`(Slip Opinion)
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`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2016
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
` TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP
`
`
`
` BRANDS LLC
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
` No. 16–341. Argued March 27, 2017—Decided May 22, 2017
`
`The patent venue statute, 28 U. S. C. §1400(b), provides that “[a]ny
`civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial
`district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has
`committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established
`place of business.” In Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products
`Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 226, this Court concluded that for purposes of
`§1400(b) a domestic corporation “resides” only in its State of incorpo-
`ration, rejecting the argument that §1400(b) incorporates the broader
`definition of corporate “residence” contained in the general venue
`
` statute, 28 U. S. C. §1391(c). Congress has not amended §1400(b)
`since Fourco, but it has twice amended §1391, which now provides
`that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” and “[f]or all venue pur-
`poses,” a corporation “shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in
`any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s
`
`personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.”
`§§1391(a), (c).
`
`Respondent filed a patent infringement suit in the District Court
`for the District of Delaware against petitioner, a competitor that is
`organized under Indiana law and headquartered in Indiana but ships
`the allegedly infringing products into Delaware. Petitioner moved to
`transfer venue to a District Court in Indiana, claiming that venue
`was improper in Delaware. Citing Fourco, petitioner argued that it
`did not “resid[e]” in Delaware and had no “regular and established
`place of business” in Delaware under §1400(b). The District Court re-
`jected these arguments. The Federal Circuit denied a petition for a
`writ of mandamus, concluding that §1391(c) supplies the definition of
`
`“resides” in §1400(b). The Federal Circuit reasoned that because pe-
`
`
`
`
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`

`

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`2 TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC
`
`
`
`Syllabus
`titioner resided in Delaware under §1391(c), it also resided there un-
`
`der §1400(b).
`Held: As applied to domestic corporations, “reside[nce]” in §1400(b) re-
`
`fers only to the State of incorporation. The amendments to §1391 did
`
`not modify the meaning of §1400(b) as interpreted by Fourco. Pp. 3–
`10.
`
`
`
`(a) The venue provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 covered patent
`
`cases as well as other civil suits. Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin
`Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561, 563. In 1897, Congress enacted a patent
`
`
`specific venue statute. This new statute (§1400(b)’s predecessor)
`permitted suit in the district of which the defendant was an “inhabit-
`ant” or in which the defendant both maintained a “regular and estab-
`lished place of business” and committed an act of infringement. 29
`
`Stat. 695. A corporation at that time was understood to “inhabit” on-
`ly the State of incorporation. This Court addressed the scope of
`
`
`§1400(b)’s predecessor in Stonite, concluding that it constituted “the
`exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement proceed-
`ings” and thus was not supplemented or modified by the general ven-
`ue provisions. 315 U. S., at 563.
`
`In 1948, Congress recodified the patent venue statute as §1400(b).
`That provision, which remains unaltered today, uses “resides” in-
`stead of “inhabit[s].” At the same time, Congress also enacted the
`general venue statute, §1391, which defined “residence” for corporate
`
`defendants. In Fourco, this Court reaffirmed Stonite’s holding, ob-
`serving that Congress enacted §1400(b) as a standalone venue stat-
`ute and that nothing in the 1948 recodification evidenced an intent to
`alter that status, even the fact that §1391(c) by “its terms” embraced
`“all actions,” 353 U. S., at 228. The Court also concluded that “re-
`sides” in the recodified version bore the same meaning as “inhabit[s]”
`in the pre-1948 version. See id., at 226.
`
`This landscape remained effectively unchanged until 1988, when
`Congress amended the general venue statute, §1391(c). The revised
`provision stated that it applied “[f]or purposes of venue under this
`chapter.” In VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917
`F. 2d 1574, 1578, the Federal Circuit held that, in light of this
`amendment, §1391(c) established the definition for all other venue
`statutes under the same “chapter,” including §1400(b). In 2011, Con-
`gress adopted the current version of §1391, which provides that its
`general definition applies “[f]or all venue purposes.” The Federal
`
`Circuit reaffirmed VE Holding in the case below. Pp. 3–7.
`(b) In Fourco, this Court definitively and unambiguously held that
`the word “reside[nce]” in §1400(b), as applied to domestic corpora-
`tions, refers only to the State of incorporation. Because Congress has
`
`not amended §1400(b) since Fourco, and neither party asks the Court
`
`
`
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`
`
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`

`

`3
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`
`Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`
`Syllabus
`to reconsider that decision, the only question here is whether Con-
`
`gress changed §1400(b)’s meaning when it amended §1391. When
`Congress intends to effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily pro-
`vides a relatively clear indication of its intent in the amended provi-
`sion’s text. No such indication appears in the current version of
`§1391.
`
`
`Respondent points out that the current §1391(c) provides a default
`rule that, on its face, applies without exception “[f]or all venue pur-
`
`poses.” But the version at issue in Fourco similarly provided a de-
`fault rule that applied “ ‘for venue purposes,’ ” 353 U. S., at 223, and
`
`
`those phrasings are not materially different in this context. The ad-
`dition of the word “all” to the already comprehensive provision does
`not suggest that Congress intended the Court to reconsider its deci-
`sion in Fourco. Any argument based on this language is even weaker
`
`now than it was when the Court rejected it in Fourco. Fourco held
`
`
`that §1400(b) retained a meaning distinct from the default definition
`
`
`contained in §1391(c), even though the latter, by its terms, included
`
`no exceptions. The current version of §1391 includes a saving clause,
`which expressly states that the provision does not apply when “oth-
`erwise provided by law,” thus making explicit the qualification that
`the Fourco Court found implicit in the statute. Finally, there is no
`indication that Congress in 2011 ratified the Federal Circuit’s deci-
`sion in VE Holding. Pp. 7–10.
`821 F. 3d 1338, reversed and remanded.
`THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
`Members joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the considera-
`tion or decision of the case.
`
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`
`

`

`
`
`
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`1
`
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
`_________________
`
` No. 16–341
`_________________
` TC HEARTLAND LLC, PETITIONER v. KRAFT
`
`
` FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
`
`[May 22, 2017]
`
`JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The question presented in this case is where proper
`
`venue lies for a patent infringement lawsuit brought
`against a domestic corporation. The patent venue statute,
`28 U. S. C. §1400(b), provides that “[a]ny civil action for
`patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district
`where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has
`committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
`established place of business.” In Fourco Glass Co. v.
`Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 226 (1957), this
`
`
`Court concluded that for purposes of §1400(b) a domestic
`corporation “resides” only in its State of incorporation.
`In reaching that conclusion, the Court rejected the
`
`
`argument that §1400(b) incorporates the broader defini-
`tion of corporate “residence” contained in the general
`venue statute, 28 U. S. C. §1391(c). 353 U. S., at 228.
`Congress has not amended §1400(b) since this Court
`construed it in Fourco, but it has amended §1391 twice.
`Section 1391 now provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise
`provided by law” and “[f]or all venue purposes,” a corpora-
`tion “shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`2 TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the
`court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action
`in question.” §§1391(a), (c). The issue in this case is
`whether that definition supplants the definition an-
`nounced in Fourco and allows a plaintiff to bring a patent
`infringement lawsuit against a corporation in any district
`in which the corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction.
`We conclude that the amendments to §1391 did not modify
`the meaning of §1400(b) as interpreted by Fourco. We
`therefore hold that a domestic corporation “resides” only in
`
`its State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue
`statute.
`
`
`
`
`
`I
`Petitioner, which is organized under Indiana law and
`
`headquartered in Indiana, manufactures flavored drink
`mixes.1 Respondent, which is organized under Delaware
`law and has its principal place of business in Illinois, is a
`competitor in the same market. As relevant here, re-
`spondent sued petitioner in the District Court for the
`District of Delaware, alleging that petitioner’s products
`
`infringed one of respondent’s patents. Although petitioner
`is not registered to conduct business in Delaware and has
`no meaningful local presence there, it does ship the al-
`
`legedly infringing products into the State.
`Petitioner moved to dismiss the case or transfer venue
`
`——————
`
` 1The complaint alleged that petitioner is a corporation, and petitioner
` admitted this allegation in its answer. See App. 11a, 60a. Similarly,
`
`
`the petition for certiorari sought review on the question of “corporate”
`residence. See Pet. for Cert. i. In their briefs before this Court, how-
`ever, the parties suggest that petitioner is, in fact, an unincorporated
`
`entity. See Brief for Respondent 9, n. 4 (the complaint’s allegation was
`
`“apparently inaccurat[e]”); Reply Brief 4. Because this case comes to us
`at the pleading stage and has been litigated on the understanding that
`petitioner is a corporation, we confine our analysis to the proper venue
`for corporations. We leave further consideration of the issue of peti-
`tioner’s legal status to the courts below on remand.
`
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`

`

`
`
` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`to the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
`arguing that venue was improper in Delaware. See 28
`U. S. C. §1406. Citing Fourco’s holding that a corporation
`resides only in its State of incorporation for patent in-
`fringement suits, petitioner argued that it did not
`“resid[e]” in Delaware under the first clause of §1400(b).
`
`It further argued that it had no “regular and established
`
`place of business” in Delaware under the second clause of
`§1400(b). Relying on Circuit precedent, the District Court
`rejected these arguments, 2015 WL 5613160 (D Del., Sept.
`24, 2015), and the Federal Circuit denied a petition for a
`writ of mandamus, In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F. 3d
`1338 (2016). The Federal Circuit concluded that subse-
`quent statutory amendments had effectively amended
`§1400(b) as construed in Fourco, with the result that
`§1391(c) now supplies the definition of “resides” in
`§1400(b). 821 F. 3d, at 1341–1343. Under this logic,
`because the District of Delaware could exercise personal
`jurisdiction over petitioner, petitioner resided in Delaware
`under §1391(c) and, therefore, under §1400(b). We granted
`certiorari, 580 U. S. ___ (2016), and now reverse.
`II
`
`
`A
`
`The history of the relevant statutes provides important
`
`context for the issue in this case. The Judiciary Act of
`1789 permitted a plaintiff to file suit in a federal district
`court if the defendant was “an inhabitant” of that district
`or could be “found” for service of process in that district.
`
`Act of Sept. 24, 1789, §11, 1 Stat. 79. The Act covered
`patent cases as well as other civil suits. Stonite Products
`Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561, 563 (1942). In
`1887, Congress amended the statute to permit suit only in
`the district of which the defendant was an inhabitant or,
`in diversity cases, of which either the plaintiff or defend-
`ant was an inhabitant. See Act of Mar. 3, 1887, §1, 24
`
`
`
`
`
`3
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`
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`

`

`
` 4 TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
` Stat. 552; see also Stonite, supra, at 563–564.
` This Court’s decision in In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653,
`
`
`661–662 (1893), arguably suggested that the 1887 Act did
`not apply to patent cases. As a result, while some courts
`continued to apply the Act to patent cases, others refused
`to do so and instead permitted plaintiffs to bring suit (in
`line with the pre-1887 regime) anywhere a defendant
`could be found for service of process. See Stonite, supra, at
`564–565.
`In 1897, Congress resolved the confusion by
`enacting a patent specific venue statute. See Act of Mar.
`3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695. In so doing, it “placed pat-
`ent infringement cases in a class by themselves, outside
`the scope of general venue legislation.” Brunette Machine
`
`Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U. S. 706, 713
`
`
`(1972). This new statute (§1400(b)’s predecessor) permit-
`ted suit in the district of which the defendant was an
`“inhabitant,” or a district in which the defendant both
`maintained a “regular and established place of business”
`
` and committed an act of infringement. 29 Stat. 695. At
`the time, a corporation was understood to “inhabit” only
`the State in which it was incorporated. Shaw v. Quincy
`Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 449–450 (1892).
`
`The Court addressed the scope of §1400(b)’s predecessor
`in Stonite. In that case, the two defendants inhabited
`different districts within a single State. The plaintiff
`sought to sue them both in the same district, invoking a
`then governing general venue statute that, if applicable,
`
`permitted it to do so. 315 U. S., at 562–563. This Court
`
`rejected the plaintiff ’s venue choice on the ground that the
`patent venue statute constituted “the exclusive provision
`controlling venue in patent infringement proceedings” and
`thus was not supplemented or modified by the general
`venue provisions. Id., at 563. In the Court’s view, the
`patent venue statute “was adopted to define the exact
`jurisdiction of the federal courts in actions to enforce
`patent rights,” a purpose that would be undermined by
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`interpreting it “to dovetail with the general provisions
`relating to the venue of civil suits.” Id., at 565–566. The
`Court thus held that the patent venue statute “alone
`should control venue in patent infringement proceedings.”
`Id., at 566.
`
`In 1948, Congress recodified the patent venue statute as
`
`§1400(b). See Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 936. The
`recodified provision, which remains unaltered today,
`states that “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may
`be brought in the judicial district where the defendant
`resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of
`infringement and has a regular and established place of
`business.” 28 U. S. C. §1400(b) (1952 ed.). This version
`differs from the previous one in that it uses “resides”
`instead of “inhabit[s].” At the same time, Congress also
`enacted the general venue statute, §1391, which defined
`“residence” for corporate defendants. That provision
`stated that “[a] corporation may be sued in any judicial
`district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do busi-
`ness or is doing business, and such judicial district shall
`be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue
`purposes.” §1391(c) (1952 ed.).
`
`
`Following the 1948 legislation, courts reached differing
`conclusions regarding whether §1400(b)’s use of the word
`
`“resides” incorporated §1391(c)’s definition of “residence.”
`
` See Fourco, 353 U. S., at 224, n. 3 (listing cases). In Fourco,
`this Court reviewed a decision of the Second Circuit
`holding that §1391(c) defined residence for purposes of
`§1400(b), “just as that definition is properly . . . incorpo-
`rated into other sections of the venue chapter.” Trans-
`mirra Prods. Corp. v. Fourco Glass Co., 233 F. 2d 885, 886
`(1956). This Court squarely rejected that interpretation,
`reaffirming Stonite’s holding that §1400(b) “is the sole and
`exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringe-
`
`ment actions, and . . . is not to be supplemented by . . .
`§1391(c).” 353 U. S., at 229. The Court observed that
`
`
`
`
`
`5
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`

`

`
` 6 TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Congress enacted §1400(b) as a standalone venue statute
`and that nothing in the 1948 recodification evidenced an
`intent to alter that status. The fact that §1391(c) by “its
`terms” embraced “all actions” was not enough to overcome
`the fundamental point that Congress designed §1400(b) to
`be “complete, independent and alone controlling in its
`sphere.” Id., at 228.
`The Court also concluded that “resides” in the recodified
`
`version of §1400(b) bore the same meaning as “inhabit[s]”
`in the pre-1948 version. See id., at 226 (“[T]he [w]ords
`
`‘inhabitant’ and ‘resident,’ as respects venue, are synony-
`mous” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The substitu-
`tion of “resides” for “inhabit[s]” thus did not suggest any
`alteration in the venue rules for corporations in patent
`cases. Accordingly, §1400(b) continued to apply to domes-
`tic corporations in the same way it always had: They were
`subject to venue only in their States of incorporation. See
`ibid. (The use of “resides” “negat[es] any intention to make
`corporations suable, in patent infringement cases, where
`they are merely ‘doing business,’ because those synony-
`mous words [“inhabitant” and “resident”] mean domicile
`
`and, in respect of corporations, mean the state of incorpo-
`ration only”).
`
`
`
`
`
`B
`This landscape remained effectively unchanged until
`
`1988, when Congress amended the general venue statute,
`§1391(c), to provide that “[f]or purposes of venue under
`this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be
`deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is
`subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is
`commenced.” Judicial Improvements and Access to Jus-
`tice Act, §1013(a), 102 Stat. 4669. The Federal Circuit in
`VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F. 2d
`1574 (1990), announced its view of the effect of this
`amendment on the meaning of the patent venue statute.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`The court reasoned that the phrase “[f]or purposes of
`venue under this chapter” was “exact and classic language
`of incorporation,” id., at 1579, and that §1391(c) accord-
`ingly established the definition for all other venue statutes
`under the same “chapter.” Id., at 1580. Because §1400(b)
`fell within the relevant chapter, the Federal Circuit con-
`cluded that §1391(c), “on its face,” “clearly applies to
`§1400(b), and thus redefines the meaning of the term
`‘resides’ in that section.” Id., at 1578.
`Following VE Holding, no new developments occurred
`until Congress adopted the current version of §1391 in
`2011 (again leaving §1400(b) unaltered). See Federal
`Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011,
`§202, 125 Stat. 763. Section 1391(a) now provides that,
`“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,” “this section shall
`govern the venue of all civil actions brought in district
`courts of the United States.” And §1391(c)(2), in turn,
`provides that, “[f]or all venue purposes,” certain entities,
`“whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if
`a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defend-
`ant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with
`respect to the civil action in question.” In its decision
`below, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed VE Holding, reason-
`ing that the 2011 amendments provided no basis to recon-
`sider its prior decision.
`
`
`
`7
`
`
`
`III
`
`
`We reverse the Federal Circuit. In Fourco, this Court
`definitively and unambiguously held that the word “re-
`side[nce]” in §1400(b) has a particular meaning as applied
`
`to domestic2 corporations: It refers only to the State of
`——————
`2The parties dispute the implications of petitioner’s argument for
`
`foreign corporations. We do not here address that question, nor do we
`express any opinion on this Court’s holding in Brunette Machine Works,
`Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U. S. 706 (1972) (determining
`proper venue for foreign corporation under then existing statutory
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`8 TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC
`
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
` incorporation. Congress has not amended §1400(b) since
`
`Fourco, and neither party asks us to reconsider our hold-
`ing in that case. Accordingly, the only question we must
`answer is whether Congress changed the meaning of
`§1400(b) when it amended §1391. When Congress intends
`to effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily provides a
`relatively clear indication of its intent in the text of the
`amended provision. See United States v. Madigan, 300
`U. S. 500, 506 (1937) (“[T]he modification by implication of
`the settled construction of an earlier and different section
`is not favored”); A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law 331
`(2012) (“A clear, authoritative judicial holding on the
`meaning of a particular provision should not be cast in
`
`doubt and subjected to challenge whenever a related
`though not utterly inconsistent provision is adopted in the
`same statute or even in an affiliated statute”).
`The current version of §1391 does not contain any indi-
`
`cation that Congress intended to alter the meaning of
`§1400(b) as interpreted in Fourco. Although the current
`version of §1391(c) provides a default rule that applies
`“[f]or all venue purposes,” the version at issue in Fourco
`similarly provided a default rule that applied “for venue
`purposes.” 353 U. S., at 223 (internal quotation marks
`omitted).
`In this context, we do not see any material
`difference between the two phrasings. See Pure Oil Co. v.
`Suarez, 384 U. S. 202, 204–205 (1966) (construing “‘for
`venue purposes’” to cover “all venue statutes”). Respond-
`ent argues that “‘all venue purposes’ means ‘all venue
`purposes’—not
`‘all venue purposes except for patent
`venue.’” Brief for Respondent 21. The plaintiffs in Fourco
`advanced the same argument. See 353 U. S., at 228 (“The
`main thrust of respondents’ argument is that §1391(c) is
`clear and unambiguous and that its terms include all
`actions—including patent infringement actions”). This
`——————
`
` regime).
`
`
`
`
`
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`
`
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`

`

`
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Court was not persuaded then, and the addition of the
`word “all” to the already comprehensive provision does not
`suggest that Congress intended for us to reconsider that
`conclusion.
`This particular argument is even weaker under the
`
`current version of §1391 than it was under the provision
`in place at the time of Fourco, because the current provi-
`sion includes a saving clause expressly stating that it does
`
`not apply when “otherwise provided by law.” On its face,
`the version of §1391(c) at issue in Fourco included no
`exceptions, yet this Court still held that “resides” in
`its original meaning contrary to
`§1400(b) retained
`
`§1391(c)’s default definition. Fourco’s holding rests on
`even firmer footing now that §1391’s saving clause ex-
`pressly contemplates that certain venue statutes may
`retain definitions of “resides” that conflict with its default
`definition. In short, the saving clause makes explicit the
`qualification that this Court previously found implicit in
`the statute. See Pure Oil, supra, at 205 (interpreting
`earlier version of §1391 to apply “to all venue statutes
`using residence as a criterion, at least in the absence of
`contrary restrictive indications in any such statute”).
`Respondent suggests that the saving clause in §1391(a)
`does not apply to the definitional provisions in §1391(c),
`Brief for Respondent 31–32, but that interpretation is
`belied by the text of §1391(a), which makes clear that the
`saving clause applies to the entire “section.”
`See
`§1391(a)(1) (“Except as otherwise provided by law— . . .
`this section shall govern the venue of all civil actions”
`(emphasis added)).
`
`Finally, there is no indication that Congress in 2011
`
`ratified the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding. If
`
`anything, the 2011 amendments undermine that decision’s
`rationale. As petitioner points out, VE Holding relied
`heavily—indeed, almost exclusively—on Congress’ deci-
`sion in 1988 to replace “for venue purposes” with “[f]or
`
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`9
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`

`

`
` 10 TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`purposes of venue under this chapter” (emphasis added) in
`§1391(c). Congress deleted “under this chapter” in 2011
`and worded the current version of §1391(c) almost identi-
`cally to the original version of the statute.
` Compare
`§1391(c) (2012 ed.) (“[f]or all venue purposes”) with
`§1391(c) (1952 ed.) (“for venue purposes”). In short, noth-
`ing in the text suggests congressional approval of VE
`Holding.
`
`
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`
`
`*
`*
`*
`As applied to domestic corporations, “reside[nce]” in
`
`§1400(b) refers only to the State of incorporation. Accord-
`ingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
`remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
`this opinion.
`
`
`
`
`It is so ordered.
`
`
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`
`
` JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or
`
` decision of this case.
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`