throbber

`(Slip Opinion)
`
`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2017
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`1
`
` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
`
` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`
`
`PEREIRA v. SESSIONS, ATTORNEY GENERAL
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE FIRST CIRCUIT
` No. 17–459. Argued April 23, 2018—Decided June 21, 2018
`
`Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
`Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), nonpermanent residents who are subject to re-
`moval proceedings may be eligible for cancellation of removal if,
`
`
`among other things, they have “been physically present in the United
`
`
` States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately
`
` preceding the date of [an] application” for cancellation. 8 U. S. C.
`
` §1229(b)(1)(A). Under the stop-time rule, however, the period of con-
`tinuous presence is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a no-
`
` tice to appear under section 1229(a).” §1229(d)(1)(A). Section
`1229(a), in turn, provides that the Government shall serve nonciti-
`zens in removal proceedings with a written “ ‘notice to appear,’ ” spec-
`
`
`ifying, among other things, “[t]he time and place at which the [re-
`
`moval] proceedings will be held.” §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Per a 1997
`regulation stating that a “notice to appear” served on a noncitizen
`
`need only provide “the time, place and date of the initial removal
`
`
`hearing, where practicable,” 62 Fed. Reg. 10332, the Department of
`
`
`Homeland Security (DHS), at least in recent years, almost always
`
`serves noncitizens with notices that fail to specify the time, place, or
`date of initial removal hearings whenever the agency deems it im-
`
`
`practicable to include such information. The Board of Immigration
`Appeals (BIA) has held that such notices trigger the stop-time rule
`even if they do not specify the time and date of the removal proceed-
`ings.
`
`
`Petitioner Wescley Fonseca Pereira is a native and citizen of Brazil
`
`who came to the United States in 2000 and remained after his visa
`expired. Following a 2006 arrest for operating a vehicle while under
`
`the influence of alcohol, DHS served Pereira with a document titled
`
`“notice to appear” that did not specify the date and time of his initial
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`
`
`PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`
`removal hearing, instead ordering him to appear at a time and date
`to be set in the future. More than a year later, in 2007, the Immigra-
`
`tion Court mailed Pereira a more specific notice setting the date and
`time for his initial hearing, but the notice was sent to the wrong ad-
`
`dress and was returned as undeliverable. As a result, Pereira failed
`to appear, and the Immigration Court ordered him removed in absen-
`
`tia.
`
`
`
`In 2013, Pereira was arrested for a minor motor vehicle violation
`
`and detained by DHS. The Immigration Court reopened the removal
`proceedings after Pereira demonstrated that he never received the
`
`2007 notice. Pereira then applied for cancellation of removal, argu-
`
`ing that he had been continuously present in the United States for
`more than 10 years and that the stop-time rule was not triggered by
`
`DHS’ initial 2006 notice because the document lacked information
`
`about the time and date of his removal hearing. The Immigration
`Court disagreed and ordered Pereira removed. The BIA agreed with
`the Immigration Court that the 2006 notice triggered the stop-time
`rule, even though it failed to specify the time and date of Pereira’s in-
`
`itial removal hearing. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit de-
`
`nied Pereira’s petition for review of the BIA’s order. Applying the
`framework set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
`
`
`
`fense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, it held that the stop-time rule is
`ambiguous and that the BIA’s interpretation of the rule was a per-
`
`missible reading of the statute.
`
`Held: A putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific
`
`time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a “notice
`to appear under §1229(a),” and so does not trigger the stop-time rule.
`
`Pp. 7–20.
`
`(a) The Court need not resort to Chevron deference, for the unam-
`biguous statutory text alone is enough to resolve this case. Under the
`
`stop-time rule, “any period of . . . continuous physical presence” is
`“deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear under
`section 1229(a).” 8 U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1). By expressly referencing
`
`§1229(a), the statute specifies where to look to find out what “notice
`
`
`to appear” means. Section 1229(a), in turn, clarifies that the type of
`
`notice “referred to as a ‘notice to appear’ ” throughout the statutory
`section is a “written notice . . . specifying,” as relevant here, “[t]he
`
`time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.”
`§1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Thus, to trigger the stop-time rule, the Govern-
`
`ment must serve a notice to appear that, at the very least,
`
`“specif[ies]” the “time and place” of the removal hearing.
`
`The Government and dissent point out that the stop-time rule re-
`
`
`fers broadly to a notice to appear under “§1229(a)”—which includes
`paragraph (1), as well as paragraphs (2) and (3). But that does not
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`
`
`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`
`Syllabus
`
`
`matter, because only paragraph (1) bears on the meaning of a “notice
`
`
`to appear.” If anything, paragraph (2), which allows for a “change or
`postponement” of the proceedings to a “new time and place,”
`§1229(a)(2)(A)(i), bolsters the Court’s interpretation of the statute be-
`
`cause the provision presumes that the Government has already
`
`served a “notice to appear” that specified a time and place as required
`
`by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Another neighboring provision, §1229(b)(1),
`
`
`
`lends further support for the view that a “notice to appear” must
`specify the time and place of removal proceedings to trigger the stop-
`time rule. Section 1229(b)(1) gives a noncitizen “the opportunity to
`
`
`secure counsel before the first [removal] hearing date” by mandating
`
`that such “hearing date shall not be scheduled earlier than 10 days
`
`after the service of the notice to appear.” For that provision to have
`
`any meaning, the “notice to appear” must specify the time and place
`that the noncitizen, and his counsel, must appear at the removal pro-
`ceedings. Finally, common sense reinforces the conclusion that a no-
`
`
`tice that does not specify when and where to appear for a removal
`
`proceeding is not a “notice to appear” that triggers the stop-time rule.
`
`After all, an essential function of a “notice to appear” is to provide
`
`noncitizens “notice” of the information (i.e., the “time” and “place”)
`that would enable them “to appear” at the removal hearing in the
`
`first place. Without conveying such information, the Government
`
`cannot reasonably expect noncitizens to appear for their removal pro-
`ceedings. Pp. 7–13.
`
`(b) The Government and the dissent advance a litany of counterar-
`
`guments, all of which are unpersuasive. To begin, the Government
`
`mistakenly argues that §1229(a) is not definitional. That is wrong.
`
`
`Section 1229(a) speaks in definitional terms, requiring that a notice
`to appear specify, among other things, the “time and place at which
`
`
`the proceedings will be held.” As such, the dissent is misguided in
`arguing that a defective notice to appear, which fails to specify time-
`and-place information, is still a notice to appear for purposes of the
`stop-time rule. Equally unavailing is the Government’s (and the dis-
`
`sent’s) attempt to generate ambiguity in the statute based on the
`word “under.” In light of the plain language and statutory context,
`the word “under,” as used in the stop-time rule, clearly means “in ac-
`cordance with” or “according to” because it connects the stop-time
`trigger in §1229b(d)(1) to a “notice to appear” that specifies the enu-
`merated time-and-place information. The Government fares no bet-
`ter in arguing that surrounding statutory provisions reinforce its pre-
`ferred reading of the stop-time rule, as none of those provisions
`supports its atextual interpretation. Unable to root its reading in the
`statutory text, the Government and dissent raise a number of practi-
`cal concerns, but those concerns are meritless and do not justify de-
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`4
`
`
`
`
`PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
`
`
`Syllabus
`parting from the statute’s clear text. In a final attempt to salvage its
`atextual interpretation, the Government turns to the alleged statuto-
`ry purpose and legislative history of the stop-time rule. Even for
`those who consider statutory purpose and legislative history, howev-
`er, neither supports the Government’s position. Requiring the Gov-
`
`ernment to furnish time-and-place information in a notice to appear
`is entirely consistent with Congress’ stated objective of preventing
`
`noncitizens from exploiting administrative delays to accumulate
`
`lengthier periods of continuous precedent. Pp. 13–20.
` 866 F. 3d 1, reversed and remanded.
`SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
`
`
`
`C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, KAGAN, and GORSUCH,
`
`
`
`
`JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a
`
`
`
`dissenting opinion.
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`1
`
`
`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.
`Opinion of the Court
`
` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
`
`
`
` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
`
` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
`
` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
`
`
` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
`
`
`
`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 17–459
`_________________
` WESCLEY FONSECA PEREIRA, PETITIONER v.
`
`JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
`[June 21, 2018]
`JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
`Nonpermanent residents, like petitioner here, who are
`
`subject to removal proceedings and have accrued 10 years
`of continuous physical presence in the United States, may
`be eligible for a form of discretionary relief known as
`
`cancellation of removal. 8 U. S. C. §1229b(b)(1). Under
`
`the so-called “stop-time rule” set forth in §1229b(d)(1)(A),
`
`however, that period of continuous physical presence is
`“deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to
`
`appear under section 1229(a).” Section 1229(a), in turn,
`provides that the Government shall serve noncitizens in
`removal proceedings with “written notice (in this section
`referred to as a ‘notice to appear’) . . . specifying” several
`
`required pieces of information, including “[t]he time and
`place at which the [removal] proceedings will be held.”
`§1229(a)(1)(G)(i).1
`
`The narrow question in this case lies at the intersection
`
`
`
`——————
` 1The Court uses the term “noncitizen” throughout this opinion to
`
`refer to any person who is not a citizen or national of the United States.
`
` See 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(3).
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`2
`
`
`
`
`PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`of those statutory provisions. If the Government serves a
`noncitizen with a document that is labeled “notice to
`appear,” but the document fails to specify either the time
`or place of the removal proceedings, does it trigger the
`
`stop-time rule? The answer is as obvious as it seems: No.
`A notice that does not inform a noncitizen when and
`where to appear for removal proceedings is not a “notice to
`appear under section 1229(a)” and therefore does not
`trigger the stop-time rule. The plain text, the statutory
`context, and common sense all lead inescapably and un-
`
`ambiguously to that conclusion.
`I
`
`A
`
`
`Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
`
`Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009–546,
`the Attorney General of the United States has discretion
`to “cancel removal” and adjust the status of certain non-
`permanent residents. §1229b(b). To be eligible for such
`relief, a nonpermanent resident must meet certain enu-
`merated criteria, the relevant one here being that the
`
`noncitizen must have “been physically present in the
`
`United States for a continuous period of not less than 10
`years immediately preceding the date of [an] application”
`
`for cancellation of removal. §1229b(b)(1)(A).2
`IIRIRA also established the stop-time rule at issue in
`
`this case. Under that rule, “any period of . . . continuous
`
`physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to
`end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear under
`section 1229(a) of this title.”3 §1229b(d)(1)(A). Section
`
`——————
`2Lawful permanent residents also may be eligible for cancellation of
`removal if, inter alia, they have continuously resided in the United
`States for at least seven years. §1229b(a)(2).
`
`
` 3The period of continuous physical presence also stops if and when
`“the alien has committed” certain enumerated offenses that would
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`3
`
`
`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`1229(a), in turn, provides that “written notice (in this
`section referred to as a ‘notice to appear’) shall be given
`
`. . . to the alien . . . specifying”:
`
`
`“(A) The nature of the proceedings against the alien.
`
`“(B) The legal authority under which the proceed-
`
`ings are conducted.
`
`“(C) The acts or conduct alleged to be in violation of
`law.
`
`“(D) The charges against the alien and the statutory
`provisions alleged to have been violated.
`
`
`“(E) The alien may be represented by counsel and
`the alien will be provided (i) a period of time to secure
`
`counsel under subsection (b)(1) of this section and (ii)
`a current list of counsel prepared under subsection
`(b)(2) of this section.
`
`“(F)(i) The requirement that the alien must imme-
`diately provide (or have provided) the Attorney Gen-
`eral with a written record of an address and telephone
`number (if any) at which the alien may be contacted
`
`respecting proceedings under section 1229a of this
`title.
`
`“(ii) The requirement that the alien must provide
`the Attorney General immediately with a written rec-
`ord of any change of the alien’s address or telephone
`number.
`
`“(iii) The consequences under section 1229a(b)(5) of
`this title of failure to provide address and telephone
`
`information pursuant to this subparagraph.
`“(G)(i) The time and place at which the [re-
`
`
`moval] proceedings will be held.
`“(ii) The consequences under section 1229a(b)(5) of
`
`this title of the failure, except under exceptional cir-
`
`
`——————
`
`constitute grounds for removal or inadmissibility. §1229b(d)(1)(B).
`
`
`
`That provision is not at issue here.
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`4
`
`
`
`
`
`
` PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`to appear at
`such proceedings.”
`cumstances,
`§1229(a)(1) (boldface added).
`The statute also enables the Government to “change or
`
`postpon[e] . . . the time and place of [the removal] proceed-
`ings.” §1229(a)(2)(A). To do so, the Government must give
`
`the noncitizen “a written notice . . . specifying . . . the new
`
`time or place of the proceedings” and “the consequences
`. . . of failing, except under exceptional circumstances, to
`
`
`
`attend such proceedings.” Ibid. The Government is not
`required to provide written notice of the change in time or
`place of the proceedings if the noncitizen is “not in deten-
`tion” and “has failed to provide [his] address” to the Gov-
`ernment. §1229(a)(2)(B).
`
`
`The consequences of a noncitizen’s failure to appear at a
`
`
`removal proceeding can be quite severe. If a noncitizen
`
`who has been properly served with the “written notice
`required under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)”
`fails to appear at a removal proceeding, he “shall be or-
`
`dered removed in absentia” if the Government “establishes
`by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the
`written notice was so provided and that the alien is re-
`movable.” §1229a(b)(5)(A). Absent “exceptional circum-
`
`stances,” a noncitizen subject to an in absentia removal
`order is ineligible for some forms of discretionary relief for
`10 years if, “at the time of the notice described in para-
`
`graph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a),” he “was provided oral
`
`notice . . . of the time and place of the proceedings and of
`
`the consequences” of failing to appear. §1229a(b)(7). In
`certain limited circumstances, however, a removal order
`entered in absentia may be rescinded—e.g., when the
`noncitizen “demonstrates that [he] did not receive notice
`
`in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).”
`§1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
`
`
`
`
`
`B
`
`In 1997, shortly after Congress passed IIRIRA, the
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Attorney General promulgated a regulation stating that a
`
`“notice to appear” served on a noncitizen need only provide
`“the time, place and date of the initial removal hearing,
`where practicable.” 62 Fed. Reg. 10332 (1997). Per that
`
`regulation, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
`
`at least in recent years, almost always serves noncitizens
`with notices that fail to specify the time, place, or date of
`
`initial removal hearings whenever the agency deems it
`impracticable to include such information. See Brief for
`Petitioner 14; Brief for Respondent 48–49; Tr. of Oral Arg.
`
`
`52–53 (Government’s admission that “almost 100 percent”
`of “notices to appear omit the time and date of the pro-
`ceeding over the last three years”). Instead, these notices
`state that the times, places, or dates of the initial hearings
`are “to be determined.” Brief for Petitioner 14.
`In Matter of Camarillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (2011), the
`
`Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) addressed whether
`such notices trigger the stop-time rule even if they do not
`specify the time and date of the removal proceedings. The
`
`BIA concluded that they do. Id., at 651. It reasoned that
`
`the statutory phrase “notice to appear ‘under section
`
`[1229](a)’” in the stop-time rule “merely specifies the
`document the DHS must serve on the alien to trigger the
`‘stop-time’ rule,” but otherwise imposes no “substantive
`requirements” as to what information that document must
`include to trigger the stop-time rule. Id., at 647.
`C
`
`Petitioner Wescley Fonseca Pereira is a native and
`citizen of Brazil. In 2000, at age 19, he was admitted to
`the United States as a temporary “non-immigrant visitor.”
`App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a. After his visa expired, he re-
`mained in the United States. Pereira is married and has
`
`two young daughters, both of whom are United States
`citizens. He works as a handyman and, according to
`submissions before the Immigration Court, is a well-
`
`5
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`
`
` PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`respected member of his community.
`
`In 2006, Pereira was arrested in Massachusetts for
`
`operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
`
`On May 31, 2006, while Pereira was detained, DHS served
`him (in person) with a document labeled “Notice to Ap-
`pear.” App. 7–13. That putative notice charged Pereira as
`removable for overstaying his visa, informed him that
`“removal proceedings” were being initiated against him,
`
`and provided him with information about the “[c]onduct of
`
`the hearing” and the consequences for failing to appear.
`Id., at 7, 10–12. Critical here, the notice did not specify
`
`the date and time of Pereira’s removal hearing. Instead, it
`
`ordered him to appear before an Immigration Judge in
`Boston “on a date to be set at a time to be set.” Id., at 9
`
`
`(underlining in original).
`More than a year later, on August 9, 2007, DHS filed
`
`the 2006 notice with the Boston Immigration Court. The
`
`Immigration Court thereafter attempted to mail Pereira a
`more specific notice setting the date and time for his ini-
`tial removal hearing for October 31, 2007, at 9:30 a.m.
`
`But that second notice was sent to Pereira’s street address
`rather than his post office box (which he had provided to
`DHS), so it was returned as undeliverable. Because Pe-
`
`reira never received notice of the time and date of his re-
`moval hearing, he failed to appear, and the Immigration
`
`Court ordered him removed in absentia. Unaware of that re-
`
`moval order, Pereira remained in the United States.
`In 2013, after Pereira had been in the country for more
`
`
`than 10 years, he was arrested for a minor motor vehicle
`violation (driving without his headlights on) and was
`
`subsequently detained by DHS. The Immigration Court
`reopened the removal proceedings after Pereira demon-
`strated that he never received the Immigration Court’s
`
`2007 notice setting out the specific date and time of his
`
`hearing. Pereira then applied for cancellation of removal,
`arguing that the stop-time rule was not triggered by DHS’
`
`
`6
`
`
`
`
`

`

`7
`
`
`
`
`
`
` Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`initial 2006 notice because the document lacked infor-
`mation about the time and date of his removal hearing.
`
`
`The Immigration Court disagreed, finding the law “quite
`settled that DHS need not put a date certain on the Notice
`
`
`to Appear in order to make that document effective.” App.
`to Pet. for Cert. 23a. The Immigration Court therefore
`concluded that Pereira could not meet the 10-year physical-
`presence requirement under §1229b(b), thereby render-
`
`ing him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal,
`
`and ordered Pereira removed from the country. The
`BIA dismissed Pereira’s appeal. Adhering to its precedent
`in Camarillo, the BIA agreed with the Immigration Court
`
`that the 2006 notice triggered the stop-time rule and that
`
`Pereira thus failed to satisfy the 10-year physical-presence
`requirement and was ineligible for cancellation of removal.
`
`The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied Perei-
`ra’s petition for review of the BIA’s order. 866 F. 3d 1
`(2017). Applying the framework set forth in Chevron
`U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
`
`467 U. S. 837 (1984), the Court of Appeals first found that
`
`the stop-time rule in §1229b(d)(1) is ambiguous because it
`“does not explicitly state that the date and time of the
`hearing must be included in a notice to appear in order to
`
`cut off an alien’s period of continuous physical presence.”
`866 F. 3d, at 5. Then, after reviewing the statutory text
`and structure, the administrative context, and pertinent
`legislative history, the Court of Appeals held that the
`BIA’s interpretation of the stop-time rule was a permissi-
`ble reading of the statute. Id., at 6–8.
`
`II
`
`A
`
`
`The Court granted certiorari in this case, 583 U. S. ___
`(2018), to resolve division among the Courts of Appeals on
`a simple, but important, question of statutory interpreta-
`tion: Does service of a document styled as a “notice to
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

` in
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`listed”
`items
`appear” that fails to specify “the
`
` §1229(a)(1) trigger the stop-time rule?4 Pet. for Cert. i.
`As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the question
`
`presented by Pereira, which focuses on all “items listed” in
`§1229(a)(1), sweeps more broadly than necessary to re-
`solve the particular case before us. Although the time-
`and-place information in a notice to appear will vary from
`
`case to case, the Government acknowledges that “[m]uch
`of the information Section 1229(a)(1) calls for does not”
`
`change and is therefore “included in standardized lan-
`guage on the I–862 notice-to-appear form.” Brief for Re-
`spondent 36 (referencing 8 U. S. C. §§1229(a)(1)(A)–(B),
`
`(E)–(F), and (G)(ii)). In fact, the Government’s 2006 notice
`to Pereira included all of the information required by
`
`§1229(a)(1), except it failed to specify the date and time of
`Pereira’s removal proceedings. See App. 10–12. Accord-
`ingly, the dispositive question in this case is much nar-
`rower, but no less vital: Does a “notice to appear” that does
`
`not specify the “time and place at which the proceedings
`will be held,” as required by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i), trigger the
`stop-time rule?5
`
`——————
` 4Compare Orozco-Velasquez v. Attorney General United States, 817
`
`F. 3d 78, 83–84 (CA3 2016) (holding that the stop-time rule unambigu-
`
`ously requires service of a “notice to appear” that meets §1229(a)(1)’s
`
` requirements), with Moscoso-Castellanos v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1079, 1083
`
`
`(CA9 2015) (finding the statute ambiguous and deferring to the BIA’s
`interpretation); O’Garro v. United States Atty. Gen., 605 Fed. Appx.
`951, 953 (CA11 2015) (per curiam) (same); Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch,
`786 F. 3d 235, 239–240 (CA2 2015) (per curiam) (same); Gonzalez-
`
`Garcia v. Holder, 770 F. 3d 431, 434–435 (CA6 2014) (same); Yi Di
`
`Wang v. Holder, 759 F. 3d 670, 674–675 (CA7 2014) (same); Urbina v.
`Holder, 745 F. 3d 736, 740 (CA4 2014) (same).
`5The Court leaves for another day whether a putative notice to ap-
`
` pear that omits any of the other categories of information enumerated
`
` in §1229(a)(1) triggers the stop-time rule. Contrary to the dissent’s
`assertion, this exercise of judicial restraint is by no means “tantamount
`to admitting” that the Government’s (and dissent’s) atextual interpre-
`
`
`8
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
`9
`
`
`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
` In addressing that narrower question, the Court need
`
`
`
` not resort to Chevron deference, as some lower courts have
`done, for Congress has supplied a clear and unambiguous
`answer to the interpretive question at hand. See 467
`U. S., at 842–843 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that
`
`is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
`
`must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
`
`of Congress”). A putative notice to appear that fails to
`designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen’s
`removal proceedings is not a “notice to appear under
`section 1229(a),” and so does not trigger the stop-time
`rule.
`
`
`
`B
`The statutory text alone is enough to resolve this case.
`
`Under the stop-time rule, “any period of . . . continuous
`physical presence” is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is
`served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).” 8
`
`U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1). By expressly referencing §1229(a),
`the statute specifies where to look to find out what “notice
`
`to appear” means. Section 1229(a), in turn, clarifies that
`the type of notice “referred to as a ‘notice to appear’”
`throughout the statutory section is a “written notice . . .
`specifying,” as relevant here, “[t]he time and place at
`
`which
`the
`[removal] proceedings will be held.”
`§1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Thus, based on the plain text of the
`
`statute, it is clear that to trigger the stop-time rule, the
`Government must serve a notice to appear that, at the
`very least, “specif[ies]” the “time and place” of the removal
`proceedings.
`
`
`It is true, as the Government and dissent point out, that
`
`the stop-time rule makes broad reference to a notice to
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`
`tation is a permissible construction of the statute. Post, at 10 (opinion
`
`
`of ALITO, J.).
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`
` PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`appear under “section 1229(a),” which includes para-
`graph (1), as well as paragraphs (2) and (3). See Brief for
`Respondent 27–28; post, at 5–6 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But
`
`the broad reference to §1229(a) is of no consequence, be-
`
`cause, as even the Government concedes, only paragraph
`(1) bears on the meaning of a “notice to appear.” Brief for
`Respondent 27. By contrast, paragraph (2) governs the
`
`“[n]otice of change in time or place of proceedings,” and
`paragraph (3) provides for a system to record noncitizens’
`addresses and phone numbers. Nowhere else within
`§1229(a) does the statute purport to delineate the re-
`quirements of a “notice to appear.” In fact, the term “no-
`tice to appear” appears only in paragraph (1) of §1229(a).
`
`If anything, paragraph (2) of §1229(a) actually bolsters
`
`
`the Court’s interpretation of the statute. Paragraph (2)
`
`provides that, “in the case of any change or postponement
`in the time and place of [removal] proceedings,” the Gov-
`ernment shall give the noncitizen “written notice . . .
`specifying . . . the new time or place of the proceedings.”
`§1229(a)(2)(A)(i). By allowing for a “change or postpone-
`ment” of the proceedings to a “new time or place,” para-
`
`graph (2) presumes that the Government has already
`served a “notice to appear under section 1229(a)” that
`
`specified a time and place as required by §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).
`Otherwise, there would be no time or place to “change or
`postpon[e].” §1229(a)(2). Notably, the dissent concedes
`
`that paragraph (2) confirms that a notice to appear must
`“state the ‘time and place’ of the removal proceeding as
`required by §1229(a)(1).’” Post, at 13. The dissent never-
`
`theless retorts that this point is “entirely irrelevant.” Ibid.
`Not so. Paragraph (2) clearly reinforces the conclusion
`that
`“a notice
`to appear under section 1229(a),”
`§1229b(d)(1), must include at least the time and place of
`the removal proceedings to trigger the stop-time rule.
`
`Another neighboring statutory provision lends further
`contextual support for the view that a “notice to appear”
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`10
`
`
`
`
`

`

`
`11
`
`
`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`must include the time and place of the removal proceed-
`ings to trigger the stop-time rule. Section 1229(b)(1) gives
`a noncitizen “the opportunity to secure counsel before the
`first [removal] hearing date” by mandating that such
`
`“hearing date shall not be scheduled earlier than 10 days
`after the service of the notice to appear.” For §1229(b)(1)
`to have any meaning, the “notice to appear” must specify
`the time and place that the noncitizen, and his counsel,
`must appear at the removal hearing. Otherwise, the
`Government could serve a document labeled “notice to
`appear” without listing the time and location of the hear-
`ing and then, years down the line, provide that infor-
`mation a day before the removal hearing when it becomes
`available. Under that view of the statute, a noncitizen
`
`theoretically would have had the “opportunity to secure
`counsel,” but that opportunity will not be meaningful if,
`
`given the absence of a specified time and place, the noncit-
`
`izen has minimal time and incentive to plan accordingly,
`
`and his counsel, in turn, receives limited notice and time
`to prepare adequately. It therefore follows that, if a “no-
`
`tice to appear” for purposes of §1229(b)(1) must include
`the time-and-place information, a “notice to appear” for
`purposes of the stop-time rule under §1229b(d)(1) must as
`well. After all, “it is a normal rule of statutory construc-
`tion that identical words used in different parts of the
`
`same act are intended to have the same meaning.”
`
`Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 571
`
`(2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).6
`——————
`6The dissent argues that, if a notice to appear must furnish time-and-
`
`place information, the Government “may be forced by the Court’s
`
`interpretation to guess that the hearing will take place far in the
`
`future, only to learn shortly afterwards that the hearing is in fact
`
`imminent.” Post, at 14. In such a scenario, the dissent hypothesizes, a
`
`noncitizen would be “lulled into a false sense of security” and thus
`would have little meaningful opportunity to secure counsel and prepare
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`

`

`12
`
`
`
`
`PEREIRA v. SESSIONS
`
`Opinion of the Court
`
`
` Finally, common sense compels the conclusion that a
`notice that does not specify when and where to appear for
`a removal proceeding is not a “notice to appear” that trig-
`gers the stop-time rule. If the three words “notice to ap-
`pear” mean anything in this context, they must mean that,
`
`at a minimum, the Government has to provide noncitizens
`“notice” of the information, i.e., the “time” and “place,” that
`
`would enable them “to appear” at the removal hearing in
`
`the first place. Conveying such time-and-place infor-
`mation to a noncitizen is an essential function of a notice
`
`to appear, for wi

This document is available on Docket Alarm but you must sign up to view it.


Or .

Accessing this document will incur an additional charge of $.

After purchase, you can access this document again without charge.

Accept $ Charge
throbber

Still Working On It

This document is taking longer than usual to download. This can happen if we need to contact the court directly to obtain the document and their servers are running slowly.

Give it another minute or two to complete, and then try the refresh button.

throbber

A few More Minutes ... Still Working

It can take up to 5 minutes for us to download a document if the court servers are running slowly.

Thank you for your continued patience.

This document could not be displayed.

We could not find this document within its docket. Please go back to the docket page and check the link. If that does not work, go back to the docket and refresh it to pull the newest information.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

You need a Paid Account to view this document. Click here to change your account type.

Your account does not support viewing this document.

Set your membership status to view this document.

With a Docket Alarm membership, you'll get a whole lot more, including:

  • Up-to-date information for this case.
  • Email alerts whenever there is an update.
  • Full text search for other cases.
  • Get email alerts whenever a new case matches your search.

Become a Member

One Moment Please

The filing “” is large (MB) and is being downloaded.

Please refresh this page in a few minutes to see if the filing has been downloaded. The filing will also be emailed to you when the download completes.

Your document is on its way!

If you do not receive the document in five minutes, contact support at support@docketalarm.com.

Sealed Document

We are unable to display this document, it may be under a court ordered seal.

If you have proper credentials to access the file, you may proceed directly to the court's system using your government issued username and password.


Access Government Site

We are redirecting you
to a mobile optimized page.





Document Unreadable or Corrupt

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket

We are unable to display this document.

Refresh this Document
Go to the Docket