`(Slip Opinion)
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` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Per Curiam
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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` No. 17–333
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` O. JOHN BENISEK, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
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`LINDA H. LAMONE, ADMINISTRATOR,
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` MARYLAND STATE BOARD OF
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` ELECTIONS, ET AL.
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`ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
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`THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
`[June 18, 2018]
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`PER CURIAM.
`This appeal arises from the denial of a motion for a
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`preliminary injunction in the District Court. Appellants
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`are several Republican voters, plaintiffs below, who allege
`that Maryland’s Sixth Congressional District was gerry-
`mandered in 2011 for the purpose of retaliating against
`them for their political views.
`In May 2017, six years after the Maryland General
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`Assembly redrew the Sixth District, plaintiffs moved the
`District Court to enjoin Maryland’s election officials from
`holding congressional elections under the 2011 map. They
`asserted that “extend[ing] this constitutional offense”—
`i.e., the alleged gerrymander—“into the 2018 election
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`would be a manifest and irreparable injury.” Record in
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`No. 1:13–cv–3233, Doc. 177–1, p. 3. In order to allow time
`for the creation of a new districting map, plaintiffs urged
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`the District Court to enter a preliminary injunction by
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`August 18, 2017. Id., at 32.
`On August 24, 2017, the District Court denied plaintiffs’
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` BENISEK v. LAMONE
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`Per Curiam
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` motion and stayed further proceedings pending this
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` Court’s disposition of partisan gerrymandering claims in
`Gill v. Whitford, No. 16–1161. 266 F. Supp. 3d 799. The
`District Court found that plaintiffs had failed to show a
`likelihood of success on the merits sufficient to warrant a
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`Id., at 808–814. The District
`preliminary injunction.
`Court also held that it was “in no position to award
`[p]laintiffs the remedy they . . . requested on the timetable
`they . . . demanded.” Id., at 815. The court explained
`that, notwithstanding its “diligence in ruling on the pend-
`ing preliminary injunction motion (which has been a
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`priority for each member of this panel),” plaintiffs’ pro-
`posed August deadline for injunctive relief had “already
`come and gone.” Ibid.
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`In addition, the District Court emphasized that it was
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`concerned about “measuring the legality and constitution-
`ality of any redistricting plan in Maryland . . . according to
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`the proper legal standard.” Id., at 816. In the District
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`Court’s view, it would be “better equipped to make that
`legal determination and to chart a wise course for further
`proceedings” after this Court issued a decision in Gill.
`Ibid. Plaintiffs ask this Court to vacate the District
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`Court’s order and remand for further consideration of
`whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate.
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`We now note our jurisdiction and review the District
`Court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, keeping in
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`mind that a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary
`remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural
`Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 24 (2008). As
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` a matter of equitable discretion, a preliminary injunction
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` does not follow as a matter of course from a plaintiff ’s
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`showing of a likelihood of success on the merits. See id., at
`32. Rather, a court must also consider whether the mov-
`ant has shown “that he is likely to suffer irreparable
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`harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance
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`of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in
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` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Per Curiam
`the public interest.” Id., at 20.
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`Plaintiffs made no such showing below. Even if we
`assume—contrary to the findings of the District Court—
`that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their
`claims, the balance of equities and the public interest
`tilted against their request for a preliminary injunction.
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`First, a party requesting a preliminary injunction must
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`generally show reasonable diligence. Cf. Holmberg v.
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`Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 396 (1946). That is as true in
`election law cases as elsewhere. See Lucas v. Townsend,
` 486 U. S. 1301, 1305 (1988) (KENNEDY, J., in chambers);
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` Fishman v. Schaffer, 429 U. S. 1325, 1330 (1976) (Mar-
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`shall, J., in chambers). In this case, appellants did not
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`move for a preliminary injunction in the District Court
`until six years, and three general elections, after the 2011
`map was adopted, and over three years after the plaintiffs’
`first complaint was filed.
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`Plaintiffs argue that they have nevertheless pursued
`their claims diligently, and they attribute their delay in
`seeking a preliminary injunction to the “convoluted proce-
`dural history of the case” and the “dogged refusal to coop-
`erate in discovery” by state officials. Reply Brief 22. Yet
`the record suggests that the delay largely arose from a
`circumstance within plaintiffs’ control: namely, their
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`failure to plead the claims giving rise to their request for
`preliminary injunctive relief until 2016. Although one of
`the seven plaintiffs before us filed a complaint in 2013
`alleging that Maryland’s congressional map was an un-
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`constitutional gerrymander, that initial complaint did not
`present the retaliation theory asserted here. See Amended
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`Complaint, Doc. 11, p. 3 (Dec. 2, 2013) (explaining that
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`the gerrymandering claim did not turn upon “the reason
`or intent of the legislature” in adopting the map).
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`It was not until 2016 that the remaining plaintiffs
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`joined the case and filed an amended complaint alleging
`that Maryland officials intentionally retaliated against
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` BENISEK v. LAMONE
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`Per Curiam
`them because of their political views. See 3 App. 640–643.
`Plaintiffs’ newly presented claims—unlike the gerryman-
`dering claim presented in the 2013 complaint—required
`discovery into the motives of the officials who produced
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`the 2011 congressional map. See, e.g., Memorandum of
`Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, Doc. 111–
`1, p. 3 (Jan. 4, 2017) (describing plaintiffs’ demand that
`various state officials “testify . . . and answer questions
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`concerning legislative intent”). It is true that the asser-
`tion of legislative privilege by those officials delayed the
`completion of that discovery. See Joint Motion To Extend
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`Deadlines for Completion of Fact Discovery and Expert
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`Witness Disclosures, Doc. 161, pp. 1–2 (Mar. 3, 2017);
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`Joint Motion To Extend Deadlines for Completion of Fact
`Discovery and Expert Witness Disclosures, Doc. 170,
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`pp. 1–2 (Mar. 27, 2017). But that does not change the fact
`that plaintiffs could have sought a preliminary injunction
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`much earlier. See Fishman, supra, at 1330. In consider-
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`ing the balance of equities among the parties, we think
`that plaintiffs’ unnecessary, years-long delay in asking
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`for preliminary injunctive relief weighed against their
`request.
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`Second, a due regard for the public interest in orderly
`elections supported the District Court’s discretionary
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`decision to deny a preliminary injunction and to stay the
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` proceedings. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U. S. 1, 4–5
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`(2006) (per curiam). Plaintiffs themselves represented to
`the District Court that any injunctive relief would have to
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`be granted by August 18, 2017, to ensure the timely com-
`pletion of a new districting scheme in advance of the 2018
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`election season. Despite the District Court’s undisputedly
`diligent efforts, however, that date had “already come and
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`gone” by the time the court ruled on plaintiffs’ motion.
`266 F. Supp. 3d, at 815. (Such deadline has also, of
`course, long since passed for purposes of entering a pre-
`liminary injunction on remand from this Court.)
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` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Per Curiam
`On top of this time constraint was the legal uncertainty
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`surrounding any potential remedy for the plaintiffs’ as-
`serted injury. At the time the District Court made its
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`decision, the appeal in Gill was pending before this Court.
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`The District Court recognized that our decision in Gill had
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`the potential to “shed light on critical questions in this
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`case” and to set forth a “framework” by which plaintiffs’
`claims could be decided and, potentially, remedied. 266
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`F. Supp. 3d, at 815–816. In the District Court’s view,
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`“charging ahead” and adjudicating the plaintiffs’ claims in
`that fluctuating legal environment, when firmer guidance
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`from this Court might have been forthcoming, would have
`been a mistake. Id., at 816. Such a determination was
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`within the sound discretion of the District Court. Given
`the District Court’s decision to wait for this Court’s ruling
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`in Gill before further adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims, the
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`court reasonably could have concluded that a preliminary
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`injunction would have been against the public interest, as
`an injunction might have worked a needlessly “chaotic and
`disruptive effect upon the electoral process,” Fishman,
`supra, at 1330, and because the “purpose of a preliminary
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`injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of
`the parties until a trial on the merits can be held,” Univer-
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`sity of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U. S. 390, 395 (1981). In
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`these particular circumstances, we conclude that the
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`District Court’s decision denying a preliminary injunction
`cannot be regarded as an abuse of discretion.
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`The order of the District Court is
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`Affirmed.
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