`(Slip Opinion)
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` OCTOBER TERM, 2019
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`Syllabus
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`1
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` NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
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`
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` being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
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` The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
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` prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
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` See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`
`
` Syllabus
`
`INTEL CORPORATION INVESTMENT POLICY
` COMMITTEE ET AL. v. SULYMA
`
`
`CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
`
`THE NINTH CIRCUIT
` No. 18–1116. Argued December 4, 2019—Decided February 26, 2020
`
`
` The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires
`
`plaintiffs with “actual knowledge” of an alleged fiduciary breach to file
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`suit within three years of gaining that knowledge, 29 U. S. C. §1113(2),
`rather than within the 6-year period that would otherwise apply. Re-
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`spondent Sulyma worked at Intel Corporation from 2010 to 2012 and
`
` participated in two Intel retirement plans. In October 2015, he sued
`
`petitioners—administrators of those plans—alleging that they had
`
`
` managed the plans imprudently. Petitioners countered that the suit
`was untimely under §1113(2) because Sulyma filed it more than three
`years after they had disclosed their investment decisions to him. Al-
`though Sulyma had visited the website that hosted many of these dis-
`
`closures many times, he testified that he did not remember reviewing
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`the relevant disclosures and that he had been unaware of the allegedly
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`
`imprudent investments while working at Intel. The District Court
`
`granted summary judgment to petitioners under §1113(2). The Ninth
`
`Circuit reversed. That court agreed with petitioners that Sulyma
`could have known about the investments from the disclosures, but held
`
`
`that his testimony created a dispute as to when he gained “actual
`knowledge” for purposes of §1113(2).
`
`
`Held: A plaintiff does not necessarily have “actual knowledge” under
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`
`
`§1113(2) of the information contained in disclosures that he receives
`
`but does not read or cannot recall reading. To meet §1113(2)’s “actual
`
`knowledge” requirement, the plaintiff must in fact have become aware
`of that information. Pp. 5–12.
`
`
`(a) ERISA’s “plain and unambiguous statutory language” must be
`
`enforced “according to its terms.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
`
`Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251. Although ERISA does not define the phrase
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`INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA
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`Syllabus
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`“actual knowledge,” its meaning is plain. Dictionaries confirm that, to
`
`have “actual knowledge” of a piece of information, one must in fact be
`aware of it. Legal dictionaries give “actual knowledge” the same mean-
`ing. The law will sometimes impute knowledge—often called “con-
`structive” knowledge—to a person who fails to learn something that a
`reasonably diligent person would have learned. The addition of “ac-
`tual” in §1113(2) signals that the plaintiff’s knowledge must be more
`than hypothetical. Congress has repeatedly drawn the same “linguis-
`
`
`tic distinction,” Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 647, elsewhere
`
`in ERISA. When Congress has included both actual and constructive
`knowledge in ERISA limitations provisions, Congress has done so ex-
`
`plicitly. But Congress has never added to §1113(2) the language it has
`
`used in those other provisions to encompass both forms of knowledge.
`Pp. 5–8.
`
`
`(b) Petitioners’ arguments for a broader reading of §1113(2) based
`on text, context, purpose, and statutory history all founder on Con-
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`gress’s choice of the word “actual.” Petitioners may well be correct that
`
`
`heeding the plain meaning of §1113(2) substantially diminishes the
`protection that it provides for ERISA fiduciaries. But if policy consid-
`erations suggest that the current scheme should be altered, Congress
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`must be the one to do it. Pp. 8–11.
`
`(c) This opinion does not foreclose any of the “usual ways” to prove ac-
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`tual knowledge at any stage in the litigation. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
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`U. S. 825, 842. Plaintiffs who recall reading particular disclosures will
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`be bound by oath to say so in their depositions. Actual knowledge can
`also be proved through “inference from circumstantial evidence.” Ibid.
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`And this opinion does not preclude defendants from contending that
`evidence of “willful blindness” supports a finding of “actual
`
`
`knowledge.” Cf. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A., 563 U. S.
`
`754, 769. Pp. 11–12.
`909 F. 3d 1069, affirmed.
`ALITO, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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` Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)
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`Opinion of the Court
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`1
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` NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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` preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
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` notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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` ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
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` corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
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`SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
`
`_________________
`
` No. 18–1116
`_________________
`INTEL CORPORATION INVESTMENT POLICY
`
` COMMITTEE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
`
` CHRISTOPHER M. SULYMA
`
`ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
`
`APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
`[February 26, 2020]
`
` JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
`The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
`
`
`(ERISA) requires plaintiffs with “actual knowledge” of an
`
`alleged fiduciary breach to file suit within three years of
`gaining that knowledge rather than within the 6-year pe-
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`riod that would otherwise apply. §413(a)(2)(A), 88 Stat.
`889, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §1113. The question here is
`whether a plaintiff necessarily has “actual knowledge” of
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`the information contained in disclosures that he receives
`
`but does not read or cannot recall reading. We hold that he
`does not and therefore affirm.
`I
`A
`
`Retirement plans governed by ERISA must have at least
`one named fiduciary, §1102(a)(1), who must manage the
`plan prudently and solely in the interests of participants
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`and their beneficiaries, §1104(a). Fiduciaries who breach
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`these duties are personally liable to the plan for any result-
`ing losses. §1109(a). ERISA authorizes participants and
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`Opinion of the Court
`their beneficiaries, as well as co-fiduciaries and the Secre-
`tary of Labor, to sue for that relief. §1132(a)(2).
`
`Such suits must be filed within one of three time periods,
`each with different triggering events. The first begins when
`the breach occurs. Specifically, under §1113(1), suit must
`
`be filed within six years of “the date of the last action which
`
`constituted a part of the breach or violation” or, in cases of
`breach by omission, “the latest date on which the fiduciary
`could have cured the breach or violation.” We have referred
`to §1113(1) as a statute of repose, which “effect[s] a legisla-
`tive judgment that a defendant should be free from liability
`after the legislatively determined period of time.” Califor-
`nia Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities,
`Inc., 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 5) (internal quo-
`tation marks omitted).
`
`The second period, which accelerates the filing deadline,
`begins when the plaintiff gains “actual knowledge” of the
`breach. Under §1113(2), suit must be filed within three
`years of “the earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual
`knowledge of the breach or violation.” Section 1113(2) is a
`statute of limitations, which “encourage[s] plaintiffs to pur-
`sue diligent prosecution of known claims.” Id., at ___ (slip
`op., at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted).
`
`The third period, which applies “in the case of fraud or
`concealment,” begins when the plaintiff discovers the al-
`leged breach. §1113. In such cases, suit must be filed
`
`within six years of “the date of discovery.” Ibid.
`B
`
`Respondent Sulyma worked at Intel Corporation from
`2010 to 2012. He participated in two Intel retirement
`plans, the Intel Retirement Contribution Plan and the Intel
`
`401(k) Savings Plan. Payments into these plans were in
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`Opinion of the Court
`turn invested in two funds managed by the Intel Invest-
`ment Policy Committee.1 These funds mostly comprised
`stocks and bonds. After the stock market decline in 2008,
`however, the committee increased the funds’ shares of al-
`ternative assets, such as hedge funds, private equity, and
`commodities. These assets carried relatively high fees.
`
`And as the stock market rebounded, Sulyma’s funds lagged
`behind others such as index funds.
`Sulyma filed this suit on behalf of a putative class in Oc-
`
`tober 2015, alleging primarily that the committee and other
`plan administrators (petitioners here) had breached their
`
`fiduciary duties by overinvesting in alternative assets. Pe-
`titioners countered that the suit was untimely under
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`§1113(2). Although Sulyma filed it within six years of the
`
`alleged breaches, he filed it more than three years after pe-
`titioners had disclosed their investment decisions to him.
`
`ERISA and its implementing regulations mandate vari-
`
`ous disclosures to plan participants. See generally 29
`U. S. C. §§1021–1031; see also Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
`Co., 577 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2016). Sulyma received numer-
`ous disclosures while working at Intel, some explaining the
`extent to which his retirement plans were invested in alter-
`native assets. In November 2011, for example, he received
`an e-mail informing him that a Qualified Default Invest-
`ment Alternative (QDIA) notice was available on a website
`called NetBenefits, where many of his disclosures were
`hosted. See App. 149–151; see also 29 CFR §§2550.404c–
`5(b)–(d) (2019) (QDIA notices); §2520.104b–1(c) (regulating
`electronic disclosure). This notice broke down the percent-
`ages at which his 401(k) fund was invested in stocks, bonds,
`hedge funds, and commodities. See App. 236. In 2012, he
`
`received a summary plan description explaining that the
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
`1Specifically the Intel Global Diversified Fund, in which his retirement
`
`contribution plan was automatically invested, and the Intel Target Date
`
`2045 Fund, which he chose for his 401(k) plan.
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`Opinion of the Court
`funds were invested in stocks and alternative assets, id., at
`227, and referring him to other documents—called fund fact
`
`sheets—with the percentages in graphical form. See 29
`U. S. C. §§1022, 1024(b) (summary plan descriptions); see
`
`also App. 307 (June 2012 fact sheet for his 401(k) plan
`fund); id., at 338 (June 2012 fact sheet for his retirement
`
`contribution plan fund); id., at 277–340 (other fact sheets
`provided during his tenure at Intel). Also in 2012, he re-
`ceived e-mails directing him to annual disclosures that pe-
`titioners provided for both his plans, which showed the un-
`derlying funds’ return rates and again directed him to the
`
`NetBenefits site for further information. See 29 CFR
`§2550.404a–5; see also App. 242–243 (retirement contribu-
`
`tion plan annual disclosure); id., at 250–251 (401(k) plan
`
`annual disclosure).
`
`Petitioners submitted records showing that Sulyma vis-
`ited the NetBenefits site repeatedly during his employ-
`ment. Id., at 258–276. But he testified in his deposition
`that he did not “remember reviewing” the above disclosures
`during his tenure. Id., at 175; see also id., at 183, 193, 196–
`197. He also stated in a declaration that he was “unaware”
`while working at Intel “that the monies that [he] had in-
`vested through the Intel retirement plans had been in-
`
`vested in hedge funds or private equity.” Id., at 212. He
`recalled reviewing only account statements sent to him by
`
`mail, which directed him to the NetBenefits site and noted
`
`that his plans were invested in “short-term/other” assets
`but did not specify which. See, e.g., id., at 375.
`
`The District Court granted summary judgment to peti-
`tioners under §1113(2), reasoning that “[i]t would be im-
`proper to allow Sulyma’s claims to survive merely because
`he did not look further into the disclosures made to him.”
`2017 WL 1217185, *9 (ND Cal., Mar. 31, 2017). The Ninth
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`Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)
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`Opinion of the Court
`Circuit reversed. As relevant here,2 the court construed “ac-
`tual knowledge” to mean “what it says: knowledge that is
`actual, not merely a possible inference from ambiguous cir-
`cumstances.” 909 F. 3d 1069, 1076 (2018) (internal quota-
`tion marks omitted). Although Sulyma “had sufficient in-
`formation available to him to know about the allegedly
`imprudent investments” more than three years before filing
`suit, the court held that his testimony created a dispute as
`to when he actually gained that knowledge. Id., at 1077.
`
`Several Circuits have likewise construed §1113(2) to re-
`quire “knowledge that is actual,” id., at 1076, but one has
`
`construed it to require only proof of sufficient disclosure.3
`We granted certiorari, 587 U. S. ___ (2019), to resolve
`whether the phrase “actual knowledge” does in fact mean
`
`“what it says,” 909 F. 3d, at 1076, and hold that it does.
`
`II
`A
`
`“We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory lan-
`
`guage” in ERISA, as in any statute, “according to its terms.”
`
`Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251
`(2010). Although ERISA does not define the phrase “actual
`knowledge,” its meaning is plain. Dictionaries are hardly
`necessary to confirm the point, but they do. When Congress
`
`
`
`
`
`——————
` 2The court also addressed the separate question of what exactly a
`
`
` plaintiff must actually know about a defendant’s conduct and the rele-
` vant law in order for §1113(2) to apply. That question is not before us
`
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` and we do not address it.
`
`
` 3Compare Caputo v. Pfizer, Inc., 267 F. 3d 181, 194 (CA2 2001); Reich
` v. Lancaster, 55 F. 3d 1034, 1056–1057 (CA5 1995); Gluck v. Unisys
`
`
` Corp., 960 F. 2d 1168, 1176 (CA3 1992); Radiology Center, S. C., v. Stifel,
`
`
`Nicolaus & Co., 919 F. 2d 1216, 1222 (CA7 1990); Brock v. Nellis, 809
`
`
` F. 2d 753, 754–755 (CA11 1987), with Brown v. Owens Corning Invest-
` ment Review Comm., 622 F. 3d 564, 571 (CA6 2010) (“Actual knowledge
`
`
`
` does not require proof that the individual Plaintiffs actually saw or read
`the documents that disclosed the allegedly harmful investments” (inter-
`nal quotation marks omitted)).
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`INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA
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`Opinion of the Court
`passed ERISA, the word “actual” meant what it means to-
`day: “existing in fact or reality.” Webster’s Seventh New
`
`Collegiate Dictionary 10 (1967); accord, Merriam-Webster’s
`
`Collegiate Dictionary 13 (11th ed. 2005) (same); see also
`
`American Heritage Dictionary 14 (1973) (“In existence;
`real; factual”); id., at 18 (5th ed. 2011) (“Existing in reality
`and not potential, possible, simulated, or false”). So did the
`word “knowledge,” which meant and still means “the fact or
`condition of being aware of something.” Webster’s Seventh
`New Collegiate Dictionary 469 (1967); accord, Merriam-
`
`Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 691 (2005) (same); see also
`American Heritage Dictionary 725 (1973) (“Familiarity,
`awareness, or understanding gained through experience or
`
`study”); id., at 973 (2011) (same). Thus, to have “actual
`
`
`knowledge” of a piece of information, one must in fact be
`aware of it.
`
`
`Legal dictionaries give “actual knowledge” the same
`meaning: “[r]eal knowledge as distinguished from pre-
`sumed knowledge or knowledge imputed to one.” Ballen-
`tine’s Law Dictionary 24 (3d ed. 1969); accord, Black’s Law
`Dictionary 1043
`(11th ed. 2019)
`(defining
`“actual
`knowledge” as “[d]irect and clear knowledge, as distin-
`guished from constructive knowledge”).4 The qualifier “ac-
`tual” creates that distinction. In everyday speech, “actual
`
`knowledge” might seem redundant; one who claims
`——————
` 4Petitioners cite this dictionary’s somewhat puzzling second definition
`
`of “actual knowledge,” which it dubs “implied actual knowledge”:
`
`“[k]nowledge of information that would lead a reasonable person to in-
`
`quire further.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1043 (11th ed. 2019). Not even
`
`this entry, however, appears to equate “implied actual knowledge” with
`“actual knowledge” as normally understood. It instead proceeds to ref-
`
`
`erence the common-law “discovery rule,” ibid., under which a limitations
`
`period begins when “the plaintiff discovers (or reasonably should have
`discovered) the injury giving rise to the claim,” id., at 585 (emphasis
`
`added); see also Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 646 (2010). As
`
`we noted in Merck, that rule is broader than “actual knowledge.” Id.,
`at 647.
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`Opinion of the Court
`“knowledge” of a topic likely means to suggest that he actu-
`ally knows a thing or two about it. But the law will some-
`
`times
`impute knowledge—often called “constructive”
`knowledge—to a person who fails to learn something that a
`reasonably diligent person would have learned. See id., at
`
`1043. Similarly, we held in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559
`
`U. S. 633 (2010), that the word “discovery,” when used in a
`statute of limitations without qualification, “encompasses
`
`not only those facts the plaintiff actually knew, but also
`those facts a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have
`known.” Id., at 648. The addition of “actual” in §1113(2)
`
`signals that the plaintiff ’s knowledge must be more than
`
`“potential, possible, virtual, conceivable, theoretical, hypo-
`
`thetical, or nominal.” Black’s Law Dictionary 53 (4th ed.
`
`1951). Indeed, in Merck, we cited §1113(2) as evidence of
`the “linguistic distinction” between “‘actual knowledge’”
`and the “hypothetical” knowledge that a reasonably diligent
`plaintiff would have. 559 U. S., at 646–647 (quoting
`§1113(2); emphasis in original).
`
`Congress has drawn the same distinction elsewhere in
`ERISA. Multiple provisions contain alternate 6-year and 3-
`year limitations periods, with the 6-year period beginning
`at “the date on which the cause of action arose” and the 3-
`year period starting at “the earliest date on which the plain-
`tiff acquired or should have acquired actual knowledge of
`the existence of such cause of action.” §§1303(e)(6), (f )(5)
`
`(emphasis added); accord, §§1370(f )(1)–(2), 1451(f )(1)–(2).
`
`
`
`ERISA also requires plaintiffs challenging the suspension
`of benefits under §1085 to do so within “one year after the
`earliest date on which the plaintiff acquired or should have
`acquired actual knowledge of the existence of such cause of
`
`action.” §1085(e)(9)(I)(iv). Thus, Congress has repeatedly
`
`drawn a “linguistic distinction” between what an ERISA
`
`plaintiff actually knows and what he should actually know.
`Merck, 559 U. S., at 647. And when Congress has included
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` INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA
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`Opinion of the Court
`both forms of knowledge in a provision limiting ERISA ac-
`
`tions, it has done so explicitly. We cannot assume that it
`meant to do so by implication in §1113(2). Instead we “gen-
`erally presum[e] that Congress acts intentionally and pur-
`posely when it includes particular language in one section
`of a statute but omits it in another.” BFP v. Resolution
`Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 537 (1994) (internal quo-
`tation marks omitted).
`
`Petitioners dispute the characterization of anything less
`than actual knowledge as constructive knowledge, arguing
`that the latter term usually refers to information that a
`plaintiff must seek out rather than information that is sent
`to him. But if a plaintiff is not aware of a fact, he does not
`have “actual knowledge” of that fact however close at hand
`the fact might be. §1113(2). And Congress has never added
`to §1113(2) the language it has used in other ERISA limita-
`tions provisions to encompass both what a plaintiff actually
`
`knows and what he reasonably could know.
`
`As presently written, therefore, §1113(2) requires more
`than evidence of disclosure alone. That all relevant infor-
`
`mation was disclosed to the plaintiff is no doubt relevant in
`
`judging whether he gained knowledge of that information.
`
`See Part III, infra. To meet §1113(2)’s “actual knowledge”
`requirement, however, the plaintiff must in fact have be-
`come aware of that information.
`B
`
`Petitioners offer arguments for a broader reading of
`§1113(2) based on text, context, purpose, and statutory his-
`tory. All founder on Congress’s choice of the word “actual.”
`
`As for text, petitioners do not dispute the normal defini-
`
`tions of “actual,” “knowledge,” or “actual knowledge.” They
`focus instead on the least conspicuous part of the phrase
`“had actual knowledge”: the word “had.” §1113(2). Once a
`plaintiff receives a disclosure, they argue, he “ha[s]” the
`knowledge that §1113(2) requires because he effectively
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`Opinion of the Court
`holds it in his hand. Ibid. In other words, he has the req-
`uisite knowledge because he could acquire it with reason-
`able effort. That turns §1113(2) into what it is plainly not:
`a constructive-knowledge requirement.
`
`Petitioners’ contextual argument fails for the same rea-
`
`son. As they point out, ERISA’s disclosure regime is meant
`to “ensur[e] that ‘the individual participant knows exactly
`where he stands with respect to the plan.’” Firestone Tire
`
`& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U. S. 101, 118 (1989) (quoting
`H. R. Rep. No. 93–533, p. 11 (1973)). This is the reason for
`
`ERISA’s requirements that disclosures be written for a lay
`audience. See, e.g., 29 U. S. C. §1022(a). Once plan admin-
`
`istrators satisfy their obligations to impart knowledge, pe-
`titioners say, §1113(2)’s knowledge requirement is satisfied
`too. But that is simply not what §1113(2) says. Unlike
`other ERISA
`limitations periods—which also
`form
`§1113(2)’s context—§1113(2) begins only when a plaintiff
`actually is aware of the relevant facts, not when he should
`
`be. And a given plaintiff will not necessarily be aware of all
`facts disclosed to him; even a reasonably diligent plaintiff
`
`would not know those facts immediately upon receiving the
`
`disclosure. Although “the words of a statute must be read
`
`in their context,” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489
`
`U. S. 803, 809 (1989), petitioners’ argument again gives the
`word “actual” little meaning at all.
`
`Petitioners also argue that §1113(2)’s plain meaning un-
`dermines its purpose of protecting plan administrators
`from suits over bygone investment decisions. If a plan par-
`ticipant can simply deny knowledge, they say, administra-
`tors will rarely get the benefit of §1113(2). But even if this
`is true, as it may well be, we cannot say that heeding the
`clear meaning of the word “actual” renders the statute so
`“‘[in]coherent’” that it must be disregarded. Kingdomware
`Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016)
`(slip op., at 8).
`
`
`For one thing, plan participants are not the only potential
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` INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA
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`Opinion of the Court
`plaintiffs subject to §1113. The Secretary of Labor, for ex-
`
`ample, may also sue imprudent fiduciaries for the benefit of
`
`plan participants. See §1132(a)(2). And the United States
`
`represents that the Secretary will have a hard time doing
`so within §1113(2)’s timeframe if deemed to have actual
`
`knowledge of the facts contained in the many reports that
`the Department receives from ERISA plans each year. See
`
`Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27–28. Moreover,
`the statute’s repose period will still protect defendants from
`
`suits filed more than six years after the alleged breach. See
`
`§1113(1).
`
`Petitioners may well be correct that heeding the plain
`meaning of §1113(2) substantially diminishes the protec-
`
`tion that it provides for ERISA fiduciaries, but by the same
`
`token, petitioners’ interpretation would greatly reduce
`§1113(1)’s value for beneficiaries, given the disclosure re-
`gime that petitioners themselves emphasize. Choosing be-
`
`tween these alternatives is a task for Congress, and we
`must assume that the language of §1113(2) reflects Con-
`gress’s choice. If policy considerations suggest that the cur-
`rent scheme should be altered, Congress must be the one to
`do it. See, e.g., Azar v. Allina Health Services, 587 U. S. ___,
`
`___ (2019).
`
`Finally, petitioners argue that the plain meaning of “ac-
`tual knowledge” renders an earlier version of §1113(2) inco-
`herent. As originally enacted, the §1113(2) limitations pe-
`riod began either when the plaintiff gained actual
`
`knowledge of the alleged breach or when “a report from
`which [the plaintiff] could reasonably be expected to have
`obtained knowledge . . . was filed with” the Secretary of La-
`bor. 29 U. S. C. §1113(2) (1976 ed.). That latter, construc-
`tive-knowledge clause was later repealed. See Omnibus
`Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, §9342(b), 101 Stat.
`
`
`1330–371. According to petitioners, if “actual knowledge”
`
`means what it says, then the original version of §1113(2)
`charged plan participants with learning what was sent to
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` 11
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` Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)
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`Opinion of the Court
`the Secretary but not what was sent to them.
`
`The version at issue here, however, is the current one—
`
`from which Congress removed any mention of constructive
`knowledge. “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we
`presume it intends its amendment to have real and sub-
`stantial effect.” Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
`
`542 U. S. 241, 258–259 (2004) (internal quotation marks
`omitted). Section 1113(2)’s history thus more readily sug-
`
`gests that the current version does in fact require actual
`knowledge.
`
`
`
`
`III
`
`
`Nothing in this opinion forecloses any of the “usual ways”
`to prove actual knowledge at any stage in the litigation.
`Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 842 (1994). Plaintiffs
`who recall reading particular disclosures will of course be
`
`bound by oath to say so in their depositions. On top of that,
`actual knowledge can be proved through “inference from
`circumstantial evidence.” Ibid.; see also Staples v. United
`
`
`States, 511 U. S. 600, 615–616, n. 11 (1994) (“[K]nowledge
`can be inferred from circumstantial evidence”). Evidence of
`disclosure would no doubt be relevant, as would electronic
`records showing that a plaintiff viewed the relevant disclo-
`sures and evidence suggesting that the plaintiff took action
`in response to the information contained in them. And
`though, “[a]t the summary judgment stage, facts must be
`viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,”
`that is true “only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those
`facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting
`Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c)).
`If a plaintiff ’s denial of
`
`
`knowledge is “blatantly contradicted by the record,” “a court
`should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of
`
`ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” 550 U. S.,
`at 380.
`
`
`Today’s opinion also does not preclude defendants from
`contending that evidence of “willful blindness” supports a
`
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` 12
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` INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA
`
`Opinion of the Court
` finding of “actual knowledge.” Cf. Global-Tech Appliances,
`Inc. v. SEB S. A., 563 U. S. 754, 769 (2011).
`In the case before us, however, petitioners do not argue
`
`
`that “actual knowledge” is established in any of these ways,
`only that they need not offer any such proof. And that is
`incorrect.
`
`
`
`
`*
`*
`For these reasons, we affirm.
`
`
`
`*
`
`It is so ordered.
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`