`
`Supreme Court of the United States
`
`IN THE
`
`>> >>
`OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC,
`
`v.
`
`GREENE’S ENERGY GROUP, LLC,
`
`On Writ of Certiorari to the
`United States Court of Appeals
`for the Federal Circuit
`
`Petitioner,
`
`Respondent.
`
`BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE PROFESSORS OF
`ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, FEDERAL COURTS,
`AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
`IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
`
`John M. Golden
`
`October 30, 2017
`
`Thomas H. Lee
`Counsel of Record
`FORDHAM UNIVERSITY
`SCHOOL OF LAW
`150 West 62nd Street
`New York, New York 10023
`212-636-6728
`thlee@fordham.edu
`Counsel for Amici Curiae
`Professors of Administrative
`Law, Federal Courts, and
`Intellectual Property Law
`
`
`
`i
`
`QUESTION PRESENTED
`
`Whether inter partes review—an adversarial
`process used by the Patent and Trademark Office
`(PTO) to analyze the validity of existing patents—
`violates the Constitution by extinguishing private
`property rights through a non-Article III forum
`without a jury.
`
`
`
`ii
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`
`
`Page
`
`QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iv
`
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................. 1
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 3
`
`ARGUMENT ................................................................ 5
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`AN INVENTION PATENT IS A
`SOVEREIGN GRANT OF RIGHTS
`TO EXCLUDE, NOT A COMMON-
`LAW PROPERTY RIGHT. ................................ 6
`
`INTER PARTES REVIEW OF AN
`ISSUED PATENT FOR NOVELTY
`OR NONOBVIOUSNESS, WITH
`A RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE
`FEDERAL CIRCUIT, DOES NOT
`VIOLATE ARTICLE III. ................................. 18
`
`A. IPRs Address Matters of Public
`Right ......................................................... 18
`
`B. For Purposes of the Public Rights
`Exception, IPR Compares Favorably
`to Adjudicatory Regimes Addressed
`in the Court’s Precedents......................... 25
`
`
`
`iii
`
`C. The Results of IPR Are Subject to
`an Appeal as of Right with Robust
`Review by an Article III Court ................ 28
`
`III.
`
`IPR IS A CRITICAL DEVICE IN
`CONGRESS’S EFFORTS TO
`OPERATE A PATENT SYSTEM
`THAT PROCESSES HUNDREDS
`OF THOUSANDS OF PATENT
`APPLICATIONS EACH YEAR. ..................... 32
`
`IV. HOLDERS OF PATENTS BASED
`ON U.S. APPLICATIONS FILED
`AFTER NOVEMBER 29, 1999,
`WHEN CONGRESS FIRST
`AUTHORIZED INTER PARTES
`REEXAMINATION, SHOULD BE
`DEEMED TO HAVE CONSENTED
`TO INTER PARTES REVIEW
`WITH A RIGHT OF APPEAL
`ONLY TO THE FEDERAL
`CIRCUIT. ........................................................ 36
`
`CONCLUSION ........................................................... 40
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`iv
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
` Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
`Genetics, Inc.,
`133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) ............................................ 8
`
`B & B Hardware, Inc. v.
`Hargis Indus., Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) .......................................... 25
`
`Bank Markazi v. Peterson,
`136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) .......................................... 29
`
`Bloomer v. McQuewan,
`55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852) ........................... 9, 17
`
`Chadha v. Immigration &
`Naturalization Serv.,
`634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980),
`aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) ..................................... 25
`
`Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) .......................................... 27
`
`Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
`v. Schor,
`478 U.S. 833 (1986) .............................. 5, 26, 27, 36
`
`Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper
`Bag Co.,
`210 U.S. 405 (1908) ................................................ 7
`
`
`
`v
`
`Crowell v. Benson,
`285 U.S. 22 (1932) .............................. 19, 26, 28, 29
`
`Dickinson v. Zurko,
`527 U.S. 150 (1999) .............................................. 30
`
`Evans v. Eaton,
`16 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 454 (1818) .............................. 11
`
`Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
`Kabushiki Co.,
`535 U.S. 722 (2002) ................................................ 8
`
`Gayler v. Wilder,
`51 U.S. 477 (1850) ............................................ 9, 27
`
`Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
`492 U.S. 33 (1989) ................................................ 26
`
`Grant v. Raymond,
`31 U.S. 218 (1832) ................................................ 11
`
`In re Gartside,
`203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............................. 30
`
`In re Hatschek’s Patents,
`[1909] 26 Rep. Pat. Cas. 228
`(High Ct. of Justice, Ch. Div.) ........................ 14, 15
`
`In re Honibal’s Patent,
`[1855] 9 Moore 378 (P.C.) ..................................... 17
`
`In re Teles AG Informationstechnologien,
`747 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ....................... 37, 38
`
`
`
`vi
`
`Kappos v. Hyatt,
`132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012) .......................................... 37
`
`Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson
`& Johnson,
`745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ............................... 8
`
`KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
`550 U.S. 398 (2007) ................................................ 8
`
`Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,
`395 U.S. 653 (1969) ........................................ 35, 36
`
`Leo Sheep Co. v. United States,
`440 U. S. 668 (1979) ............................................... 7
`
`Marbury v. Madison,
`1 Cranch 137 (1803) ............................................. 29
`
`Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
`517 U.S. 370 (1996) .............................................. 31
`
`Mathews v. Eldridge,
`424 U.S. 319 (1976) .............................................. 31
`
`Microsoft v. i4i Limited Partnership,
`131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) .......................................... 30
`
`Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land
`& Improvement Co.,
`59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855) ............... 5, 19, 20, 21
`
`
`
`vii
`
`Nautilus, Inc. v.
`Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
`134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) ............................................ 8
`
`Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad
`Ocean Motor Co.,
`851 F.3d 1270 (2017) ............................................ 31
`
`Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
`Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
`458 U.S. 50 (1982) .......................................... 19, 26
`
`Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co.,
`189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), rev’d in
`part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) ............................. 24
`
`Queen v. E. Archipelago Co.,
`[1853] 1 E. & B. 310 (Q.B.) ................................... 15
`
`Stern v. Marshall,
`564 U.S. 462 (2011) .............................. 5, 19, 23, 26
`
`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
`135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) ...................................... 10, 17
`
`Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods
`Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985) ........................ passim
`
`Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,
`135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015) ...................................... 5, 36
`
`Constitutional Provisions
`
`Fifth Amendment................................................. 11, 28
`
`
`
`viii
`
`U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ........................................... 7
`
`U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 ................................................ 5
`
`U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ........................................ 7
`
`Statutes
`
`5 U.S.C. § 706 ....................................................... 29, 30
`
`35 U.S.C. § 141(c) ................................................. 30, 38
`
`35 U.S.C. § 143 ........................................................... 23
`
`35 U.S.C. § 151 ........................................................... 10
`
`35 U.S.C. § 301 ........................................................... 37
`
`35 U.S.C. § 301 (1982) ............................................... 37
`
`35 U.S.C. § 302 ........................................................... 37
`
`35 U.S.C. § 302 (1982) ............................................... 37
`
`35 U.S.C. § 311 ............................................... 22, 24, 25
`
`35 U.S.C. § 314(a) ................................................ 23, 24
`
`35 U.S.C. § 319 ..................................................... 23, 30
`
`1787 N.Y. Laws 472–473 ........................................... 13
`
`1798 N.Y. Laws 215–216 ........................................... 13
`
`Act of Apr. 10, 1790,
`ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat 109–110 ..................................... 10
`
`
`
`ix
`
`Act of July 4, 1836,
`§ 7, 5 Stat. 119 ...................................................... 10
`
`American Inventors Protection Act of
`November 29, 1999 ............................................... 38
`
`Patent Act of 1790.......................................... 10, 12, 17
`
`Patents Act, 1902,
`2 Edw. 80, 81–82, c. 34, § 3 .................................. 14
`
`Pub. L. No. 96-517,
`94 Stat. 3015 (1980).............................................. 37
`
`Rules
`
`Sup. Ct. R. 37.6 ............................................................ 1
`
`Treatises, Periodical Materials, and Other
`
`Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as
`Architecture: Legislative and
`Administrative Courts Under Article
`III, 65 Ind. L.J. 233 (1990). ............................ 19, 29
`
`Christopher Beauchamp, Repealing
`Patents 19–26 (2017), available at
`http://ssrn.com/abstract=3044003........................ 11
`
`2 William Blackstone, Commentaries
`on the Laws of England 346 (1766)
`(U. Chi. Press, 1979) ............................................... 6
`
`
`
`x
`
`Sean Bottomley, The British Patent
`System During the Industrial
`Revolution 1700–1852: From
`Privilege to Property 18 (2014) ............................ 16
`
`Oren Bracha, The Commodification of
`Patents 1600–1836: How Patents
`Became Rights and Why We Should
`Care, 38 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 177, 205
`(2004) .................................................................... 14
`
`Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History
`of Anglo-American Intellectual
`Property, ch. 1, at 110 (2005)
`(S.J.D. diss., Harv. Univ.), available
`at https://law.utexas.edu/
`faculty/obracha/dissertation/ ................................ 12
`
`Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas:
`The Intellectual Origins of American
`Intellectual Property, 1790–1909,
`at 16–18 (2016) ....................................................... 6
`
`Bruce W. Bugbee, Genesis of American
`Patent and Copyright Law (1967) ................. 10, 12
`
`Davis Rich Dewey, Early Financial
`History of the United States 246
`(1903) .................................................................... 21
`
`P.J. Federico, State Patents,
`13 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 166, 172–173
`(1931) .................................................................... 12
`
`
`
`xi
`
`John M. Golden, Proliferating Patents
`and Patent Law’s “Cost Disease,”
`51 Hous. L. Rev. 455 (2013) ..................... 32, 33, 34
`
`John M. Golden, Working Without
`Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover,
`65 Duke L.J. 1657 (2016) ............................... 28, 30
`
`H. Tómas Gómez-Arostegui & Sean
`Bottomley, Privy Council and Scire
`Facias 1700–1883: An Addendum
`to the Brief for H. Tómas Gómez-
`Arostegui and Sean Bottomley as
`Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
`Party (Oct. 18, 2017), available
`at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3054989 ................... 15
`
`P.A. Howell, The Judicial Committee of
`the Privy Council 1833–1876: Its
`Origins, Structure and Development
`(1979) .............................................................. 16, 17
`
`E. Wyndham Hulme, Privy Council Law
`and Practice of Letters Patent for
`Invention from the Restoration to
`1794, 33 L.Q. Rev. 180, 193–194
`(1917) .................................................................... 14
`
`Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of
`Administrative Action (1965) ............................... 29
`
`
`
`xii
`
`Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
`Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in
`6 Thomas Jefferson, The Papers of
`Thomas Jefferson: Retirement Series
`384 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2009) ...................... 22
`
`Christine MacLeod, Inventing the
`Industrial Revolution: The English
`Patent System, 1660–1800 (1988) ................. 14, 16
`
`James Madison, Monopolies,
`Perpetuities, Corporations,
`Ecclesiastical Endowments,
`in James Madison, Writings 756, 757
`(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). .................................. 13
`
`William Martin, The English Patent
`System 111 (1904) ................................................ 14
`
`Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the
`Administrative Constitution:
`The Lost One Hundred Years
`of American Administrative Law
`(2012) .............................................................. 11, 17
`
`Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in
`the Political Branches,
`107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 567 (2007) ....................... 9
`
`James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-
`Stripping and the Supreme Court’s
`Power to Supervise Inferior
`Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433,
`1446 & n.52 (2000) ................................................. 6
`
`
`
`xiii
`
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
`Data Visualization Center:
`Patents Dashboard,
`https://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/
`patents/ main.dashxml
`(last visited Oct. 26, 2017).................................... 35
`
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
`Maintenance Fee Statement,
`available via https://fees.uspto.gov/
`MaintenanceFees/fees/ details?
`applicationNumber=09373418&
`patentNumber=6179053
`(last visited Oct. 26, 2017).................................... 39
`
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
`Trial Statistics: IPR, PGR,
`CBM 5 (Sept. 2017), available
`at https://www.uspto.gov/ sites/
`default/files/documents/Trial_
`Stats_2017-09-30.pdf ............................................ 16
`
`U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
`U.S. Patent Activity: Calendar
`Years 1790 to the Present,
`https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/
`ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm
`(last visited Oct. 24, 2017).............................. 32, 34
`
`U.S. Patent No. 6,179,053 ......................................... 38
`
`
`
`xiv
`
`Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote
`the Progress of Useful Arts:
`American Patent Law and
`Administration, 1798–1836,
`at 1 (1998) ............................................................. 12
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`
`INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
`
`Amici curiae are law professors, specializing in
`administrative law, federal courts, and intellectual
`property law who have an interest in the efficient
`operation of the United States’ patent system in
`promoting technological advance in conformity with
`constitutional and other legal requirements. The
`views expressed
`in this brief represent their
`individual views and are not intended to represent
`the views of their states of residence or employment,
`their educational institutions, or any administrative
`subdivisions thereof.1 The names of amici are listed
`below, with institutional affiliations provided for
`purposes of identification.
`
`Dan L. Burk
`Chancellor’s Professor of Law
`University of California, Irvine, School of Law
`
`Christopher A. Cotropia
`Professor of Law
`University of Richmond School of Law
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1 No “counsel for a party authored th[is] brief in whole or in
`part,” and no such counsel or party “made a monetary
`contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
`the brief.” Sup. Ct. R. 37.6. Funds to support submission of the
`brief came
`from Professor Golden’s
`faculty development
`allowance at the University of Texas at Austin. The parties
`gave blanket consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs such as
`this one.
`
`
`
`2
`
`Samuel Estreicher
`Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law
`New York University School of Law
`
`John M. Golden
`Professor in Law
`The University of Texas at Austin
`
`Harold J. Krent
`Dean and Professor of Law
`Chicago-Kent College of Law
`
`Megan M. La Belle
`Professor of Law
`The Catholic University of America
`Columbus School of Law
`
`Thomas H. Lee
`Leitner Family Professor
`Fordham University School of Law
`
`Kali Murray
`Associate Professor of Law
`Marquette University Law School
`
`Xuan-Thao Nguyen
`Gerald L. Bepko Chair in Law
`Indiana University McKinney School of Law
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`3
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`A government’s grant of an invention patent
`does not create a core private property right
`immunized from administrative reexamination for
`compliance with statutory requirements. In Great
`Britain and the states of the early Republic, the
`sovereign retained the right to revoke invention
`patents. In the early United States, reliance on
`Article III courts to handle questions of the validity of
`issued patent rights reflected the general resources
`and
`comparative
`competences
`of government
`institutions, not constitutional mandate. Trial courts
`were better suited to fact-finding and evidence-taking
`regarding prior art than Congress or Cabinet officers.
`And like Britain’s Privy Council, which exercised its
`summary revocation power as late as 1779 and
`retained but did not exercise that power in the
`nineteenth century, Congress and Cabinet officers
`had other pressing responsibilities.
`
`Congress enacted inter partes review (IPR) as
`a mechanism to police patent validity in response to a
`choking multitude of issued patents (many including
`claims of dubious validity), an influx of several
`hundred thousand new patent applications per year,
`and aggressive practices of patent assertion. IPR is
`limited to giving the Patent and Trademark Office
`(PTO)
`authority
`to
`reexamine
`patentability
`requirements of novelty and nonobviousness for
`which the PTO has long been the gatekeeper prior to
`patent issuance. Questions of patent infringement or
`remedies for infringement are outside IPR’s domain.
`Further, Congress has provided for a robust right to
`
`
`
`4
`
`appeal a final decision in IPR to an Article III court:
`the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
`
`The PTO’s inter partes review of issued
`patents subject to judicial review does not violate
`Article III. The subject matter considered in IPR—
`whether specific patent claims satisfy statutory
`requirements of novelty and nonobviousness—
`concerns the validity of patent rights against the
`world and thus falls within the so-called “public
`rights” exception for non-Article III adjudication.
`Even if the traditional public rights exception does
`not
`apply,
`any
`lingering
`concerns
`about
`encroachment on Article III
`judicial power are
`answered by the existence of a right to an appeal to
`the Federal Circuit that is de novo on questions of
`law and meaningful on questions of fact.
`
`Finally, in 1980, Congress enacted not only
`requirements
`for maintenance
`fees, but also
`provisions for ex parte reexamination by the PTO of
`the same validity questions at issue in IPR today.
`Hence, as of 1980, inventors and their assignees had
`clear notice that, by applying for a patent, they would
`be participating voluntarily in a regulatory scheme
`under which the enforceability and validity of patent
`rights were subject
`to
`the PTO’s continuing
`jurisdiction. Since at least November 29, 1999, such
`persons had notice that, for patents resulting from
`applications filed after that date, any challenge to the
`results of a reexamination, whether ex parte or inter
`partes, would need to take the exclusive path of an
`appeal to the Federal Circuit.
`
`
`
`5
`
`In sum, by instituting IPR with a right of
`appeal
`to
`the Federal Circuit, Congress has
`maintained Article III judicial power while supplying
`an appropriate administrative response to systemic
`need.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`In interpreting the Constitution’s vesting of
`judicial Power of the United States”
`in
`“[t]he
`Article III courts, U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, this Court
`has recognized that “a matter of ‘public right’ … can
`be decided outside the Judicial Branch.” Stern v.
`Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 488 (2011). In applying this
`public rights doctrine, the Court has been attentive to
`historical understandings and practice. Murray’s
`Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
`(18 How.) 272, 277 (1855). The Court has also
`emphasized more practical concerns: “the extent to
`which the ‘essential attributes of judicial power’ are
`reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, the
`extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises
`the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested
`only in Article III courts, the origins and importance
`of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that
`drove”
`resort
`to non-Article
`III adjudication.
`Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478
`U.S. 833, 851 (1986).
` Finally, the Court has
`highlighted the potential relevance of parties’ consent
`to non-Article III adjudication.
` Wellness Int’l
`Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015).
`All of these considerations favor a conclusion that
`IPR does not violate Article III, most particularly as
`
`
`
`6
`
`applied to patents resulting from U.S. applications
`filed after November 29, 1999.
`
`I. AN INVENTION PATENT IS A SOVEREIGN
`GRANT OF RIGHTS TO EXCLUDE, NOT A
`COMMON-LAW PROPERTY RIGHT.
`
`In the Anglo-American legal order, a “patent”
`—more accurately “letters to be made patent”—is a
`sovereign government’s public announcement of a
`grant of an exclusive right to a private person.2
`These grants have historically included such diverse
`objects as government ranks or posts, lands for
`development and settlement, exclusive licenses for
`fishing in territorial waters or mining public lands,
`and exclusive rights in inventions. See James E.
`Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme
`Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78
`Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1446 & n.52 (2000). Prior to the
`founding, invention patents commonly granted rights
`to make or use an invention as well as to exclude
`others from such activities. See Oren Bracha,
`Owning Ideas: The Intellectual Origins of American
`Intellectual Property, 1790–1909, at 16–18 (2016).
`
`All patents are grants of exclusive right from
`the government to a person, but not all patents were
`
`
`2 “Letters patent” was the English translation of the Latin
`expression “literae patentes,” literally “open letters,” meaning a
`sovereign grant that was publicly proclaimed, by contrast to
`secret “literae clausae” or “closed letters.” See 2 William
`Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 346 (1766)
`(U. Chi. Press, 1979).
`
`
`
`7
`
`created equal as to the grantee’s rights. On one end
`was the land patent, which typically gave the grantee
`a permanent exclusive right to specified land. See,
`e.g., Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U. S. 668
`(1979) (detailing history of Congress’s “checkerboard”
`land grants to build a transcontinental railroad).
`Letters patent conveying land were thus essentially
`title transfers creating a traditional private property
`right. Congress’s power to confer land patents has
`neither a purpose nor a duration limitation. Instead,
`the Constitution simply states, “The Congress shall
`have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
`and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
`Property belonging to the United States.” U.S. Const.
`art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
`
`to grant
`In contrast, Congress’s power
`invention patents is limited in several respects. The
`U.S. Constitution provides Congress with power “[t]o
`promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
`securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
`the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
`Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This
`language authorizes grants of invention patents only
`“for limited Times.” Further, the grant is to be to an
`“Inventor[]” and in the service of “promot[ing] the
`Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. Const. art.
`I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper
`Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423 (1908) (“The patent law is
`the execution of a policy having its first expression in
`the Constitution ….”). And for relevant purposes, the
`“exclusive Right” is to “Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art.
`I, § 8, cl. 8.
`
`
`
`8
`
`The bases for such limitations on invention
`patents are not hard to grasp. Human innovation is
`cumulative:
`it
`is the nature of
`invention to
`comprehend and improve upon prior inventions and
`knowledge. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
`Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
`Perpetual patents could stifle innovation by leading
`to ever-increasing accumulations of exclusive rights.
`Likewise, without requirements of novelty and
`nonobviousness, patent claims might proliferate to
`cover matter already invented or slight variations
`thereto. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
`398, 427 (2007). Lack of a requirement of patent
`claim definiteness could leave patent rights in an
`invention with highly uncertain scope. See Nautilus,
`Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129
`(2014).
`
`But such requirements are often difficult to
`implement in practice. Words may fall short in
`describing new inventions. See Festo Corp. v.
`Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
`722, 731
`(2002).
` Assessment of novelty or
`nonobviousness may require laborious sifting through
`decades of prior art. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v.
`Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1452 (Fed. Cir.
`1984) (observing that, for purposes of assessing
`nonobviousness, the Patent Act “requires us to
`presume full knowledge by the inventor of the prior
`art in the field of his endeavor” (internal quotation
`marks
`and
`emphasis
`omitted)).
` Resulting
`uncertainty
`in scope and validity distinguishes
`patents for inventions from patents for subject matter
`with more readily determinable metes and bounds,
`
`
`
`9
`
`such as parcels of land. Consequently, even before
`the U.S. patent system approached its modern
`caseload of hundreds of
`thousands of patent
`applications each year, the Anglo-American legal
`order long recognized a continuing sovereign power to
`revoke invention patents mistakenly bestowed.
`
`The fact that, around the time of the United
`States’ founding, challenges to patent validity were
`frequently entertained by English common law courts
`does not entail the conclusion that invention patents
`were “core” private property rights in the Lockean
`sense of “natural rights that individuals would enjoy
`even in the absence of political society,” Caleb Nelson,
`Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L.
`Rev. 559, 567 (2007). The Constitution’s explicit
`tying of patents’ “exclusive Right[s]” to the public end
`of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful
`Arts” suggests the contrary. Core private rights have
`been contrasted to “ ‘privileges’ or ‘franchises’ ” that
`“were but means to carry out public ends.” Id. In the
`mid-nineteenth century, this Court characterized a
`patent as granting a “franchise … consist[ing]
`altogether in the right to exclude every one from the
`making, using, or vending the thing patented,
`without the permission of the patentee.” Bloomer v.
`McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852).
`
`Indeed, the right to exclude granted by letters
`patent did “not exist at common law.” Gayler v.
`Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 494 (1850). As Justice Thomas
`recently explained:
`
`Invention patents originated not as
`private property
`rights, but as
`royal
`
`
`
`10
`
`prerogatives. They could be issued and revoked
`only by the Crown, which sometimes used the
`patent to delegate governmental power to
`regulate an industry. Provoked by the Crown’s
`use of these so-called “monopoly patents” to
`promote private economic
`interests over
`innovation
`and
`beneficial
`commerce,
`Parliament enacted the Statute of Monopolies
`in 1624. But even under the regime that
`Parliament put in place, patents remained
`sovereign grants, issued, enforced, and revoked
`by the Privy Council. The Framers adopted a
`similar scheme.
`
`Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
`831, 847 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal
`citations omitted).
`
`It is unsurprising, then, that before the First
`Congress enacted the Patent Act of 1790, the
`established practice in the States was to grant patent
`rights by special statute. See Bruce W. Bugbee,
`Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law 102–
`103, 132–136 (1967). Under the 1790 Act and its
`successors, Congress generally delegated the task of
`granting patents to the Executive Branch. See, e.g.,
`35 U.S.C. § 151; Act of July 4, 1836, § 7, 5 Stat. 119;
`Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat 109–110.
`
`As noted above, the U.S. Constitution vests the
`Legislative Branch with power to grant a limited-
`time “exclusive Right” to a “Discovery.” Accordingly,
`Congress may extend a patent term in the public
`interest and may also repeal a patent upon
`
`
`
`11
`
`determining that there was in fact no “Discovery.”3
`Congress has occasionally passed statutes extending
`the terms of individual patents. See, e.g., Evans v.
`Eaton, 16 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 454, 506–507 (1818). The
`courts, however, were historically the forum for
`repeals of patents for non-compliance with statutory
`requirements.
` See Christopher Beauchamp,
`Repealing Patents 19–26
`(2017), available at
`http://ssrn.com/abstract=3044003.
`This
`was,
`presumably in part, because grounds for challenging
`the validity of an issued patent, such as the existence
`of invalidating prior art or an inadequate patent
`disclosure, see, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218,
`239
`(1832)—required
`scrutiny
`of
`written
`specifications and particularized fact-finding, tasks
`for which courts and juries were relatively well-suited
`in comparison to Congress. During this period,
`Congress “seemed to have little hesitation in using
`courts or judicial personnel as administrators.” Jerry
`L. Mashaw,
`Creating
`the
`Administrative
`Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of
`American Administrative Law 74 (2012).
`
`It would be anachronistic to infer from the
`absence of post-issuance review by a patent office and
`the leading role of courts in early validity challenges
`that Article III of the Constitution required the courts
`to play the role they did. It was a state of play keyed
`not to constitutional command, but rather to the
`
`
`3 We express no view on whether and under what circumstances
`such a repeal would constitute a “taking” requiring just
`compensation because that Fifth Amendment issue is not before
`the Court. Cf. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 585.
`
`
`
`12
`
`practical realities of a relatively bare-bones Executive
`Branch. The “Patent Board” established by the
`Patent Act of 1790 consisted of the Secretary of State,
`the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General, all of
`whom had other substantial responsibilities. Bruce
`W. Bugbee, Genesis of American Patent and
`Copyright Law 149–150 (1967). The influx of new
`patent applications soon overwhelmed this Board,
`and the result was congressional enactment in 1793
`of a pure registration system for patents that
`prevailed until 1836. Id. In that year, Congress
`created a Patent Office with professional examiners
`to check applications for compliance with statutory
`requirements such as novelty. See Edward C.
`Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful
`Arts: American Patent Law and Administration,
`1798–1836, at 1 (1998).
`
`With respect to repeals, the general American
`view at the time of the founding was apparently that
`a legislature had the power to cancel invention
`patents, just as it had the right to grant them. Oren
`Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American
`Intellectual Property, ch. 1, at 110 (2005) (S.J.D.
`diss., Harv. Univ.), available at https://law.utexas.edu/
`faculty/obracha/dissertation/. Multiple patents enacted
`by early state legislatures provided expressly for their
`repeal and specified payment to the patentee upon
`such action. Bugbee, supra, at 96–97, 100. In at
`least one instance, a state patent was repealed even
`in the absence of such a provision.4 P.J. Federico,
`
`
`4 See Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American
`Intellectual Property, ch. 1, at 110 (2005) (S.J.D. diss., Harv.
`
`
`
`13
`
`State Patents, 13 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 166, 172–173
`(1931) (discussing repeal in New York and repeal
`petitions in Pennsylvania). Compare 1798 N.Y. Laws
`215–216
`(repealing act granting “an exclusive
`privilege” to make and use a steamboat after
`concluding that the privilege was “justly forfeited”),
`with 1787 N.Y. Laws 472–473 (original grant).
`James Madison supported providing for repeal in
`advance, explaining:
`
`In all cases of monopoly, not excepting
`those specified in favor of authors & inventors,
`it would be well to reserve to the State, a