`
`3511 the $upreme QEuurt at the @Hniteh $tate§
`
`STATE OF GEORGIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS,
`
`U.
`
`PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC.
`
`0N PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
`
`TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`
`FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
`
`REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
`
`ANTHONY B. ASKEW
`
`JOHN P. ELWOOD
`
`LISA C. PAVENTO
`
`JOSHUA S. JOHNSON
`
`MEUNIER CARLIN &
`CURFMAN LLC
`
`Counsel of Record
`MATTHEW X. ETCHEMENDY
`
`.999 Peachtree St. NE,
`
`VINSON & ELKINS LLP
`
`2200 Pennsylvania Ave.,
`NW, Suite 500 West
`
`Washington, DC 20037
`(202) 63.9- 6623
`joshjohnson@velaw. com
`
`Suite 1300
`Atlanta, GA 30309
`
`(404) 645- 7700
`
`DANIEL R. ORTIZ
`
`UNIVERSITY OF
`
`VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF
`
`LAW SUPREME COURT
`
`LITIGATION CLINIC
`
`580 Massie Road
`
`Charlottesville, VA
`22903
`
`
`
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page
`
`Table Of Authorities ................................................... II
`
`A. The Split Is Real ..................................................... 2
`
`B. The “Very Wrong” Decision Below Demands
`Review ..................................................................... 7
`
`C. This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle For
`
`Addressing An Important Question .................... 11
`
`Conclusion .................................................................. 12
`
`(I)
`
`
`
`II
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Cases:
`
`Page(s)
`
`American Soc’y for Testing & Materials v.
`Public.Resource. Org, Inc. ,
`896 F.3d 437 (DC. Cir. 2018) .............................. 10
`
`Banks v. Manchester,
`128 U.S. 244 (1888) ................................................ 5
`
`Callaghan v. Myers,
`128 U.S. 617 (1888) ................................................ 9
`
`CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt.
`Reports, Inc.,
`44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994) ........................................ 5
`
`Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
`490 U.S. 730 (1989) ................................................ 2
`
`County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate
`Sols.,
`261 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001) ................................ 4, 5
`
`Eldred v. Ashcroft,
`537 U.S. 186 (2003) ................................................ 3
`
`Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,
`510 U.S. 517 (1994) ................................................ 2
`
`Howell v. Miller,
`91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898) .................................... 3, 4
`
`Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n,
`121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997) .................................. 5
`
`Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
`376 U.S. 225 (1964) ................................................ 1
`
`Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc.,
`402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005) .................................. 1
`
`
`
`III
`
`Cases—Continued:
`
`Page(s)
`
`Southern Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc. v. Veeck,
`539 U.S. 969 (2003) ................................................ 5
`
`Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc.,
`293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) .............................. 5, 6
`
`Wheaton v. Peters,
`33 U.S. 591 (1834) .................................................. 9
`
`Statutes:
`
`17 U.S.C. § 107 ............................................................. 3
`
`1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 8 ................................................ 4
`
`Other Authorities:
`
`1 Alexander Lindey & Michael Landau, Lindey
`on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts
`(3d ed. 2019) ....................................................... 2, 8
`
`Copyright Law Revision: Studies Prepared for
`the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and
`Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the
`Judiciary, Study No. 33, 86th Cong., 2d
`Sess. (1961) ........................................................... 10
`
`U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U. S.
`Copyright Office Practices (3d ed. 2017) ................ 9
`
`
`
`REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
`
`Respondent PRO, petitioners, and a diverse array
`of amici (including eight states) agree: This case
`presents an “excellent vehicle” in an “ideal” procedural
`posture to address the “confusion and perceived
`inconsistency among the lower courts” regarding the
`scope of the “judge-made common law doctrine[]” that
`government
`edicts
`are
`ineligible
`for
`copyright
`protection—an issue of unquestioned “significance.”
`Br.
`in Opp.
`(“BIO”)
`1,
`13-14,
`28.
`As PRO
`acknowledges, this Court’s review is “sorely needed.”
`Id. at 9.
`
`for
`request
`Despite acquiescing in petitioners’
`review, PRO fruitlessly labors to distinguish this case
`from others in the circuit split. PRO’s hairsplitting
`efforts
`to draw factual distinctions
`ignore
`the
`reasoning underlying the courts of appeals’ decisions
`and provide no basis for reconciling them with the
`Eleventh Circuit’s decision here.
`Indeed, PRO
`ultimately concedes that “the courts of appeals diverge
`in their approaches to applying the government edicts
`doctrine.” BIO 14. The result: “case law is confusing
`and outcomes are difficult to predict.” Id. at 9.
`
`Such disagreement among the courts of appeals is
`“particularly troublesome in the realm of copyright.”
`Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890
`(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co.
`v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964) (noting “[t]he
`purpose of Congress to have national uniformity in
`* * * copyright laws”). Given “Congress’ paramount
`goal * * * of enhancing predictability and certainty of
`copyright ownership,” Community for Creative Non-
`
`(1)
`
`
`
`2
`
`is
`Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989), “it
`peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright
`law be demarcated as clearly as possible,” Fogerty v.
`Fantasy,
`Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994); see also
`Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n (“SIIA”) Amicus Br. 4-6.
`As the numerous briefs before this Court demonstrate,
`
`there is a widespread consensus that this Court’s
`nineteenth-century case law on the government edicts
`doctrine has generated “uncertainty” regarding the
`scope of copyright protection, “ma[king] it difficult * * *
`to know [one’s] rights and obligations.” BIO 1, 10. The
`doctrine has proven “difficult to apply” where, as here,
`“a work does not fall neatly into a category,
`like
`statutes or judicial opinions, already held to be”
`uncopyrightable. Id. at 9; accord id. at 1 (“lower courts
`have struggled”).
`
`As even respondent and its amici urge, this Court
`should grant review to resolve that confusion. And it
`should reverse the Eleventh Circuit’s “very wrong”
`decision.
`1 Alexander Lindey & Michael Landau,
`Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts
`§ 125.30 cmt. (3d ed. 2019).
`
`A.
`
`The Split Is Real
`
`PRO’s suggestion that “there is no square circuit
`split” (BIO 1) would come as a surprise to the Eleventh
`Circuit, which recognized that while some courts of
`appeals have “extended” the government edicts
`doctrine, others “have declined to extend the rule in
`
`other, related contexts.” Pet. App. 17a. PRO’s amici
`similarly acknowledge “division among the circuits” on
`the question presented. R St. Inst. Amicus Br. 5. And
`PRO’s labored, nine-page discussion of the split makes
`clear that its purported distinction between a “square
`
`
`
`3
`
`circuit split” and one that “might as well” exist (BIO 1)
`rests on little more than identifying factual differences
`among cases that lack legal or practical relevance.
`Even PRO cannot deny that “the courts of appeals
`diverge
`in
`their
`approaches
`to
`applying the
`government edicts doctrine, sufficient to justify review
`in this Court.” Id. at 14-15. PRO also admits that the
`
`“confusion and perceived inconsistency among the
`lower courts has made it difficult * * * to know [one’s]
`rights and obligations.”
`Id. at 1.
`“[T]his Court’s
`intervention is * * * sorely needed” (id. at 9) to restore
`the certainty and national uniformity required for
`copyright law to achieve its constitutionally rooted
`objective
`of
`promoting
`“the
`proliferation
`of
`knowledge,” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18
`(2003) (citation omitted); see also pp. 1-2, supra.1
`
`In any event, PRO’s efforts to minimize the split
`and cast doubt on whether “any court of appeals would
`decide this case differently” (BIO 14-15) are meritless.
`PRO’s treatment of Justice Harlan’s opinion in Howell
`v. Miller, 91 F. 129 (6th Cir. 1898), exemplifies its
`futile parsing of the circuit split. PRO contends the
`OCGA and the annotated code book in Howell “are not
`
`similar in the relevant sense” because “Howell did not
`
`1 Because the fair-use defense presupposes the existence of a
`“copyrighted work,” 17 U.S.C. § 107, the potential availability of
`fair-use defenses in appropriate cases (see BIO 22-23) does not
`militate against granting review to resolve the disagreement
`among courts of appeals on the threshold question of the scope of
`the government edicts doctrine’s rule of copyright ineligibility.
`See Pet. 35 n.11. Furthermore, there is no basis for PRO’s con-
`tention that its online publication of the entirety of 186 OCGA
`volumes and supplements constitutes fair use. See Pet. App. 8a-
`9a, 65a-7 2a.
`
`
`
`4
`
`publish his annotations under the authority of the
`state.” BIO 20. But the state did not merely “assign[]
`some evidentiary effect to [Howell’s] volumes.” Ibid.
`The legislature provided that Howell’s annotated code
`book “shall be received and admitted * * * as evidence
`
`of the existing laws *** with the like effect as if
`published under and by the authority of the State.”
`1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 8 (emphasis added).
`PRO
`identifies nothing in copyright law that could reconcile
`(1)
`the Sixth Circuit’s
`recognition of copyright
`protection for annotations in a code book that state law
`mandated be treated “with the like effect as if
`
`published under and by the authority of the State,” see
`Howell, 91 F. at 138, and (2) the Eleventh Circuit’s
`denial
`of
`copyright protection for
`annotations
`produced by a private publisher under a work-made-
`for-hire agreement with the state.
`
`In discussing other cases, PRO similarly invokes
`factual distinctions, but never meaningfully explains
`their legal significance. PRO points to nothing in the
`Copyright Act or this Court’s precedents that would
`grant copyright protection to government-created
`maps that “clarified county residents’ duty to pay
`property tax,”2 while withholding it from annotations
`that merely provide references for researchers. Nor
`does PRO identify any copyright-law principle that
`would justify according Georgia’s annotations less
`protection than a work approved by state regulators
`
`2 BIO 16 (discussing County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate
`Sols., 261 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001)).
`
`
`
`5
`
`“as a legal standard for [insurance] valuation,”3 or a
`medical coding system a government agency requires
`to be used in reimbursement applications.4
`
`PRO is also wrong in suggesting (BIO 17) that the
`Fifth Circuit
`in Veeck v. Southern Building Code
`Congress International, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (2002) (en
`banc), did not depart from the Second and Ninth
`Circuits’
`analytic
`framework
`for
`identifying
`uncopyrightable government edicts. The Second and
`Ninth Circuits interpret Banks v. Manchester, 128
`U.S. 244 (1888), as instructing courts to consider
`incentives for authorship and the need for public
`notice of the law. See County of Suffolk, 261 F.3d at
`193-194; Practice Mgmt., 121 F.3d at 518-519. Veeck,
`however,
`“reject[ed]”
`such
`a
`“bifurcated
`* * *
`interpretation of Banks” and expressly disagreed with
`County of Suffolk and Practice Management, which the
`Veeck majority believed had wrongly “identified the
`consideration of authorship incentives as a ‘holding’ of
`Banks.” Veeck, 293 F.3d at 7 96-800; see also id. at 814
`& n.19 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (majority’s analysis
`“inconsistent” with County of Suffolk and Practice
`Management); U.S. Amicus Br. at 12, Southern Bldg.
`Code Cong. Int’l, Inc. v. Veeck, 539 U.S. 969 (2003)
`(mem.) (No. 02-355) (Veeck U.S. Br.) (“some of the
`reasoning in [Practice Management] differs” from
`Veeck).
`Instead, Veeck calls for a bright-line inquiry
`
`3 BIO 20-21 (quoting 000 Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter
`Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 74 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis omit-
`ted)).
`
`4 See BIO 21-22 (discussing Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am.
`Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (1997), amended, 133 F.3d 1140 (9th
`Cir. 1998)).
`
`
`
`6
`
`into whether a work is “obligatory in law.” Veeck, 293
`F.3d at 805.
`
`In addition to being wrong, PRO’s attempted
`muddling of the disagreement between the Fifth
`Circuit and the Second and Ninth Circuits provides no
`basis for denying review. PRO concedes (BIO 15) that
`no other court of appeals has employed the analytic
`framework the Eleventh Circuit adopted here, which
`considers “the identity of the public officials who
`created the work, the authoritativeness of the work,
`and the process by which the work was created.” Pet.
`App. 3a-4a. Based on those factors, the Eleventh
`Circuit concluded that the OCGA’s annotations were
`
`“sufficiently law-like” to be “attributable to the
`constructive authorship of the People,” and thus
`uncopyrightable. Id. at 24a-26a.
`
`As petitioners have explained, Georgia would
`prevail under any other circuit’s approach. Pet. 22-24.
`If, as Veeck concluded, the relevant inquiry is simply
`whether the work at issue constitutes “the law,” 293
`F.3d at 800, Georgia’s annotations are copyrightable
`because it is undisputed that they do “not hav[e] the
`force of law,” Pet. App. 26a; cf. Veeck, 293 F.3d at 806
`(suggesting
`annotations
`to model
`code
`are
`copyrightable, even if model code has been “enacted
`into law”).5 To the extent economic incentives are
`
`5 PRO erroneously suggests the annotations here “comprehen-
`sively govern a very broad range of primary conduct” and
`“expressly regulate an entire area of private endeavor.” BIO 19
`(quoting Veeck U.S. Br. 11); accord id. at 21-22. To the contrary:
`the annotations do not “govern” or “regulate” anything. PRO else-
`where acknowledges “the annotations do not carry the force of
`law.” Id. at 6; see also PRO C.A. Br. 21 (“No one disputes that the
`
`
`
`7
`
`relevant, PRO does not dispute that the absence of
`copyright protection would remove Lexis’s incentive to
`continue its current contract with Georgia, which
`allows
`the state to provide its citizens with a
`reasonably priced annotated code at minimal cost to
`taxpayers. See BIO 17 -18.6 As for notice concerns, it
`is undisputed that Georgia’s unannotated statutes—
`the actual law—are available online, and the OCGA is
`publicly available at over 60 sites throughout Georgia.
`Pet. App. 7a-8a.
`
`B.
`
`The “Very Wrong” Decision Below De-
`mands Review
`
`Because they cannot prevail on the actual question
`presented here, PRO and some of its amici try to
`change the subject. But the question is not, as some
`PRO amici
`claim, whether
`“the
`law can be
`copyrighted.”
`Next-Generation Legal Research
`Platforms Amicus Br. 6 (Next-Generation Amicus Br.).
`Nor is it, as PRO contends, “whether Georgia’s only
`official code is an edict of government that cannot be
`copyrighted, because the law belongs to the People.”
`BIO 1. As the Eleventh Circuit and PRO acknowledge,
`see Pet. App. 8a; BIO 6, 13, Georgia does not claim
`
`General Assembly does not individually enact the annotations as
`laws”). PRO is also wrong in asserting that an annotation of a
`vacated federal district court decision accompanying OCGA § 1-
`1-1 is “labeled as Code Commission Guidance.” BIO 7; cf. Appel-
`lant’s C.A. App. 90 (annotation lacks label).
`
`6 Although it is costless for a California corporation like PRO to
`urge Georgia to “ensure the publication of the OCGA by creating
`it using its own staff or by paying Lexis,” BIO 18, that approach
`would require diverting scarce state resources from other priori-
`ties or increasing taxes on Georgia residents.
`
`
`
`8
`
`copyright in the actual law—the OCGA’s statutory
`text. Through its contract with Lexis, Georgia makes
`its statutes freely available online. Pet. App. 7a. That
`website is text searchable and includes statutory text,
`numbering, and captions, as well as history lines
`explaining when statutes were enacted and revised.
`Anders Ganten Aff. 1H] 8-9 (June 27, 2016), ECF No.
`38-1. If PRO or others are dissatisfied with Lexis’s free
`
`website, they can republish the OCGA’s statutory text
`in whatever format they see fit.
`Indeed, PRO could
`take pages
`from bound OCGA volumes,
`redact
`substantive information beyond the statutory text and
`numbering, and then publish those redacted pages
`online.
`
`Instead, PRO has published the entirety of 186
`OCGA volumes
`and
`supplements,
`including
`annotations that all agree are not the law, and in
`which Georgia claims copyright. Properly stated, the
`question presented here
`is
`thus whether
`the
`government
`edicts
`doctrine’s
`rule
`of
`copyright
`ineligibility extends to works that, like the OCGA’s
`annotations, lack the force of law. Pet. I.
`
`PRO offers little in defense of the merits of the
`
`1 Lindey &
`Eleventh Circuit’s “very wrong” decision.
`Landau § 125.30
`cmt. While petitioners have
`explained how a straightforward application of the
`Copyright
`Act’s
`plain
`text
`establishes
`the
`copyrightability of the OCGA’s annotations, Pet. 24-
`25, PRO makes no meaningful effort to ground the
`Eleventh Circuit’s decision in the Act’s text, instead
`effectively conceding it relied on “judge-made common
`law,” BIO 28. PRO also does not dispute that the
`decision
`below conflicts with well-established
`
`
`
`9
`
`the
`Copyright Office guidance, which supports
`copyrightability of Georgia’s annotations.7 See U.S.
`Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright
`Office Practices §§ 313.6(C)(2), 717.1 (3d ed. 2017).
`
`As for PRO’s discussion of this Court’s precedents,
`see BIO 23-27, PRO never identifies any copyright-law
`principle
`that would explain why the official,
`government-paid reporters in Wheaton v. Peters, 33
`U.S. 591 (1834), and Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617
`(1888), could hold copyrights in their annotations of
`judicial opinions, but Georgia cannot hold a copyright
`in the OCGA’s annotations (including annotations
`summarizing judicial decisions). See Callaghan, 128
`U.S. at 646-650 (discussing Wheaton and Callaghan
`reporters’ compensation); see also SIIA Amicus Br. 11
`(comparing Callaghan
`headnotes with OCGA
`annotations).
`Indeed,
`the very Copyright-Office-
`sponsored study PRO cites (BIO 29-30) explains that
`nineteenth-century case law held that while “laws,
`court decisions, governmental rules, etc.,
`[were] not
`subject
`to copyright,” “other material prepared for
`State Governments by their employees,” including
`“annotations,” were “copyrightable on behalf of the
`
`7 Although PRO asserts that “Petitioners’ applications to regis-
`ter copyright” in “recent [OCGA] editions” have “languished,”
`BIO 29, the Copyright Office has registered copyrights in the
`OCGA’s 2016 and 2017 cumulative supplements. Registration
`Nos. TX0008253115 (Aug. 9, 2016), TX0008520098 (Aug. 4, 2017).
`
`Given the Copyright Office’s well-established guidance support-
`ing the copyrightability of annotations like Georgia’s, and the
`universal agreement among the diverse assortment of parties and
`amici here that the Court should grant review, there is no need
`to invite the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the gov-
`ernment’s views.
`
`
`
`10
`
`States.” Copyright Law Revision: Studies Prepared for
`the
`Subcomm.
`on Patents, Trademarks,
`and
`Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Study
`No. 33, at 28-29, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1961). The
`study concluded that “no compelling reason” existed
`“to withdraw from the States the privilege they have
`exercised for many years of securing copyright in some
`of
`their publications,” and noted that copyright
`protection made possible the very type of arrangement
`Georgia has with Lexis—i.e., “giv[ing] exclusive rights
`to a private publisher to induce [it] to print and publish
`* * * material[s] at [its] own expense.” Id. at 36.
`
`PRO’s and its amici’s merits arguments only
`highlight the current “confusion” over the government
`edicts doctrine. BIO 1. Is the doctrine founded on “the
`
`First Amendment” (R St. Inst. Amicus Br. 9), “Due
`Process” (BIO 34), “the Rule of Law” (ibid.), “the
`concept of popular sovereignty” (Pet. App. 35a), “the
`nature of law in a democratic society” (id. at 19a), or—
`as one might expect in a copyright case, see Pet. 3—
`the Copyright Act’s text? No one seems to know for
`sure. See Pet. App. 12a (government edicts doctrine’s
`“foundations * * * are far from clear”); cf. American
`Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org,
`Inc., 896 F.3d 437, 458-459 (DC. Cir. 2018) (Katsas,
`J ., concurring) (discussing “possible grounds” on which
`doctrine “might rest”). As PRO urges,
`this Court
`“should grant certiorari to clarify, authoritatively, how
`courts should analyze whether a given work is an
`uncopyrightable government edict.” BIO 2.
`
`
`
`11
`
`C.
`
`This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle For Ad-
`
`dressing An Important Question
`
`regarding this
`There is widespread agreement
`case’s “significance.” BIO 14; see also States Amicus
`Br. 3 (“profound importance”); R St. Inst. Amicus Br. 5
`(“exceptionally important”); Next-Generation Amicus
`Br. 5 (same). About one-third of states claim copyright
`in annotations to their statutes. See BIO 11-12; Next-
`Generation Amicus Br. 20; SIIA Amicus Br. 15-16;
`States Amicus Br. 4; Pet. 34-35. Eight state amici
`(which have every reason to try to cabin the decision
`below to protect their own copyright claims) have
`explained that
`the Eleventh Circuit’s
`reasoning
`“would likely invalidate the copyrights in all” official
`annotated state codes nationwide.
`States Amicus
`
`Br. 4. By clouding the copyright incentives on which
`states
`like Georgia
`rely to produce
`statutory
`annotations at minimal
`cost
`to taxpayers,
`the
`Eleventh Circuit’s decision “threaten[s] the continued
`production of official annotated state codes,” id. at 1,
`thus calling into question the continued “public
`availability
`of
`high-quality
`legal
`analysis
`in
`jurisdictions spanning the country,” SIIA Amicus
`Br. 16; accord Matthew Bender Amicus Br. 10-16.
`
`Without sales of copyright-protected annotated codes,
`companies like Lexis also would not agree to publish
`unannotated statutes for free online. See Matthew
`
`Bender Amicus Br. 15. And by exacerbating the
`uncertainty
`regarding
`the
`government
`edicts
`doctrine’s
`scope,
`the
`decision
`below
`risks
`“discourag[ing] * * * invest[ments] in the production”
`of a wide range of “law-adjacent works,” SIIA Amicus
`
`
`
`12
`
`Br. 12, from industry standards, to model codes, to
`legal treatises and restatements of the law.
`
`PRO also agrees that this case is an “excellent
`vehicle” in an “ideal” procedural posture, with “no
`disputed or murky factual questions.” BIO 13-14.
`Although PRO in passing suggests the possibility of
`“disputes over the meaning of state law,” it does not
`identify any descriptions of Georgia law in the petition
`with which it disagrees, or that it views as diverging
`from the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation.
`Id. at 5
`n.1, 14 n.3; cf. Sup. Ct. R. 15.2 (“obligation * * * to point
`out
`in the brief in opposition * * * any perceived
`misstatement made in the petition”). The plain text of
`the limited state statutory language relevant here
`speaks for itself. See Pet. 7-8. And the state-law
`principle that gives rise to the question presented—
`i.e., that the OCGA’s annotations lack “the force of
`
`law”—is undisputed. Pet. App. 26a; BIO 6. This Court
`can resolve that question without addressing any
`contested state-law issues.
`
`CONCLUSION
`
`The petition should be granted.
`
`
`
`13
`
`Respectfully submitted.
`
`ANTHONY B. ASKEW
`
`JOHN P. ELWOOD
`
`LISA C. PAVENTO
`
`JOSHUA S. JOHNSON
`
`Counsel of Record
`MATTHEW X. ETCHEMENDY
`
`VINSON & ELKINS LLP
`
`2200 Pennsylvania Ave.,
`NW, Suite 500 West
`
`Washington, DC 20037
`(202) 639-6623
`joshjohnson@velaw.com
`
`MEUNIER CARLIN &
`
`CURFMAN LLC
`
`.999 Peachtree St. NE,
`Suite 1300
`
`Atlanta, GA 30309
`
`(404) 645- 7700
`
`DANIEL R. ORTIZ
`
`UNIVERSITY OF
`
`VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF
`
`LAW SUPREME COURT
`
`LITIGATION CLINIC
`
`580 Massie Road
`
`Charlottesville, VA
`22903
`
`MAY 2019
`
`