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` Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016)
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`BREYER, J., dissenting
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`LAMONDRE TUCKER v. LOUISIANA
`ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
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`COURT OF LOUISIANA
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` No. 15–946. Decided May 31, 2016
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`The motion of Former Prosecutors for leave to file a brief
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`as amici curiae is granted. The motion of Law and Politi-
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` cal Science Scholars for leave to file a brief as amici curiae
`is granted. The motion of Charles Hamilton Houston
`Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law School to
`file a brief as amicus curiae is granted. The motion of
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` Former Appellate Court Jurists for leave to file a brief as
`amici curiae is granted. The petition for a writ of certio-
`rari is denied.
`JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,
`dissenting from the denial of certiorari.
`Lamondre Tucker shot and killed his pregnant girl-
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`friend in 2008. At the time of the murder, Tucker was 18
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`years, 5 months, and 6 days old, cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543
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`U. S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The Eighth and Fourteenth
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`Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on
`offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes
`were committed”), and he had an IQ of 74, cf. Atkins v.
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`Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 321 (2002) (execution of the in-
`tellectually disabled violates the Eighth Amendment).
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`Tucker was sentenced to death in a Louisiana county
`(Caddo Parish) that imposes almost half the death sen-
`tences in Louisiana, even though it accounts for only 5% of
`that State’s population and 5% of its homicides. See Pet.
`for Cert. 18.
`Given these facts, Tucker may well have received the
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`death penalty not because of the comparative egregious-
`ness of his crime, but because of an arbitrary feature of his
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`2
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`TUCKER v. LOUISIANA
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`BREYER, J., dissenting
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` case, namely, geography. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S.
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`___, ___–___ (2015) (BREYER, J., dissenting) (slip op., at
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`12–14). One could reasonably believe that if Tucker had
`committed the same crime but been tried and sentenced
`just across the Red River in, say, Bossier Parish, he would
`not now be on death row. See, e.g., Smith, The Geography
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`of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B. U.
`L. Rev. 227, 233–235, 278, 281 (2012); Robertson, The
`Man Who Says Louisiana Should “Kill More,” N. Y. Times,
`July 8, 2015, p. A1 (“From 2010 to 2014, more people were
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`sentenced to death per capita [in Caddo Parish] than in
`any other county in the United States, among counties
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`with four or more death sentences in that time period”);
`see also Glossip, supra, at ___ (BREYER, J., dissenting)
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`(slip op., at 12) (“[I]n 2012, just 59 counties (fewer than 2%
`of counties in the country) accounted for all death sen-
`tences imposed nationwide”).
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`For this reason, and for the additional reasons set out in
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`my opinion in Glossip, I would grant certiorari in this case
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`to confront the first question presented, i.e., whether
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`imposition of the death penalty constitutes cruel and
`unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
`teenth Amendments.
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