`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2016
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` Syllabus
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` COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, ET AL. v.
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` MENDEZ ET AL.
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`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
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`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 16–369. Argued March 22, 2017—Decided May 30, 2017
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`The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department received word from a
`confidential informant that a potentially armed and dangerous parol-
`ee-at-large had been seen at a certain residence. While other officers
`searched the main house, Deputies Conley and Pederson searched
`the back of the property where, unbeknownst to the deputies, re-
`spondents Mendez and Garcia were napping inside a shack where
`they lived. Without a search warrant and without announcing their
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`presence, the deputies opened the door of the shack. Mendez rose
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`from the bed, holding a BB gun that he used to kill pests. Deputy
`Conley yelled, “Gun!” and the deputies immediately opened fire,
`shooting Mendez and Garcia multiple times. Officers did not find the
`parolee in the shack or elsewhere on the property.
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`Mendez and Garcia sued Deputies Conley and Pederson and the
`County under 42 U. S. C. §1983, pressing three Fourth Amendment
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`claims: a warrantless entry claim, a knock-and-announce claim, and
`an excessive force claim. On the first two claims, the District Court
`awarded Mendez and Garcia nominal damages. On the excessive
`force claim, the court found that the deputies’ use of force was rea-
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`sonable under Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, but held them liable
`nonetheless under the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, which makes
`an officer’s otherwise reasonable use of force unreasonable if (1) the
`officer “intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation”
`and (2) “the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment viola-
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`tion,” Billington v. Smith, 292 F. 3d 1177, 1189. On appeal, the
`Ninth Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immun-
`ity on the knock-and-announce claim and that the warrantless entry
`violated clearly established law. It also affirmed the District Court’s
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`COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. MENDEZ
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`Syllabus
`application of the provocation rule, and held, in the alternative, that
`basic notions of proximate cause would support liability even without
`the provocation rule.
`Held: The Fourth Amendment provides no basis for the Ninth Circuit’s
`“provocation rule.” Pp. 5–10.
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`(a) The provocation rule is incompatible with this Court’s excessive
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`force jurisprudence, which sets forth a settled and exclusive frame-
`work for analyzing whether the force used in making a seizure com-
`plies with the Fourth Amendment. See Graham, supra, at 395. The
`operative question in such cases is “whether the totality of the cir-
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`cumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of search or seizure.” Tennes-
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`see v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 8–9. When an officer carries out a seizure
`that is reasonable, taking into account all relevant circumstances,
`there is no valid excessive force claim. The provocation rule, howev-
`er, instructs courts to look back in time to see if a different Fourth
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`Amendment violation was somehow tied to the eventual use of force,
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`an approach that mistakenly conflates distinct Fourth Amendment
`claims. The proper framework is set out in Graham. To the extent
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`that a plaintiff has other Fourth Amendment claims, they should be
`analyzed separately.
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`The Ninth Circuit attempts to cabin the provocation rule by defin-
`ing a two-prong test: First, the separate constitutional violation must
`“creat[e] a situation which led to” the use of force; and second, the
`separate constitutional violation must be committed recklessly or in-
`tentionally. 815 F. 3d 1178, 1193. Neither limitation, however,
`solves the fundamental problem: namely, that the provocation rule is
`an unwarranted and illogical expansion of Graham. In addition, each
`limitation creates problems of its own. First, the rule relies on a
`vague causal standard. Second, while the reasonableness of a search
`or seizure is almost always based on objective factors, the provocation
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`rule looks to the subjective intent of the officers who carried out the
`seizure.
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`There is no need to distort the excessive force inquiry in this way in
`order to hold law enforcement officers liable for the foreseeable con-
`sequences of all their constitutional torts. Plaintiffs can, subject to
`qualified immunity, generally recover damages that are proximately
`caused by any Fourth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Heck v.
`Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 483. Here, if respondents cannot recover
`on their excessive force claim, that will not foreclose recovery for in-
`juries proximately caused by the warrantless entry. Pp. 5–10.
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`(b) The Ninth Circuit’s proximate-cause holding is similarly taint-
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`ed. Its analysis appears to focus solely on the risks foreseeably asso-
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`ciated with the failure to knock and announce—the claim on which
`the court concluded that the deputies had qualified immunity—
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`Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`Syllabus
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`rather than the warrantless entry. On remand, the court should re-
`visit the question whether proximate cause permits respondents to
`recover damages for their injuries based on the deputies’ failure to
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`secure a warrant at the outset. Pp. 10–11.
`815 F. 3d 1178, vacated and remanded.
`ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
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` bers joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the consideration
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`or decision of the case.
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
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` No. 16–369
`_________________
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` COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, ET AL.,
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` PETITIONERS v. ANGEL MENDEZ, ET AL.
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`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
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`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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`[May 30, 2017]
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` JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
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`If law enforcement officers make a “seizure” of a person
`using force that is judged to be reasonable based on a
`consideration of the circumstances relevant to that deter-
`mination, may the officers nevertheless be held liable for
`injuries caused by the seizure on the ground that they
`committed a separate Fourth Amendment violation that
`contributed to their need to use force? The Ninth Circuit
`has adopted a “provocation rule” that imposes liability in
`such a situation.
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`We hold that the Fourth Amendment provides no basis
`for such a rule. A different Fourth Amendment violation
`cannot transform a later, reasonable use of force into an
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`unreasonable seizure.
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`I
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`A
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`In October 2010, deputies from the Los Angeles County
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`Sheriff ’s Department were searching for a parolee-at-large
`named Ronnie O’Dell. A felony arrest warrant had been
`issued for O’Dell, who was believed to be armed and dan-
`gerous and had previously evaded capture. Findings of
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` COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. MENDEZ
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`Opinion of the Court
`Fact and Conclusions of Law, No. 2:11–cv–04771 (CD
`Cal.), App. to Pet. for Cert. 56a, 64a. Deputies Christo-
`pher Conley and Jennifer Pederson were assigned to assist
`the task force searching for O’Dell. Id., at 57a–58a. The
`task force received word from a confidential informant
`that O’Dell had been seen on a bicycle at a home in Lan-
`caster, California, owned by Paula Hughes, and the offic-
`ers then mapped out a plan for apprehending O’Dell. Id.,
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`at 58a. Some officers would approach the front door of the
`Hughes residence, while Deputies Conley and Pederson
`would search the rear of the property and cover the back
`door of the residence. Id., at 59a. During this briefing, it
`was announced that a man named Angel Mendez lived in
`the backyard of the Hughes home with a pregnant woman
`named Jennifer Garcia (now Mrs. Jennifer Mendez). Ibid.
`Deputy Pederson heard this announcement, but at trial
`Deputy Conley testified that he did not remember it. Ibid.
`
`
`When the officers reached the Hughes residence around
`midday, three of them knocked on the front door while
`Deputies Conley and Pederson went to the back of the
`property. Id., at 63a. At the front door, Hughes asked if
`the officers had a warrant. Ibid. A sergeant responded
`that they did not but were searching for O’Dell and had a
`warrant for his arrest. Ibid. One of the officers heard
`what he thought were sounds of someone running inside
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`the house. Id., at 64a. As the officers prepared to open
`the door by force, Hughes opened the door and informed
`them that O’Dell was not in the house. Ibid. She was
`placed under arrest, and the house was searched, but
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`O’Dell was not found. Ibid.
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`Meanwhile, Deputies Conley and Pederson, with guns
`drawn, searched the rear of the residence, which was
`cluttered with debris and abandoned automobiles. Id., at
`60a, 65a. The property included three metal storage sheds
`and a one-room shack made of wood and plywood. Id., at
`60a. Mendez had built the shack, and he and Garcia had
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`Opinion of the Court
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` lived inside for about 10 months. Id., at 61a. The shack
`had a single doorway covered by a blue blanket. Ibid.
`Amid the debris on the ground, an electrical cord ran into
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`the shack, and an air conditioner was mounted on the
`side. Id., at 62a. A gym storage locker and clothes and
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`other possessions were nearby. Id., at 61a. Mendez kept a
`BB rifle in the shack for use on rats and other pests. Id.,
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`at 62a. The BB gun “closely resembled a small caliber
`rifle.” Ibid.
`Deputies Conley and Pederson first checked the three
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`metal sheds and found no one inside. Id., at 65a. They
`then approached the door of the shack. Id., at 66a. Unbe-
`
`knownst to the officers, Mendez and Garcia were in the
`shack and were napping on a futon. Id., at 67a. The
`deputies did not have a search warrant and did not knock
`and announce their presence. Id., at 66a. When Deputy
`Conley opened the wooden door and pulled back the blan-
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`ket, Mendez thought it was Ms. Hughes and rose from the
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`bed, picking up the BB gun so he could stand up and place
`it on the floor. Id., at 68a. As a result, when the deputies
`entered, he was holding the BB gun, and it was “point[ing]
`somewhat south towards Deputy Conley.” Id., at 69a.
`
`Deputy Conley yelled, “Gun!” and the deputies immediately
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`opened fire, discharging a total of 15 rounds. Id., at 69a–
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`70a. Mendez and Garcia “were shot multiple times and
`suffered severe injuries,” and Mendez’s right leg was later
`amputated below the knee. Id., at 70a. O’Dell was not in
`the shack or anywhere on the property. Ibid.
`B
`Mendez and his wife (respondents here) filed suit under
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`Rev. Stat. §1976, 42 U. S. C. §1983, against petitioners,
`the County of Los Angeles and Deputies Conley and Ped-
`erson. As relevant here, they pressed three Fourth
`Amendment claims. First, they claimed that the deputies
`executed an unreasonable search by entering the shack
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` COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. MENDEZ
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`Opinion of the Court
`without a warrant (the “warrantless entry claim”); second,
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`they asserted that the deputies performed an unreason-
`able search because they failed to announce their presence
`before entering the shack (the “knock-and-announce
`claim”); and third, they claimed that the deputies effected
`an unreasonable seizure by deploying excessive force in
`opening fire after entering the shack (the “excessive force
`claim”).
`After a bench trial, the District Court ruled largely in
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`favor of respondents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 135a–136a.
`The court found Deputy Conley liable on the warrantless
`entry claim, and the court also found both deputies liable
`on the knock-and-announce claim. But the court awarded
`nominal damages for these violations because “the act of
`pointing the BB gun” was a superseding cause “as far as
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`damage [from the shooting was] concerned.” App. 238.
`
`The District Court then addressed respondents’ exces-
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`sive force claim. App. to Pet. for Cert. 105a–127a. The
`court began by evaluating whether the deputies used
`excessive force under Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386
`(1989). The court held that, under Graham, the deputies’
`use of force was reasonable “given their belief that a man
`was holding a firearm rifle threatening their lives.” App.
`to Pet. for Cert. 108a. But the court did not end its exces-
`sive force analysis at this point. Instead, the court turned
`to the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule, which holds that
`“an officer’s otherwise reasonable (and lawful) defensive
`use of force is unreasonable as a matter of law, if (1) the
`officer intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent re-
`sponse, and (2) that provocation is an independent consti-
`tutional violation.” Id., at 111a. Based on this rule, the
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`District Court held the deputies liable for excessive force
`and awarded respondents around $4 million in damages.
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`Id., at 135a–136a.
`The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in
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`part. 815 F. 3d 1178 (CA9 2016). Contrary to the District
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`Opinion of the Court
`Court, the Court of Appeals held that the officers were
`entitled to qualified immunity on the knock-and-announce
`claim. Id., at 1191–1193. But the court concluded that
`the warrantless entry of the shack violated clearly estab-
`lished law and was attributable to both deputies. Id., at
`1191, 1195. Finally, and most important for present
`purposes, the court affirmed the application of the provo-
`cation rule. The Court of Appeals did not disagree with
`the conclusion that the shooting was reasonable under
`Graham; instead, like the District Court, the Court of
`Appeals applied the provocation rule and held the depu-
`ties liable for the use of force on the theory that they had
`intentionally and recklessly brought about the shooting by
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`entering the shack without a warrant in violation of clearly
`established law. 815 F. 3d, at 1193.
`
`The Court of Appeals also adopted an alternative ra-
`tionale for its judgment. It held that “basic notions of
`proximate cause” would support liability even without the
`provocation rule because it was “reasonably foreseeable”
`that the officers would meet an armed homeowner when
`they “barged into the shack unannounced.” Id., at 1194–
`1195.
`
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`We granted certiorari. 580 U. S. ___ (2016).
`
`II
`
`The Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule permits an exces-
`
`sive force claim under the Fourth Amendment “where an
`officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent con-
`frontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth
`Amendment violation.” Billington v. Smith, 292 F. 3d
`1177, 1189 (CA9 2002). The rule comes into play after a
`forceful seizure has been judged to be reasonable under
`Graham. Once a court has made that determination, the
`rule instructs the court to ask whether the law enforce-
`ment officer violated the Fourth Amendment in some
`other way in the course of events leading up to the seizure.
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` COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. MENDEZ
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`Opinion of the Court
`If so, that separate Fourth Amendment violation may
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`“render the officer’s otherwise reasonable defensive use of
`force unreasonable as a matter of law.” Id., at 1190–1191.
`The provocation rule, which has been “sharply ques-
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`tioned” outside the Ninth Circuit, City and County of San
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`Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. ___, ___, n. 4 (2015) (slip
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`op., at 14, n. 4), is incompatible with our excessive force
`jurisprudence. The rule’s fundamental flaw is that it uses
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`another constitutional violation to manufacture an exces-
`sive force claim where one would not otherwise exist.
`The Fourth Amendment prohibits
`“unreasonable
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`searches and seizures.” “[R]easonableness is always the
`touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis,” Birchfield v.
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`North Dakota, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 37),
`and reasonableness is generally assessed by carefully
`weighing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
`individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
`importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
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`the intrusion.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 8 (1985)
`(internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`Our case law sets forth a settled and exclusive frame-
`work for analyzing whether the force used in making a
`seizure complies with the Fourth Amendment. See Gra-
`ham, 490 U. S., at 395. As in other areas of our Fourth
`Amendment jurisprudence, “[d]etermining whether the
`force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’”
`requires balancing of the individual’s Fourth Amendment
`interests against the relevant government interests. Id.,
`at 396. The operative question in excessive force cases is
`“whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a
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`particular sort of search or seizure.” Garner, supra, at 8–9.
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`The reasonableness of the use of force is evaluated
`under an “objective” inquiry that pays “careful attention to
`the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”
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`Graham, supra, at 396. And “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a
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`particular use of force must be judged from the perspective
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`Opinion of the Court
`of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the
`
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`20/20 vision of hindsight.” Ibid. “Excessive force claims
`. . . are evaluated for objective reasonableness based upon
`the information the officers had when the conduct oc-
`curred.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 207 (2001). That
`inquiry is dispositive: When an officer carries out a seizure
`that is reasonable, taking into account all relevant cir-
`cumstances, there is no valid excessive force claim.
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`The basic problem with the provocation rule is that it
`fails to stop there. Instead, the rule provides a novel and
`unsupported path to liability in cases in which the use of
`force was reasonable. Specifically, it instructs courts to
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`look back in time to see if there was a different Fourth
`
`Amendment violation that is somehow tied to the eventual
`use of force. That distinct violation, rather than the force-
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`ful seizure itself, may then serve as the foundation of the
`plaintiff ’s excessive force claim. Billington, supra, at 1190
`(“The basis of liability for the subsequent use of force is
`the initial constitutional violation . . . ”).
`
`This approach mistakenly conflates distinct Fourth
`Amendment claims. Contrary to this approach, the objec-
`tive reasonableness analysis must be conducted separately
`for each search or seizure that is alleged to be unconstitu-
`tional. An excessive force claim is a claim that a law
`enforcement officer carried out an unreasonable seizure
`through a use of force that was not justified under the
`relevant circumstances. It is not a claim that an officer
`used reasonable force after committing a distinct Fourth
`Amendment violation such as an unreasonable entry.
`
`By conflating excessive force claims with other Fourth
`Amendment claims, the provocation rule permits excessive
`force claims that cannot succeed on their own terms. That
`is precisely how the rule operated in this case. The Dis-
`trict Court found (and the Ninth Circuit did not dispute)
`that the use of force by the deputies was reasonable under
`Graham. However, respondents were still able to recover
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`COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. MENDEZ
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`Opinion of the Court
`damages because the deputies committed a separate
`constitutional violation (the warrantless entry into the
`
` shack) that in some sense set the table for the use of force.
`That is wrong. The framework for analyzing excessive
`force claims is set out in Graham. If there is no excessive
`force claim under Graham, there is no excessive force
`claim at all. To the extent that a plaintiff has other
`Fourth Amendment claims, they should be analyzed
`separately.*
`The Ninth Circuit’s efforts to cabin the provocation rule
`
`only undermine it further. The Ninth Circuit appears to
`recognize that it would be going entirely too far to suggest
`
`that any Fourth Amendment violation that is connected to
`a reasonable use of force should create a valid excessive
`force claim. See, e.g., Beier v. Lewiston, 354 F. 3d 1058,
`1064 (CA9 2004) (“Because the excessive force and false
`arrest factual inquiries are distinct, establishing a lack of
`probable cause to make an arrest does not establish an
`excessive force claim, and vice-versa”). Instead, that court
`has endeavored to limit the rule to only those distinct
`Fourth Amendment violations that in some sense “pro-
`voked” the need to use force. The concept of provocation,
`——————
`*Respondents do not attempt to defend the provocation rule. In-
`stead, they argue that the judgment below should be affirmed under
`Graham itself. Graham commands that an officer’s use of force be
`
`assessed for reasonableness under the “totality of the circumstances.”
`490 U. S., at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). On respondents’
`view, that means taking into account unreasonable police conduct prior
`to the use of force that foreseeably created the need to use it. Brief for
`Respondents 42–43. We did not grant certiorari on that question, and
`the decision below did not address it. Accordingly, we decline to ad-
`dress it here. See, e.g., McLane Co. v. EEOC, ante, at 11 (“[W]e are a
`court of review, not of first view” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
`
`
`All we hold today is that once a use of force is deemed reasonable under
`Graham, it may not be found unreasonable by reference to some sepa-
`rate constitutional violation. Any argument regarding the District
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`Court’s application of Graham in this case should be addressed to the
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`Ninth Circuit on remand.
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`Opinion of the Court
` in turn, has been defined using a two-prong test. First,
`
`the separate constitutional violation must “creat[e] a
`situation which led to” the use of force; second, the sepa-
`rate constitutional violation must be committed recklessly
`or intentionally. 815 F. 3d, at 1193 (internal quotation
`marks omitted).
`Neither of these limitations solves the fundamental
`
`problem of the provocation rule: namely, that it is an
`unwarranted and illogical expansion of Graham. But in
`addition, each of the limitations creates problems of its
`own. First, the rule includes a vague causal standard. It
`applies when a prior constitutional violation “created a
`situation which led to” the use of force. The rule does not
`incorporate the familiar proximate cause standard. In-
`deed, it is not clear what causal standard is being applied.
`
`Second, while the reasonableness of a search or seizure is
`almost always based on objective factors, see Whren v.
`United States, 517 U. S. 806, 814 (1996), the provocation
`rule looks to the subjective intent of the officers who car-
`ried out the seizure. As noted, under the Ninth Circuit’s
`rule, a prior Fourth Amendment violation may be held to
`have provoked a later, reasonable use of force only if the
`prior violation was intentional or reckless.
`The provocation rule may be motivated by the notion
`
`that it is important to hold law enforcement officers liable
`for the foreseeable consequences of all of their constitu-
`
`tional torts. See Billington, 292 F. 3d, at 1190 (“[I]f an
`officer’s provocative actions are objectively unreasonable
`under the Fourth Amendment, . . . liability is established,
`
`and the question becomes . . . what harms the constitu-
`tional violation proximately caused”). However, there is
`no need to distort the excessive force inquiry in order to
`accomplish this objective. To the contrary, both parties
`accept the principle that plaintiffs can—subject to quali-
`fied immunity—generally recover damages that are prox-
`imately caused by any Fourth Amendment violation. See,
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` COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES v. MENDEZ
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`Opinion of the Court
`e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 483 (1994) (§1983
`“creates a species of tort liability” informed by tort princi-
`ples regarding “damages and the prerequisites for their
`recovery” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Memphis
`Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U. S. 299, 306
`(1986) (“[W]hen §1983 plaintiffs seek damages for viola-
`tions of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordi-
`narily determined according to principles derived from the
`common law of torts”). Thus, there is no need to dress up
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`every Fourth Amendment claim as an excessive force
`claim. For example, if the plaintiffs in this case cannot
`recover on their excessive force claim, that will not fore-
`close recovery for injuries proximately caused by the war-
`rantless entry. The harm proximately caused by these
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`two torts may overlap, but the two claims should not be
`confused.
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`
`III
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`The Court of Appeals also held that “even without rely-
`ing on [the] provocation theory, the deputies are liable for
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`the shooting under basic notions of proximate cause.” 815
`F. 3d, at 1194. In other words, the court apparently con-
`cluded that the shooting was proximately caused by the
`deputies’ warrantless entry of the shack. Proper analysis
`of this proximate cause question required consideration of
`the “foreseeability or the scope of the risk created by the
`predicate conduct,” and required the court to conclude that
`there was “some direct relation between the injury asserted
`and the injurious conduct alleged.” Paroline v. United
`States, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 7) (internal
`quotation marks omitted).
`
`Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals’ proximate cause
`analysis appears to have been tainted by the same errors
`that cause us to reject the provocation rule. The court
`reasoned that when officers make a “startling entry” by
`“barg[ing] into” a home “unannounced,” it is reasonably
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` 11
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`It is so ordered.
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` Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`foreseeable that violence may result. 815 F. 3d, at 1194–
`1195 (internal quotation marks omitted). But this ap-
`pears to focus solely on the risks foreseeably associated
`with the failure to knock and announce, which could not
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`serve as the basis for liability since the Court of Appeals
`concluded that the officers had qualified immunity on that
`claim. By contrast, the Court of Appeals did not identify
`the foreseeable risks associated with the relevant constitu-
`tional violation (the warrantless entry); nor did it explain
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`how, on these facts, respondents’ injuries were proximately
`caused by the warrantless entry. In other words, the
`Court of Appeals’ proximate cause analysis, like the provo-
`cation rule, conflated distinct Fourth Amendment claims
`and required only a murky causal link between the war-
`rantless entry and the injuries attributed to it. On re-
`mand, the court should revisit the question whether prox-
`imate cause permits respondents to recover damages for
`their shooting injuries based on the deputies’ failure to
`secure a warrant at the outset. See Bank of America Corp.
`v. Miami, ante, at 12 (declining to “draw the precise
`boundaries of proximate cause” in the first instance). The
`arguments made on this point by the parties and by the
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`United States as amicus provide a useful starting point for
`this inquiry. See Brief for Petitioners 42–56; Brief for
`Respondents 20–31, 51–59; Reply Brief 17–24; Brief for
`United States as Amicus Curiae 26–32.
`
`
`*
`*
`*
`For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
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`is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceed-
`ings consistent with this opinion.
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` JUSTICE GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or
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`decision of this case.
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