that a normal visitor would have gone to their
`front door, rather than into their backyard or onto their
`deck. Thus, they argued, the “knock and talk” exception
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`did not apply.
`At the close of Carroll’s case in chief, the parties each
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`moved for judgment as a matter of law. The District Court
`denied both motions, and sent the case to a jury. As rele-
`vant here, the District Court instructed the jury that the
`“knock and talk” exception “allows officers without a
`warrant to knock on a resident’s door or otherwise ap-
`proach the residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants,
`just as any private citizen might.” Id., at 24 (Apr. 10,
`2013). The District Court further explained that “officers
`should restrict their movements to walkways, driveways,
`porches and places where visitors could be expected to go.”
`Ibid. The jury then returned a verdict for Carroll.
`The Carmans appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the
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`Third Circuit reversed in relevant part. The court held
`that Officer Carroll violated the Fourth Amendment as a
`matter of law because the “knock and talk” exception
`“requires that police officers begin their encounter at the
`front door, where they have an implied invitation to go.”
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`749 F. 3d, at 199. The court also held that Carroll was not
`entitled to qualified immunity because his actions violated
`clearly established law.
` The court therefore re-
`Ibid.
`versed the District Court and held that the Carmans were
`entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
`Carroll petitioned for certiorari. We grant the petition
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`and reverse the Third Circuit’s determination that Carroll
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`was not entitled to qualified immunity.
`A government official sued under §1983 is entitled to
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`qualified immunity unless the official violated a statutory
`or constitutional right that was clearly established at the
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`time of the challenged conduct. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
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`563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 3). A right is clearly
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`Per Curiam
`established only if its contours are sufficiently clear that
`“a reasonable official would understand that what he is
`doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483
`U. S. 635, 640 (1987). In other words, “existing precedent
`must have placed the statutory or constitutional question
`beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).
`This doctrine “gives government officials breathing room
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`to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and “pro-
`tects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who know-
`ingly violate the law.’” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12) (quoting
`Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 341 (1986)).
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`Here the Third Circuit cited only a single case to sup-
`port its decision that Carroll was not entitled to qualified
`immunity—Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F. 3d 497
`(CA3 2003). Assuming for the sake of argument that a
`controlling circuit precedent could constitute clearly estab-
`lished federal law in these circumstances, see Reichle v.
`Howards, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 7), Marasco
`does not clearly establish that Carroll violated the Car-
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`mans’ Fourth Amendment rights.
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`In Marasco, two police officers went to Robert Smith’s
`house and knocked on the front door. When Smith did not
`respond, the officers went into the backyard, and at least
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`one entered the garage. 318 F. 3d, at 519. The court
`acknowledged that the officers’ “entry into the curtilage
`after not receiving an answer at the front door might be
`reasonable.” Id., at 520. It held, however, that the Dis-
`trict Court had not made the factual findings needed to
`decide that issue. Id., at 521. For example, the Third
`Circuit noted that the record “did not discuss the layout of
`the property or the position of the officers on that prop-
`erty,” and that “there [was] no indication of whether the
`officers followed a path or other apparently open route
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`that would be suggestive of reasonableness.” Ibid. The
`court therefore remanded the case for further proceedings.
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`In concluding that Officer Carroll violated clearly estab-
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`lished law in this case, the Third Circuit relied exclusively
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`on Marasco’s statement that “entry into the curtilage after
`not receiving an answer at the front door might be reason-
`able.” Id., at 520; see 749 F. 3d, at 199 (quoting Marasco,
`supra, at 520). In the court’s view, that statement clearly
`established that a “knock and talk” must begin at the
`front door. But that conclusion does not follow. Marasco
`held that an unsuccessful “knock and talk” at the front
`door does not automatically allow officers to go onto other
`parts of the property. It did not hold, however, that
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`knocking on the front door is required before officers go
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`onto other parts of the property that are open to visitors.
`Thus, Marasco simply did not answer the question whether
`a “knock and talk” must begin at the front door when
`visitors may also go to the back door. Indeed, the house at
`issue seems not to have even had a back door, let alone
`one that visitors could use. 318 F. 3d, at 521.
`Moreover, Marasco expressly stated that “there [was] no
`indication of whether the officers followed a path or other
`apparently open route that would be suggestive of reason-
`ableness.” Ibid. That makes Marasco wholly different
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`from this case, where the jury necessarily decided that
`Carroll “restrict[ed] [his] movements to walkways, drive-
`ways, porches and places where visitors could be expected
`to go.” Tr. 24 (Apr. 10, 2013).
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`To the extent that Marasco says anything about this
`case, it arguably supports Carroll’s view. In Marasco, the
`Third Circuit noted that “[o]fficers are allowed to knock on
`a residence’s door or otherwise approach the residence
`seeking to speak to the inhabitants just as any private
`citizen may.” 318 F. 3d, at 519. The court also said that,
`“‘when the police come on to private property . . . and
`restrict their movements to places visitors could be ex-
`pected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches), observa-
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`tions made from such vantage points are not covered by
`the Fourth Amendment.’” Ibid. (quoting 1 W. LaFave,
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`CARROLL v. CARMAN
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`Per Curiam
`Search and Seizure §2.3(f) (3d ed. 1996 and Supp. 2003)
`(footnotes omitted)). Had Carroll read those statements
`before going to the Carmans’ house, he may have concluded—
`quite reasonably—that he was allowed to knock on any
`door that was open to visitors.*
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`The Third Circuit’s decision is even more perplexing in
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`comparison to the decisions of other federal and state
`courts, which have rejected the rule the Third Circuit
`adopted here. For example, in United States v. Titemore,
`437 F. 3d 251 (CA2 2006), a police officer approached a
`house that had two doors. The first was a traditional door
`that opened onto a driveway; the second was a sliding
`glass door that opened onto a small porch. The officer
`chose to knock on the latter. Id., at 253–254. On appeal,
`the defendant argued that the officer had unlawfully
`entered his property without a warrant in violation of the
`Fourth Amendment. Id., at 255–256. But the Second
`Circuit rejected that argument. As the court explained,
`the sliding glass door was “a primary entrance visible to
`and used by the public.” Id., at 259. Thus, “[b]ecause [the
`officer] approached a principal entrance to the home using
`a route that other visitors could be expected to take,” the
`court held that he did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
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`Id., at 252.
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`The Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v.
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`James, 40 F. 3d 850 (1994), vacated on other grounds, 516
`U. S. 1022 (1995), provides another example. There, police
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`*In a footnote, the Court of Appeals “recognize[d] that there may be
`some instances in which the front door is not the entrance used by
`visitors,” but noted that “this is not one such instance.” 749 F. 3d 192,
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`198, n. 6 (2014) (emphasis added). This footnote still reflects the Third
`Circuit’s view that the “knock and talk” exception is available for only
`one entrance to a dwelling, “which in most circumstances is the front
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`door.” Id., at 198. Cf. United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F. 3d 1179, 1188
`(CA9 2012) (“Officers conducting a knock and talk . . . need not ap-
`proach only a specific door if there are multiple doors accessible to the
`public.”).
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`Per Curiam
`officers approached a duplex with multiple entrances.
`Bypassing the front door, the officers “used a paved walk-
`way along the side of the duplex leading to the rear side
`door.” 40 F. 3d, at 862. On appeal, the defendant argued
`that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights
`when they went to the rear side door. The Seventh Circuit
`rejected that argument, explaining that the rear side door
`was “accessible to the general public” and “was commonly
`used for entering the duplex from the nearby alley.” Ibid.
`In situations “where the back door of a residence is readily
`accessible to the general public,” the court held, “the
`Fourth Amendment is not implicated when police officers
`approach that door in the reasonable belief that it is a
`principal means of access to the dwelling.” Ibid. See also,
`e.g., United States v. Garcia, 997 F. 2d 1273, 1279–1280
`(CA9 1993) (“If the front and back of a residence are read-
`ily accessible from a public place, like the driveway and
`parking area here, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated
`when officers go to the back door reasonably believing it
`is used as a principal entrance to the dwelling”); State v.
`Domicz, 188 N. J. 285, 302, 907 A. 2d 395, 405 (2006)
`(“when a law enforcement officer walks to a front or back
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`door for the purpose of making contact with a resident and
`reasonably believes that the door is used by visitors, he is
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`not unconstitutionally trespassing on to the property”).
` We do not decide today whether those cases were cor-
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`rectly decided or whether a police officer may conduct a
`“knock and talk” at any entrance that is open to visitors
`rather than only the front door. “But whether or not the
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`constitutional rule applied by the court below was correct,
`it was not ‘beyond debate.’” Stanton v. Sims, 571 U. S.
`___, ___ (2013) (per curiam) (slip op., at 8) (quoting al-
`Kidd, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9)). The Third Circuit
`therefore erred when it held that Carroll was not entitled
`to qualified immunity.
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`The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment of
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` CARROLL v. CARMAN
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`Per Curiam
`the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is
`reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
`consistent with this opinion.
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`It is so ordered.
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