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`Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`RAPHAEL DEON HOLIDAY v. WILLIAM STEPHENS,
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`DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
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`JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
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`ON APPLICATION FOR STAY AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF
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`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
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`THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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`No. 15–6956 (15A520) (Decided November 18, 2015)
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`The application for stay of execution of sentence of death
`presented to JUSTICE SCALIA and by him referred to the
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`Court is denied. The petition for writ of certiorari is de-
`nied.
` Statement of JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, respecting the appli-
`cation for stay of execution and denial of certiorari.
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`A federal statute entitles defendants sentenced to death
`to court-appointed counsel during “all available post-
`conviction process.” 18 U. S. C. §3599(e). This statute
`requires counsel to “represent the defendant in . . . pro-
`ceedings for executive or other clemency as may be availa-
`ble to the defendant.” Ibid.; see Harbison v. Bell, 556 U. S.
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`180, 185–186 (2009). Pursuant to §3599, Raphael Holiday
`asked his court-appointed counsel—Seth Kretzer and
`James Volberding—to petition the State of Texas for
`clemency. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a. His attorneys de-
`clined, however, because of their belief that there was “no
`chance at all that a clemency petition would be granted.”
`Id., at 11a (internal quotation marks omitted).
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`Holiday asked a Federal District Court to appoint a new
`attorney who would file his petition for clemency. The
`court denied his request. The court recognized that §3599
`compelled it to appoint new counsel if “the interests of
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`justice” require. Ibid. (quoting Martel v. Clair, 565 U. S.
`___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 7); (internal quotation marks
`omitted). But given the “representations” of Holiday’s
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` HOLIDAY v. STEPHENS
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`Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J.
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`attorneys, the court found new counsel unwarranted.
`App. to Pet. for Cert. 11a.
`This denial was an abuse of discretion. When Congress
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`authorized federally funded counsel to represent clients in
`clemency proceedings, it plainly “did not want condemned
`men and women to be abandoned by their counsel at the
`last moment and left to navigate the sometimes labyrin-
`thine clemency process from their jail cells.” Harbison,
`556 U. S., at 194 (quoting Hain v. Mullin, 436 F. 3d 1168,
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`1175 (CA10 2006) (en banc); internal quotation marks
`omitted). Yet this is exactly what happened here. Al-
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`though the “‘interests of justice’ standard contemplates a
`peculiarly context-specific inquiry,” Martel, 565 U. S., at
`___ (slip op., at 13), it surely precludes a court from reject-
`ing a substitution motion solely because it agrees with the
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`appointed attorneys’ premonitions about clemency.
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`Executive clemency is fundamentally unpredictable.
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`Clemency officials typically have “complete discretion” to
`commute a defendant’s sentence based on “a wide range of
`factors not comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings
`and sentencing determinations.” Ohio Adult Parole Au-
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`thority v. Woodard, 523 U. S. 272, 278, 281 (1998) (princi-
`pal opinion); see Tex. Const., Art. IV, §11; Tex. Code Crim.
`Proc. Ann., Art. 48.01 (Vernon Supp. 2014). By granting
`death-eligible defendants an attorney, “Congress ensured
`that no prisoner would be put to death without meaningful
`access to th[is] ‘“fail safe”’ of our justice system.” Harbi-
`son, 556 U. S., at 194 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506
`U. S. 390, 415 (1993)). So long as clemency proceedings
`were “available” to Holiday, §3599(e), the interests of
`justice required the appointment of attorneys who would
`represent him in that process. Cf. Christeson v. Roper,
`574 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (per curiam) (slip op., at 8) (re-
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`versing the denial of a substitution motion under §3599
`despite the “host of procedural obstacles” confronting the
`petitioner’s claims). The District Court’s denial did not
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` Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2015)
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`Statement of SOTOMAYOR, J.
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`adequately account for Holiday’s statutory right.
`Despite the District Court’s error, I reluctantly join the
`Court’s decision to deny Holiday’s petition for certiorari.
`After the court rejected Holiday’s request for new counsel,
`his original attorneys eventually submitted a clemency
`application on his behalf. This application proved unsuc-
`cessful—and likely would have benefited from additional
`preparation by more zealous advocates. Yet this Court,
`unlike a state court, is likely to have no power to order
`Texas to reconsider its clemency decision with new attor-
`neys representing Holiday.
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