`(Slip Opinion)
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`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2016
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`
`Syllabus
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`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`KINDRED NURSING CENTERS LIMITED
`
`PARTNERSHIP, DBA WINCHESTER CENTRE FOR
`
`HEALTH AND REHABILITATION, NKA FOUNTAIN
`
`
` CIRCLE HEALTH AND REHABILITATION, ET AL. v.
`
`
` CLARK ET AL.
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY
`No. 16–32. Argued February 22, 2017—Decided May 15, 2017
`
`Respondents Beverly Wellner and Janis Clark—the wife and daughter,
`respectively, of Joe Wellner and Olive Clark—each held a power of
`
`attorney affording her broad authority to manage her family mem-
`ber’s affairs. When Joe and Olive moved into a nursing home operat-
`
`ed by petitioner Kindred Nursing Centers L. P., Beverly and Janis
`used their powers of attorney to complete all necessary paperwork.
`As part of that process, each signed an arbitration agreement on her
`relative’s behalf providing that any claims arising from the relative’s
`
`stay at the facility would be resolved through binding arbitration.
`
`After Joe and Olive died, their estates (represented by Beverly and
`Janis) filed suits alleging that Kindred’s substandard care had
`caused their deaths. Kindred moved to dismiss the cases, arguing
`
`that the arbitration agreements prohibited bringing the disputes to
`
`court. The trial court denied Kindred’s motions, and the Kentucky
`Court of Appeals agreed that the suits could go forward.
`The Kentucky Supreme Court consolidated the cases and affirmed.
`
`
`The court initially found that the language of the Wellner power of
`
`attorney did not permit Beverly to enter into an arbitration agree-
`ment on Joe’s behalf, but that the Clark document gave Janis the ca-
`
`pacity to do so on behalf of Olive. Nonetheless, the court held, both
`
`arbitration agreements were invalid because neither power of attor-
`ney specifically entitled the representative to enter into an arbitra-
`tion agreement. Because the Kentucky Constitution declares the
`
`rights of access to the courts and trial by jury to be “sacred” and “in-
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`KINDRED NURSING CENTERS L. P. v. CLARK
`
`
`Syllabus
`violate,” the court determined, an agent could deprive her principal of
`such rights only if expressly provided in the power of attorney.
`Held: The Kentucky Supreme Court’s clear-statement rule violates the
`Federal Arbitration Act by singling out arbitration agreements for
`
`disfavored treatment. Pp. 4–10.
`
`(a) The FAA, which makes arbitration agreements “valid, irrevoca-
`
`ble, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in eq-
`
`
`uity for the revocation of any contract,” 9 U. S. C. §2, establishes an
`equal-treatment principle: A court may invalidate an arbitration
`agreement based on “generally applicable contract defenses,” but not
`on legal rules that “apply only to arbitration or that derive their
`meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue,”
`AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333, 339. The Act thus
`
`preempts any state rule that discriminates on its face against arbi-
`tration or that covertly accomplishes the same objective by disfavor-
`ing contracts that have the defining features of arbitration agree-
`ments.
`
`The Kentucky Supreme Court’s clear-statement rule fails to put
`arbitration agreements on an equal plane with other contracts. By
`requiring an explicit statement before an agent can relinquish her
`
`
`principal’s right to go to court and receive a jury trial, the court did
`exactly what this Court has barred: adopt a legal rule hinging on the
`
`
`primary characteristic of an arbitration agreement. Pp. 4–7.
`
`(b) In support of the decision below, respondents argue that the
`clear-statement rule affects only contract formation, and that the
`FAA does not apply to contract formation questions. But the Act’s
`text says otherwise. The FAA cares not only about the “en-
`force[ment]” of arbitration agreements, but also about their initial
`
`“valid[ity]”—that is, about what it takes to enter into them. 9
`U. S. C. §2. Precedent confirms the point. In Concepcion, the Court
`noted the impermissibility of applying a contract defense like duress
`“in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.” 563 U. S., at 341. That dis-
`cussion would have made no sense if the FAA had nothing to say
`about contract formation, because duress involves “unfair dealing at
`
`the contract formation stage.” Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v.
`
`Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U. S. 527, 547. Final-
`
`ly, respondents’ view would make it trivially easy for States to un-
`dermine the Act. Pp. 7–9.
`
`(c) Because the Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated the Clark-
`Kindred arbitration agreement based exclusively on the clear-
`statement rule, the court must now enforce that agreement. But be-
`cause it is unclear whether the court’s interpretation of the Wellner
`document was wholly independent of its rule, the court should de-
`termine on remand whether it adheres, in the absence of the rule, to
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`2
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`3
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`Syllabus
` its prior reading of that power of attorney. Pp. 9–10.
`
`478 S. W. 3d 306, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
`KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
`
`
`
` and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.
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`
`
`THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. GORSUCH, J., took no part in the
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`
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`consideration or decision of the case.
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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`
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 16–32
`_________________
`KINDRED NURSING CENTERS LIMITED PARTNER-
`SHIP, DBA WINCHESTER CENTRE FOR HEALTH
`
`
`
`
`
` AND REHABILITATION, NKA FOUNTAIN
`
`
`
`CIRCLE HEALTH AND REHABILITA-
`
`
`
`
`TION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
`
`
`
`JANIS E. CLARK ET AL.
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
`
`
`KENTUCKY
`
`[May 15, 2017]
`
` JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Act) requires
`
`courts to place arbitration agreements “on equal footing
`with all other contracts.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577
`U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 6) (quoting Buckeye Check
`
`Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440, 443 (2006)); see
`
`
`9 U. S. C. §2. In the decision below, the Kentucky Su-
`preme Court declined to give effect to two arbitration
`agreements executed by individuals holding “powers of
`attorney”—that is, authorizations to act on behalf of oth-
`ers. According to the court, a general grant of power (even
`if seemingly comprehensive) does not permit a legal repre-
`
`sentative to enter into an arbitration agreement for some-
`one else; to form such a contract, the representative must
`possess specific authority to “waive his principal’s funda-
`mental constitutional rights to access the courts [and] to
`trial by jury.” Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478
`
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`2
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` KINDRED NURSING CENTERS L. P. v. CLARK
`
`Opinion of the Court
`S. W. 3d 306, 327 (2015). Because that rule singles out
`arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment, we hold
`that it violates the FAA.
`
`
`
`I
`
`Petitioner Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. operates
`
`nursing homes and rehabilitation centers. Respondents
`Beverly Wellner and Janis Clark are the wife and daugh-
`
`ter, respectively, of Joe Wellner and Olive Clark, two now-
`deceased residents of a Kindred nursing home called the
`Winchester Centre.
`
`At all times relevant to this case, Beverly and Janis
`each held a power of attorney, designating her as an
`“attorney-in-fact” (the one for Joe, the other for Olive) and
`affording her broad authority to manage her family mem-
`ber’s affairs. In the Wellner power of attorney, Joe gave
`
`Beverly the authority, “in my name, place and stead,” to
`(among other things) “institute legal proceedings” and
`make “contracts of every nature in relation to both real
`and personal property.” App. 10–11. In the Clark power
`of attorney, Olive provided Janis with “full power . . . to
`transact, handle, and dispose of all matters affecting me
`and/or my estate in any possible way,” including the power
`to “draw, make, and sign in my name any and all . . .
`contracts, deeds, or agreements.” Id., at 7.
`
`Joe and Olive moved into the Winchester Centre in
`2008, with Beverly and Janis using their powers of attor-
`
`ney to complete all necessary paperwork. As part of that
`process, Beverly and Janis each signed an arbitration
`agreement with Kindred on behalf of her relative. The
`two contracts, worded identically, provided that “[a]ny and
`all claims or controversies arising out of or in any way
`
`relating to . . . the Resident’s stay at the Facility” would be
`resolved through “binding arbitration” rather than a
`lawsuit. Id., at 14, 21.
`
`
`When Joe and Olive died the next year, their estates
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`3
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` (represented again by Beverly and Janis) brought separate
`suits against Kindred in Kentucky state court. The com-
`plaints alleged that Kindred had delivered substandard
`care to Joe and Olive, causing their deaths. Kindred
`moved to dismiss the cases, arguing that the arbitration
`agreements Beverly and Janis had signed prohibited
`bringing their disputes to court. But the trial court denied
`Kindred’s motions, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals
`agreed that the estates’ suits could go forward. See App.
`to Pet. for Cert. 125a–126a, 137a–138a.
`The Kentucky Supreme Court, after consolidating the
`
`cases, affirmed those decisions by a divided vote. See 478
`S. W. 3d, at 313. The court began with the language of the
`two powers of attorney. The Wellner document, the court
`stated, did not permit Beverly to enter into an arbitration
`agreement on Joe’s behalf. In the court’s view, neither the
`provision authorizing her to bring legal proceedings nor
`the one enabling her to make property-related contracts
`reached quite that distance. See id., at 325–326; supra,
`
`at 2. By contrast, the court thought, the Clark power of
`attorney extended that far and beyond. Under that docu-
`ment, after all, Janis had the capacity to “dispose of all
`matters” affecting Olive. See supra, at 2. “Given this
`extremely broad, universal delegation of authority,” the
`court acknowledged, “it would be impossible to say that
`
`entering into [an] arbitration agreement was not covered.”
`
` 478 S. W. 3d, at 327.
` And yet, the court went on, both arbitration agree-
`
`
`ments—Janis’s no less than Beverly’s—were invalid. That
`was because a power of attorney could not entitle a repre-
`sentative to enter into an arbitration agreement without
`specifically saying so. The Kentucky Constitution, the
`court explained, protects the rights of access to the courts
`and trial by jury; indeed, the jury guarantee is the sole
`right the Constitution declares “sacred” and “inviolate.”
`
`Id., at 328–329. Accordingly, the court held, an agent
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` KINDRED NURSING CENTERS L. P. v. CLARK
`
`Opinion of the Court
`could deprive her principal of an “adjudication by judge or
`jury” only if the power of attorney “expressly so pro-
`vide[d].” Id., at 329. And that clear-statement rule—so
`said the court—complied with the FAA’s demands. True
`enough that the Act precludes “singl[ing] out arbitration
`agreements.”
`Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
`But that was no problem, the court asserted, because its
`rule would apply not just to those agreements, but also to
`some other contracts implicating “fundamental constitu-
`tional rights.” Id., at 328. In the future, for example, the
`court would bar the holder of a “non-specific” power of
`
`attorney from entering into a contract “bind[ing] the prin-
`cipal to personal servitude.” Ibid.
`
`Justice Abramson dissented, in an opinion joined by two
`
`of her colleagues. In their view, the Kentucky Supreme
`Court’s new clear-statement rule was “clearly not . . .
`
`applicable to ‘any contract’ but [instead] single[d] out
`arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment.” Id., at
`
`344–345. Accordingly, the dissent concluded, the rule
`“r[a]n afoul of the FAA.” Id., at 353.
`
`
`We granted certiorari. 580 U. S. ___ (2016).
`
`II
`
`A
`
`
`The FAA makes arbitration agreements “valid, irrevo-
`cable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
`law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9
`U. S. C. §2. That statutory provision establishes an equal-
`treatment principle: A court may invalidate an arbitration
`
`agreement based on “generally applicable contract defenses”
`
`like fraud or unconscionability, but not on legal rules
`that “apply only to arbitration or that derive their mean-
`ing from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at
`issue.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. 333,
`339 (2011). The FAA thus preempts any state rule dis-
`criminating on its face against arbitration—for example, a
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`Opinion of the Court
`“law prohibit[ing] outright the arbitration of a particular
`
`type of claim.” Id., at 341. And not only that: The Act also
`displaces any rule that covertly accomplishes the same
`objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so coinciden-
`tally) have the defining features of arbitration agreements.
`
`In Concepcion, for example, we described a hypothetical
`state law declaring unenforceable any contract that “disal-
`low[ed] an ultimate disposition [of a dispute] by a jury.”
`Id., at 342. Such a law might avoid referring to arbitra-
`tion by name; but still, we explained, it would “rely on the
`uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as [its] basis”—
`and thereby violate the FAA. Id., at 341 (quoting Perry v.
`
`Thomas, 482 U. S. 483, 493, n. 9 (1987)).
`The Kentucky Supreme Court’s clear-statement rule, in
`
`just that way, fails to put arbitration agreements on an
`equal plane with other contracts. By the court’s own
`account, that rule (like the one Concepcion posited) serves
`to safeguard a person’s “right to access the courts and to
`trial by jury.” 478 S. W. 3d, at 327; see supra, at 3–4. In
`ringing terms, the court affirmed the jury right’s unsur-
`
`passed standing in the State Constitution: The framers,
`the court explained, recognized “that right and that right
`alone as a divine God-given right” when they made it “the
`only thing” that must be “‘held sacred’” and “‘inviolate.’”
`478 S. W. 3d, at 328–329 (quoting Ky. Const. §7). So it
`was that the court required an explicit statement before
`an attorney-in-fact, even if possessing broad delegated
`powers, could relinquish that right on another’s behalf.
`See 478 S. W. 3d, at 331 (“We say only that an agent’s
`authority to waive his principal’s constitutional right to
`access the courts and to trial by jury must be clearly ex-
`pressed by the principal”). And so it was that the court
`did exactly what Concepcion barred: adopt a legal rule
`hinging on the primary characteristic of an arbitration
`agreement—namely, a waiver of the right to go to court
`and receive a jury trial. See 563 U. S., at 341–342; see
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`6
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`KINDRED NURSING CENTERS L. P. v. CLARK
`
`Opinion of the Court
`also 478 S. W. 3d, at 353 (Abramson, J., dissenting) (not-
`ing that the jury-trial right at the core of “the majority’s
`new rule” is “the one right that just happens to be correla-
`tive to the right to arbitrate” (emphasis deleted)). Such a
`rule
`is too tailor-made to arbitration agreements—
`subjecting them, by virtue of their defining trait, to un-
`common barriers—to survive the FAA’s edict against
`
`singling out those contracts for disfavored treatment.1
`
`And the state court’s sometime-attempt to cast the rule
`in broader terms cannot salvage its decision. The clear-
`statement requirement, the court suggested, could also
`apply when an agent endeavored to waive other “funda-
`mental constitutional rights” held by a principal. 478
`
`S. W. 3d, at 331; see supra, at 4. But what other rights,
`really? No Kentucky court, so far as we know, has ever
`before demanded that a power of attorney explicitly confer
`authority to enter into contracts implicating constitutional
`
`guarantees. Nor did the opinion below indicate that such
`a grant would be needed for the many routine contracts—
`executed day in and day out by legal representatives—
`meeting that description. For example, the Kentucky
`Constitution protects the “inherent and inalienable” rights
`to “acquir[e] and protect[ ] property” and to “freely com-
`municat[e] thoughts and opinions.” Ky. Const. §1. But
`the state court nowhere cautioned that an attorney-in-fact
`——————
`1Making matters worse, the Kentucky Supreme Court’s clear-
`statement rule appears not to apply to other kinds of agreements
`
`relinquishing the right to go to court or obtain a jury trial. Nothing in
`the decision below (or elsewhere in Kentucky law) suggests that explicit
`authorization is needed before an attorney-in-fact can sign a settlement
`
`agreement or consent to a bench trial on her principal’s behalf. See 478
`
`
`S. W. 3d, at 325 (discussing the Wellner power of attorney’s provision
`for “managing a claim in litigation” without insisting that such com-
`
`mitments would require a clearer grant). Mark that as yet another
`indication that the court’s demand for specificity in powers of attorney
`arises from the suspect status of arbitration rather than the sacred
`
`status of jury trials.
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`7
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`Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`would now need a specific authorization to, say, sell her
`principal’s furniture or commit her principal to a non-
`disclosure agreement. (And were we in the business of
`giving legal advice, we would tell the agent not to worry.)
`
`Rather, the court hypothesized a slim set of both patently
`objectionable and utterly fanciful contracts that would be
`subject to its rule: No longer could a representative lack-
`ing explicit authorization waive her “principal’s right to
`worship freely” or “consent to an arranged marriage” or
`“bind [her] principal to personal servitude.” 478 S. W. 3d,
`at 328; see supra, at 4. Placing arbitration agreements
`within that class reveals the kind of “hostility to arbitra-
`tion” that led Congress to enact the FAA. Concepcion,
`563 U. S., at 339. And doing so only makes clear the
`arbitration-specific character of the rule, much as if it were
`
`made applicable to arbitration agreements and black swans.2
`B
`The respondents, Janis and Beverly, primarily advance
`
`a different argument—based on the distinction between
`contract formation and contract enforcement—to support
`the decision below. Kentucky’s clear-statement rule, they
`begin, affects only contract formation, because it bars
`agents without explicit authority from entering into arbi-
`tration agreements. And in their view, the FAA has “no
`application” to “contract formation issues.” Supp. Brief for
`Respondents 1. The Act, to be sure, requires a State to
`enforce all arbitration agreements (save on generally
`applicable grounds) once they have come into being. But,
`the respondents claim, States have free rein to decide—
`irrespective of the FAA’s equal-footing principle—whether
`such contracts are validly created in the first instance.
`
`——————
`2We do not suggest that a state court is precluded from announcing a
`new, generally applicable rule of law in an arbitration case. We simply
`reiterate here what we have said many times before—that the rule
`
` must in fact apply generally, rather than single out arbitration.
`
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`8
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` KINDRED NURSING CENTERS L. P. v. CLARK
`
`Opinion of the Court
` See id., at 3 (“The FAA’s statutory framework applies only
`
`after a court has determined that a valid arbitration
`agreement was formed”).
`Both the FAA’s text and our case law interpreting it say
`
`otherwise. The Act’s key provision, once again, states that
`an arbitration agreement must ordinarily be treated as
`“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U. S. C. §2; see
`supra, at 4. By its terms, then, the Act cares not only
`about the “enforce[ment]” of arbitration agreements, but
`also about their initial “valid[ity]”—that is, about what it
`takes to enter into them. Or said otherwise: A rule selec-
`tively finding arbitration contracts invalid because im-
`properly formed fares no better under the Act than a rule
`selectively refusing to enforce those agreements once
`properly made. Precedent confirms that point. In Concep-
`cion, we noted the impermissibility of applying a contract
`defense like duress “in a fashion that disfavors arbitra-
`tion.” 563 U. S., at 341. But the doctrine of duress, as we
`have elsewhere explained, involves “unfair dealing at the
`contract formation stage.” Morgan Stanley Capital Group
`Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U. S.
`527, 547 (2008). Our discussion of duress would have
`made no sense if the FAA, as the respondents contend,
`had nothing to say about contract formation.
`
`And still more: Adopting the respondents’ view would
`make it trivially easy for States to undermine the Act—
`indeed, to wholly defeat it. As the respondents have
`acknowledged, their reasoning would allow States to
`pronounce any attorney-in-fact incapable of signing an
`arbitration agreement—even if a power of attorney specif-
`
`ically authorized her to do so. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.
`(After all, such a rule would speak to only the contract’s
`formation.) And why stop there? If the respondents were
`right, States could just as easily declare everyone incompe-
`tent to sign arbitration agreements. (That rule too would
`address only formation.) The FAA would then mean
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`9
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`nothing at all—its provisions rendered helpless to prevent
`even the most blatant discrimination against arbitration.
`
`III
`
`As we did just last Term, we once again “reach a conclu-
`sion that . . . falls well within the confines of (and goes no
`further than) present well-established law.” DIRECTV,
`
`
`577 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). The Kentucky Supreme
`Court specially impeded the ability of attorneys-in-fact to
`
`
`enter into arbitration agreements. The court thus flouted
`the FAA’s command to place those agreements on an equal
`
`footing with all other contracts.
`
`Our decision requires reversing the Kentucky Supreme
`Court’s judgment in favor of the Clark estate. As noted
`earlier, the state court held that the Clark power of attor-
`ney was sufficiently broad to cover executing an arbitra-
`
`tion agreement. See supra, at 3. The court invalidated
`the agreement with Kindred only because the power of
`attorney did not specifically authorize Janis to enter into
`it on Olive’s behalf. In other words, the decision below
`
`was based exclusively on the clear-statement rule that we
`have held violates the FAA. So the court must now en-
`force the Clark-Kindred arbitration agreement.
`
`
`By contrast, our decision might not require such a result
`in the Wellner case. The Kentucky Supreme Court began
`
`its opinion by stating that the Wellner power of attorney
`was insufficiently broad to give Beverly the authority to
`
`execute an arbitration agreement for Joe. See supra, at 3.
`If that interpretation of the document is wholly independ-
`ent of the court’s clear-statement rule, then nothing we
`have said disturbs it. But if that rule at all influenced the
`construction of the Wellner power of attorney, then the
`court must evaluate the document’s meaning anew. The
`court’s opinion leaves us uncertain as to whether such an
`impermissible taint occurred. We therefore vacate the
`judgment below and return the case to the state court for
`
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` KINDRED NURSING CENTERS L. P. v. CLARK
`
`Opinion of the Court
`further consideration. See Marmet Health Care Center,
`Inc. v. Brown, 565 U. S. 530, 534 (2012) (per curiam)
`(vacating and remanding another arbitration decision
`because we could not tell “to what degree [an] alternative
`holding was influenced by” the state court’s erroneous,
`arbitration-specific rule). On remand, the court should
`determine whether it adheres, in the absence of its clear-
`statement rule, to its prior reading of the Wellner power of
`attorney.
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`For these reasons, we reverse in part and vacate in part
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`the judgment of the Kentucky Supreme Court, and we
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`remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent
`with this opinion.
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` 10
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`It is so ordered.
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` JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or
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`decision of this case.
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
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` THOMAS, J., dissenting
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`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`1
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`_________________
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` No. 16–32
`_________________
`KINDRED NURSING CENTERS LIMITED PARTNER-
`SHIP, DBA WINCHESTER CENTRE FOR HEALTH
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` AND REHABILITATION, NKA FOUNTAIN
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`CIRCLE HEALTH AND REHABILITA-
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`TION, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
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`JANIS E. CLARK ET AL.
`
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
`
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`KENTUCKY
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`[May 15, 2017]
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`JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
`I continue to adhere to the view that the Federal Arbi-
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`tration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., does not apply to
`proceedings in state courts. See Allied-Bruce Terminix
`Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 285–297 (1995) (THOMAS, J.,
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`dissenting); see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U. S.
`___, ___ (2015) (same) (slip op., at 1); Preston v. Ferrer, 552
`U. S. 346, 363 (2008) (same); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
`v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440, 449 (2006) (same); Green Tree
`Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U. S. 444, 460 (2003)
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`(same); Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U. S.
`681, 689 (1996) (same). In state-court proceedings, there-
`fore, the FAA does not displace a rule that requires ex-
`press authorization from a principal before an agent may
`waive the principal’s right to a jury trial. Accordingly, I
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`would affirm the judgment of the Kentucky Supreme
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`Court.
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