`(Slip Opinion)
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`
`
` OCTOBER TERM, 2017
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`
`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
`
`
`
` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
`
`
`
` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
`
` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`
`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
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`
`
` TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.
`v. HAWAII ET AL.
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 17–965. Argued April 25, 2018—Decided June 26, 2018
`
`In September 2017, the President issued Proclamation No. 9645, seek-
`
`ing to improve vetting procedures for foreign nationals traveling to
`the United States by identifying ongoing deficiencies in the infor-
`mation needed to assess whether nationals of particular countries
`present a security threat. The Proclamation placed entry restrictions
`on the nationals of eight foreign states whose systems for managing
`
`and sharing information about their nationals the President deemed
`
`inadequate. Foreign states were selected for inclusion based on a re-
`
`view undertaken pursuant to one of the President’s earlier Executive
`Orders. As part of that review, the Department of Homeland Securi-
`ty (DHS), in consultation with the State Department and intelligence
`
`
`
`agencies, developed an information and risk assessment “baseline.”
`
`DHS then collected and evaluated data for all foreign governments,
`
`identifying those having deficient information-sharing practices and
`presenting national security concerns, as well as other countries “at
`risk” of failing to meet the baseline. After a 50-day period during
`which the State Department made diplomatic efforts to encourage
`
`foreign governments to improve their practices, the Acting Secretary
`of Homeland Security concluded that eight countries—Chad, Iran,
`
`Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen—remained
`
`deficient. She recommended entry restrictions for certain nationals
`from all of those countries but Iraq, which had a close cooperative re-
`lationship with the U. S. She also recommended including Somalia,
`which met the information-sharing component of the baseline stand-
`ards but had other special risk factors, such as a significant terrorist
`
`presence. After consulting with multiple Cabinet members, the Pres-
`
`ident adopted the recommendations and issued the Proclamation.
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`2
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`TRUMP v. HAWAII
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`
`Syllabus
`Invoking his authority under 8 U. S. C. §§1182(f) and 1185(a), he de-
`termined that certain restrictions were necessary to “prevent the en-
`
`try of those foreign nationals about whom the United States Gov-
`
`ernment lacks sufficient information” and “elicit improved identity-
`
`management and information-sharing protocols and practices from
`foreign governments.” The Proclamation imposes a range of entry re-
`strictions that vary based on the “distinct circumstances” in each of
`the eight countries. It exempts lawful permanent residents and pro-
`
`vides case-by-case waivers under certain circumstances. It also di-
`
`rects DHS to assess on a continuing basis whether the restrictions
`should be modified or continued, and to report to the President every
`180 days. At the completion of the first such review period, the Pres-
`
`ident determined that Chad had sufficiently improved its practices,
`
`and he accordingly lifted restrictions on its nationals.
`
`Plaintiffs—the State of Hawaii, three individuals with foreign rela-
`
`
`tives affected by the entry suspension, and the Muslim Association of
`
`Hawaii—argue that the Proclamation violates the Immigration and
`
`Nationality Act (INA) and the Establishment Clause. The District
`Court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction barring enforce-
`
`ment of the restrictions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that
`
`the Proclamation contravened two provisions of the INA: §1182(f),
`
`which authorizes the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or
`
`any class of aliens” whenever he “finds” that their entry “would be
`
`detrimental to the interests of the United States,” and §1152(a)(1)(A),
`
`which provides that “no person shall . . . be discriminated against in
`
`the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex,
`nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” The court did not
`reach the Establishment Clause claim.
`Held:
`
`1. This Court assumes without deciding that plaintiffs’ statutory
`
`claims are reviewable, notwithstanding consular nonreviewability or
`
`any other statutory nonreviewability issue. See Sale v. Haitian Cen-
`ters Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155. Pp. 8–9.
`
`2. The President has lawfully exercised the broad discretion grant-
`ed to him under §1182(f) to suspend the entry of aliens into the Unit-
`
`ed States. Pp. 9–24.
`
`
`
`(a) By its terms, §1182(f) exudes deference to the President in
`
`every clause. It entrusts to the President the decisions whether and
`
`when to suspend entry, whose entry to suspend, for how long, and on
`what conditions. It thus vests the President with “ample power” to
`
`impose entry restrictions in addition to those elsewhere enumerated
`in the INA. Sale, 509 U. S., at 187. The Proclamation falls well with-
`
`in this comprehensive delegation. The sole prerequisite set forth in
`§1182(f) is that the President “find[ ]” that the entry of the covered al-
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`3
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`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Syllabus
`
`iens “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”
`
`The President has undoubtedly fulfilled that requirement here. He
`first ordered DHS and other agencies to conduct a comprehensive
`
`evaluation of every single country’s compliance with the information
`
`and risk assessment baseline. He then issued a Proclamation with
`extensive findings about the deficiencies and their impact. Based on
`
`that review, he found that restricting entry of aliens who could not be
`vetted with adequate information was in the national interest.
`
`
`
`Even assuming that some form of inquiry into the persuasiveness
`of the President’s findings is appropriate, but see Webster v. Doe, 486
`
`U. S. 592, 600, plaintiffs’ attacks on the sufficiency of the findings
`
`cannot be sustained. The 12-page Proclamation is more detailed
`than any prior order issued under §1182(f). And such a searching in-
`
`quiry is inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the deference
`
`traditionally accorded the President in this sphere. See, e.g., Sale,
`509 U. S., at 187–188.
`
`The Proclamation comports with the remaining textual limits in
`§1182(f). While the word “suspend” often connotes a temporary de-
`
`ferral, the President is not required to prescribe in advance a fixed
`end date for the entry restriction. Like its predecessors, the Procla-
`
`mation makes clear that its “conditional restrictions” will remain in
`force only so long as necessary to “address” the identified “inadequa-
`
`cies and risks” within the covered nations. Finally, the Proclamation
`properly identifies a “class of aliens” whose entry is suspended, and
`
`the word “class” comfortably encompasses a group of people linked by
`nationality. Pp. 10–15.
`(b) Plaintiffs have not identified any conflict between the Proc-
`
`lamation and the immigration scheme reflected in the INA that
`would implicitly bar the President from addressing deficiencies in the
`
`Nation’s vetting system. The existing grounds of inadmissibility and
`the narrow Visa Waiver Program do not address the failure of certain
`
`high-risk countries to provide a minimum baseline of reliable infor-
`mation. Further, neither the legislative history of §1182(f) nor his-
`torical practice justifies departing from the clear text of the statute.
`Pp. 15–20.
`
`
`(c) Plaintiffs’ argument that the President’s entry suspension vio-
`lates §1152(a)(1)(A) ignores the basic distinction between admissibil-
`
`
`ity determinations and visa issuance that runs throughout the INA.
`
`Section 1182 defines the universe of aliens who are admissible into
`the United States (and therefore eligible to receive a visa). Once
`
`§1182 sets the boundaries of admissibility, §1152(a)(1)(A) prohibits
`discrimination in the allocation of immigrant visas based on national-
`ity and other traits. Had Congress intended in §1152(a)(1)(A) to con-
`
`strain the President’s power to determine who may enter the country,
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`TRUMP v. HAWAII
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`Syllabus
`it could have chosen language directed to that end. Common sense
`
`and historical practice confirm that §1152(a)(1)(A) does not limit the
`President’s delegated authority under §1182(f). Presidents have re-
`
`peatedly exercised their authority to suspend entry on the basis of
`
`nationality. And on plaintiffs’ reading, the President would not be
`
`permitted to suspend entry from particular foreign states in response
`
`
`to an epidemic, or even if the United States were on the brink of war.
`Pp. 20–24.
`
`
`
`3. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
`merits of their claim that the Proclamation violates the Establish-
`ment Clause. Pp. 24–38.
`(a) The individual plaintiffs have Article III standing to chal-
`
`lenge the exclusion of their relatives under the Establishment
`
`Clause. A person’s interest in being united with his relatives is suffi-
`ciently concrete and particularized to form the basis of an Article III
`
`
`injury in fact. Cf., e.g., Kerry v. Din, 576 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 24–26.
`
`
`(b) Plaintiffs allege that the primary purpose of the Proclamation
`was religious animus and that the President’s stated concerns about
`vetting protocols and national security were but pretexts for discrim-
`
`inating against Muslims. At the heart of their case is a series of
`
`statements by the President and his advisers both during the cam-
`paign and since the President assumed office. The issue, however, is
`not whether to denounce the President’s statements, but the signifi-
`cance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neu-
`
`tral on its face, addressing a matter within the core of executive re-
`sponsibility. In doing so, the Court must consider not only the
`statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the
`Presidency itself. Pp. 26–29.
`
`
`
`
`(c) The admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a “funda-
`
`mental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political
`
`departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo v. Bell,
`
`
`430 U. S. 787, 792. Although foreign nationals seeking admission
`
`have no constitutional right to entry, this Court has engaged in a cir-
`cumscribed judicial inquiry when the denial of a visa allegedly bur-
`
`dens the constitutional rights of a U. S. citizen. That review is lim-
`
`ited to whether the Executive gives a “facially legitimate and bona
`fide” reason for its action, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 769,
`but the Court need not define the precise contours of that narrow in-
`quiry in this case. For today’s purposes, the Court assumes that it
`may look behind the face of the Proclamation to the extent of apply-
`
`ing rational basis review, i.e., whether the entry policy is plausibly
`related to the Government’s stated objective to protect the country
`and improve vetting processes. Plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence may be
`
`considered, but the policy will be upheld so long as it can reasonably
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`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Syllabus
`be understood to result from a justification independent of unconsti-
`
`tutional grounds. Pp. 30–32.
`
`
`
`(d) On the few occasions where the Court has struck down a policy
`
`as illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny, a common thread has
`
`been that the laws at issue were “divorced from any factual context
`
`from which [the Court] could discern a relationship to legitimate
`
`
`state interests.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 635. The Proclama-
`tion does not fit that pattern. It is expressly premised on legitimate
`purposes and says nothing about religion. The entry restrictions on
`Muslim-majority nations are limited to countries that were previous-
`
`ly designated by Congress or prior administrations as posing national
`
`
`security risks. Moreover, the Proclamation reflects the results of a
`worldwide review process undertaken by multiple Cabinet officials
`
`and their agencies. Plaintiffs challenge the entry suspension based
`on their perception of its effectiveness and wisdom, but the Court
`
`cannot substitute its own assessment for the Executive’s predictive
`judgments on such matters. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Pro-
`ject, 561 U. S. 1, 33–34.
`
`Three additional features of the entry policy support the Govern-
`
`
`ment’s claim of a legitimate national security interest. First, since
`the President introduced entry restrictions in January 2017, three
`
`Muslim-majority countries—Iraq, Sudan, and Chad—have been re-
`moved from the list. Second, for those countries still subject to entry
`restrictions, the Proclamation includes numerous exceptions for vari-
`
`ous categories of foreign nationals. Finally, the Proclamation creates
`a waiver program open to all covered foreign nationals seeking entry
`as immigrants or nonimmigrants. Under these circumstances, the
`
`Government has set forth a sufficient national security justification
`to survive rational basis review. Pp. 33–38.
`878 F. 3d 662, reversed and remanded.
`ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY,
`
`
`THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., and THOMAS,
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`
`
`
`J., filed concurring opinions. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
`
` which KAGAN, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
`
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` which GINSBURG, J., joined.
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`

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`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
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` that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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`_________________
`
` No. 17–965
`_________________
`DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
`
`STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. HAWAII, ET AL.
`
`
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`
`[June 26, 2018]
`
`CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
`Court.
`
`Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, foreign
`
`
`nationals seeking entry into the United States undergo a
`vetting process to ensure that they satisfy the numerous
`requirements for admission. The Act also vests the Presi-
`dent with authority to restrict the entry of aliens when-
`
`ever he finds that their entry “would be detrimental to the
`interests of the United States.” 8 U. S. C. §1182(f). Rely-
`
`ing on that delegation, the President concluded that it was
`necessary to impose entry restrictions on nationals of
`
`countries that do not share adequate information for an
`informed entry determination, or that otherwise present
`national security risks. Presidential Proclamation No.
`9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (2017) (Proclamation). The
`plaintiffs in this litigation, respondents here, challenged
`the application of those entry restrictions to certain aliens
`abroad. We now decide whether the President had author-
`ity under the Act to issue the Proclamation, and whether
`the entry policy violates the Establishment Clause of the
`First Amendment.
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`2
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` TRUMP v. HAWAII
`
`Opinion of the Court
`I
`
`
`
`
`A
`
`Shortly after taking office, President Trump signed
`
`
`Executive Order No. 13769, Protecting the Nation From
`
`Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States. 82 Fed.
`Reg. 8977 (2017) (EO–1). EO–1 directed the Secretary of
`
`Homeland Security to conduct a review to examine the
`adequacy of information provided by foreign governments
`
`about their nationals seeking to enter the United States.
`
`§3(a). Pending that review, the order suspended for 90
`days the entry of foreign nationals from seven countries—
`Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—
`that had been previously identified by Congress or prior
`administrations as posing heightened terrorism risks.
`§3(c). The District Court for the Western District of Wash-
`ington entered a temporary restraining order blocking the
`entry restrictions, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
`Circuit denied the Government’s request to stay that
`order. Washington v. Trump, 847 F. 3d 1151 (2017) (per
`curiam).
`
`In response, the President revoked EO–1, replacing it
`
`with Executive Order No. 13780, which again directed a
`worldwide review. 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (2017) (EO–2).
`
`Citing investigative burdens on agencies and the need to
`
`diminish the risk that dangerous individuals would enter
`without adequate vetting, EO–2 also temporarily restricted
`
`the entry (with case-by-case waivers) of foreign nationals
`from six of the countries covered by EO–1: Iran, Libya,
`
`Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. §§2(c), 3(a). The
`
`order explained that those countries had been selected
`because each “is a state sponsor of terrorism, has been
`significantly compromised by terrorist organizations, or
`contains active conflict zones.” §1(d). The entry re-
`striction was to stay in effect for 90 days, pending comple-
`tion of the worldwide review.
`These interim measures were immediately challenged in
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`
`Opinion of the Court
`court. The District Courts for the Districts of Maryland
`
`and Hawaii entered nationwide preliminary injunctions
`barring enforcement of the entry suspension, and the
`
`respective Courts of Appeals upheld those injunctions,
`albeit on different grounds. International Refugee Assis-
`tance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 857 F. 3d 554 (CA4 2017);
`
`
`Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F. 3d 741 (CA9 2017) (per curiam).
`This Court granted certiorari and stayed the injunctions—
`allowing the entry suspension to go into effect—with
`respect to foreign nationals who lacked a “credible claim of
`a bona fide relationship” with a person or entity in the
`United States. Trump v. IRAP, 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017)
`(per curiam) (slip op., at 12). The temporary restrictions
`in EO–2 expired before this Court took any action, and we
`vacated the lower court decisions as moot. Trump v.
`
`IRAP, 583 U. S. ___ (2017); Trump v. Hawaii, 583 U. S.
`
`
`___ (2017).
`
`On September 24, 2017, after completion of the world-
`
`wide review, the President issued the Proclamation before
`us—Proclamation No. 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabili-
`ties and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the
`United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety
`Threats. 82 Fed. Reg. 45161. The Proclamation (as its
`
`title indicates) sought to improve vetting procedures by
`
`identifying ongoing deficiencies in the information needed
`
`to assess whether nationals of particular countries present
`“public safety threats.” §1(a). To further that purpose, the
`Proclamation placed entry restrictions on the nationals of
`eight foreign states whose systems for managing and
`sharing information about their nationals the President
`deemed inadequate.
`The Proclamation described how foreign states were
`
`
`selected for inclusion based on the review undertaken
`
`pursuant to EO–2. As part of that review, the Department
`of Homeland Security (DHS), in consultation with the
`State Department and several intelligence agencies,
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`4
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` TRUMP v. HAWAII
`
`Opinion of the Court
`developed a “baseline” for the information required from
`foreign governments to confirm the identity of individuals
`seeking entry into the United States, and to determine
`whether those individuals pose a security threat. §1(c).
`
`The baseline included three components. The first,
`
`“identity-management information,” focused on whether a
`
`foreign government ensures the integrity of travel docu-
`ments by issuing electronic passports, reporting lost or
`
`stolen passports, and making available additional identity-
`
`
`related information. Second, the agencies considered the
`extent to which the country discloses information on crim-
`inal history and suspected terrorist links, provides travel
`document exemplars, and facilitates the U. S. Govern-
`ment’s receipt of information about airline passengers and
`crews traveling to the United States. Finally, the agencies
`
`weighed various indicators of national security risk,
`
`
`including whether the foreign state is a known or potential
`terrorist safe haven and whether it regularly declines to
`receive returning nationals following final orders of
`removal from the United States. Ibid.
`
`DHS collected and evaluated data regarding all foreign
`
`governments. §1(d). It identified 16 countries as having
`deficient information-sharing practices and presenting
`
`national security concerns, and another 31 countries as “at
`risk” of similarly failing to meet the baseline. §1(e). The
`State Department then undertook diplomatic efforts over
`a 50-day period to encourage all foreign governments to
`
`improve their practices. §1(f). As a result of that effort,
`
`numerous countries provided DHS with travel document
`exemplars and agreed to share information on known or
`
`suspected terrorists. Ibid.
`
`
`Following the 50-day period, the Acting Secretary of
`Homeland Security concluded that eight countries—Chad,
`Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and
`Yemen—remained deficient in terms of their risk profile
`and willingness to provide requested information. The
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`Opinion of the Court
`Acting Secretary recommended that the President impose
`entry restrictions on certain nationals from all of those
`
`countries except Iraq. §§1(g), (h). She also concluded that
`although Somalia generally satisfied the information-
`sharing component of the baseline standards, its “identity-
`management deficiencies” and “significant terrorist pres-
`
`
`ence” presented special circumstances justifying additional
`
`limitations. She therefore recommended entry limitations
`
`for certain nationals of that country. §1(i). As for Iraq,
`the Acting Secretary found that entry limitations on its
`nationals were not warranted given the close cooperative
`relationship between the U. S. and Iraqi Governments and
`
`Iraq’s commitment to combating ISIS. §1(g).
`
`After consulting with multiple Cabinet members and
`other officials, the President adopted the Acting Secre-
`
`tary’s recommendations and issued the Proclamation.
`Invoking his authority under 8 U. S. C. §§1182(f) and
`
`1185(a), the President determined that certain entry
`
`restrictions were necessary to “prevent the entry of those
`foreign nationals about whom the United States Govern-
`
`ment lacks sufficient information”; “elicit improved identity-
`management and
`information-sharing protocols and
`practices from foreign governments”; and otherwise “ad-
`vance [the] foreign policy, national security, and counter-
`
`terrorism objectives” of the United States. Proclamation
`§1(h). The President explained that these restrictions
`
`would be the “most likely to encourage cooperation” while
`“protect[ing] the United States until such time as im-
`
`provements occur.” Ibid.
`
`The Proclamation imposed a range of restrictions that
`vary based on the “distinct circumstances” in each of the
`
`eight countries. Ibid. For countries that do not cooperate
`
`with the United States in identifying security risks (Iran,
`
`North Korea, and Syria), the Proclamation suspends entry
`
`of all nationals, except for Iranians seeking nonimmigrant
`
`§§2(b)(ii), (d)(ii),
`student and exchange-visitor visas.
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`6
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` TRUMP v. HAWAII
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`Opinion of the Court
`(e)(ii). For countries that have information-sharing defi-
`
`ciencies but are nonetheless “valuable counterterrorism
`
`partner[s]” (Chad, Libya, and Yemen), it restricts entry of
`nationals seeking immigrant visas and nonimmigrant
`business or tourist visas. §§2(a)(i), (c)(i), (g)(i). Because
`Somalia generally satisfies the baseline standards but was
`found to present special risk factors, the Proclamation
`suspends entry of nationals seeking immigrant visas and
`requires additional scrutiny of nationals seeking nonim-
`
`migrant visas. §2(h)(ii). And for Venezuela, which refuses
`to cooperate in information sharing but for which alterna-
`tive means are available to identify its nationals, the
`
`Proclamation limits entry only of certain government
`officials and their family members on nonimmigrant busi-
`
`ness or tourist visas. §2(f)(ii).
`
`The Proclamation exempts lawful permanent residents
`
`and foreign nationals who have been granted asylum.
`§3(b). It also provides for case-by-case waivers when a
`foreign national demonstrates undue hardship, and that
`his entry is in the national interest and would not pose a
`threat to public safety. §3(c)(i); see also §3(c)(iv) (listing
`
`examples of when a waiver might be appropriate, such as
`
`if the foreign national seeks to reside with a close family
`member, obtain urgent medical care, or pursue significant
`business obligations). The Proclamation further directs
`DHS to assess on a continuing basis whether entry re-
`
`strictions should be modified or continued, and to report to
`the President every 180 days. §4. Upon completion of the
`first such review period, the President, on the recommen-
`
`dation of the Secretary of Homeland Security, determined
`that Chad had sufficiently improved its practices, and he
`accordingly lifted restrictions on its nationals. Presiden-
`tial Proclamation No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15937 (2018).
`B
`
`Plaintiffs in this case are the State of Hawaii, three
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`Opinion of the Court
`individuals (Dr. Ismail Elshikh, John Doe #1, and John
`
`Doe #2), and the Muslim Association of Hawaii. The State
`
`operates the University of Hawaii system, which recruits
`students and faculty from the designated countries. The
`
`three individual plaintiffs are U. S. citizens or lawful
`
`permanent residents who have relatives from Iran, Syria,
`and Yemen applying for immigrant or nonimmigrant
`visas. The Association is a nonprofit organization that
`
`operates a mosque in Hawaii.
`
`the Proclamation—except as
`Plaintiffs challenged
`applied to North Korea and Venezuela—on several
`grounds. As relevant here, they argued that the Procla-
`mation contravenes provisions in the Immigration and
`Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 187, as amended. Plain-
`tiffs further claimed that the Proclamation violates the
`Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, because it
`
`was motivated not by concerns pertaining to national
`security but by animus toward Islam.
`
`The District Court granted a nationwide preliminary
`injunction barring enforcement of the entry restrictions.
`
`The court concluded that the Proclamation violated two
`provisions of the INA: §1182(f), because the President did
`
`not make sufficient findings that the entry of the covered
`foreign nationals would be detrimental to the national
`interest, and §1152(a)(1)(A), because the policy discrimi-
`nates against immigrant visa applicants on the basis of
`
`265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1155–1159 (Haw.
`nationality.
`2017). The Government requested expedited briefing and
`
`
`sought a stay pending appeal. The Court of Appeals for the
`
`
`Ninth Circuit granted a partial stay, permitting enforce-
`
`ment of the Proclamation with respect to foreign nationals
`who lack a bona fide relationship with the United States.
`This Court then stayed the injunction in full pending
`
`disposition of the Government’s appeal. 583 U. S. ___
`(2017).
`
`
`The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court first held that
`
`
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`

`

`
`
`
`
`8
`
`
`
` TRUMP v. HAWAII
`
`Opinion of the Court
`the Proclamation exceeds the President’s authority under
`
`§1182(f).
`In its view, that provision authorizes only a
`“temporary” suspension of entry in response to “exigen-
`cies” that “Congress would be ill-equipped to address.”
`878 F. 3d 662, 684, 688 (2017). The court further reasoned
`
`that the Proclamation “conflicts with the INA’s finely
`
`reticulated regulatory scheme” by addressing “matters of
`immigration already passed upon by Congress.” Id., at
`685, 690. The Ninth Circuit then turned to §1152(a)(1)(A)
`and determined that the entry restrictions also contravene
`the prohibition on nationality-based discrimination in the
`
`issuance of immigrant visas. The court did not reach
`plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim.
`
`
`We granted certiorari. 583 U. S. ___ (2018).
`
`II
`
`Before addressing the merits of plaintiffs’ statutory
`claims, we consider whether we have authority to do so.
`The Government argues that plaintiffs’ challenge to the
`Proclamation under the INA is not justiciable. Relying on
`the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, the Government
`
`contends that because aliens have no “claim of right” to
`
`enter the United States, and because exclusion of aliens is
`
`“a fundamental act of sovereignty” by the political branches,
`
`review of an exclusion decision “is not within the province
`of any court, unless expressly authorized by law.” United
`
`
`States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537, 542–
`543 (1950). According to the Government, that principle
`barring review is reflected in the INA, which sets forth a
`comprehensive framework for review of orders of removal,
`but authorizes judicial review only for aliens physically
`present in the United States. See Brief for Petitioners 19–
`20 (citing 8 U. S. C. §1252).
`
`The justiciability of plaintiffs’ challenge under the INA
`presents a difficult question. The Government made
`
`similar arguments that no judicial review was available in
`
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`

`

`9
`
`
`Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155 (1993).
`
`The Court in that case, however, went on to consider on
`the merits a statutory claim like the one before us without
`addressing the issue of reviewability. The Government
`does not argue that the doctrine of consular nonreview-
`ability goes to the Court’s jurisdiction, see Tr. of Oral Arg.
`13, nor does it point to any provision of the INA that
`
`expressly strips the Court of jurisdiction over plaintiffs’
`claims, see Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center,
`
`568 U. S. 145, 153 (2013) (requiring Congress to “clearly
`
`
`
`
`
`state[]” that a statutory provision is jurisdictional). As a
`result, we may assume without deciding that plaintiffs’
`
`statutory claims are reviewable, notwithstanding consular
`nonreviewability or any other statutory nonreviewability
`issue, and we proceed on that basis.
`
`III
`
`
`The INA establishes numerous grounds on which an
`alien abroad may be inadmissible to the United States and
`
`ineligible for a visa. See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. §§1182(a)(1)
`
`(health-related grounds), (a)(2) (criminal history), (a)(3)(B)
`
`(terrorist activities), (a)(3)(C) (foreign policy grounds).
`
`Congress has also delegated to the President authority to
`suspend or restrict the entry of aliens in certain circum-
`
`stances. The principal source of that authority, §1182(f),
`enables the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or
`any class of aliens” whenever he “finds” that their entry
`“would be detrimental to the interests of the United
`
`States.”1
`——————
`1The President also invoked his power under 8 U. S. C. §1185(a)(1),
`
`which grants the President authority to adopt “reasonable rules,
`
`
` regulations, and orders” governing entry or removal of aliens, “subject
`
` to such limitations and exceptions as [he] may prescribe.” Because this
`provision “substantially overlap[s]” with §1182(f), we agree with the
`
`
`Government that we “need not resolve . . . the precise relationship
`between the two statutes” in evaluating the validity of the Proclama-
`
`
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`

`10
`
`
`
`
`
`
`TRUMP v. HAWAII
`
`
`Opinion of the Court
`Plaintiffs argue that the Proclamation is not a valid
`
`exercise of the President’s authority under the INA. In
`their view, §1182(f) confers only a residual power to tem-
`porarily halt the entry of a discrete group of aliens en-
`gaged in harmful conduct. They also assert that the Proc-
`la