`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2017
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`
`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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`
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`
` Syllabus
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`PEREIRA v. SESSIONS, ATTORNEY GENERAL
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FIRST CIRCUIT
` No. 17–459. Argued April 23, 2018—Decided June 21, 2018
`
`Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
`Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), nonpermanent residents who are subject to re-
`moval proceedings may be eligible for cancellation of removal if,
`
`
`among other things, they have “been physically present in the United
`
`
` States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately
`
` preceding the date of [an] application” for cancellation. 8 U. S. C.
`
` §1229(b)(1)(A). Under the stop-time rule, however, the period of con-
`tinuous presence is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a no-
`
` tice to appear under section 1229(a).” §1229(d)(1)(A). Section
`1229(a), in turn, provides that the Government shall serve nonciti-
`zens in removal proceedings with a written “ ‘notice to appear,’ ” spec-
`
`
`ifying, among other things, “[t]he time and place at which the [re-
`
`moval] proceedings will be held.” §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Per a 1997
`regulation stating that a “notice to appear” served on a noncitizen
`
`need only provide “the time, place and date of the initial removal
`
`
`hearing, where practicable,” 62 Fed. Reg. 10332, the Department of
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`Homeland Security (DHS), at least in recent years, almost always
`
`serves noncitizens with notices that fail to specify the time, place, or
`date of initial removal hearings whenever the agency deems it im-
`
`
`practicable to include such information. The Board of Immigration
`Appeals (BIA) has held that such notices trigger the stop-time rule
`even if they do not specify the time and date of the removal proceed-
`ings.
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`
`Petitioner Wescley Fonseca Pereira is a native and citizen of Brazil
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`who came to the United States in 2000 and remained after his visa
`expired. Following a 2006 arrest for operating a vehicle while under
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`the influence of alcohol, DHS served Pereira with a document titled
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`“notice to appear” that did not specify the date and time of his initial
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`2
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`PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
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`Syllabus
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`removal hearing, instead ordering him to appear at a time and date
`to be set in the future. More than a year later, in 2007, the Immigra-
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`tion Court mailed Pereira a more specific notice setting the date and
`time for his initial hearing, but the notice was sent to the wrong ad-
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`dress and was returned as undeliverable. As a result, Pereira failed
`to appear, and the Immigration Court ordered him removed in absen-
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`tia.
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`
`
`In 2013, Pereira was arrested for a minor motor vehicle violation
`
`and detained by DHS. The Immigration Court reopened the removal
`proceedings after Pereira demonstrated that he never received the
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`2007 notice. Pereira then applied for cancellation of removal, argu-
`
`ing that he had been continuously present in the United States for
`more than 10 years and that the stop-time rule was not triggered by
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`DHS’ initial 2006 notice because the document lacked information
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`about the time and date of his removal hearing. The Immigration
`Court disagreed and ordered Pereira removed. The BIA agreed with
`the Immigration Court that the 2006 notice triggered the stop-time
`rule, even though it failed to specify the time and date of Pereira’s in-
`
`itial removal hearing. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit de-
`
`nied Pereira’s petition for review of the BIA’s order. Applying the
`framework set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
`
`
`
`fense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, it held that the stop-time rule is
`ambiguous and that the BIA’s interpretation of the rule was a per-
`
`missible reading of the statute.
`
`Held: A putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific
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`time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a “notice
`to appear under §1229(a),” and so does not trigger the stop-time rule.
`
`Pp. 7–20.
`
`(a) The Court need not resort to Chevron deference, for the unam-
`biguous statutory text alone is enough to resolve this case. Under the
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`stop-time rule, “any period of . . . continuous physical presence” is
`“deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear under
`section 1229(a).” 8 U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1). By expressly referencing
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`§1229(a), the statute specifies where to look to find out what “notice
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`
`to appear” means. Section 1229(a), in turn, clarifies that the type of
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`notice “referred to as a ‘notice to appear’ ” throughout the statutory
`section is a “written notice . . . specifying,” as relevant here, “[t]he
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`time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.”
`§1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Thus, to trigger the stop-time rule, the Govern-
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`ment must serve a notice to appear that, at the very least,
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`“specif[ies]” the “time and place” of the removal hearing.
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`The Government and dissent point out that the stop-time rule re-
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`fers broadly to a notice to appear under “§1229(a)”—which includes
`paragraph (1), as well as paragraphs (2) and (3). But that does not
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`3
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`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Syllabus
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`matter, because only paragraph (1) bears on the meaning of a “notice
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`
`to appear.” If anything, paragraph (2), which allows for a “change or
`postponement” of the proceedings to a “new time and place,”
`§1229(a)(2)(A)(i), bolsters the Court’s interpretation of the statute be-
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`cause the provision presumes that the Government has already
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`served a “notice to appear” that specified a time and place as required
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`by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Another neighboring provision, §1229(b)(1),
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`lends further support for the view that a “notice to appear” must
`specify the time and place of removal proceedings to trigger the stop-
`time rule. Section 1229(b)(1) gives a noncitizen “the opportunity to
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`secure counsel before the first [removal] hearing date” by mandating
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`that such “hearing date shall not be scheduled earlier than 10 days
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`after the service of the notice to appear.” For that provision to have
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`any meaning, the “notice to appear” must specify the time and place
`that the noncitizen, and his counsel, must appear at the removal pro-
`ceedings. Finally, common sense reinforces the conclusion that a no-
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`tice that does not specify when and where to appear for a removal
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`proceeding is not a “notice to appear” that triggers the stop-time rule.
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`After all, an essential function of a “notice to appear” is to provide
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`noncitizens “notice” of the information (i.e., the “time” and “place”)
`that would enable them “to appear” at the removal hearing in the
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`first place. Without conveying such information, the Government
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`cannot reasonably expect noncitizens to appear for their removal pro-
`ceedings. Pp. 7–13.
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`(b) The Government and the dissent advance a litany of counterar-
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`guments, all of which are unpersuasive. To begin, the Government
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`mistakenly argues that §1229(a) is not definitional. That is wrong.
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`Section 1229(a) speaks in definitional terms, requiring that a notice
`to appear specify, among other things, the “time and place at which
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`the proceedings will be held.” As such, the dissent is misguided in
`arguing that a defective notice to appear, which fails to specify time-
`and-place information, is still a notice to appear for purposes of the
`stop-time rule. Equally unavailing is the Government’s (and the dis-
`
`sent’s) attempt to generate ambiguity in the statute based on the
`word “under.” In light of the plain language and statutory context,
`the word “under,” as used in the stop-time rule, clearly means “in ac-
`cordance with” or “according to” because it connects the stop-time
`trigger in §1229b(d)(1) to a “notice to appear” that specifies the enu-
`merated time-and-place information. The Government fares no bet-
`ter in arguing that surrounding statutory provisions reinforce its pre-
`ferred reading of the stop-time rule, as none of those provisions
`supports its atextual interpretation. Unable to root its reading in the
`statutory text, the Government and dissent raise a number of practi-
`cal concerns, but those concerns are meritless and do not justify de-
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`4
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`PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
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`Syllabus
`parting from the statute’s clear text. In a final attempt to salvage its
`atextual interpretation, the Government turns to the alleged statuto-
`ry purpose and legislative history of the stop-time rule. Even for
`those who consider statutory purpose and legislative history, howev-
`er, neither supports the Government’s position. Requiring the Gov-
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`ernment to furnish time-and-place information in a notice to appear
`is entirely consistent with Congress’ stated objective of preventing
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`noncitizens from exploiting administrative delays to accumulate
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`lengthier periods of continuous precedent. Pp. 13–20.
` 866 F. 3d 1, reversed and remanded.
`SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
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`
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`C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, KAGAN, and GORSUCH,
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`JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a
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`dissenting opinion.
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`1
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`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.
`Opinion of the Court
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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`
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 17–459
`_________________
` WESCLEY FONSECA PEREIRA, PETITIONER v.
`
`JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
`[June 21, 2018]
`JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
`Nonpermanent residents, like petitioner here, who are
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`subject to removal proceedings and have accrued 10 years
`of continuous physical presence in the United States, may
`be eligible for a form of discretionary relief known as
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`cancellation of removal. 8 U. S. C. §1229b(b)(1). Under
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`the so-called “stop-time rule” set forth in §1229b(d)(1)(A),
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`however, that period of continuous physical presence is
`“deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to
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`appear under section 1229(a).” Section 1229(a), in turn,
`provides that the Government shall serve noncitizens in
`removal proceedings with “written notice (in this section
`referred to as a ‘notice to appear’) . . . specifying” several
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`required pieces of information, including “[t]he time and
`place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.”
`§1229(a)(1)(G)(i).1
`
`The narrow question in this case lies at the intersection
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`
`
`——————
` 1The Court uses the term “noncitizen” throughout this opinion to
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`refer to any person who is not a citizen or national of the United States.
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` See 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(3).
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`2
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`PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
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`Opinion of the Court
`of those statutory provisions. If the Government serves a
`noncitizen with a document that is labeled “notice to
`appear,” but the document fails to specify either the time
`or place of the removal proceedings, does it trigger the
`
`stop-time rule? The answer is as obvious as it seems: No.
`A notice that does not inform a noncitizen when and
`where to appear for removal proceedings is not a “notice to
`appear under section 1229(a)” and therefore does not
`trigger the stop-time rule. The plain text, the statutory
`context, and common sense all lead inescapably and un-
`
`ambiguously to that conclusion.
`I
`
`A
`
`
`Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
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`Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009–546,
`the Attorney General of the United States has discretion
`to “cancel removal” and adjust the status of certain non-
`permanent residents. §1229b(b). To be eligible for such
`relief, a nonpermanent resident must meet certain enu-
`merated criteria, the relevant one here being that the
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`noncitizen must have “been physically present in the
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`United States for a continuous period of not less than 10
`years immediately preceding the date of [an] application”
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`for cancellation of removal. §1229b(b)(1)(A).2
`IIRIRA also established the stop-time rule at issue in
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`this case. Under that rule, “any period of . . . continuous
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`physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to
`end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear under
`section 1229(a) of this title.”3 §1229b(d)(1)(A). Section
`
`——————
`2Lawful permanent residents also may be eligible for cancellation of
`removal if, inter alia, they have continuously resided in the United
`States for at least seven years. §1229b(a)(2).
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` 3The period of continuous physical presence also stops if and when
`“the alien has committed” certain enumerated offenses that would
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`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Opinion of the Court
`1229(a), in turn, provides that “written notice (in this
`section referred to as a ‘notice to appear’) shall be given
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`. . . to the alien . . . specifying”:
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`“(A) The nature of the proceedings against the alien.
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`“(B) The legal authority under which the proceed-
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`ings are conducted.
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`“(C) The acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of
`law.
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`“(D) The charges against the alien and the statutory
`provisions alleged to have been violated.
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`“(E) The alien may be represented by counsel and
`the alien will be provided (i) a period of time to secure
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`counsel under subsection (b)(1) of this section and (ii)
`a current list of counsel prepared under subsection
`(b)(2) of this section.
`
`“(F)(i) The requirement that the alien must imme-
`diately provide (or have provided) the Attorney Gen-
`eral with a written record of an address and telephone
`number (if any) at which the alien may be contacted
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`respecting proceedings under section 1229a of this
`title.
`
`“(ii) The requirement that the alien must provide
`the Attorney General immediately with a written rec-
`ord of any change of the alien’s address or telephone
`number.
`
`“(iii) The consequences under section 1229a(b)(5) of
`this title of failure to provide address and telephone
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`information pursuant to this subparagraph.
`“(G)(i) The time and place at which the [re-
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`moval] proceedings will be held.
`“(ii) The consequences under section 1229a(b)(5) of
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`this title of the failure, except under exceptional cir-
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`——————
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`constitute grounds for removal or inadmissibility. §1229b(d)(1)(B).
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`That provision is not at issue here.
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`4
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` PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
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`Opinion of the Court
`to appear at
`such proceedings.”
`cumstances,
`§1229(a)(1) (boldface added).
`The statute also enables the Government to “change or
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`postpon[e] . . . the time and place of [the removal] proceed-
`ings.” §1229(a)(2)(A). To do so, the Government must give
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`the noncitizen “a written notice . . . specifying . . . the new
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`time or place of the proceedings” and “the consequences
`. . . of failing, except under exceptional circumstances, to
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`
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`attend such proceedings.” Ibid. The Government is not
`required to provide written notice of the change in time or
`place of the proceedings if the noncitizen is “not in deten-
`tion” and “has failed to provide [his] address” to the Gov-
`ernment. §1229(a)(2)(B).
`
`
`The consequences of a noncitizen’s failure to appear at a
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`removal proceeding can be quite severe. If a noncitizen
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`who has been properly served with the “written notice
`required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)”
`fails to appear at a removal proceeding, he “shall be or-
`
`dered removed in absentia” if the Government “establishes
`by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the
`written notice was so provided and that the alien is re-
`movable.” §1229a(b)(5)(A). Absent “exceptional circum-
`
`stances,” a noncitizen subject to an in absentia removal
`order is ineligible for some forms of discretionary relief for
`10 years if, “at the time of the notice described in para-
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`graph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a),” he “was provided oral
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`notice . . . of the time and place of the proceedings and of
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`the consequences” of failing to appear. §1229a(b)(7). In
`certain limited circumstances, however, a removal order
`entered in absentia may be rescinded—e.g., when the
`noncitizen “demonstrates that [he] did not receive notice
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`in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).”
`§1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
`
`
`
`
`
`B
`
`In 1997, shortly after Congress passed IIRIRA, the
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` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Opinion of the Court
`Attorney General promulgated a regulation stating that a
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`“notice to appear” served on a noncitizen need only provide
`“the time, place and date of the initial removal hearing,
`where practicable.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10332 (1997). Per that
`
`regulation, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
`
`at least in recent years, almost always serves noncitizens
`with notices that fail to specify the time, place, or date of
`
`initial removal hearings whenever the agency deems it
`impracticable to include such information. See Brief for
`Petitioner 14; Brief for Respondent 48–49; Tr. of Oral Arg.
`
`
`52–53 (Government’s admission that “almost 100 percent”
`of “notices to appear omit the time and date of the pro-
`ceeding over the last three years”). Instead, these notices
`state that the times, places, or dates of the initial hearings
`are “to be determined.” Brief for Petitioner 14.
`In Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (2011), the
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`Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) addressed whether
`such notices trigger the stop-time rule even if they do not
`specify the time and date of the removal proceedings. The
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`BIA concluded that they do. Id., at 651. It reasoned that
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`the statutory phrase “notice to appear ‘under section
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`[1229](a)’” in the stop-time rule “merely specifies the
`document the DHS must serve on the alien to trigger the
`‘stop-time’ rule,” but otherwise imposes no “substantive
`requirements” as to what information that document must
`include to trigger the stop-time rule. Id., at 647.
`C
`
`Petitioner Wescley Fonseca Pereira is a native and
`citizen of Brazil. In 2000, at age 19, he was admitted to
`the United States as a temporary “non-immigrant visitor.”
`App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. After his visa expired, he re-
`mained in the United States. Pereira is married and has
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`two young daughters, both of whom are United States
`citizens. He works as a handyman and, according to
`submissions before the Immigration Court, is a well-
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`5
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` PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
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`Opinion of the Court
`respected member of his community.
`
`In 2006, Pereira was arrested in Massachusetts for
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`operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
`
`On May 31, 2006, while Pereira was detained, DHS served
`him (in person) with a document labeled “Notice to Ap-
`pear.” App. 7–13. That putative notice charged Pereira as
`removable for overstaying his visa, informed him that
`“removal proceedings” were being initiated against him,
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`and provided him with information about the “[c]onduct of
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`the hearing” and the consequences for failing to appear.
`Id., at 7, 10–12. Critical here, the notice did not specify
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`the date and time of Pereira’s removal hearing. Instead, it
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`ordered him to appear before an Immigration Judge in
`Boston “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” Id., at 9
`
`
`(underlining in original).
`More than a year later, on August 9, 2007, DHS filed
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`the 2006 notice with the Boston Immigration Court. The
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`Immigration Court thereafter attempted to mail Pereira a
`more specific notice setting the date and time for his ini-
`tial removal hearing for October 31, 2007, at 9:30 a.m.
`
`But that second notice was sent to Pereira’s street address
`rather than his post office box (which he had provided to
`DHS), so it was returned as undeliverable. Because Pe-
`
`reira never received notice of the time and date of his re-
`moval hearing, he failed to appear, and the Immigration
`
`Court ordered him removed in absentia. Unaware of that re-
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`moval order, Pereira remained in the United States.
`In 2013, after Pereira had been in the country for more
`
`
`than 10 years, he was arrested for a minor motor vehicle
`violation (driving without his headlights on) and was
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`subsequently detained by DHS. The Immigration Court
`reopened the removal proceedings after Pereira demon-
`strated that he never received the Immigration Court’s
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`2007 notice setting out the specific date and time of his
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`hearing. Pereira then applied for cancellation of removal,
`arguing that the stop-time rule was not triggered by DHS’
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`6
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`7
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` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`initial 2006 notice because the document lacked infor-
`mation about the time and date of his removal hearing.
`
`
`The Immigration Court disagreed, finding the law “quite
`settled that DHS need not put a date certain on the Notice
`
`
`to Appear in order to make that document effective.” App.
`to Pet. for Cert. 23a. The Immigration Court therefore
`concluded that Pereira could not meet the 10-year physical-
`presence requirement under §1229b(b), thereby render-
`
`ing him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal,
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`and ordered Pereira removed from the country. The
`BIA dismissed Pereira’s appeal. Adhering to its precedent
`in Camarillo, the BIA agreed with the Immigration Court
`
`that the 2006 notice triggered the stop-time rule and that
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`Pereira thus failed to satisfy the 10-year physical-presence
`requirement and was ineligible for cancellation of removal.
`
`The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied Perei-
`ra’s petition for review of the BIA’s order. 866 F. 3d 1
`(2017). Applying the framework set forth in Chevron
`U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
`
`467 U. S. 837 (1984), the Court of Appeals first found that
`
`the stop-time rule in §1229b(d)(1) is ambiguous because it
`“does not explicitly state that the date and time of the
`hearing must be included in a notice to appear in order to
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`cut off an alien’s period of continuous physical presence.”
`866 F. 3d, at 5. Then, after reviewing the statutory text
`and structure, the administrative context, and pertinent
`legislative history, the Court of Appeals held that the
`BIA’s interpretation of the stop-time rule was a permissi-
`ble reading of the statute. Id., at 6–8.
`
`II
`
`A
`
`
`The Court granted certiorari in this case, 583 U. S. ___
`(2018), to resolve division among the Courts of Appeals on
`a simple, but important, question of statutory interpreta-
`tion: Does service of a document styled as a “notice to
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` in
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`PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
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`Opinion of the Court
`listed”
`items
`appear” that fails to specify “the
`
` §1229(a)(1) trigger the stop-time rule?4 Pet. for Cert. i.
`As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the question
`
`presented by Pereira, which focuses on all “items listed” in
`§1229(a)(1), sweeps more broadly than necessary to re-
`solve the particular case before us. Although the time-
`and-place information in a notice to appear will vary from
`
`case to case, the Government acknowledges that “[m]uch
`of the information Section 1229(a)(1) calls for does not”
`
`change and is therefore “included in standardized lan-
`guage on the I–862 notice-to-appear form.” Brief for Re-
`spondent 36 (referencing 8 U. S. C. §§1229(a)(1)(A)–(B),
`
`(E)–(F), and (G)(ii)). In fact, the Government’s 2006 notice
`to Pereira included all of the information required by
`
`§1229(a)(1), except it failed to specify the date and time of
`Pereira’s removal proceedings. See App. 10–12. Accord-
`ingly, the dispositive question in this case is much nar-
`rower, but no less vital: Does a “notice to appear” that does
`
`not specify the “time and place at which the proceedings
`will be held,” as required by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i), trigger the
`stop-time rule?5
`
`——————
` 4Compare Orozco-Velasquez v. Attorney General United States, 817
`
`F. 3d 78, 83–84 (CA3 2016) (holding that the stop-time rule unambigu-
`
`ously requires service of a “notice to appear” that meets §1229(a)(1)’s
`
` requirements), with Moscoso-Castellanos v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1079, 1083
`
`
`(CA9 2015) (finding the statute ambiguous and deferring to the BIA’s
`interpretation); O’Garro v. United States Atty. Gen., 605 Fed. Appx.
`951, 953 (CA11 2015) (per curiam) (same); Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch,
`786 F. 3d 235, 239–240 (CA2 2015) (per curiam) (same); Gonzalez-
`
`Garcia v. Holder, 770 F. 3d 431, 434–435 (CA6 2014) (same); Yi Di
`
`Wang v. Holder, 759 F. 3d 670, 674–675 (CA7 2014) (same); Urbina v.
`Holder, 745 F. 3d 736, 740 (CA4 2014) (same).
`5The Court leaves for another day whether a putative notice to ap-
`
` pear that omits any of the other categories of information enumerated
`
` in §1229(a)(1) triggers the stop-time rule. Contrary to the dissent’s
`assertion, this exercise of judicial restraint is by no means “tantamount
`to admitting” that the Government’s (and dissent’s) atextual interpre-
`
`
`8
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`9
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`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` In addressing that narrower question, the Court need
`
`
`
` not resort to Chevron deference, as some lower courts have
`done, for Congress has supplied a clear and unambiguous
`answer to the interpretive question at hand. See 467
`U. S., at 842–843 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that
`
`is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
`
`must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
`
`of Congress”). A putative notice to appear that fails to
`designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen’s
`removal proceedings is not a “notice to appear under
`section 1229(a),” and so does not trigger the stop-time
`rule.
`
`
`
`B
`The statutory text alone is enough to resolve this case.
`
`Under the stop-time rule, “any period of . . . continuous
`physical presence” is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is
`served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).” 8
`
`U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1). By expressly referencing §1229(a),
`the statute specifies where to look to find out what “notice
`
`to appear” means. Section 1229(a), in turn, clarifies that
`the type of notice “referred to as a ‘notice to appear’”
`throughout the statutory section is a “written notice . . .
`specifying,” as relevant here, “[t]he time and place at
`
`which
`the
`[removal] proceedings will be held.”
`§1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Thus, based on the plain text of the
`
`statute, it is clear that to trigger the stop-time rule, the
`Government must serve a notice to appear that, at the
`very least, “specif[ies]” the “time and place” of the removal
`proceedings.
`
`
`It is true, as the Government and dissent point out, that
`
`the stop-time rule makes broad reference to a notice to
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`
`tation is a permissible construction of the statute. Post, at 10 (opinion
`
`
`of ALITO, J.).
`
`
`
`
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` PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`appear under “section 1229(a),” which includes para-
`graph (1), as well as paragraphs (2) and (3). See Brief for
`Respondent 27–28; post, at 5–6 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But
`
`the broad reference to §1229(a) is of no consequence, be-
`
`cause, as even the Government concedes, only paragraph
`(1) bears on the meaning of a “notice to appear.” Brief for
`Respondent 27. By contrast, paragraph (2) governs the
`
`“[n]otice of change in time or place of proceedings,” and
`paragraph (3) provides for a system to record noncitizens’
`addresses and phone numbers. Nowhere else within
`§1229(a) does the statute purport to delineate the re-
`quirements of a “notice to appear.” In fact, the term “no-
`tice to appear” appears only in paragraph (1) of §1229(a).
`
`If anything, paragraph (2) of §1229(a) actually bolsters
`
`
`the Court’s interpretation of the statute. Paragraph (2)
`
`provides that, “in the case of any change or postponement
`in the time and place of [removal] proceedings,” the Gov-
`ernment shall give the noncitizen “written notice . . .
`specifying . . . the new time or place of the proceedings.”
`§1229(a)(2)(A)(i). By allowing for a “change or postpone-
`ment” of the proceedings to a “new time or place,” para-
`
`graph (2) presumes that the Government has already
`served a “notice to appear under section 1229(a)” that
`
`specified a time and place as required by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).
`Otherwise, there would be no time or place to “change or
`postpon[e].” §1229(a)(2). Notably, the dissent concedes
`
`that paragraph (2) confirms that a notice to appear must
`“state the ‘time and place’ of the removal proceeding as
`required by §1229(a)(1).’” Post, at 13. The dissent never-
`
`theless retorts that this point is “entirely irrelevant.” Ibid.
`Not so. Paragraph (2) clearly reinforces the conclusion
`that
`“a notice
`to appear under section 1229(a),”
`§1229b(d)(1), must include at least the time and place of
`the removal proceedings to trigger the stop-time rule.
`
`Another neighboring statutory provision lends further
`contextual support for the view that a “notice to appear”
`
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`
`
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`
`10
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`11
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`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`must include the time and place of the removal proceed-
`ings to trigger the stop-time rule. Section 1229(b)(1) gives
`a noncitizen “the opportunity to secure counsel before the
`first [removal] hearing date” by mandating that such
`
`“hearing date shall not be scheduled earlier than 10 days
`after the service of the notice to appear.” For §1229(b)(1)
`to have any meaning, the “notice to appear” must specify
`the time and place that the noncitizen, and his counsel,
`must appear at the removal hearing. Otherwise, the
`Government could serve a document labeled “notice to
`appear” without listing the time and location of the hear-
`ing and then, years down the line, provide that infor-
`mation a day before the removal hearing when it becomes
`available. Under that view of the statute, a noncitizen
`
`theoretically would have had the “opportunity to secure
`counsel,” but that opportunity will not be meaningful if,
`
`given the absence of a specified time and place, the noncit-
`
`izen has minimal time and incentive to plan accordingly,
`
`and his counsel, in turn, receives limited notice and time
`to prepare adequately. It therefore follows that, if a “no-
`
`tice to appear” for purposes of §1229(b)(1) must include
`the time-and-place information, a “notice to appear” for
`purposes of the stop-time rule under §1229b(d)(1) must as
`well. After all, “it is a normal rule of statutory construc-
`tion that identical words used in different parts of the
`
`same act are intended to have the same meaning.”
`
`Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 571
`
`(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).6
`——————
`6The dissent argues that, if a notice to appear must furnish time-and-
`
`place information, the Government “may be forced by the Court’s
`
`interpretation to guess that the hearing will take place far in the
`
`future, only to learn shortly afterwards that the hearing is in fact
`
`imminent.” Post, at 14. In such a scenario, the dissent hypothesizes, a
`
`noncitizen would be “lulled into a false sense of security” and thus
`would have little meaningful opportunity to secure counsel and prepare
`
`
`
`
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`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`12
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`PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
` Finally, common sense compels the conclusion that a
`notice that does not specify when and where to appear for
`a removal proceeding is not a “notice to appear” that trig-
`gers the stop-time rule. If the three words “notice to ap-
`pear” mean anything in this context, they must mean that,
`
`at a minimum, the Government has to provide noncitizens
`“notice” of the information, i.e., the “time” and “place,” that
`
`would enable them “to appear” at the removal hearing in
`
`the first place. Conveying such time-and-place infor-
`mation to a noncitizen is an essential function of a notice
`
`to appear, for wi