`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2017
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
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` MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL. v.
`
`
`
`
` COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ET AL.
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF COLORADO
`No. 16–111. Argued December 5, 2017—Decided June 4, 2018
`
`
`Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., is a Colorado bakery owned and operated
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`by Jack Phillips, an expert baker and devout Christian. In 2012 he
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`told a same-sex couple that he would not create a cake for their wed-
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`ding celebration because of his religious opposition to same-sex mar-
`riages—marriages that Colorado did not then recognize—but that he
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`would sell them other baked goods, e.g., birthday cakes. The couple
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`filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (Commis-
`sion) pursuant to the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA),
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`which prohibits, as relevant here, discrimination based on sexual ori-
`entation in a “place of business engaged in any sales to the public and
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`any place offering services . . . to the public.” Under CADA’s admin-
`istrative review system, the Colorado Civil Rights Division first found
`probable cause for a violation and referred the case to the Commis-
`sion. The Commission then referred the case for a formal hearing be-
`fore a state Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who ruled in the cou-
`
`ple’s favor. In so doing, the ALJ rejected Phillips’ First Amendment
`
`claims: that requiring him to create a cake for a same-sex wedding
`would violate his right to free speech by compelling him to exercise
`his artistic talents to express a message with which he disagreed and
`would violate his right to the free exercise of religion. Both the
`Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed.
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`Held: The Commission’s actions in this case violated the Free Exercise
`
`Clause. Pp. 9–18.
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`(a) The laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must,
`protect gay persons and gay couples in the exercise of their civil
`rights, but religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are
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`protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression.
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`See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___, ___. While it is unexceptional
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`2
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`MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
`
`CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N
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`
`Syllabus
`
`
`that Colorado law can protect gay persons in acquiring products and
`services on the same terms and conditions as are offered to other
`members of the public, the law must be applied in a manner that is
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`neutral toward religion. To Phillips, his claim that using his artistic
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`skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in
`his own voice and of his own creation, has a significant First
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`Amendment speech component and implicates his deep and sincere
`religious beliefs. His dilemma was understandable in 2012, which
`was before Colorado recognized the validity of gay marriages per-
`formed in the State and before this Court issued United States v.
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`Windsor, 570 U. S. 744, or Obergefell. Given the State’s position at
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`the time, there is some force to Phillips’ argument that he was not
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`unreasonable in deeming his decision lawful. State law at the time
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`also afforded storekeepers some latitude to decline to create specific
`messages they considered offensive. Indeed, while the instant en-
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`forcement proceedings were pending, the State Civil Rights Division
`concluded in at least three cases that a baker acted lawfully in declin-
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`ing to create cakes with decorations that demeaned gay persons or
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`gay marriages. Phillips too was entitled to a neutral and respectful
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`consideration of his claims in all the circumstances of the case.
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`Pp. 9–12.
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`(b) That consideration was compromised, however, by the Commis-
`sion’s treatment of Phillips’ case, which showed elements of a clear
`and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs moti-
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`vating his objection. As the record shows, some of the commissioners
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`at the Commission’s formal, public hearings endorsed the view that
`religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere
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`or commercial domain, disparaged Phillips’ faith as despicable and
`characterized it as merely rhetorical, and compared his invocation of
`his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Hol-
`ocaust. No commissioners objected to the comments. Nor were they
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`mentioned in the later state-court ruling or disavowed in the briefs
`filed here. The comments thus cast doubt on the fairness and impar-
`tiality of the Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’ case.
`
`
`Another indication of hostility is the different treatment of Phillips’
`case and the cases of other bakers with objections to anti-gay mes-
`
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`sages who prevailed before the Commission. The Commission ruled
`against Phillips in part on the theory that any message on the re-
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`quested wedding cake would be attributed to the customer, not to the
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`
`baker. Yet the Division did not address this point in any of the cases
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`involving requests for cakes depicting anti-gay marriage symbolism.
`The Division also considered that each bakery was willing to sell oth-
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`er products to the prospective customers, but the Commission found
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`Phillips’ willingness to do the same irrelevant. The State Court of
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`3
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`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Syllabus
`
`Appeals’ brief discussion of this disparity of treatment does not an-
`swer Phillips’ concern that the State’s practice was to disfavor the re-
`ligious basis of his objection. Pp. 12–16.
`
`(c) For these reasons, the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ case
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`violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws
`or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint. The
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`government, consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of free ex-
`ercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious be-
`liefs of affected citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes
`judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs
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`and practices. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
`
`U. S. 520. Factors relevant to the assessment of governmental neu-
`trality include “the historical background of the decision under chal-
`lenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official
`policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, in-
`cluding contemporaneous statements made by members of the deci-
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`sionmaking body.” Id., at 540. In view of these factors, the record
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`here demonstrates that the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’
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`case was neither tolerant nor respectful of his religious beliefs. The
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`Commission gave “every appearance,” id., at 545, of adjudicating his
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`religious objection based on a negative normative “evaluation of the
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`particular justification” for his objection and the religious grounds for
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`it, id., at 537, but government has no role in expressing or even sug-
`gesting whether the religious ground for Phillips’ conscience-based
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`objection is legitimate or illegitimate. The inference here is thus that
`Phillips’ religious objection was not considered with the neutrality
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`required by the Free Exercise Clause. The State’s interest could have
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`been weighed against Phillips’ sincere religious objections in a way
`consistent with the requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly
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`observed. But the official expressions of hostility to religion in some
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`of the commissioners’ comments were inconsistent with that re-
`quirement, and the Commission’s disparate consideration of Phillips’
`case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same.
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`Pp. 16–18.
`370 P. 3d 272, reversed.
`KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
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`
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`C. J., and BREYER, ALITO, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J.,
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`filed a concurring opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined. GORSUCH, J.,
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` filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed
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`an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
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`GORSUCH, J., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
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` SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.
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` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 16–111
`_________________
` MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., ET AL., PETITIONERS
`
`
` v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, ET AL.
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
`
`
`COLORADO
`
`
`[June 4, 2018]
`
` JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
`
`In 2012 a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece
`Cakeshop, a bakery in Colorado, to make inquiries about
`ordering a cake for their wedding reception. The shop’s
`owner told the couple that he would not create a cake for
`their wedding because of his religious opposition to same-
`sex marriages—marriages the State of Colorado itself did
`not recognize at that time. The couple filed a charge with
`the Colorado Civil Rights Commission alleging discrimina-
`tion on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the
`Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.
`
`The Commission determined that the shop’s actions
`violated the Act and ruled in the couple’s favor. The Colo-
`rado state courts affirmed the ruling and its enforcement
`order, and this Court now must decide whether the Com-
`mission’s order violated the Constitution.
`
`The case presents difficult questions as to the proper
`reconciliation of at least two principles. The first is the
`authority of a State and its governmental entities to pro-
`tect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish
`to be, married but who face discrimination when they seek
`
`
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`2
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`MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
`CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
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` goods or services. The second is the right of all persons to
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`exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amend-
`ment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth
`Amendment.
`The freedoms asserted here are both the freedom of
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`speech and the free exercise of religion. The free speech
`
`
`aspect of this case is difficult, for few persons who have
`seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought of its
`creation as an exercise of protected speech. This is an
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`instructive example, however, of the proposition that the
`application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can
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`deepen our understanding of their meaning.
`One of the difficulties in this case is that the parties
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`
`disagree as to the extent of the baker’s refusal to provide
`service. If a baker refused to design a special cake with
`words or images celebrating the marriage—for instance, a
`cake showing words with religious meaning—that might
`be different from a refusal to sell any cake at all. In defin-
`
`ing whether a baker’s creation can be protected, these
`details might make a difference.
`
`The same difficulties arise in determining whether a
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` baker has a valid free exercise claim. A baker’s refusal to
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`attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut the right
`way, or a refusal to put certain religious words or decora-
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`tions on the cake, or even a refusal to sell a cake that has
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`been baked for the public generally but includes certain
`religious words or symbols on it are just three examples of
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`possibilities that seem all but endless.
`
`Whatever the confluence of speech and free exercise
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`principles might be in some cases, the Colorado Civil
`Rights Commission’s consideration of this case was incon-
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`sistent with the State’s obligation of religious neutrality.
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`The reason and motive for the baker’s refusal were based
`on his sincere religious beliefs and convictions. The
`Court’s precedents make clear that the baker, in his capac-
`ity as the owner of a business serving the public, might
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`3
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` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Opinion of the Court
`have his right to the free exercise of religion limited by
`generally applicable laws. Still, the delicate question of
`when the free exercise of his religion must yield to an
`otherwise valid exercise of state power needed to be de-
`termined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on
`the part of the State itself would not be a factor in the
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`balance the State sought to reach. That requirement,
`however, was not met here. When the Colorado Civil
`Rights Commission considered this case, it did not do
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`so with the religious neutrality that the Constitution
`requires.
`
`Given all these considerations, it is proper to hold that
`whatever the outcome of some future controversy involv-
`ing facts similar to these, the Commission’s actions here
`violated the Free Exercise Clause; and its order must be
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`set aside.
`
`I
`
`A
`
`
`Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., is a bakery in Lakewood,
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`Colorado, a suburb of Denver. The shop offers a variety of
`baked goods, ranging from everyday cookies and brownies
`
`to elaborate custom-designed cakes for birthday parties,
`weddings, and other events.
`
`Jack Phillips is an expert baker who has owned and
`operated the shop for 24 years. Phillips is a devout Chris-
`tian. He has explained that his “main goal in life is to be
`obedient to” Jesus Christ and Christ’s “teachings in all
`aspects of his life.” App. 148. And he seeks to “honor God
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`through his work at Masterpiece Cakeshop.” Ibid. One of
`Phillips’ religious beliefs is that “God’s intention for mar-
`riage from the beginning of history is that it is and should
`
`be the union of one man and one woman.” Id., at 149. To
`Phillips, creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding
`would be equivalent to participating in a celebration that
`is contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs.
`
`
`
`
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`
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`4
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`MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
`CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`Phillips met Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins when they
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`entered his shop in the summer of 2012. Craig and Mul-
`lins were planning to marry. At that time, Colorado did
`not recognize same-sex marriages, so the couple planned
`to wed legally in Massachusetts and afterwards to host a
`reception for their family and friends in Denver. To pre-
`pare for their celebration, Craig and Mullins visited the
`shop and told Phillips that they were interested in order-
`ing a cake for “our wedding.” Id., at 152 (emphasis de-
`
`leted). They did not mention the design of the cake they
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`envisioned.
`
`Phillips informed the couple that he does not “create”
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`wedding cakes for same-sex weddings. Ibid. He ex-
`plained, “I’ll make your birthday cakes, shower cakes, sell
`you cookies and brownies, I just don’t make cakes for same
`
`sex weddings.” Ibid. The couple left the shop without
`further discussion.
`
`The following day, Craig’s mother, who had accompa-
`
`nied the couple to the cakeshop and been present for their
`interaction with Phillips, telephoned to ask Phillips why
`he had declined to serve her son. Phillips explained that
`he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings
`
`because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage,
`and also because Colorado (at that time) did not recognize
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`same-sex marriages. Id., at 153. He later explained his
`
`belief that “to create a wedding cake for an event that
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`celebrates something that directly goes against the teach-
`ings of the Bible, would have been a personal endorsement
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`and participation in the ceremony and relationship that
`they were entering into.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted).
`B
`
`For most of its history, Colorado has prohibited discrim-
`
`ination in places of public accommodation. In 1885, less
`than a decade after Colorado achieved statehood, the
`General Assembly passed “An Act to Protect All Citizens
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`5
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`Opinion of the Court
`in Their Civil Rights,” which guaranteed “full and equal
`enjoyment” of certain public facilities to “all citizens,”
`“regardless of race, color or previous condition of servi-
`tude.” 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws pp. 132–133. A decade later,
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`the General Assembly expanded the requirement to apply
`to “all other places of public accommodation.” 1895 Colo.
`Sess. Laws ch. 61, p. 139.
`Today, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA)
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`carries forward the state’s tradition of prohibiting discrim-
`ination in places of public accommodation. Amended in
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`2007 and 2008 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
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`sexual orientation as well as other protected characteris-
`tics, CADA in relevant part provides as follows:
`
`
`“It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a per-
`son, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or
`deny to an individual or a group, because of disability,
`race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital sta-
`tus, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal en-
`joyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
`advantages, or accommodations of a place of public ac-
`
`commodation.” Colo. Rev. Stat. §24–34–601(2)(a)
`(2017).
`
`The Act defines “public accommodation” broadly to include
`any “place of business engaged in any sales to the public
`and any place offering services . . . to the public,” but
`excludes “a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that
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`is principally used for religious purposes.” §24–34–601(1).
`CADA establishes an administrative system for the
`
`resolution of discrimination claims. Complaints of dis-
`crimination in violation of CADA are addressed in the first
`instance by the Colorado Civil Rights Division. The Divi-
`sion investigates each claim; and if it finds probable cause
`
`that CADA has been violated, it will refer the matter to
`the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The Commission,
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`MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
`CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N
`Opinion of the Court
`in turn, decides whether to initiate a formal hearing be-
`fore a state Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who will
`hear evidence and argument before issuing a written
`decision. See §§24–34–306, 24–4–105(14). The decision of
`the ALJ may be appealed to the full Commission, a seven-
`member appointed body. The Commission holds a public
`hearing and deliberative session before voting on the case.
`If the Commission determines that the evidence proves a
`CADA violation, it may impose remedial measures as
`provided by statute. See §24–34–306(9). Available reme-
`dies include, among other things, orders to cease-and-
`desist a discriminatory policy, to file regular compliance
`reports with the Commission, and “to take affirmative
`action, including the posting of notices setting forth the
`substantive rights of the public.” §24–34–605. Colorado
`law does not permit the Commission to assess money
`damages or fines. §§24–34–306(9), 24–34–605.
`C
` Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint
`against Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips in September
`2012, shortly after the couple’s visit to the shop. App. 31.
`The complaint alleged that Craig and Mullins had been
`denied “full and equal service” at the bakery because of
`their sexual orientation, id., at 35, 48, and that it was
`Phillips’ “standard business practice” not to provide cakes
`for same-sex weddings, id., at 43.
` The Civil Rights Division opened an investigation. The
`investigator found that “on multiple occasions,” Phillips
`“turned away potential customers on the basis of their
`sexual orientation, stating that he could not create a cake
`for a same-sex wedding ceremony or reception” because
`his religious beliefs prohibited it and because the potential
`customers “were doing something illegal” at that time.
`Id., at 76. The investigation found that Phillips had de-
`clined to sell custom wedding cakes to about six other
`
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`7
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` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` same-sex couples on this basis. Id., at 72. The investiga-
`tor also recounted that, according to affidavits submitted
`
`by Craig and Mullins, Phillips’ shop had refused to sell
`cupcakes to a lesbian couple for their commitment celebra-
`tion because the shop “had a policy of not selling baked
`goods to same-sex couples for this type of event.” Id., at
`73. Based on these findings, the Division found probable
`cause that Phillips violated CADA and referred the case to
`the Civil Rights Commission. Id., at 69.
`The Commission found it proper to conduct a formal
`
`hearing, and it sent the case to a State ALJ. Finding no
`
`dispute as to material facts, the ALJ entertained cross-
`motions for summary judgment and ruled in the couple’s
`
`favor. The ALJ first rejected Phillips’ argument that
`declining to make or create a wedding cake for Craig and
`
`Mullins did not violate Colorado law. It was undisputed
`that the shop is subject to state public accommodations
`laws. And the ALJ determined that Phillips’ actions
`
`constituted prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex-
`
` ual orientation, not simply opposition to same-sex marriage
`as Phillips contended. App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a–72a.
`Phillips raised two constitutional claims before the ALJ.
`
`
`
`He first asserted that applying CADA in a way that would
`require him to create a cake for a same-sex wedding would
`violate his First Amendment right to free speech by com-
`pelling him to exercise his artistic talents to express a
`message with which he disagreed. The ALJ rejected the
`contention that preparing a wedding cake is a form of
`protected speech and did not agree that creating Craig and
`Mullins’ cake would force Phillips to adhere to “an ideolog-
`
`
`ical point of view.” Id., at 75a. Applying CADA to the
`
`facts at hand, in the ALJ’s view, did not interfere with
`Phillips’ freedom of speech.
`
`Phillips also contended that requiring him to create
`cakes for same-sex weddings would violate his right to the
`free exercise of religion, also protected by the First
`
`
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`8
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`MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
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`CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N
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`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`Amendment. Citing this Court’s precedent in Employment
`
`Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S.
`
`872 (1990), the ALJ determined that CADA is a “valid and
`neutral law of general applicability” and therefore that
`
`applying it to Phillips in this case did not violate the Free
`Exercise Clause. Id., at 879; App. to Pet. for Cert. 82a–
`83a. The ALJ thus ruled against Phillips and the
`cakeshop and in favor of Craig and Mullins on both consti-
`tutional claims.
`
`The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision in full. Id.,
`at 57a. The Commission ordered Phillips to “cease and
`
`desist from discriminating against . . . same-sex couples by
`
`refusing to sell them wedding cakes or any product [they]
`
`
`would sell to heterosexual couples.” Ibid. It also ordered
`additional remedial measures, including “comprehensive
`staff training on the Public Accommodations section” of
`CADA “and changes to any and all company policies to
`comply with . . . this Order.” Id., at 58a. The Commission
`additionally required Phillips to prepare “quarterly com-
`pliance reports” for a period of two years documenting “the
`
`number of patrons denied service” and why, along with “a
`
`statement describing the remedial actions taken.” Ibid.
`
`
`Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals,
`which affirmed the Commission’s legal determinations and
`remedial order. The court rejected the argument that the
`“Commission’s order unconstitutionally compels” Phillips
`and the shop “to convey a celebratory message about same
`
`sex marriage.” Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370
`P. 3d 272, 283 (2015). The court also rejected the argu-
`ment that the Commission’s order violated the Free Exer-
`cise Clause. Relying on this Court’s precedent in Smith,
`
`supra, at 879, the court stated that the Free Exercise
`
`Clause “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
`comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicabil-
`
`ity” on the ground that following the law would interfere
`
`with religious practice or belief. 370 P. 3d, at 289. The
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`9
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`Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`court concluded that requiring Phillips to comply with the
`statute did not violate his free exercise rights. The Colo-
`rado Supreme Court declined to hear the case.
` Phillips sought review here, and this Court granted
`certiorari. 582 U. S. ___ (2017). He now renews his claims
`under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the
`First Amendment.
`
`II
`A
` Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons
`and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as
`inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws
`and the Constitution can, and in some instances must,
`protect them in the exercise of their civil rights. The
`exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be
`given great weight and respect by the courts. At the same
`time, the religious and philosophical objections to gay
`marriage are protected views and in some instances pro-
`tected forms of expression. As this Court observed in
`Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___ (2015), “[t]he First
`Amendment ensures that religious organizations and
`persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach
`the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their
`lives and faiths.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 27). Nevertheless,
`while those religious and philosophical objections are
`protected, it is a general rule that such objections do not
`allow business owners and other actors in the economy
`and in society to deny protected persons equal access to
`goods and services under a neutral and generally applica-
`ble public accommodations law. See Newman v. Piggie
`Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402, n. 5 (1968) (per
`curiam); see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
`and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 572
`(1995) (“Provisions like these are well within the State’s
`usual power to enact when a legislature has reason to
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`MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
`
`
` CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`believe that a given group is the target of discrimination,
`and they do not, as a general matter, violate the First or
`
`Fourteenth Amendments”).
`
`
`When it comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a
`member of the clergy who objects to gay marriage on
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`moral and religious grounds could not be compelled to
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`perform the ceremony without denial of his or her right to
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`the free exercise of religion. This refusal would be well
`understood in our constitutional order as an exercise of
`religion, an exercise that gay persons could recognize and
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`accept without serious diminishment to their own dignity
`
`
`and worth. Yet if that exception were not confined, then a
`long list of persons who provide goods and services for
`marriages and weddings might refuse to do so for gay
`persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma in-
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`consistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights
`laws that ensure equal access to goods, services, and
`public accommodations.
`
`It is unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay
`
`persons, just as it can protect other classes of individuals,
`
`in acquiring whatever products and services they choose
`on the same terms and conditions as are offered to other
`members of the public. And there are no doubt innumera-
`ble goods and services that no one could argue implicate
`the First Amendment. Petitioners conceded, moreover,
`that if a baker refused to sell any goods or any cakes for
`
`gay weddings, that would be a different matter and the
`State would have a strong case under this Court’s prece-
`dents that this would be a denial of goods and services
`that went beyond any protected rights of a baker who
`
`offers goods and services to the general public and is
`subject to a neutrally applied and generally applicable
`public accommodations law. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4–7, 10.
`
`Phillips claims, however, that a narrower issue is pre-
`
`sented. He argues that he had to use his artistic skills to
`make an expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in
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` 11
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` Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`his own voice and of his own creation. As Phillips would
`see the case, this contention has a significant First
`
`Amendment speech component and implicates his deep
`and sincere religious beliefs. In this context the baker
`likely found it difficult to find a line where the customers’
`
`rights to goods and services became a demand for him to
`exercise the right of his own personal expression for their
`message, a message he could not express in a way con-
`
`sistent with his religious beliefs.
`
`
`Phillips’ dilemma was particularly understandable
`given the background of legal principles and administra-
`tion of the law in Colorado at that time. His decision and
`
`his actions leading to the refusal of service all occurred in
`the year 2012. At that point, Colorado did not recognize
`the validity of gay marriages performed in its own State.
`See Colo. Const., Art. II, §31 (2012); 370 P. 3d, at 277. At
`the time of the events in question, this Court had not
`issued its decisions either in United States v. Windsor, 570
`U. S. 744 (2013), or Obergefell. Since the State itself did
`not allow those marriages to be performed in Colorado,
`there is some force to the argument that the baker was not
`unreasonable in deeming it lawful to decline to take an
`action that he understood to be an expression of support
`
`for their validity when that expression was contrary to his
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`sincerely held religious beliefs, at least insofar as his
`
`refusal was limited to refusing to create and express a
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`message in support of gay marriage, even one planned to
`take place in another State.
`
`At the time, state law also afforded storekeepers some
`latitude to decline to create specific messages the store-
`keeper considered offensive. Indeed, while enforcement
`
`proceedings against Phillips were ongoing, the Colorado
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`Civil Rights Division itself endorsed this proposition in
`cases involving other bakers’ creation of cakes, concluding
`
`on at least three occasions that a baker acted lawfully in
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`declining to create cakes with decorations that demeaned
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` 12
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`MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO
`
` CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`gay persons or gay marriages. See Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd.,
`Charge No. P20140071X (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Le Bak-
`ery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X (Mar. 24, 2015);
`
`Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Mar. 24,
`2015).
`
`There were, to be sure, responses to these arguments
`that the State could make when it contended for a differ-
`ent result in seeking the enforcement of its generally
`applicable state regulations of businesses that serve the
`
`public. And any decision in favor of the baker would have
`to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors of goods
`
`and services who object to gay marriages for moral and
`religious reasons in effect be allowed to put up signs say-
`ing “no goods or services will be sold if they will be used
`
`for gay marriages,” something that would impose a serious
`
`
`stigma on gay persons. But, nonetheless, Phillips was
`entitled to the neutral and respectful consideration of his
`claims in all the circumstances of the case.
`B
`
`The neutral and respectful consideration to which Phil-
`lips was entitled was compromised here, however. The
`Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of his case has some
`
`elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the
`sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection.
`
`That hostility surfaced at the Commission’s formal,
`public hearings, as shown by the record. On May 30,
`
`2014, the seven-member Commission convened publicly to
`
`consider Phillips’ case. At several points during its meet-
`ing, commissioners endorsed the view that religious belief